







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THE
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CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

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THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1860.

No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*The Elements of Political Science.* In two Books. Book I. On Method. Book II. On Doctrine. By PATRICK EDWARD DOVE. Author of the *Theory of Human Progression*. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter, 1854.

THIS publication is not a very recent one; but it is quite new to us, and we have read it with considerable interest. The author is evidently a conscientious and religious man, and, we may add, a ready writer. He expresses very well what he clearly thinks, and his courage, in presenting his views, is much more obvious than his skill in ordering his thoughts, or his patience in reflecting on their correctness. We regard his book as a very useful study for those who wish to classify their ideas on many difficult portions of the form and substance of political philosophy; not, however, because of what is true in the book, for that is very simple; but because of the mental skill which may be obtained by seeking out and exposing to one's self its abounding logical vices, and its philosophical and political heresies. We cannot undertake to point these out in detail, for that can be more profitably done by each reader for himself; and our task can be much more acceptably performed by limiting ourselves chiefly to the fundamental conception of the whole work, its aprioral and abstract deductive method.

It will, however, facilitate this our principal undertaking, if we first expose a few of the author's conclusions; for this will not only prove that his premises or argument must be wrong, but it will aid us in showing the illegitimacy of the abstract deductive method in any such science.

It might be expected that, as such a science cannot move a step without definitions, we should begin by discussing those of the author. But we do not find any that seem to be used in the structure of the author's system. Indeed he tells us that all the most essential conceptions of political science are indefinable, as equity, justice, duty, crime, right, wrong, property, value. True, these words have often been defined, and he does not prove the definitions false. In one instance he attempts it, and we may look to see if he has succeeded. He takes Archbishop Whately's definition of value, as a capacity of being given and received in exchange, and pronounces it wrong because the thrust of a sword may be given and received in exchange, and a wife, though of value, cannot be. But this criticism is a mere play upon the words; four of them being used in the criticism in a perverted sense. Change the form thus—value, in political economy, is a word expressive of the relation of equality in the market of different objects of traffic—and then the criticism falls. The author's readers will look in vain for a science built upon definitions, and we must be content to accept the book as we find it.

It is quite obvious that the main purpose of the book is to prove that, according to natural law, no individual can have any right to an inheritable estate in land. His argument is quite summary, pp. 119, 170, 254; that, because the earth is the gift of God to all living men alike, therefore each man has a right to his share of it while he lives, according to a division to be made by the nation, with the consent of each individual. Now surely the assumption of this argument is not an obvious axiomatic truth, when it involves the assertion that no man can have any exclusive right to a portion of the earth without an agreement had with all other persons in it, and that all men, women, and children, savages and civilized men, are equally entitled to a share of the earth, irrespective of their capacity, or occupation, or desire to cultivate land; and that even

antipodes must be consulted about lands which they never heard of.

Philosophically speaking, the gift of the earth to man is an inference from his position on it, his wants, and his nature, and therefore his title, irrespective of social regulations, must depend on these, and cannot be apriorally determined. But assume that the gift is to all alike: then it is a title in common. No division can take place without the universal consent of the race. He says, not without the consent of each individual of the *nation*. But how one nation gets title to the exclusion of others, he does not say. And when one man dies and another is born, then there must be a new division. Surely this is practically absurd. But, farther, there never was such a division, and therefore no man or nation has any valid title to the land he or it possesses; and according to another principle of the author, often repeated—that every man may enforce justice for himself—any man or nation may assert his or its right to enjoy in common any portion of the earth. Hence the Saxons, and afterwards the Normans, had an absolute right to invade England, and insist upon a share of its lands. And no division ever can be made, for a universal agreement is impossible.

He proposes a periodical division by the state, p. 256, at a fixed rent, payable to the state. Well, let us suppose that the state has got title as against other states; that it is not subject to a call for repartition, when any one man or generation dies; and that every man in the state has agreed that the state shall lease the land and receive the rents: now what rent can be got? Nothing, if the people are all savages. But suppose them civilized; then many of them will want town lots, and houses, and not farms. And who is to build the towns? Not the renters; for their titles are not permanent enough. Then the state must do it, and all improvements must depend upon the state as lessor. And if it wants its land well cultivated, and drained, and manured, and its towns well built, it must be possessed of all science, and must oversee and direct and constrain all its tenants. On this system, the state must intermeddle in all matters, and there will be no inducement to individual excellence; no encouragement of taste and skill in

gardening, or farming, or architecture. But we are sure that our readers will excuse us from running out this scheme into all its absurd consequences.

Another of his conclusions is, that all men are equal in natural rights, pp. 139—160. His proof is, that because men are all of one natural class, reason and moral law can know no difference between them. It therefore imposes on all the same duties, and hence (because rights and duties are correlative) invests all with the same rights. In other words, God knows no difference among men, and therefore assigns to all alike the same rights and duties. We might carry out the idea, and add, nature knows no difference between the crab and the cultivated apple-trees, and therefore requires all to bear the same kind of fruit. Nature, reason, the moral law, or God, the author of them all, does distinguish among men, even to the extent of individualizing them. With him the rule is, “to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required.” Even men do always distinguish so far as they are able, and do measure both rights and duties according to capacity. Benevolence always distinguishes in this way. But human law, by its general rules, cannot do so; for laws so discriminating could not be administered. So far as possible it treats all men as equal, and speaks to all with the same voice, because it cannot possibly accommodate itself to all the differences of capacity among men, without leaving an open door to arbitrariness of administration; and because in this way all permanent social ranks are avoided, and no excuse is left for mere artificial distinctions. Yet the law does distinguish when it can do so with entire safety. It distinguishes in taxation; it has one rule for children and another for adults; and it allows judges to distinguish in the imposition of penalties, not to mention other cases. This view expresses the principal truth contained in the maxim regarding human equality. So far as we remember, Hobbes was the first to extend its meaning; and then he used it to aid in proving absolute monarchy as the only legitimate form of government.

This doctrine of *civil* equality has been, perhaps, more abused than any other that falls within the field of politics. In its true sense it is of inestimable value; but when used to

betray ignorant or wicked men into the supposition that they are morally, or intellectually, or even socially, equal to the most eminent around them, and ought to act accordingly: when used to excite in them a factitious idea of their importance, and to lead them to be ever asserting their rights and forgetting their duties; then it is sometimes most disastrous in its consequences. It is a violation of that instinctive respect which every virtuous and reasonably sensible man has for his fellow-men around him, who, by a careful cultivation of their powers, have attained a deserved degree of eminence in their respective spheres. It tends to extinguish that respect for true merit, which is the natural inner stimulus of all true progress, so far as it has any moral quality in it; to rub off the productive blossoms of the tree of moral life, and to leave it to utter barrenness, and to final and corroding disappointment.

In various forms the author insists upon the right and the duty of every individual to resist the action of government when it is doing wrong; and he often insists that the presumption is always against its rectitude, and the essay on *Moral Dynamics* is principally devoted to prove this. It follows of course that it is the right and duty of every person to resist every governmental act, until the government shall prove its title to act, and to act in the way proposed. He does not say who shall decide the question. Such a doctrine stands in no need of discussion, for any one can see that it would render all true government impossible, and yet government is an absolute need of our social nature. Society, even that of the family, cannot exist without it. We expect, however, to have something more to say on this subject in another connection.

The author does not pretend to inquire whether men ought or ought not to associate; but only on what principles they ought to associate, if they do associate, p. 199. This is very remarkable. He is discussing man's aprioral political duties, and yet he does not investigate the very first relevant question concerning man's nature, his social tendencies. Of course he cannot know that he has formed a single accurate deduction, this question being confessedly passed by. If it is a

demand of man's nature that he shall associate, then it is his moral duty to do so, and nature will fix the terms of his association according to his condition, circumstances, and purposes. We say moral, and not political duty, because politics comes as a consequence of the fulfilment of this moral duty. We do not imitate the author, in his confounding of the spheres of morals and politics, so far as to say that this moral duty gives rise to or flows from any correlative right in any other persons to demand association. We say only that, if such is his nature, duty to himself and to God demands that he shall associate, not according to the best bargain he can make, or if he can make a good one, but on the terms which God in his providence indicates to be adequate for the common welfare.

It did not suit the author to say that man ought not to associate, for then there ought to be no politics, and this book ought not to have been written. It did not suit to say the contrary, for then the whole scheme of the author would have been deranged. In all its essential elements and real powers, he makes political association a matter of contract. Government with him, in its primary capacity, is a set of men employed by others to prevent injustice among them, p. 168. But it must act according to rules of perfect and abstract political right, p. 33, varying not by lapse of time or change of circumstances, pp. 121, 141, 178, else the government must be resisted by every individual. And as no government can be sure of having such rules, it has no moral right to act, p. 360; and as the presumption is that all human institutions are wrong, of course these perfect, abstract, and immutable rules can never be enforced, and this primary capacity is null. For the rest, government is merely a set of men hired to make public improvements, and it can make none without the unanimous consent of all who are to be affected by the act, and who are joined in the expense. Such a government would be a mere common agency, binding only its employers. On this system, as is quite obvious to any reflecting man, there could be no public improvements, and thus this secondary capacity of government becomes null, and the association or state is dissolved into its original elements.

Hobbes seems to have been the first inventor of this doctrine of the social compact, and he used it to prove the right of the Stuarts to the absolute monarchy of Great Britain. Locke took it up, and used it to establish the right of the people to get rid of the Stuarts, and to call in William of Orange. Rousseau adopted and expanded it, and his followers used it to get clear of the Bourbons and all their institutions, and then founded the rule of the infidel mob of Paris. But, with them all, the social compact was a mere fiction, a sort of argumentative postulate for a foregone conclusion. As matter of fact, nothing of the kind ever took place in history; and if there had, no government could be maintained by it, for it could bind only the consenting parties, and would require renewal with every change of the persons composing the nation; not to mention crowds of other difficulties, any one of which would make this an impracticable governmental theory. We had thought that this fiction of a social compact, to account for past governments, or as a theory for future ones, had been long ago so completely exploded and abandoned, that we should never hear of it again from any thinker of reasonable intelligence.

The author does not assign social compact as the actual origin of existing or of any past governments; but urges it as the true rational ground of all valid institutions. If he had taken the trouble, before he began to weave his political fabric, to study the history of human associations, and the social elements of human nature, and the mode in which they most usually and naturally arrange themselves under given circumstances, and the works of authors who have pursued this method, he might have collected enough of sound and precious threads of social nature to form the warp and woof of a valuable web. But he chose the easier task of weaving his web out of his own bowels. It may succeed in catching a few insects; or, hanging across a path, it may fret the nerves of some passer-by, and then it will vanish from the atmosphere of history, to be followed, however, by many other cobwebs equally useless for human purposes. He has dabbled a little in the works of Kant and Whewell, and has caught a glimpse

of some valuable thoughts in both of them; but he has greatly misapprehended their meaning and their application.

With the author, a nation is a mere aggregate of individuals, and can have no rights that did not exist in the individuals, p. 55, and he often repeats this. He might as well have said that water has no other properties than the hydrogen and oxygen of which it is composed; or that a tree, a horse, or a man, has no other capacities or uses than the water and earths that enter into their respective structures. We may make garden out of these original elements; but when they assume an organic form, they must be treated as organisms. It was some mysterious affinity or vital force, and no rationalistic process, that brought them together, and constructed them with such wondrous skill. We have no aprioral faculty by which, from the idea of vital force, we can construct, in thought or in fact, a tree or a horse. But finding them constructed, we may inspect the process and obtain some knowledge of it. The author thought he had discovered an aprioral way of constructing society; but he has failed. He might have known that hundreds had failed before, and that all who have tried it have failed; and modern socialism would have furnished him many instructive examples. And on the other hand, he had before him a hundred examples of actual constructions, with their history of many centuries, and he might have learned something from them of the natural process of construction and improvement.

States are not at all a mere aggregate of individuals. Chemical, vegetable, and vital affinity is something more than mere aggregation, for they produce physical organisms out of scattered atoms. And intellectual and social affinity is more still, for it generates social organisms out of individual men. Man's nature abounds with germs of thought and sentiment that can find no development except in the atmosphere of social life; and it is only by observing their development under all the circumstances of social life, that their true nature can possibly be comprehended. Aprioral discussions of them are absurd; they can be nothing more than discussions of subjective thought, and the inquirer explains only his own thought-world, and not any real one. And without these social affinities

there never could have been any contracts; for men never could have been so associated as to obtain a language or common customs and interests, and to improve each other so as to arrive at the idea of regulating social intercourse in that way.

It is with amazement that we hear the author attribute all political evils to badly constituted governments, p. 14. The thought runs all through his book. Yet, as a religious and intelligent man, he certainly knew, and, but for the false position in which his partisan feelings have involved him, he would have felt and written that, not out of law, but out of the heart are the issues of moral life and death; that out of the heart proceed all the vices of which he complains; and his remedy for them would have been the moral and religious teacher, and not the political ruler; the spontaneous moral and religious faith of man, with its look directed upwards by the revealed word, and by the Divine Spirit; and not mere rationalistic and materialistic political theories such as this, having, for principal aim, the equalization of wealth and the construction of roads and harbours and social contracts; and resulting, if once tried, in nothing else than a continual struggle about rights of property and labour and position and power. Surely there is some higher purpose than this for human efforts and hopes and progress. We admit the importance of such things; but the whole purpose of politics is not to be bent in that direction.

All the views of the author that we have yet noticed, are governed by a barren and socially dissolvent rationalism, and they continue so throughout his work. They are so, because they totally ignore all the spontaneities of our nature, and thus cast down the scaffolding and the ladder by which we and our works have risen hitherto. It is this rationalism that dictates his belief that no country has or ever had a true political system. Why? Evidently because he has framed a subjective system of his own, that rejects all actual conditions, and proceeds solely from his ideas of justice and right. Of course it can have no application to real life. This aprioral condemnation of all political institutions, past and present, is only an expression of the author's sentiment; and as he does not seem to have studied them in their elements, and much less in their

relations of time, place, circumstances, and people, we cannot attach much value to it.

It is the *institutes of nature* that he wants, and by this he means those institutes that would naturally belong to man in his perfect normal and unfallen state. But we have no adequate evidence that the author has yet risen to that perfect condition; and, therefore, we cannot know that he has ascertained its nature, so far as to be able to deduce its laws. For ourselves, we admit our incapacity to legislate for such a condition of humanity. Indeed, we are not sure that in that state political laws will be needed. We are not free from a suspicion that government implies moral abnormality, and depends on it; and we have words of divine revelation that seem to mean this, when they say that "law was added because of transgressions," and "law is not made for a righteous man." And, therefore, we are not sure that the government required for our present condition bears any analogy to the form in which man will, in his perfect state, associate.

We are very sure that no political system, adapted to society under one condition of civilization, and of inner and outward circumstances and social aims, can be suitable for it under another. The author does not seem to have ever thought of this principle; his method excludes it. Suppose such a perfect law as the author insists on should be instituted; and then bring in the author's test of moral duty—that it demands an intelligent conception of the reasons for acting in a prescribed mode, and that obedience without a sufficient reason, subjectively appreciated, is mere superstition, pp. 102, 103, and then what have we? We have a law which is perfect, and yet which we are not obliged to obey, because we do not appreciate the reasons of it; and which, therefore, we cannot obey without acting superstitiously, which is a horrible sin in the eyes of rationalism.

Let us bear in mind that the law is to be the same for all, including children and savages, for it varies not for times, conditions, and circumstances, pp. 121, 141, 178. Now, what can the child or the savage do? Literally nothing. It would be at least superstitious to draw a bow, or shoot a marble for want of an intelligent and valid motive that he could appreciate;

and for anything he can know, it may be a very great crime before that perfect and incomprehensible law. Thus the law itself becomes a tyrant, and none but the perfect can have any part in its administration, for they alone can understand it, and all others must submit to their interpretation of it. This is a total extinguishment of all the physical, moral, intellectual spontaneities of our nature. It is, therefore, a suppression of our nature by laws called "the institutes of nature." Of course, the author had not those things in his intention; but his system is professedly one of strict deduction, and it must, therefore, submit to be deductively tested, and to be rejected if the results of the test are absurd.

We freely concede the justice of the author's indignation at many of the evils arising out of the relation of lord and serf, or the feudal system, as we have learned it from history; but we cannot consent to be so indiscriminating and unconditional in our condemnation of it. He has an abstract deductive standard by which he judges it, irrespective of all circumstances; we think the true standard can be found only by induction, according to the condition of man, and the circumstances of time and place. We find the relation of lord and vassal, in various degrees of intensity and under various names, existing among almost all nations from the earliest times down to the present; and this prevents us from charging it upon the mere arbitrariness of privileged classes, and naturally leads to the supposition that there must be some element of human nature which, under certain circumstances, must favour that form of institution and perhaps require it. It is now generally granted by learned historians, that this is really the case, and we shall endeavour to explain and illustrate the principle in such a form that our readers may readily gather our meaning. It is not the abuse of feudal power by privileged classes that ought to be first considered; but the principles that have given rise to privileged classes. This question is very important in the science of government, and the author has not considered it. Of course it would be out of place in a system of abstract deductive politics; but its consideration will aid us in showing the nullity of any such system.

Let us invite the reflection of our readers to the mode in

which all societies or assemblages of men ordinarily act in the face of a common danger, that may possibly be averted. If, before the danger shows itself, they had been in the habit of following any one as their leader, they instantly rally round him, and submit to his dictation until the danger is over. If they have no such customary leader, they submit to the first who shows himself courageous enough for the emergency; and most disastrous is it for them to divide their numbers between two discordant leaders. And the power attributed to the leader is in proportion to the universality and intensity of the sense of danger. If all feel the danger to be imminent and great, they unhesitatingly attribute to him full power over all, for the purpose of averting the danger, and no one dares to show any signs of rebellion. No doubt many of our readers will be able to recall unrecorded instances of this. All are familiar with the Roman custom, in times of great danger to the state, of appointing a dictator with absolute and irresponsible power to take measures for the public safety.

We see this again when a state or a multitude deliberately enters upon any undertaking requiring unity of action and involving great interests or great hazard. Hence the ready obedience to the commander of an army or navy, especially when there is a present prospect of hostile collision, or when it has actually commenced. And so it is in the ordinary command of a ship at sea. All the elements around it are dangerous to it, and safety depends on the united and ready activity of its crew. All, therefore, spontaneously as well as by custom, submit to the master, and feel that their safety requires this, especially in the midst of storms and other pressing dangers. And let one observe a confused and excited crowd at a conflagration in a country village; how readily their fears and sympathies and common aim gather them into working order at the call of some practical man of confidence and intelligence. And in times of popular reforms, a leader who truly represents the great principle of the movement, will be followed in the details with almost unquestioning alacrity. And when a general anarchy threatens, or has overtaken a people, they very soon find a leader whom they aid in crushing all whom he calls

anarchists, and in restoring order. Such were Cromwell and Napoleon.

All this illustrates the uncalculating spontaneity of human action in important and pressing emergencies. Abundant examples appear wherever there is a general disorganization of society, or where the people of a country are divided into many small tribes, hostile to or suspicious of each other. Continued danger begets a readiness for instant and complete order under the command of a chief; and the greater their intelligence and the more numerous their interests, the more strict is their submission. The lowest savages have much weaker social bonds than those tribes that have made some advance in civilization, and have larger interests and more numerous social relations demanding protection. Accidental dangers and transient purposes impress their transient character upon the means adopted. But permanent dangers give rise to permanent institutions suited to guard against them, and entering into the habits and affecting the character of the people.

For another instance, we refer to the history of Abraham. He was evidently the chief of a very considerable tribe that migrated from the East to Canaan. He was recognized and respected as a prince among the princes of the land. He was surrounded by many and quarrelsome tribes, and had very large interests to protect. The times and circumstances demanded a very strict form of social organization; and the greater the danger, and the greater the chief, the more strict would it be. Its character is indicated by the fact that, at an early period, Abraham had three hundred and eighteen trained warriors in his tribe, ready at his instant call. His tribe were called his servants. Perhaps the English word *vassals*, would more nearly express the relation in which they stood; but we cannot distinctly mark the degree of subjection; that was governed by their needs and their dangers. There may have been *vassals* as fighting men, and *villeins* as servants. It could hardly have been a mere slavery; for one man could not have that power over his whole tribe, especially a nomadic one; *that* exists only in large communities, where there is a ruling body to maintain it. It was the relation of lord and vassal, originating for the common safety, and adequate to the necessary

unity of action. The chieftdom descended regularly from father to son; and Isaac and Jacob succeeded in their turns. They, too, were princes in the land. This form of organization was a manifest necessity under the circumstances; for there could be no safety without it. No man or family could choose to live independently or out of connection with some tribe, for he or it could have no protection; and, joining a tribe, he must submit to its order. However strict might be his subjection to the chief within the tribe, it was freedom compared with an independence that was subject to the invasions, and spoliations, and insults of all surrounding tribes. And he would feel it so; for all men, who do not desire to live by the plunder and oppression of their neighbours, prefer even despotism to anarchy.

We advance another step in the history of social organization when we follow this tribe in its migration into Egypt. And we venture the suggestion that it was the whole tribe of Abraham, or of Jacob, that migrated into Egypt, and not merely Jacob and his descendants; though these only, as the ruling family, are specially spoken of. The suggestion may have some merit; but we do not discuss it here, though it has in our minds solved many difficulties, and appears plainly demanded by many circumstances in the narrative, and in their social and religious relations. Our present purpose requires only that we notice the change in the condition of the tribe or family in consequence of their having submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of a greater power, and of a different race. The result was exactly accordant with all subsequent historical experience in similar cases. They became the slaves of the Egyptians; as a body, perhaps, rather than individually. Differing in race, customs, pursuits, institutions, and religion, peace between them could not be maintained except by means of slavery. Fusion was impossible. The contact of civilization with barbarism, as well as between two differing forms of barbarism, has almost always shown this. Their differences and proximity would necessarily occasion a continual collision of interests and prejudices, and, at their stage of civilization, neither party could have intelligence enough, or respect enough for each other's social and intellectual rights, and indulgence

enough for differences to know how to manage and control the sources from which all conflicts flow. If either party, and especially if the stronger party, lacked this intellectual and moral skill, continual discord and collision could not be avoided, and they could know no remedy but the power of the stronger.

In the very nature of things no social organization can suffer the presence of any element or condition that it regards as endangering its own existence. Self-defence is an ineradicable principle of all vital organization; and it must act whenever it apprehends danger, even though its apprehensions be unfounded. As spontaneously as the oyster closes its shell, or the porcupine presents its quills against approaching danger, so spontaneously does every social organization guard against the inner and outer evils that it views as such. That it selects improper or unseasonable remedies is usually an intellectual fault, and is not to be cured by any complaints and censures of human depravity. People's individual condition cannot surpass their individual intelligence, and their social condition cannot surpass the intelligence of their leaders. This must be, so long as the responsibility of human training and progress is left to man himself; and it would seem that this responsibility is a necessary element of his progress. The slavery of the Israelites in Egypt appears to us to have come as an inevitable result of previous relations, which could not be maintained in the position of their original institution. And we are strongly impressed with the belief that it was this slavery that, under God, saved them from being completely fused and merged into the Egyptian nation, and thus losing entirely their religion and their nationality.

When the Gibeonites submitted themselves to the Israelites and obtained permission to dwell among them; how could they be anything else than a subject race, differing as they did in language, customs and religion? Two differing forms of civilization never can abide on the same territory, except when one is made subordinate to the other; and the degree or intensity of the subordination must depend upon circumstances. History presents it to us in all degrees—dependent allies; a subject people retaining their own country and laws, with governors appointed by the ruling people; a subject

people interspersed among the ruling people, and having some institutions of their own in subordination to the stronger power, or entirely governed by the laws of the other race with a severity proportioned to the danger of their rebellion; and finally mere slaves, where each of the subject race is under the control of a master and owner.

Mixture of races, thus differing in civilization, never was allowed without subordination, except where the foreign elements were so few as to excite no general apprehension. A fusion of different races on the same soil has never taken place except under the law of subordination in an appropriate degree. God makes this subordination provisional, a means of present order, and of education for order, and of future elevation. Man's foresight does not ordinarily reach so far; he intends such institutions as permanent. To produce equality by a direct fusion of principles is impossible, for neither party can abandon its own or accept those of the other: the nature of the human mind forbids it; as well may the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots. The ruling race cannot possibly give up its customs to the subject race, and the latter knows not how to make the concessions which its circumstances require. A fusion of power so as to put the two races on a political equality is impossible; for then no law or administration would be practicable except according to the will of the majority; for the majority can adopt no other standard of government than its own ideas of right and wrong, however these may be acquired. If the Chinese should acquire the majority in California, we should very soon discover that some of our American notions of equality require occasional modifications according to circumstances. Mormonism has already given us some warning of this.

If we refer to the history of any nation that ever acquired any prominence, we find there a subordination of classes; and this even appears as an element of their greatness. They knew not how else to manage difference of race. Greece and Rome are illustrious instances; and we are not apt to make complaints against them for this, because we do not recognize the influence of their institutions upon our own. We are more apt, like our author, to expend our indignation upon similar institu-

tions of modern Europe. But let us do it as wisely as possible, and we may as well do it at once.

We stop not to inquire into the morality of the invasions that broke up the old Romanized institutions of Europe. Our forefathers no doubt had a hand in them, and the roots of our own political institutions take their rise among those events. This great migration brought together on the same soil races and nations differing very widely in their pursuits, customs, languages, civilization, and all the elements that specialize the forms of political organization. Here then is the political phenomenon that we are to consider. Of course a new shaping of the political institutions became necessary. How was this to be effected? We have already seen that the principles of human nature, and even the law of self-defence, could admit no other form than that prescribed by the more powerful race. We know how much honest indignation has been expended against the law of the strongest, and our author joins in it. But what is the use? When they have the power, they do not give it up for such complaints. To them, at least, it would appear ridiculous to propose to substitute the law of the weakest. The complaint is just enough when directed against the mere arbitrariness of official power. But when founded on the fact that the more powerful race is the ruling race, it is little better than whining nonsense. Government exists for the exercise of power, and if there be two distinct races, one of which alone can have it, it must of course fall to the more powerful; for they cannot admit their inferiority to those whom they have had capacity to conquer and subject. They will rule as intelligently as they know how, and perhaps with as much moderation as the character of their subjects will admit of.

What form is such a government to take? The almost universal prevalence of feudal forms, more or less strictly combined, wherever such circumstances have existed, is evidence enough that this is a spontaneous form of political organization. It must be an organization that is always ready to meet the dangers that arise from the fact that it is power alone that can keep in subjection unwilling, disappointed and hostile subjects. It is an organization of king, counts, marquises and barons,

surrounded by their armed attendant vassals, and permanently distributed over the country in and around castles and walled towns, wherever interest suggests or danger demands. It could not be the mere power of the lord that gave him his great control over his vassals; but the force of circumstances of common danger, requiring a ready obedience to a common leader for its aversion.

But this order changes with time. When, in the course of time, the subject race, or villeins, become accustomed to the new order of things and thus less inclined to disorder and rebellion, the lords feel more free, and therefore more likely to engage in wars and marauding expeditions against each other, in which their followers join them from habit and the natural sentiment of *esprit de corps*. This was a form of disorder against which the first spontaneous feudalism made no provision; for the king had no such power as enabled him to control it. Hence disorder began to reign everywhere. There was no safety outside of feudal protection, and no rights within it to the disloyal. Property and protection were conditioned on feudal fidelity. Vassal and villein became subject to the same danger, and much the same lot befell them all—subjection to a chief for the safety of all. Now, all hopes of order rally around the king, and it was by the growth of the royal power that these disorders were suppressed, the people united and their differences fused. Then feudalism ceased to be necessary, and vassalage and villeinage began to give way. All this was the work of many centuries, and we have sketched a bare outline of it in order to expose the principles out of which these political forms grew.

Feudalism was the outgrowth of centuries of disorder, and it continually changed its form according to the permanent changes in the forms of the disorders. The church itself became feudal in its spiritual as well as in its material interests. The fundamental or crystallizing principle of the system was social spontaneity; it could not be political rationalism. And this principle is quite familiar to our modern and more rationalized experience. We all have leaders in a much larger portion of our acts than we are apt to be conscious of. He that boasts his freedom from the

leadership of others, is likely to be found the most subject to it; but in a disorderly form, as the follower of some Tom Paine or other, who assists his vanity for distinguishing himself from other men, by helping him to the expression of opinions which no mind can grow by, and which no orderly citizen can recognize as true.

We all live and grow in a common atmosphere of opinion, which furnishes the very bone and muscle of our social life, and, up to a certain point, of our spiritual life also; and, for the common business and intercourse of life, our reception of it and growth by it are the surest guaranty of our social success. It is now as it was in feudal times; no man can stand alone on peculiar and individual principles. The world moves on with its irresistible momentum, regardless of such solitary spiders, and wiping away all their fine-spun gossamers. We cannot avoid following leaders; for no man can know all things, or do all things. We all respect others in their several occupations, and concede them superiority in those matters which they have studied and practised and we have not: though many men show so little respect for others that it is hard to discover that they have any. Such men always fail of a true moral growth. We all have leaders in some part of the principles that direct our lives. We all have intellectual, political, and religious or irreligious leaders, and great part of the order of society depends on this fact. Blessed are those who have not quacks and charlatans for their leaders; and we are all liable to be seduced by them, in matters of which we are ill-informed. In such circumstances respect for common opinion is a great safeguard.

And why should the author forget his deductive rationalism, and call in sentiment to condemn the dead institutions of English feudalism? It was a waste of sentiment to vent it in wrath against this bygone form, as a government of mere brute force; he ought to have investigated its origin, and learned by the investigation. It did use such force whenever it was necessary or thought necessary, as all government does; it is the only governmental remedy for disobedience and resistance. They who were subjected to it might well call it force, and so it was, and so it still is. When physical work is to be

done, it is bone and sinew, and nervous energy that are wanted, and they are entitled to credit when they do their work well. But mere force never had attractive influence to gather up the scattered thoughts and sympathies and other principles that generate the social organism. It is intellect and sentiment, spontaneous and reflected thought, that presides in this process. The organism was not gathered and held together by mere force; but, as organism, it exerted such force when disobedience made it necessary. No doubt feudalism was often very cruel; but the social disorders that called it into being were cruel also. To avoid such forms of government, we must beware of the disorders that lead to them. Where the causal principle is, the resulting form follows.

The evils of the feudal system arose chiefly from its continuance long after the cessation of the causes out of which it arose. But this is the common lot of human institutions. Forms become indurated at the expense of life, and do not keep pace with its expansive power. They endure beyond the life that generated them, as the shell remains after the oyster is gone. Human forms cannot always be fitted to the social life which they represent. They hold, themselves, a prominent place in the habits and affections of the people, and cannot be rudely cast down without violence to public sentiment, and without causing much disorder before new forms have become fitted to the popular life. Even personal habits endure when principle desires to reject them. Almost all the stability of social progress depends upon this. Call it popular prejudice, if you please. Prejudices are natural to man, and it is quite unphilosophical to despise them, and quite ungenerous to treat them rudely and disrespectfully. We all have them, and are all trying to grow out of them. Call them mean and narrow views, still they may be better for us than no views at all. We are growing by means of them, and slowly securing each height attained. Perhaps there may be better means of ascent than the cumbersome ladders that we use; but we know of no better. Call them scabs on the intellectual system; but let them be useful as scabs; rub them not off until true skin has grown under them, and then they will slough off of themselves. They are rather the

bark of the tree, protecting the life within from summer's heat, and winter's cold, and from hostile insects, without preventing its growth. They are the walls of our moral and intellectual castle, bristling with arms against those who come as enemies, and yet with open gates and undrawn bridge for those whom we recognize as friends. If we shut ourselves up too closely, let our very weakness be our excuse, and not a cause of war against us. With much more respectful caution ought we to treat the habitual and customary forms of a whole people.

But the feudal rule was merely provisional. Its legitimate functions were exhausted when it had held the discordant elements of society together long enough to allow an assimilation and consolidation of interests and purposes to grow up among them, and to bring with them a reasonable degree of order. Then feudalism became itself a cause of disorder, and its office expired. Monarchy then called upon it to render its account and surrender its trust. The danger and the purposes of society had changed, and its old leaders were, by their disorders, mingling distress and ruin with all the hopes of humanity. For the suppression of this new form of disorder, the rallying cry is changed, and the hopes of men gather around the centre of larger sphere. The royal authority and power become enlarged by the spontaneous suffrages of society, so as to be adequate to the occasion.

Monarchy was also provisional, and it has not yet entirely settled its accounts; though it has laid aside many of its old functions. What new power shall arise to demand of it a full account, we know not yet. But monarchy crushed the life out of feudalism in every place where it had fulfilled its day, and was continued only as a usurping tyranny. This rallying around monarchy was a great blessing to Europe, for it produced union and harmony among the scattered members of European society, and substituted large and homogeneous states in the place of small and contentious tribes and clans. True, it did its work by force; but it was force employed, rather against the contentious, tyrannical, and disorderly petty chiefs, and selfish and partizan leaders, than against the people whom they governed; a force that compelled them to submit their

selfish wills to the popular need of peace, industry and progress.

It will aid us in understanding the importance of this compulsory union of scattered interests to refer to cases where union never was obtained. The Greeks never were able to form any permanent union, and by continual dissensions they destroyed each other. The Arabians, because of their divisions, have ever remained little better than nomadic barbarians. But we prefer Italy for an illustration, because we can content ourselves with quoting what has been said about it by two writers of acknowledged ability. After the fall of the Roman empire, Italy found itself divided into many small republics, with various degrees of popular freedom, and these were never successful in any permanent union, so as to be able to maintain themselves in harmony and against invasions. M. Guizot says: "This has led many Italians, the most enlightened and best of patriots, to deplore, in the present day, the republican system of Italy in the middle ages, as the true cause which hindered it from becoming a nation; it was parcelled out into a multitude of little states, not sufficiently master of their passions to confederate, to constitute themselves into one united body. They regret that this country has not, like the rest of Europe, been subject to a despotic centralization, which would have formed it into a nation, and rendered it independent of the foreigner." (*Gen. Hist. of Civ.* 221, *Lect.* 10.) And A. Comte says: "The Italian cities, which had been foremost in political liberty, paid for the privilege by fatal mutual animosities and internal quarrels, till their turbulent independence issued everywhere in the supremacy of a local family." (*Positive Phil.* 695.)

Mr. Dove rejects all this kind of human experience in matters of government, and insists that the method of observation and induction is totally incompetent as an instrument of political science, and that the only true method is that of aprioral and abstract deduction. He ought to have added his opinion that all history is useless for any political purposes. And because the abstract deductive method has been very largely successful in logic and mathematics, therefore, he insists, the same method must be successful in politics. We

do not stop to show that in his attempt he has not, in the most distant manner, followed the analogy of those sciences; but we shall spend a moment in showing that there is no analogy between them and the science of politics, and, therefore, they furnish no evidence that their method can be used in constructing political science.

Logic and mathematics, as pure sciences, have nothing to do with anything but thoughts and forms of thought. Logic treats of the necessary forms of thought in their consistent and accurate deductive development from given premises. Mathematics does the same with thoughts about space, time, number, and quantity. Their whole purpose, therefore, is, not to teach us of the qualities, or properties, or relations of things or persons; but only to give us a certain skill in the employment of our thoughts, when they come to deal with actual things. Their whole material is mere thoughts, abstract from all reference to persons or things.

But politics must, at every step, consider men and their relations, for man in society is the only subject of which it treats. It deals with thinking men, and, therefore, with systematized thoughts; yet not only with these, but also with spontaneous thought, and with sensation, sentiment, and will, and with all the complications of these, and all the relations and circumstances under which they arise, and to which they give rise: all which are excluded from logic and mathematics. Politics has principal reference to the actions of men, and incidentally to thought, sentiment, and will, because from these all acts proceed. It cannot, like logic and mathematics, perform its functions by abstracting thought from will and sentiment, because its objects are real persons and their nature and actions; and in real life, action involves thought, and sentiment, and will, in blended and inseparable synthesis. There is no conscious act that does not flow from the three united. As well might we expect animal locomotion from nerves alone, without bone and sinew, as expect will and action without thought and sentiment. And as well might we decide upon the whole system of animal action from a microscopic inspection of a few nerves, without ever having seen them in action in their organic combination, as decide upon the social duty

and action of man from an aprioral (hypothetical) inspection of rational thought, independent of sensation, sentiment, and will, and the circumstances in which he is to act. A science of vital functions, that would treat only of the analysis and structure of dry bones, would be quite as satisfactory as a science of politics that would treat only of abstract duties, or rather abstract ideas of duty.

We have no intellectual chemistry that enables us so to analyze human action as to obtain will, and sentiment, and thought separately, even if it were of use to treat them thus. With the barometer, thermometer, and hygrometer we may learn much about the condition of the atmosphere; but we have no instruments for measuring the proportions in which will, thought, and sentiment do actually combine in producing a given action, and we can have no aprioral measure of the proportions in which they ought to combine. We cannot even define the line between spontaneous and reflected thought; it is perhaps very different in different individuals. It is one of the elements of our freedom, that all such calculations are impossible. But we perceive that, besides showing that the author's analogy is unfounded, we have been proving that his method is a false one; and we pursue this thought.

Is abstract deductive politics possible? From what are they to be deduced? We admit the transcendental, so far as the term expresses those original principles, or intellectual and moral instincts of our nature that are the condition of all thought and morality, and experience in general, and in so far as it acknowledges that their origin is inexplicable, except by faith that God made us so. But it is only by experience and induction that we can know the character, properties and operations of these principles, and thus we learn that they are continually varying and developing. And we admit the transcendent, in so far as the term expresses the character of ideas that are beyond our present capacity of definition and clear thought, and also of those that are beyond all possible definition of finite minds. But from the undefined no reliable deduction can be made. We cannot from uncertain premises proceed to any definite and certain conclusion. If we try to mend the matter by an arbitrary definition expressive

of what we understand by some first principle; we may start from that, and by deduction build up a perfectly consistent system. But it will be merely systematized thought, without a semblance of evidence that it answers to any system of things, events, or principles in the world. The result is a mere ideal structure.

Kant, in order to get a footing for aprioral deduction, assumed that the world must regulate itself according to our knowledge; and Des Cartes had done the same before, or what was, by some, taken in the same way. On this principle, philosophical systems became mere constructions of consequential thought, without reference to real things. Of this character is Spinoza's construction of God and the world out of his idea of substance. And the deductive theories of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are of the same character, though differing in their assumption of first principles. This seems very like a return to the old realism of the schools, which treated ideas as being real things, and, in a certain sense, as the only true things. But the world cannot afford to retrace its steps. It will insist that substance, being, and reason, in the abstract, and divested of all properties, accidents and relations, are nothing for the mind, and that they have no existence. In nature all is concrete and nothing abstract, and systems built on abstractions must be systems of nothing but thought. The builder first creates the material—abstract substance, for instance—by chipping off all its natural properties; and then proceeds with his edifice. Surely, if any truth comes out of such labour, it is not from any virtue in the principles that it starts with. If the abstract deductive method is the true one, then man has always been learning by an inverse process; and when he abandons this, and resorts to the new road, he will have to abandon nearly all the best principles of his nature, and will find himself in total darkness and helplessness.

The author adopts the abstract deductive method, and professes to erect a system of politics out of our ideas of justice and duty. We pronounce this utterly and most obviously impossible. If he had attempted to erect a concrete deductive system, founded on the nature of man, ascertained by a careful induction, he might have obtained some principles of great use

in a more proper method. The ideas of justice and duty are necessarily relative. Applied to man, they are ideas of human relations, and for man they can have no abstract value. All our ideas of justice and duty are concrete and particular, or generalizations of particulars. It is quite as absurd to attempt to construct a system of politics out of abstract ideas of justice and duty, as to attempt to construct a true representation of the real world out of the abstract idea of substance or being.

It is the province of pure politics, says the author, "to lay down its rules of perfect and abstract political right;" rules "investigated by the intellect alone, and capable, like mathematical propositions, of universal verification," p. 33. And again he says, "just as pure mathematics seeks to determine the universal and abstract qualities of spaces, numbers and quantities, so does politics seek to determine the universal and abstract relations of man, and to found them on axioms that are capable of universal verification," p. 37. Again, "politics is the science that treats of the original and immutable relations of man," p. 56.

We stop not for verbal criticism. It is apparent that the author's politics is intended as a system of mere ideas. He is not at all to consider man in his actual relations, circumstances, and conditions; but merely ideas of what he calls relations of man, and which yet arise out of no real beings. We say that there can be no such relations; and therefore, taking him at his word, his politics is a science of nothing. But he does not mean this. What then can he mean? Evidently nothing more than that he has certain ideas of social perfection and of perfect human relations; and that, as these ideas can be constructed into a system, it must be the design of Providence that the world shall conform to them. His system is therefore entirely subjective, and his politics is the supposed law of the social world, under whatever moral, intellectual or physical conditions and circumstances it may be. We are not sure that the author saw all this; but we are very sure that we have rightly translated his confused thought.

It might be thought that such empty speculations stand in no need of being exposed; but herein the author is a type of a very large class of talkers and writers, who cause great dis-

turbance to the progress of society. This form of reasoning, more or less developed and comprehended, seems to be the natural and almost the necessary form of philosophizing for youthful and immature zeal; for, lacking a large observation of appropriate facts, and the clear conceptions and generalizations derived from them, it has not the materials for inductive philosophizing. And, lacking the patience necessary to obtain them, and the caution and sobriety which they nourish, it is easily seduced into the open paths of abstract deduction, where no shadows of real things obscure the scientific vision, and where its progress is embarrassed by no undergrowth of error, imperfection, ignorance or prejudice. And when such persons obtain, in this way, what they regard as new and important ideas, they are almost sure to regard themselves as apostles commissioned for their immediate propagation; not merely as ideas to be learned, and which will, of themselves, grow with practice when learned; but also as ideas that are at once to be enforced upon all, irrespective of any rule of fitness in time and place.

But surely the teaching and progress of truth is well compared to the sowing and growth of seed; and in both it is wise to consider the adaptation of soil and season and climate to the work to be done, and also the preliminaries of clearing and ploughing. The Great Teacher did not leave us without instructions in relation to this. He taught in parables to many, because they were not in a condition to receive the truth in a more abstract form. The concrete form of parables might be received and remembered, and might some day find a fitting place in their minds, where it could grow and develop its healing virtues. Even for his disciples, he had truths which were withheld, because they could not bear them then. And when he sent them to teach, it was with the caution, that where the people did not receive them kindly or persecuted them, they should depart and seek a soil ready for the seed. For those who would disseminate truth, it is surely an appropriate instruction—"Be ye wise as serpents and harmless as doves;" not for fear of those who persecute and kill; but because the normal growth of truth requires a favouring soil, and suitable conditions of the social atmosphere.

As a man may have seed which he knows not how to plant and cultivate, so a man may have knowledge which he knows not how to communicate. The teacher needs prudence and skill, rather than great learning. Truth cannot be forced by either the power or the intellect of man. It must be received and grow by the combination of its vital force with favouring intellectual and moral conditions. That is not true skill that scatters principles indiscriminately as to soil or season. Order is an element of truth, and truth must be communicated in order. We do not teach the differential calculus to those who have not learned arithmetic and algebra, nor do we teach human equality to boys and savages. There is much truth that cannot be received truly, until there is a prior preparation of the intellectual soil, and being untruly received, it produces only weeds. The stomach that can digest only milk, rejects stronger food or turns it into a poison of the system. The science of teaching has not yet received its proper share of thought.

This abstract deductive method can make no allowance for differences in intelligence, condition, age and circumstances; and hence, when applied by ignorant or narrow minded men, it is essentially arrogant, intolerant, uncharitable and disorderly. There the one law for all is the subjective law of him who sets himself up as the censor of other men. He would teach those that are willing to receive his doctrine; and rule, by his doctrine, those who would not receive it. The course of history reveals many sects that have been generated out of this system, and have died by it. The Gnostics, Novatians and Donatists, and numerous monastic orders are examples of this. Many such sects exist in our own day. In politics also, socialism and the history of parties furnish many examples.

On this principle life may be an activity according to certain fixed laws to which it must necessarily conform, like the activity of an engine, or of a perennial spring; but it is not a growth, in which principles and tendencies are gradually developed, and in which new hopes and duties arise according to capacity and moral condition and external circumstances. It must measure all acts and all persons by its one standard, and by it the poor widow's mite is a worthless contribution com-

pared with that of pharisaic ostentation. It gets its standard of truth by the abstraction and rejection of all that we do know about anything, and by analysis and synthesis of the pure substance, or being, or reason, or something else that remains, about which we can know nothing. Moreover it starts with an abstraction by which reason is set apart by itself and sentiment rejected altogether. As well might the blossom, just beginning to form its fruit, disown all the growth of the tree, and the process by which it was itself developed. The sentiments may be purified and elevated, but they can never be discarded as elements of human action. There is a necessary synthesis in all living nature. The crucible and the microscope may sharpen our powers of investigating nature, but they can never control its activities. They may reveal the gases and fibres that enter into its constructions, and may turn them to other purposes, but by no manipulation can they control the principles of life. In all the abstractions of Hume, Berkeley, Spinoza and Fichte, they could never get clear of the synthetic power of common sense, or our mental spontaneities; it ruled them still. It holds the world in order and stands as an adamantine rampart against all the assaults of mere deductive philosophy. A breach is now and then made in it, but common sense is full of vital force and soon supplies the materials for its repair. One valiant philosophic knight after another falls, and his armour is hung upon the wall, and his retainers are dispersed; and the real power of the world—its intellectual instincts, or common sense in the common mind—still moves onward to the accomplishment of the world's destiny, honouring and following other leaders, who do better work, and with less noise.

A mere deductive logic may, by a long course of training, force its cold rationalism into several generations of men in particular localities, and then it partially suppresses many of the finest sympathies of our nature. It may thus save from temptations to which those sympathies subject us; but it also deprives of the hopes, and joys, and moral improvement which they tend to develop. It does not suppress the sentimental elements of our nature, but forces them into an abnormal growth, making men arbitrary, censorious, obstinate, and

uncharitable. Those who are thus trained have a system complete in all its parts, admitting of no growth from within, professing uncompromising hostility to every sentiment, thought or act, that surpasses or falls short of their standard, and condemning all men who do not grow according to their rule, even though greatly their superiors. Their selfishness and vanity are offended at differences which they do not comprehend, and for which they make no allowance; and hence they are very apt to be disorderly radicals in relation to all customs and institutions that do not fit their system, however well they may fit in with the life of a people, and however necessary they may be for its harmonious and orderly development.

Referring to natural analogies, we see that all growth is inductive. All life is nourished by the concrete, and not by the abstract. We have divine authority for the analogies between truth and seed, and between truth and food, and we need not fear that a cautious use of these analogies will mislead us. Seed manifests its vitality only when placed in favouring circumstances of earth, moisture, warmth, and light; without these it can have no development, and with them, in unsuitable proportions, its development must be irregular and incomplete. Abstracted from these conditions it is as dead matter. It grows by pushing out its roots and leaves in all directions, seeking after the concrete elements of nature, and appropriating them to itself by means of a spontaneous analysis, followed immediately by a new synthesis, by which they enter as constituent parts of its organic nature. This process of analysis and synthesis is an essential part of its vital action; when this ceases life is ended; and this cannot be performed for it by any external agency. The analyzed elements of earth, and air, and water, though imparted in due proportions, could not sustain its growth; for it can live only by its own process of analysis and synthesis. In its growth, it is continually changing its form and structure, and it is only when it has advanced to an appropriate maturity that it has any tendency to bear blossoms and fruit.

So it is with food and animal life. The stomach acts not on abstract, but on concrete food. The pure nourishing elements

of food would be poison to the system. Analysis, digestion, is a necessary function of its life, and it can synthesize or assimilate only what it has itself analyzed. It must do its own analysis and synthesis, for part of its functions are applied to the rejection of the residuum which cannot enter into its organic system; discrimination is part of its life; and the animal, in its growth, is continually changing, and developing new tendencies. It is especially so with man, because of his much more various faculties. From childhood to old age, the physical tendencies are continually undergoing change, and producing altered habits of action. Youth cannot entirely comprehend this, and age is apt to forget it, and to expect even youth to be conformed to its standard.

We know of no analogies equal to these for representing the process of spiritual growth by means of truth. Mental growth commences by a spontaneous observation of the concrete things and facts of external nature, followed in due time by a spontaneous analysis and synthesis of them. The child begins life by simply noticing what exists and takes place around it, naming things and facts, and retaining them in its memory. Without this process it can have no mental growth, nothing to draw out its physical and mental activities, and nothing that can ever be an object of its thoughts. In all this process, its sentiments are developing themselves in joyous activity, and drawing it in earnest race after new objects of intellectual gratification. It is in this manner, all spontaneous and not reflecting, that it acquires its power and its materials for subsequent abstraction and generalization, when the time for reflecting and reasoning comes. Without this spontaneous process, in which the sentiments and perceptive faculties have the field to themselves, reflection and reasoning could never take place, for they could have no object. The mind cannot know even itself without observing with the utmost care the forms in which it acts in its spontaneous, as well as in its reflective and calculated development. All its generalizations are necessarily derived from observing nature within and without it. All its abstractions are from known objects, and they are results, rather than principles of mental processes. The mind cannot feed on abstractions, any more than the plant or

the animal on pure carbon. Its life consists in doing its own work; and making abstractions and generalizations is part of that work. All our faculties act spontaneously in the first steps of their development, and it is by observation that we discover their existence and nature, and learn how to apply and improve them. As spontaneously as the plant pushes out its roots and leaves, seeking after food and growing by it, so spontaneously does the mind direct its perceptive faculties to the acquisition of the facts of nature, and its analytic and synthetic faculties to their comprehension and generalization, and grows by the knowledge thus acquired, and by its own activity exercised in assimilating and using it. Rationalism is helpless without these God-given spontaneities, which it desires to disown.

Of the same spontaneous character is the origin of all political association and its institutions. Not rationalism, but sentiment, presides over the process. We have many sentiments, as those of love, sympathy, friendship, patriotism, justice, respect, shame, and the desires of society, esteem, power, eminence, and of receiving and imparting knowledge, that could have no development without society. These are the elements of that social affinity that is essential to human nature, and that forces it into social combination. Social organization is, in its origin, quite as spontaneous, starting its practical development in the respect, obedience, and unity of the family relations. All nature tends to a kind of social harmony and organic form, from the elements of the earth to the elements of cosmical systems—from the crystal up through all the grades of the vegetable and animal world to man himself. Even in the insect and higher animal races, the instinct of social organization is everywhere manifest. Man cannot be without it. Its elements may be found in the sentiments already named, in man's natural desire for order, his natural respect for his superiors, and his natural tendency to form social customs. The organic form is subject to great modifications according to the purposes in which the association takes most interest, to its degree of civilization, and to the dangers that beset it. There can be no absolute or irrelative form. Self-defence is the first law of all organization, and every association will spontaneously take the

form best suited for this, as nearly as they know how, if danger be the absorbing idea of organic action.

There can be but very little rationalism in the forms of social organization, until man has made a large advance in the science of mind; for without this we can no more anticipate the results of any given forms, than we can calculate an eclipse without a knowledge of astronomy. Spontaneity first, criticism afterwards, is the natural order of all human progress. Language and reasoning are spontaneous forms of the organization of thought; and grammar and logic are reflected forms of criticism of this organization, and the derivation of rules for its accuracy and improvement; and mathematics is a species of logic, devoted to the criticism of thought about space and number. Poetry, art, and oratory take the same course. But criticism can never enable us to lay aside our spontaneities. No rational or physiological skill can ever enable the intellect or the will to take a conscious and intelligent control over each atom, or even each fibre, that is active in producing our muscular activity. And so it is with the mind itself: clusters of mental fibres are concerned in every act of thought; and our analytic skill can never reach the point of being able to combine, proportionate and command the action of these several fibres at our pleasure. And so it is with society. No analysis can follow the fibres of social thought and sentiment through all their infinitely varying diversities, or measure out the rational forces by which they are to be commanded. It is only by observation and careful generalization, that the hidden laws of social development and action are to be brought to light. We can have no well-founded philosophical deductions except such as proceed from such generalizations. All valid deduction is, therefore, founded on a previous induction, and can never have a greater degree of certainty than the general principles from which it starts; and, because these can never, in social matters, have the definiteness and necessity of mathematical axioms, the deduction stands in need of all possible verifying aids, before it can be proclaimed as anything more than merely probable truth.

The inductive method is most modest and orderly in all its characteristics. It is not abstract reason, first creating

itself, and then dictating to nature how it must manifest itself; but it is the human understanding, studying with the utmost care the tendencies and affinities of dead matter, and the growth and operations of all vegetable and animal beings, with the utmost respect for the very nature of each, in order that man may know the laws of the relations between him and them. It is especially respectful to nature, when it approaches the study of man and society in order to ascertain the natural laws which preside over all the relations of men with each other. It dictates no political laws for the government of man, except such as it has ascertained, by the careful study of man, to be consistent with the developed principles of his nature, and with his condition and his hopes. It proceeds according to the analogy of growth, and regards all life as a constant anticipation of the future and a preparation for it, by the collection and assimilation of the materials that are to fit it for its higher destiny. With it, life is always a growing upward to flower and fruit; and not a starting from the flower itself, as abstract deduction does. With it, laws change according to the development produced by cultivation and teaching; and therefore, as legislator, it follows in their wake, leaving to the crab-tree its thorny growth until cultivation has improved its disposition, and to the savage his wild customs until the teacher has elevated his aims and his faith. When society rises high enough to place a proper value on its higher moral and intellectual rights, politics will know how to protect them, and not till then.

Induction has none of the impotence that the author and other mere deductive philosophers charge against it, as never being able to rise above actual experience: for it has within it vital principles that are continually elevating experience itself, and enlarging its spiritual sphere. Its power is proved by the immense advance which the physical sciences have made, by its method, in modern times, and by the respectable progress which it has caused in the intellectual, moral and political sciences. These may hope to make still more rapid progress, when they learn to reject the alchemy of abstract deduction, with all its aprioral, transcendent, and pretentious gropings, and its sublimated and illusory manipula-

tions of empty thought. Induction is the natural method of enlarging and generalizing our knowledge, and it has within it a vital force that insures its growth. This demands generalizations, which, though founded on experience, far surpass any individual experience in extent and comprehension; and it urges experience itself onward to still larger experience. There are many spontaneous sentiments of our mental nature—such as wonder, hope, courage, reverence, desire to hypothetize and to test and verify hypotheses, and discontentment with confused and imperfect conceptions—which, when obeyed and cultivated, continually impel us onward to broader generalizations and higher principles; and these are aided by the sentiments of relief and joy that follow and crown successful effort. And accompanying or involved in them all, there is philosophic faith, reaching out after causes and principles, and urging the mind onward and upward after larger and nobler and higher attainments than it has yet accomplished, and ever repelling the thought of impotence for further progress.

ART. II.—*Elements of Physio-Philosophy.* By LORENZ OKEN, M. D., Professor of Natural History at the University of Zürich, &c. Translated by Alfred Tulk. London, 1847, pp. 665.

As critics of Philosophy, we feel it to be a duty to expose, by an analysis of its products, that false method of philosophizing which ignores the humble induction that Newton did not think too low for his genius, and affects to pursue a higher and more intellectual path of investigation. The Rational Cosmology of Dr. Hickok, which is a product of this ambitious method, has recalled to our mind another product of it, the Physio-Philosophy of Oken, the late distinguished Zurich Professor. In our earlier days we read such works as Hickok's and Oken's, with the same emotions that in our childhood we listened to the narratives of Munchausen. But since the his-

tory of speculation has taught us the truth of the remark of Varro, that no doctrine is too absurd for philosophical credulity, we have almost lost the faculty of wonder, and like the anatomist we dissect doctrinal monstrosities for the sake of contrast with that which is true. Dr. Hickok professes to have revived the philosophical method of Plato; and if our readers wish to know what that method is by its fruits, we refer them to the *Timæus*, in which Plato has propounded a Cosmology that is only nonsense, so much so as to call in question its authorship. Dr. Hickok's first sentence is:—"There must somewhere be a position from whence it may clearly be seen that the universe has laws which are necessarily determined by immutable and eternal principles." Now, it behoved Dr. Hickok to inquire, whether such a position be within the sphere of legitimate thought; for if it be beyond the limits of human understanding, it must be by shuffling off human consciousness and ascending by intellectual intuition after the method of Schelling, that such an exalted Pisgah can be reached by man. In fact Dr. Hickok, in the third sentence of his book, admits, that only the absolute reason can stand on such an intellectual eminence. And he adds: "But the finite reason, with its partial insight, must have too limited a comprehension of the eternal principle, to be able adequately to follow out all its determined results from itself, without reference to the facts that have been determined by it to guide his intuitive processes." And in the ninth sentence he says: "Hence his [finite reason] only sure progress must be, first an apprehension of the principle, more or less inadequately, and then following out the principle in its necessary laws by reference to the actual facts that have already been determined by it." Now, this is a great coming down from the scientific apocalypse which was foreshadowed in the first sentence. The first sentence is now seen to be a wholly impertinent declaration, like telling us that God is omniscient, as a preliminary to telling us that man has only partial knowledge. But the assumption that the principles of science are apprehended before the facts of the science, is absurd enough, without claiming for man the ability to stand on the position first pointed out by our author as "somewhere"! But so far as man is concerned, we make bold to

say, it is *nowhere*. The glaring errors, defying even the laws of mechanics, to which this false method has led Dr. Hickok, have already been sufficiently exposed in this journal for April last. And although Dr. Hickok repudiates the method of German transcendentalists, his, after all, is but a modification of the one common error, that in physics there is another method than the inductive, which starts out from facts of experience and climbs to principles. It would be easy to show that Dr. Hickok's doctrine involves the assumption that man can attain to a point of knowledge where *cause* and *reason* are identical. That nature is a *rational* creation and subjected to *rational* principle, is the opening harmony with which the book begins; but the reasonings soon show the doctrine to be utterly out of tune with the facts that have to be *rationally* explained in a *rational* cosmology. The one test problem of a possible *rational* cosmology is, *Are physical causes rational?* Can *cause* and *effect* be brought to human conception, as under the *rational* law of reason and consequent? Can the *reason* for gravity be assigned? We do not mean by *reason*, the adaptation of end and mean. But we mean by reason, such an exclusive necessary antecedent of gravity, that, without thinking of adaptation, to deny it involves an insuperable contradiction upon the mere relation of the antecedent and consequent. This is the test question of a possible rational cosmology.

But let us go from Hickok to Oken! In his book Oken professes to deduce the All from the Nothing. He boldly assumes that the processes of nature and the processes of ratiocination are parallel and identical; and that reasoning and creating are the same.

His book is in three grand divisions, Mathesis, Ontology, and Biology. As nature or the universe is a development from unity to multiplicity, so these divisions bear a relation of development to each other. Mathesis treats of the whole; Ontology, of singulars; and Biology, of the whole in singulars. *Nothing* is the starting point, and *everything* is the goal to which the ratiocination conducts. Such being the plan and the scope of the book, we will show how its purposes are accomplished, and what doctrines it teaches, by quoting from each division a few sentences as samples.

The fundamental doctrine of the book is enounced in these words: "The universe or world is the reality of mathematical ideas, or in simpler language, of mathematics." And "this (says the book) is not to be taken in merely a quantitative sense . . . but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things are numbers themselves." Such being, according to the book, the nature of the universe, the science which explains it must, of course, be mathematical. Accordingly, the book says: "Philosophy is the recognition of mathematical ideas as constituting the world, or the repetition of the origin of the world in consciousness." In conformity with this notion of the province and end of philosophy in general, the book defines its own special science in these words: "Physio-Philosophy has to show how, and in accordance indeed with what laws, the material took its origin; and therefore, how something derived its existence from nothing. It has to portray the first periods of the world's development from nothing; how the elements and heavenly bodies originated; in what method by self-evolution into higher and manifold forms, they separated in minerals, became finally organic, and in man attained self-consciousness." This is the doctrine of development, which made such a noise in the *Vestiges of Creation*, and which Swedenborg in his *Principia* thus articulately propounded: "We finally show that in every drop of water is contained every single thing which had hitherto existed from the first Simple, as also the whole genus of Finites, Actives, and Elementaries; consequently that in a single drop of water is latent the whole Elementary world both visible and invisible." As Man, according to Oken, is the last object whose origin and nature is to be accounted for, his book tells us, at once, Man's relation to all of nature that originates before him in these words: "Man is the summit, the crown of nature's development, and must comprehend everything that has preceded him, even as the fruit includes within itself all the earlier developed parts of the plant. In a word, Man must represent the whole world in miniature. Now, since in Man are manifested self-consciousness or spirit, Physio-Philosophy has to show that the laws of spirit are not different from the laws of nature: but that both are transcripts or likenesses of each other." Such is the con-

ception of science given in the Introduction to the book. And it is clear, that every *rational* cosmology must, in logical consistency, assume that the laws of spirit and those of nature are likenesses of each other. On no other hypothesis is such a science possible.

With such doctrines enounced in the Introduction, the book proceeds to the first division, Mathesis. It is in this fundamental part of the treatise, that Oken puts out his strength; for it is here that he has to educe something from nothing. And mathematics is the instrument by which he is to do this. The marvellous ratiocination thus performs the creative process: "The highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental principle of all mathematics is zero = 0. The whole science of Mathematics is based upon zero. Zero alone determines the value in mathematics. Zero is nothing in itself. Mathematics is based upon nothing, and consequently arises out of nothing. Out of nothing therefore it is possible for something to arise, for mathematics, consisting of propositions, is a something in relation to 0. Mathematics itself were nothing if it had none other than its highest principle zero. In order, therefore, that mathematics may become a real science, it must, in addition to its highest principle, subdivide into a number of details, namely, first of all into numbers, and finally into propositions. What is tenable in regard to mathematics must be equally so of all the sciences; they must all resemble mathematics." This reasoning reminds us of the Irishman's mode of casting cannon: "Take a *hole*, to be sure, and pour the melted iron around it."

But let us see how Oken steps from Mathematics to Nature. "The Eternal (says he) is the nothing of Nature. As the whole of mathematics emerges out of Zero, so must everything which is singular have emerged from the Eternal or Nothing in nature." And further: "The continuance of Being is a continuous positing of the Eternal, or of the nothing, a ceaseless process of being real in that which is not. There exists nothing but nothing, nothing but the Eternal, and all individual existence is only a fallacious existence." As the book proceeds it becomes a little more specific; and, therefore, we find the nothing becoming more tangible, as in the following: "The

line is a long nothing, the surface a hollow nothing, the sphere a dense nothing; in short, the something is a nothing which has received only predicates. All things are nothings with different forms." And these nothings are combined and held together in a world by nothing. For the book says: "Gravity is a weighty nothing." So much for the doctrine of *nothing* pregnant with *everything*.

As the book, as we have shown, declares in the outset, that all things are composed of mathematical ideas, the reader will doubtless be curious to know how such a doctrine can be applied to man. "Man (says the book) is the whole of arithmetic compacted, however, out of all numbers; he can, therefore, produce numbers out of himself." And nothing daunted in his convincing ratiocination, Oken tells us—"Theology is arithmetic personified." From this notion of theology, we will show what are Oken's ideas of God.

"God (says the book) is a rotating globe. The world is God rotating." Again: "God previous to his determination to create a world was darkness; in the first act of creation, however, he appeared as fire. God's whole consciousness, apart from individual thoughts, is fire—the world is none other than a rotating globe of fire." "Every thing that is has originated out of fire." The presumption of such declarations as the foregoing, calls to our mind what old Emerson, the British mathematician, said in his Algebra, of John and Daniel Bérnouilli: "These men talk as if they were God Almighty's privy councillors, and that nothing was made without their advice."

We will now proceed to the second division, Ontology, and exhibit some of its doctrines. And we will first quote a luminous passage on the nature of light: "Light is time that has become real." And the nature of water is thus expounded: "If the essence of water consists in the contest between form and formlessness, it must thus seek to produce fluidity everywhere." And the metaphysical nature of rain is revealed in this intelligible sentence: "All rain is the extinguished function, the dying spirit of air." And of the sun it is taught: "The sun is a true gelatinous animal, a body trembling through its whole mass, and therefore phosphorescent." The follow-

ing consummation in geology is instructive: "Salt concludes the growth of the earths; it is the eruption or breaking out of the soul, as the metal was the body of earths completed. Both finally pass into a higher world, the metal into the *corporeal*, the salt into the *psychical*."

Our readers are perhaps tired of such philosophy, we, therefore, will conclude, after we have given a few sentences from the last division, Biology: "Galvanism is the principle of life. There is no other vital force than galvanic polarity. . . . A galvanic pile pounded into atoms must become alive. In this manner nature brings forth organic bodies." "Light shines upon the water and it is salted. Light shines on the salted sea, and it is alive." "The whole sea is alive."

We will finish our citations with the following: "Gazing upon a snail, one believes that he finds the prophesying goddess sitting upon the tripod. What majesty is in a creeping snail, what reflection, what earnestness, what timidity, and yet at the same time what firm confidence! Surely a snail is an exalted symbol of mind slumbering deeply within itself."

We have given our readers a glimpse of the last consummation of German speculation. Jacobi said, that when he read Oken, he did not know whether he was standing on his head or his feet. We have read the ponderous volume more than once, to see how baneful is a false method of philosophizing, destroying the common sense of the ablest minds. For it must not be supposed by our readers that Oken was either a fool or a madman. Professor Agassiz, in his masterly essay on classification prefixed to his Natural History of the United States, thus speaks of Oken: "About the time Cuvier and the French naturalists were tracing the structure of the animal kingdom, and attempting to erect a natural system of zoölogy upon this foundation, there arose in Germany a school of philosophy, under the lead of Schelling, which extended its powerful influence to all the departments of physical science. Oken, Kieser, Bojanus, Spix, Huschke, and Carus, are the most eminent naturalists, who applied the philosophy to the study of zoölogy. But no one identified his philosophical views so completely with his studies in natural history as Oken.

"Now (proceeds Agassiz) that the current is setting so strongly

against everything which recalls the German physio-philosophers and their doings, and it has become fashionable to speak ill of them, it is an imperative duty for the impartial reviewer of the history of science, to show how great and how beneficial the influence of Oken has been upon the progress of science in general and of zoölogy in particular. It is, moreover, easier, while borrowing his ideas, to sneer at his style and his nomenclature, than to discover the true meaning of what is left unexplained in his most paradoxical, sententious, or aphoristical expressions; but the man who has changed the whole method of illustrating comparative osteology—who has carefully investigated the embryology of the higher animals, at a time when few physiologists were paying any attention to the subject, who has classified the three kingdoms of nature upon principles wholly his own, who has perceived thousands of homologies and analogies among organized beings entirely overlooked before, who has published an extensive treatise of natural history containing a condensed account of all that was known at the time of its publication, who has conducted for twenty-five years the most extensive and complete periodical review of the natural sciences ever published, in which every discovery made during a quarter of a century is faithfully recorded, the man who inspired every student with an ardent love for science, and with admiration for his teacher—that man will never be forgotten, nor can the services he has rendered to science be overlooked, so long as thinking is connected with investigation.”

We quote this passage from Agassiz, both to show the position of Oken in the history of science, and to censure the unqualified praise bestowed on a philosopher with so false a method of philosophizing. The “thinking connected with investigation” must be subordinated to facts. And especially must the physical and the spiritual be discriminated, which is not done by Oken, and we are sorry to say, is not sufficiently done by Agassiz himself in his writings on natural history. We therefore set off the nonsense which we have adduced from Oken against the praise by Agassiz, without putting ourself to the trouble of showing that Agassiz underrates the pernicious influence of the German physio-philosophical method of investigation, in proving, from his own writings, that he often employs

it himself. At the same time, however, we cannot withhold our admiration of his contributions to natural history, and our expression of thanks to him for his noble essay on classification, while we demur to his notion about the unity of the human species.

ART. III.—*Classification and Mutual Relation of the Mental Faculties.*

THE subject indicated by this title will vindicate its importance, as we proceed in the discussion of it. It will be seen to have a bearing on some of the most important questions relative to the sphere of human responsibility, sin and grace, anthropology and soterology. Besides the intrinsic importance of the subject, the publication of Hamilton's Lectures offers an additional motive for surveying it under the fresh and strong light which they throw upon it.

The accepted classification of the powers of the mind, until a comparatively recent period, was twofold—intellectual and voluntary, under the respective heads of understanding and will. The following statement of Reid describes with sufficient accuracy the doctrine on this subject in and before his day.*

“The powers of the mind are so many, so various, and so connected and complicated in most of its operations, that there never has been any division of them proposed which is not liable to considerable objections. We shall, therefore, take that general division which is the most common, into the powers of understanding and those of will. Under the will we comprehend our active powers, and all that lead to action, or influence the mind to act; such as appetites, passions, affections. The understanding comprehends our contemplative powers, by which we perceive objects, by which we conceive or remember them, by which we analyse or compound them, and by which we judge and reason concerning them.”

* Reid on the Intellectual Powers: Essay I. Chap. 7.

To the same effect Edwards says:*

"I humbly conceive that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though there were two faculties. All acts of the affections are in some sense acts of the will, and all acts of the will are acts of the affections. All exercises of the will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the soul's appetite or aversion; or, which is the same thing, of its love or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more than another; but love and hatred are affections of the soul. Therefore all acts of the will are truly acts of the affections; though the exercises of the will do not obtain the name of passions, unless the will, either in its aversion or opposition, be exercised in a high degree, or in a vigorous and lively manner."

According to this distribution and nomenclature, will is used to include all the powers of the mind except the cognitive; that is, all whose functions terminate in action or prompting to action rather than in knowing. Dugald Stewart classifies all these powers which had been previously included under the term *will*, under the generic designation of "moral and active powers"—a phrase which has since had extensive currency. According to this method, will, instead of being the genus under which all the appetitive, emotional, and optative powers rank as species, is simply one species co-ordinate with the various other species of faculties, included in the genus, "moral and active powers."

This is a considerable advance towards that threefold primary distribution of the mental faculties, which has been adopted by nearly all later psychologists, and which sets intermediate between the intellect and will, a class of powers under the generic title of feeling, or sensibility, or susceptibility, or emotion, or other equivalent phrase. Under this head are included all mental powers which lie between cognition on the one hand, and deliberate choice or matured volition on the other—the appetites, passions, affections, emotions, desires, inclinations, etc. The more common phraseology in vogue to

* Edwards's Works, New York edition, vol. iv. p. 83.

denote this distribution of the powers of the mind is, intellect, sensibility, and will.

In themselves, the particular classification of the mental powers, and the nomenclature denoting it, are of small moment, so long as, under the various modes of distribution, the same essential faculties or modes of activity, in themselves and their reciprocal relations, are recognized and admitted. Up to this point, it is a question not of truth or fact, but of convenient arrangement, and perspicuous expression or definition. But it is quite obvious that the two-fold classification rules out certain theories in regard to the will's independency of the desires and feelings which some contend for, and which is compatible with, though not demanded by, the three-fold distribution above mentioned. If the dependence of the will on the feelings and desires be admitted, this inevitably implicates it with the intellect, since it cannot be denied that the feelings and desires are dependent on, as they are shaped and evoked by, the apprehensions of the intellect. This mode of conceiving of the mind and its powers, is wholly incompatible with that style of reasoning which treats the different classes of faculties, or modes of the soul's activity, as if they were different agents or entities—either a triad, a thinking substance, a feeling substance, a willing substance, or a duality, i. e. a cognitive substance, independent of the sensitive and optative. No one of course consciously or intentionally maintains any such dual or tripartite constitution of the soul. But there are many modes of thinking and reasoning which depend upon some such covert hypothesis for even the appearance of plausibility. The following are specimens. Dr. Taylor's celebrated formula for solving the mystery of the existence of moral evil, that the will or "power of choice is a power to choose morally wrong or morally right *under every possible influence to prevent such choice or action*,"* is utterly inexplicable and absurd, except on the hypothesis, (which the author never meant to adopt,) that the will is an agent independent of the intellect and the feelings. Dr. Tappan defines the will as that "which has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will

* Taylor's Moral Government, vol. i., p. 307.

indifferent, for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its action would be necessary.”* Again: “The only escape from necessity, therefore, is the conception of will as above defined—a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to passion, or passion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly which may act in the indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion.”† Again: “The reason and the sensitivity do not determine the acts of the will. The will has efficiency, or creative or modifying power in itself, self-moved, self-directed.”‡ Such representations are plainly inconsistent with the unity of the human soul, and the most familiar facts of consciousness. Instead of one cognitive, sentient, optative agent, whose thinking, feeling, and willing, all mutually interact and determine each other, it sets forth the will as a separate and independent agent, with “creative or modifying power in itself,” so that it may act either in opposition to the views of the understanding, to the highest pleasure and strongest inclination of the soul, or in “the indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or passion.” Such language implies a pair or a triplet of agents in the human soul. Yet this is not the author’s doctrine, although it is logically implied in his theory of the will. He tells us elsewhere, “the will is so conditioned in its relations to the other faculties, and in the unity of the mind, that it cannot go into action, unless supplied with objects, aims, and laws, by the reason and the sensitivity.”§ Is not here a plain contradiction? Can the will at the same time act “without reference to the reason and the sensitivity,” and be dependent on them for its “objects, aims, and laws”? This mode of reasoning, which implies not only distinction, but the separate being of the intelligent, emotional and voluntary powers, is no necessary consequence of this threefold distribution of the mental faculties. As we shall presently see, it is far from

* Tappan’s Review of Edwards on the Will, p. 221.

† Id. p. 227.

‡ Tappan on the Will, p. 300.

§ Id. p. 244.

being embraced by the highest authorities in favour of such a distribution.

For reasons already in part indicated, those who class all the faculties of the mind under the heads of understanding and will, seldom tend towards any such breach of the soul's unity. Since, on this theory, the desires are included under the will and determine its choices, while they are guided and evoked by the views of the intellect, which in its turn is largely excited and determined in its activity by the feelings and will; all these are thus but diverse yet reciprocally intertwined modes of the energizing of the one rational sentient, voluntary mind. So Reid well represents in a passage immediately following that already quoted from him.

“Although this general division may be of use in order to our proceeding more methodically in our subject, we are not to understand it as if, in those operations which are ascribed to the understanding, there were no exertion of will or activity, or as if the understanding were not employed in the operations ascribed to the will: for I conceive there is no operation of the understanding wherein the mind is not active in some degree. We have some command over our thoughts, and can attend to this or that, of many objects which present themselves to our senses, to our memory, or to our imagination. We can survey an object on this side or that, superficially or accurately, for a longer or a shorter time; so that our contemplative powers are under the guidance and direction of the active, and the former never pursue their object, without being led and directed, urged or restrained by the latter.” * *

“And as the mind exerts some degree of activity even in the operations of the understanding, so it is certain, that there can be no act of will which is not accompanied with some act of understanding. The will must have an object, and that object must be apprehended or conceived in the understanding. It is therefore to be remembered, that in most, if not all the operations of the mind, both faculties concur; and we range the operation under that faculty which hath the largest share in it.”

It is only in this view that the maxim, “nothing is moral which is not voluntary,” which Chalmers felt constrained to

enounce with "all the pomp and circumstance of a first principle," can be accepted—at least if it be applied beyond external acts to the interior exercises and states of the soul. If the will be regarded as including the desires and feelings, as both influenced by and itself influencing the judgments of the intellect, the maxim will hold, otherwise not. For nothing is more surely attested by consciousness, by the universal language and conduct of men, and by the most explicit testimonies of the word of God, than that the desires, affections, feelings, and even judgments of the mind in regard to things moral and spiritual, are themselves moral and responsible. Dr. Chalmers, overlooking the breadth of the word will, voluntary, &c., according to former usage, sought to reconcile these undeniable facts with the foregoing maxim, by making the character of the desires and feelings contingent on the choice of the will, viewed in its restricted sense, as the mere faculty of choosing or purposing distinct from them. The difficulty with this solution is, that the facts are all the other way. Regarding the will as distinct from the desires, its choices are directly determined by them; they are in accordance with the preponderant desires, while it in turn can only very indirectly and partially control these desires.

This threefold distribution of the powers of the mind has served the exigencies of those who deny all moral character to the desires, feelings, and dispositions. Using will in the restricted sense, and applying the maxim that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, they easily reach the conclusion that only volitions and acts consequent on them have moral quality; and not only so, but that these volitions must be acts of a power of self-determination or contrary choice, "despite all opposing power," "without reference to reason or passion," judgment or inclination. This, however, may be easily shown to be rather a perversion of this classification than a disproof of its validity. The most thorough and trust-worthy thinkers now adopt it, so drawing their lines of demarcation, and explaining the grounds and nature of the partition, as to avoid the pestilent errors to which we have alluded. We will quote first from Dr. McCosh, and then from Hamilton, whose de-

velopment of the same essential view is more scientific and complete. Says Dr. McCosh:

“We think it high time that writers on mental science should be prepared to admit that there is a separate class of states of the mind, which, for want of a better, we may call by the term WILL, or, as we should prefer, the OPTATIVE states of mind.”*

“We hold the will to be a general attribute of the mind and its operations manifested under various forms. It says of this object, It is good—I desire it; of that, It is evil, I reject it. In its feeblest form, it is simply wish, or the opposite of wish; and according as it fixes on the object as more or less good or evil, it rises till it may become the most intense desire or abhorrence. In its most decisive form, it is resolution or positive volition. When inconsistent objects present themselves, and the mind would choose both if it could, there may for a time be a clashing or contest. Where there is no clashing of desires, or where one of the contending desires has prevailed, and the object is declared to be better or best, and where it is also ascertained to be attainable, then the will assumes this form—I choose this; I resolve to obtain it. This, the consummating step, is commonly called volition, to distinguish it from simple wish or desire. And we hold that it is the same attribute of the mind which says, this object is good, I wish it, and desire it; and which says, on there being no competing good, or no good esteemed as equal to it, I choose it.”

“It is of the utmost moment, even in a psychological point of view, to distinguish between the emotions and the will. We cannot comprehend man’s nature and constitution, without conceiving of him as endowed with more than a mere emotional impressibility or receptive sensibility.”†

This distribution differs from that of Hamilton, only in the terms used to denote it. For the word “optative,” Hamilton uses “conative,” and he does not, like McCosh, use the word will to denote desire. We quote at some length his exposition of his views, both for the sake of the intrinsic light it sheds on a subject so important and so difficult, and as evidence of the

* “Divine Government, Physical and Moral,” p. 275. † Id. pp. 277–8.

doctrine of the most eminent of recent philosophers in relation to it.

“But taking, again, a survey of the mental modifications, or phenomena, of which we are conscious—these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great classes. In the first place, there are the phenomena of knowledge; in the second place, there are the phenomena of feeling, or the phenomena of pleasure and pain; and, in the third place, there are the phenomena of will and desire.

“Let me illustrate this by an example. I see a picture. Now, first of all—I am conscious of perceiving a certain complement of colours and figures—I recognize what the object is. This is the phenomenon of cognition or knowledge. But this is not the only phenomenon of which I may be here conscious. I may experience certain affections, in the contemplation of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, the gratification will be unalloyed; but if it be an unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfaction. This is the phenomenon of feeling—or of pleasure and pain. But these two phenomena do not yet exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occasion. I may desire to see the picture long—to see it often—to make it my own, and, perhaps, I may will, resolve, or determine so to do. This is the complex phenomenon of will and desire.

“The English language, unfortunately, does not afford us terms competent to express and discriminate, with even tolerable clearness and precision, these classes of phenomena. In regard to the first, indeed, we have comparatively little reason to complain—the synonymous terms, *knowledge* and *cognition* suffice to distinguish the phenomena of this class from those of the other two. In the second class, the defect of the language becomes more apparent. The word *feeling* is the only term under which we can possibly collect the phenomena of pleasure and pain, and yet this word is ambiguous. For it is not only employed to denote what we are conscious of as agreeable or disagreeable in our mental states, but it is likewise used as a synonym for the sense of touch. It is, however, principally in relation to the third class that the deficiency is manifested. In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of ade-

quately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the *nisus* or *conatus*—the tendency towards the realization of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire, a blind and fatal, tendency to act. Now, to express, I say, the tendency to overt action—the quality in which desire and will are equally contained—we possess no English term to which an exception of more or less cogency may not be taken. Were we to say the phenomena of *tendency*, the phrase would be vague; and the same is true of the phenomena of *doing*. Again, the term, phenomena of *appetency*, is objectionable, because, (to say nothing of the unfamiliarity of the expression,) *appetency*, though perhaps etymologically unexceptionable, has both in Latin and English a meaning almost synonymous with desire. Like the Latin *appetentia*, the Greek *ὀρεξις* is equally ill-balanced, for, though used by philosophers to comprehend both will and desire, it more familiarly suggests the latter, and we need not, therefore, be solicitous, with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, to naturalize in English the term *orectic*. Again, the phrase, phenomena of activity, would be even worse; every possible objection can be made to the term *active powers*, by which the philosophers of this country have designated the *orectic faculties* of the Aristotelians. For you will observe, that all faculties are equally active; and it is not the overt performance, but the tendency towards it, for which we are in quest of an expression. The German is the only language I am acquainted with which is able to supply the term of which philosophy is in want. The expression *Bestrebungs Vermögen*, which is most nearly, though awkwardly and inadequately, translated by *striving faculties*—faculties of effort or endeavour—is now generally employed, in the philosophy of Germany, as the genus comprehending desire and will. Perhaps the phrase, phenomena of *exertion*, is, upon the whole, the best expression to denote the manifestations, and *exertive* faculties, the best expression to denote the faculties of will and desire. *Exero*, in Latin, means literally *to put forth*—and, with us, *exertion* and *exertive* are the only endurable words that I can find which approximate, though distantly, to the strength and precision of the German expression. I shall, however, occasionally employ likewise the term *appetency*, in the rigorous

signification I have mentioned—as a genus comprehending under it both desires and volitions.”

“This division of the phenomena of mind into the three great classes of the cognitive faculties—the feelings, or capacities of pleasure and pain—and the exertive or conative powers—I do not propose as original. It was first promulgated by Kant, and the felicity of the distribution was so apparent, that it has now been long all but universally adopted in Germany by the philosophers of every school; and, what is curious, the only philosopher of any eminence by whom it has been assailed—indeed the only philosopher of any reputation by whom it has been, in that country, rejected, is not an opponent of the Kantian philosophy, but one of its most zealous champions. To the psychologists of this country, it is apparently wholly unknown. They still adhere to the old scholastic division into powers of the understanding and powers of the will; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into intellectual and active powers.”

“By its author, the Kantian classification has received no illustration; and by other German philosophers, it has apparently been viewed as too manifest to require any. Nor do I think it needs much; though a few words in explanation may not be inexpedient. An objection to the arrangement may, perhaps, be taken on the ground that the three classes are not co-ordinate. It is evident that every mental phenomenon is either an act of knowledge, or only possible through an act of knowledge—for consciousness is a knowledge—a phenomenon of cognition; and, on this principle, many philosophers—as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, Platner, and others, have been led to regard the knowing, or representative faculty, as they called it—the faculty of cognition, as the fundamental power of mind, from which all others are derivative. To this the answer is easy. These philosophers did not observe that, although pleasure and pain—although desire and volition, are only as they are known to be; yet, in these modifications, a quality, a phenomenon of mind, absolutely new, has been superadded, which was never involved in, and could, therefore, never have been evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowledge. The faculty of knowledge is certainly the first in order, inas-

much as it is the *conditio sine qua non* of the others; and we are able to conceive a being possessed of the power of recognizing existence, and yet wholly void of all feeling of pain and pleasure, and of all powers of desire and volition. On the other hand, we are wholly unable to conceive a being possessed of feeling and desire, and, at the same time, without a knowledge of any object upon which his affections may be employed, and without a consciousness of these affections themselves.

“We can further conceive a being possessed of knowledge and feeling alone—a being endowed with a power of recognizing objects, of enjoying the exercise, and of grieving at the restraint, of his activity—and yet devoid of that faculty of voluntary agency—of that conation which is possessed by man. To such a being would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, but neither desire nor will, properly so called. On the other hand, however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of a voluntary activity independently of all feeling; for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be determined to energy through a pain or pleasure—through an estimate of the relative worth of objects.”

“In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and conations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these phenomena are possible independently of each other. In our philosophical systems, they may stand separated from each other in books and chapters;—in nature they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modification of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, go to constitute the mental state; and it is only by a scientific abstraction that we are able to analyze the state into elements, which are never really existent but in mutual combination. These elements are found, indeed, in very various proportions in different states—sometimes one preponderates, sometimes another; but there is no state in which they are not all co-existent.”

“Let the mental phenomena, therefore, be distributed under the three heads of phenomena of cognition, or the faculties of knowledge; phenomena of feeling, or the capacities of pleasure and pain; and phenomena of desiring or willing, or the powers of conation.”

“The order of these is determined by their relative consecu-

tion. Feeling and appetency suppose knowledge. The cognitive faculties, therefore, stand first. But as will, and desire, and aversion, suppose a knowledge of the pleasurable and painful, the feelings will stand second as intermediate between the other two.”*

Few who have attended to this subject, and felt its difficulties, will fail to appreciate the aid which this luminous discourse contributes to its elucidation. It clears much of the obscurity and confusion which have so long clouded it. Still it is not exhaustive, or in all respects unquestionable. And here we take occasion to say, that while few set a higher value than ourselves on Hamilton’s contributions to philosophy, we hope that his writings will warm into life no school characterized by a servile adherence to his opinions. Those opinions on some subjects, especially the “relativity of human knowledge,” causality, the absolute and infinite, in our opinion, require to be subjected to the test of a rigorous, competent, and impartial criticism, and to be severely qualified, in order to leave a sure foundation either for knowledge or faith. In regard to the foregoing passage, we have simply two comments to offer.

1. Both Hamilton and McCosh imply, if they do not expressly affirm, that mere feeling or emotion, as distinguished from desire and will, has no moral character. This is true of some feelings and emotions, but not of others. It depends wholly on what the feeling is, subjectively and objectively, in itself and its object. Feelings of pleasure in view of acts of injustice, fraud, violence, licentiousness, malice; of pain at the triumph of truth, or the presence and influence of holy men, are plainly immoral and criminal. So to rejoice in the moral improvement, the conversion, or growth in grace of another, and to grieve over his downfall and apostasy, are morally right and praiseworthy. Those who were “glad” at the diabolical proposal of

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., pp. 127—131. We quote from the Boston edition, published by Gould & Lincoln, an excellent reprint of the British edition, on fine paper, and in large clear type, which it is a pleasure to read. We take this method of bringing the American edition to the notice of our readers, which we inadvertently omitted to do in our last number—the article on Hamilton in it making exclusive reference to the Edinburgh and London edition.

Judas, were certainly and deeply criminal therefor. Luke xxii. 5. Such as "have pleasure in those" that do things worthy of death incur the condemnation of God and all right-minded men. Rom. i. 32. In short, while other feelings are indifferent, feelings in regard to things of a moral and spiritual nature are morally right or wrong according to their nature. They are energizings of soul which emit and evince its purity or corruption. This we deem a principle of great moment in morals, religion, and especially Christian doctrine and experience.

2. In the passage just quoted, Hamilton says: "By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire a blind and fatal tendency to act." Such a statement demands earnest and profound consideration. That which may properly be described as a "blind and fatal tendency to act," is thereby divested of moral quality and responsibility. There are, doubtless, desires of this description, as we shall presently see. But our desires in regard to things strictly moral are neither "blind" nor "fatal" nor irresponsible. Desire is distinguished from volition by being spontaneous rather than deliberative. But it is none the less free and intelligent for that.* Are not covetousness, inordinate ambition, all malevolent desires free, intelligent, and culpable, although they have not as yet ripened into any deliberate volition or purpose? Are not benevolent desires, holy aspirations, the desire to glorify God and bless man, free, intelligent, and morally worthy and commendable, even when no opportunity is offered for volitions, purposes, and overt acts in gratification of these desires? No unper-

* Dr. Archibald Alexander, speaking of the maxim that all moral actions are voluntary, says: "The word *voluntary* as employed in the maxim under consideration, includes more than volition; it comprehends all the spontaneous exercises of the mind; that is, all its affections and emotions. Formerly all these were included under the word *will*, and we still use language that requires this latitude in the construction of the term. Thus it would be consonant to the best usage to say, that man is perfectly voluntary in loving his friend and hating his enemy; but by this is not meant that these affections are effects of volition, but only that they are the free spontaneous exercises of the mind. That all virtue consists in volition is not true, as we have seen; but that all virtuous exercises are spontaneous, is undoubtedly correct. Our moral character consists radically in our feelings and desires."—*Moral Science*, pp. 207, 208.

verted conscience can waver as to the true answer to such questions. And whoever may hesitate, the word of God places the matter beyond all controversy. For to those who do not otherwise know lust as sinful, the law says, "Thou shalt not covet." It condemns fleshly lusts, which war against the soul. It denounces emulations, wrath, strife, hatred, as works of the flesh lusting against the Spirit, and therefore excluding from the kingdom of God. (Gal. v. 19—21.) But to adduce all the scriptural proofs, express and implied, of this truth, would be to quote the whole Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse.

There is, however, a class of desires that are both "blind and fatal," and therefore irresponsible, except so far as indulging or curbing them is concerned. These are the animal appetites, which are uneasy sensations generating a desire for what will allay them, and returning periodically after they have been allayed. These are the *coecae cupiditates* of the ancients. They arise without any exercise of reason, and are entirely irrespective of any apprehensions of the mind. This is their specific difference which distinguishes them from the desires we have been considering. Those are evoked by the cognitions of the intellect, and reach forth towards the objects thus set before them. Now it is obvious that these desires in themselves possess no moral quality. Our whole responsibility terminates with our agency in restraining or denying, indulging or enkindling them. The following observations by Dr. Archibald Alexander on this subject seem to us eminently sound and judicious.

"We cannot extinguish the animal feelings by an act of the will; they arise involuntarily, and therefore cannot be in themselves of a moral nature. Yet as man has other principles and powers by which he should be governed, he becomes faulty when he neglects to govern these lower propensities in accordance with the dictates of reason and conscience. But in regard to other desires and affections, they are good or bad in every degree in which they exist. For example, not only are malice and envy sinful when ripened into acts, but the smallest conceivable exercise of such feelings is evil; and as they increase in strength, their moral evil increases. It does not require an act of volition, consenting to these feelings, to render them

evil; their very essence is evil, and is condemned by the moral sense of mankind.

“A clear understanding of this distinction might have prevented or reconciled an old dispute, viz. whether concupiscence was of the nature of sin, in the first rising of desire, prior to any act of the will.”*

This, as all competent persons must see, strikes at the very root of the great controversies respecting sin and grace. And it is no less evident that the psychological and metaphysical questions which emerge out of the subject we are now discussing, reach very far into the field of anthropology and soterology. It is on this account that these questions are invested with permanent importance and dignity.

With this dissent from some of Hamilton’s statements in connection with the distribution of the mental faculties, we think the distribution itself eminently luminous and philosophical. Not the least important of his observations are those in regard to the necessary dependence of the powers of feeling on the intellect, and of desire and will on both feeling and intellect together with the fact that these various forms of the soul’s activity, though capable of being distinguished, are inseparable from, and mutually implicated in, each other. We shall devote the residue of this article to some remarks on the unity of the soul, and the reciprocal interaction of the cognitive and optative faculties—of the intellect and will, in the broad sense of the latter term.

It is a cardinal principle, which rises almost to the eminence of a first truth, that the mind or soul of man is one, however diverse its faculties or modes of operation; even as the body is one organism and substance, however various its members and forms of activity. This truth is often forgotten or obscured by modes of reasoning which imply that the will is a separate substance from the intellect, just as independent of it, as one soul is from another: also that the desires and affections are not less separate from the will and intellect; and that all three departments of our nature, the voluntary, the emotional, and the intellectual, are not like the pulse and lungs, and blood,

* *Moral Science*, pp. 145, 146.

the mutually dependent workings and developments of one common life, but the separate and independent activities of different agents—as it were of an angel, man, or devil. How common is it for men to reason on these subjects as if the same person might be in intellect an angel, in will a man, in feeling a fiend! Now the human soul is no such double or triple essence as this. It is one, indivisible, self-same soul, that knows and thinks, that feels and wills. This is a first truth. Let it not be supposed that a man can be in thought an angel, in feeling a fiend; in opinion an atheist, in his affections devout; in his thoughts a hero, in his feelings a coward; in his intellect an unbeliever, in heart a saint. “As a man *thinketh in his heart*, so is he.” That there is in fallen humanity greater or less conflict between the decisions of conscience and other judgments, apprehensions, feelings, and purposes of the soul, is true. But this is not so much a war between the thinking and feeling faculties, as between the judgments and emotions of conscience on the one hand, and other judgments and feelings of the one identical mind on the other, as we shall yet more fully see. But whatever this conflict be, it is the effect and the evidence of a fallen state of the soul. In its original integrity and normal actings, there is no discord. All is harmony, not only between the different faculties, but between the different actings of the same faculties.

The intellect and will plainly differ from each other, as it is the province of the one to know; of the other to desire or choose. The formal object of the one is truth, of the other good; i. e. if we know anything, we know it as true. If we desire or choose anything, we desire or choose it as good; i. e. as worthy, lovely, or pleasant. It may, however, happen through the imperfection of our faculties that what we take for truth may prove false—and, through our depravity, that what we take for good, may be evil. Nevertheless, what the will chooses, it chooses under the notion of its being good; just as the intellect perceives a thing under the notion of its being true. As Edwards says, “The will is always as the greatest apparent good.” “Apparent good,” observe, not necessarily, of course, real or intrinsic good; good in the sense of

being pleasant, fitted to gratify the longings of the soul at the time. It is impossible to give a definition or analysis more philosophically accurate than the inspired record presents in its description of the origin of the first sin of our race. Mark the language; Gen. iii. 6, "And when the woman saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree *to be desired* to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." When the will chooses any object, therefore, it does so in view of its being on the whole, *in the existing state of its desires*, better, i. e. more to be desired than any competing objects. It is in short "as the greatest apparent good." This being evident and undeniable, a great principle follows, which brings to view the first nexus between the operations of the will and the intellect. It is this. Before anything can be chosen or desired by the will as good, it must be seen or apprehended as such. How is it possible to choose or desire what is not seen to be good or desirable? Every one's consciousness teaches him that it is not. Now to see or apprehend is an act of the intellect. Hence it follows,

1. That there can be no act of the will or optative faculties without some corresponding cognition of the intellect to guide it. It cannot choose to desire without light from the intellect to direct it. In the order of nature, too, if not of time, this intellectual apprehension or discernment, must precede the choice of the will, else how can it guide that choice? This however needs not to be argued. If any one says he can conceive of a choice, without first knowing or discerning the object chosen, he is plainly beyond the reach of argument. Not only, however, is there this *a priori* necessity that the mind can choose nothing which it does not first perceive; but,

2. As has already been hinted, the mind can only choose what is viewed as good or desirable. It can only desire what is viewed as attractive; and among the things thus viewed as pleasing or desirable, it will, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all, elect that which seems best, i. e. most pleasing or desirable. Here again the exercises of the intellect are not only implicated with, they take the lead of, they guide, they in a high degree determine the exercises of will and desire. There

is no such divorce between the will and intellect, and their respective actings as many have contended for. It is one and the same mind in the same complex act, discerning, desiring, wishing, choosing one and the same object. But among its faculties it is past all doubt that the understanding is, or of right ought to be, at the head. The will, including the sensibility and inclinations, is the motive energy—(hence called moral and active) like the engine of a steamship. But the understanding is the helm, the directive power which determines the course of this motive energy, and of the whole man as moved by it.

3. But if the understanding leads the will, in the sense explained, the will reacts upon and leads the intellect. Their influence is reciprocal, although that of the understanding is first in order and power. It is a familiar fact that the judgments of the intellect are much affected by our desires and preferences, our likes and dislikes. Men are very apt to think as they desire to think—as interest, taste, passion, prejudice, a friendly or unfriendly bias disposes them to think on all subjects. How constantly do they make their thinking and reasoning powers the slaves and dupes of their passions!

This is emphatically so in regard to moral and religious truths. When the will and desires are corrupt or averse to truth and righteousness, they suborn the intellect to do their bidding—to call evil good and good evil; to put light for darkness and darkness for light; to become a false, because a prejudiced witness. Thus the language of inspiration exhibits the perverse will as enticing the mind away from the true knowledge of God; while right feelings restore it to true wisdom. The language of the wicked is declared to be, "Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways. Who is the Almighty, that we should serve him? and what profit should we have, if we pray unto him?" On the other hand, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding." Let a man in his feelings dislike any just person, or any duty, and all his judgments and reasonings in regard to them will be perverted and poisoned thereby. They will be dragooned into subserviency thereto. To

vindicate what is liked; to make the worse appear the better reason, are among the most familiar intellectual phenomena.

It must not be forgotten, however, that these feelings of aversion or preference (for reasons already indicated,) in their rise, were implicated in the views of the intellect, as these evoke, guide, and shape our emotions, desires, volitions. The common phrase, "to *conceive* an aversion or preference," shows how, in the common judgment of men, the intellect is concerned in the genesis of our desires and feelings. The constant phraseology of Scripture shows how indissolubly united are the will and understanding in all moral acts and states. We are there told of the thoughts of the heart; the desires of the mind; the understanding darkened; of men being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart. But it is needless to accumulate authoritative testimonies and arguments. It is enough to refer each one to his own consciousness. And among its most obvious phenomena is this, that in reference to objects of choice we generally think as we feel, and feel as we think. It is no argument to the contrary, that men in their desires, purposes, and conduct, fall below their convictions of duty. This only proves that the soul is seduced by some competing attraction, which, for the time being, and without good reason, is viewed by it as more desirable. The judgments of conscience, its emotions of pleasure or pain, have not been allowed their rightful supremacy. Other views and emotions have been allowed to thrust themselves into the foreground; to usurp the command which belongs to the decisions and emotions of conscience—the true monarch *de jure*, if not *de facto*.

But it may be inquired, how is it possible for the intellect, which is made to apprehend truth and evidence, to evade their force, or fail to be controlled by them? How can the will prevent the natural working of the intellect or forestall its judgments, especially since, as we have already seen, the understanding is or should be the ruling faculty? This is a fair question. In regard to the first upspring of desire and volition, it has undoubtedly been shown, that the cognitive faculties must take the lead. How then can will or desire prevent

or blind the intellect? This brings us to another and most important point of correlation between conative and intellectual powers, showing the influence of the former over the latter. We say then,

4. That the will largely controls the judgments of the intellect, by controlling its acts of attention. *Attention is in most cases a voluntary act.* We attend to objects, only as we will or determine so to attend to them. Hence, the world over, men ask attention to what they have to say, as if they considered such attention a purely voluntary act. Belief they do not ask for as if it were at the option of the will to give or withhold it, when evidence is fairly attended to and appreciated. But they ask whether, in view of the proofs they offer, any can help believing the proposition they advocate. They treat the act of attention as depending on the will—conviction as depending upon the proofs adduced, attended to, and duly weighed.

Although then our intellectual judgments and convictions depend upon and are controlled by evidence, yet, without attention to this evidence, it can never be effectively before the mind, or be estimated, or followed by its due effect. And this attention is a voluntary act. Here, in our view, we find the clew to some of the most mysterious and perplexing facts in our mental operations. The first is, that it is the nature and office of the intellect to discern and be convinced by truth and evidence. The second is the undeniable fact that it is often swayed by passion, prejudice, wilful (will-full) resistance to truth and evidence. How can these two things co-exist—an intellect whose convictions must be controlled by evidence, and yet in fact often judging in utter defiance of all evidence, in obedience to the behests of a depraved will? Simply because the will can often divert the mind from such evidence or aspects of evidence as are unwelcome to the mind. Is not this the secret of the mistaken, perverse, and even wicked judgments so often formed in spite of evidence? Is it any excuse for errors thus imbibed, that they are honestly entertained? Is not the cause of them manifestly culpable? Can good intentions sanctify wrong acts, which, if we had candidly searched and weighed the evidence, we could not but have known to be

wrong? Then are the greatest cruelties of tyrants and persecutors justified. Paul was innocent in hunting the saints to death. The barbarous atrocities of the French Revolution, and of the Hindoo idolatry, can be alike justified. Jesuitism is the only true morality, and the end sanctifies the means. The immutable distinction between right and wrong is obliterated. Men then are responsible for their opinions on moral subjects.

The fact that attention is a voluntary act, leads to another important practical consequence. We have shown that it gives the will great control over the truths and evidences that may be brought to bear on the mind. We have also seen that the purposes and desires are largely swayed by the views and conceptions of the intellect. Hence it follows that the will, though it cannot change the affections and desires immediately by any purpose or determination to do so, may yet often indirectly exercise a considerable influence over them. It may and constantly does decide what objects and truths shall occupy the attention of the mind. But the objects and truths held in the mind's view go very far to determine the character of its affections and desires. No emotion can arise in the soul, unless in view of its appropriate object. The feeling of filial affection cannot arise unless we think of our parents. The fear and love of God cannot arise if God be banished from the thoughts. The love of truth, goodness, beauty, cannot arise in a soul which ignores them, or keeps them out of sight. If one allows his mind to gloat over the pleasures of sensuality and licentiousness, and turns it away from the excellence and loveliness of purity and goodness, he will nourish pollution in his soul. They who will not retain God in their knowledge, will not of course keep him in their affections. Thus we see that in most exercises of the will, the intellect and the desires are mysteriously implicated, that they interact with and upon each other in reference to all objects of choice; that the will is dependent on the intellect for light, and is governed by its views, while in turn it reacts upon the intellect, affecting its judgments, controlling its attention to the evidences and facts on which its judgments depend; in short, that it is not will alone, nor intellect alone, that is concerned in choice, but

the one individual soul at once choosing as it sees, and seeing, to a great extent, as it chooses. Agreeably to this, the Scriptures teach that it is one and the same thing to love and to know God. Both are eternal life. To know him truly is to see that in him which awakens love. To love him is impossible for those who do not thus know him.

There is indeed much knowledge which excites no desire, and leads to no act of will. To know that there are innumerable grains of sand on the sea-shore does not necessarily awaken any desire for them. The whole optative faculty may be indifferent to them, and to a multitude of objects. The converse, however, is not true. There can be no *desire* or volition without knowledge. And in regard to rational desires and choices on the one hand, and all cognitions of the intellect relative to objects of choice on the other, it is clear that they can no more be sundered, than the flesh can be torn from the bones, or the bark from the tree, without disintegration and death.

And it can scarcely be doubted which is the guiding faculty. In so far as the intelligence or reason fails to have the lead, our desires, choices, and actions, can neither be intelligent nor rational. We become the creatures of blind fortuitous impulse—even as the beasts that perish. To this issue does all depravity tend—hence so often termed FLESH in Scripture. Neither desires nor feelings can have any moral character that are in no sense dependent on or related to reason or intelligence. If our desires and volitions become corrupt, the intelligence shares in that corruption. It constantly happens, indeed, that men do violence to their conscience and better judgment. But it is none the less true, that they persuade themselves for the moment that they have a reason for doing so, which excuses them, or mitigates the atrocity and baseness of their conduct. All such errors of principle are culpable, because they arise from a culpable refusal or neglect to ascertain and weigh the facts in the case. They hate the light, and will not come to the light, because their deeds are evil.

In general, it may be said, that we know that we ought to obey conscience and to seek all possible light to guide its judgments. This is both an intellectual and emotional faculty—

adapted at once to guide and to determine, as we know it ought, the choices of the will. We know that we cannot refuse to give it all due light, or to obey its enlightened dictates, or allow false views, apprehensions and desires to overbear it, without the deepest criminality. Whether we commit sin knowingly, or not knowing what we do, we are guilty. For we ought to have known, desired, chosen, done our duty. There is nothing that we know more intimately and surely than that all the thoughts and desires and actions ought to be subject to the conscience, and that conscience an enlightened one.

It is here to be observed, in accordance with what has been said before, that the intellect views things under a twofold aspect. 1. In pure cognition, as true. 2. When acting as a guide to the will, as good or desirable. Now many things may be viewed as true, under the first aspect, without being viewed either as things to be desired or shunned. That the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles—that here is a forest and there a plain—are things known as true—but it does not necessarily follow that they are viewed with desire or aversion. On the other hand, we may view things as desirable, which we cannot believe to have any real existence except in our own imaginations—as that the earth were a theatre of painless and paradisaic bliss. Again, we may see a tree—and viewed as simply having existence, we may be indifferent to it. But if it be viewed as beautiful in shape and foliage; as affording a grateful shade; as a decoration of our premises, it may thus be apprehended as in the highest degree good and desirable.

This leads us to repeat another remark, viz. that while there may be, and are, many acts of the intellect that are merely and exclusively cognitive, which incite no exercises of desire or volition; i. e. which view objects simply as existent and true, without thinking of them as desirable or undesirable; yet the reverse is not true; there can be no outgoing of desire or volition without an antecedent exercise of intellect which perceives the object chosen or desired, and apprehends it as desirable or otherwise.

Here we have the clew to one of the most undeniable and important truths of religion, while it is among the most difficult to be logically defined and explained. We refer to the

blindness which the word of God everywhere ascribes to sin and unbelief; and the spiritual illumination which it affirms to take place in regeneration—and this in regard to those truths which in some respects are perfectly known, understood, and believed. Many who know and believe speculatively the truths of Christianity are the subjects of this blindness, and need to have it dispelled before they will ever love or choose religion. How then is this to be explained? Simply thus. They discern everything in these truths but that which is most important, their infinite beauty and attractiveness, that which once apprehended at once draws the heart after it. They see everything in Christ, but that he is chief among ten thousand and altogether lovely. To them there is no form nor comeliness in Him or his religion that they should desire Him. They apprehend, in short, all but that which if seen would make them desire him, even as according to the example just noted, one may see in a tree everything but that which makes it grateful or attractive—or a rustic would see all the words and letters of *Paradise Lost*, or all the parts of a splendid edifice, without detecting the element of beauty or attractiveness.

It is further true that, in these moral æsthetics—if we may so call them—this blindness to the beauty of moral excellence is itself sin. It is mysteriously implicated with the workings of desire and will. It cannot exist without a culpable closing of the eyes to the evidence in the case; it constitutes but does not excuse a material part of our depravity; it is on the footing of all moral blindness which arises from the deceitfulness of sin; and is no more excusable than that state of mind in which a man sees nothing better or more desirable in virtue than in vice.

If the foregoing analysis of the connection between the intelligence and the emotional faculties be correct, then we learn where to rank that sentimentalism which places all virtue in mere sensibility and beautiful emotion, uninformed by intelligence, and unguided by principle. This mawkish sensibility, substituted for intelligent and high-toned conscientiousness, forms the ideal standard of excellence which is glorified at the expense of knowledge and virtue, in novels as frail as the paper and the gilt in which they are bound; and for the most part

forms the web and woof of our Pickwick literature. If any are in danger of adopting a standard of character so impotent and effeminate, so degrading and demoralizing, let us remind them that it is in keeping for irrational brutes and dead matter to be the passive creatures of unintelligent impulse, the sport of blind fortuity. But man is rational and intelligent. He abnegates his higher nature, when he disowns his reason to be swayed by mere emotion—when, for the pole-star of clear and manly principles he takes the fire-fly light of passion for his guide and law!

Practical and Speculative Reason. We have noted the difference between those exercises of the understanding which take a purely speculative view of an object, and those which take that view which apprehends it as good, as a thing which is or ought to be desired and chosen. To this latter class belong the judgments of conscience, and not only these, but also those perceptions and judgments regarding objects which tend to incite desire or volition. With reference to this distinction in the exercises of the mind, and more particularly with reference to the judgments of the moral faculty, Kant made a distinction between the Speculative and Practical reason. In the sense which we have already pointed out, there is a solid ground for such a distinction, i. e. if by practical reason we understand the faculties of the mind which take those views of objects that directly excite or tend to excite desire, volition, action, as distinguished from those which have no such tendency. It is to be observed, however, that in all cases of right feeling, the practical view harmonizes with, it does not contradict, the speculative view, although it may go beyond it. The two are parallel or concentric. They do not cut or cross each other. In other words, before I can desire or choose, or try to obtain a tree, I must speculatively believe its existence; and still farther, that it is desirable to possess. Kant's object in setting up the distinction between the Speculative and Practical Reason was wholly inconsistent with this view. His theory of the Speculative Reason led logically to scepticism as to all things outside of the Ego or Reason; in other words to subjective Idealism. Of course it subverted Religion and Morals. To escape this dire consequence, with a "noble inconsistency,"

as it has been justly called, he asserted the existence of the Practical Reason, meaning thereby the conscience which gives the ideas of freedom, God, immortality, right; whose judgments, he said, are valid, although directly contradictory to the conclusions of the Speculative Reason, when rightly exercised. They are indeed valid against all arguments to the contrary. The only mistake lies in supposing that the Speculative Reason rightly exercised, asserts the contrary.

It is in this region, we apprehend, that we find whatever of truth lies in some analogous and cognate distinctions between the theology of the intellect and of the feelings, Christianity as a doctrine and as a life. There is just as much and as little ground for them as for Kant's distinction between the Practical and Speculative Reason, to which, in the form in which it is now fashionable to present them, they may trace their fatherhood. The only truth in them is that the æsthetic, moral and spiritual view of objects is more and better than the barely speculative, but not that it is contrary to or subversive of any true speculation or doctrine. It may overbear a false dogma or speculation; but it supposes and requires true doctrine as the ground in which it roots itself, the trunk on which it is engrafted. A rustic may spell the syllables and words of *Paradise Lost* and be utterly blind to its beauty. But then how can one perceive its beauty who knows not its syllables and words? Many persons believe orthodox doctrine and scriptural truths who are wholly void of spiritual life and right feeling. But then, how can one feel aright towards God and Christ, who rejects the truth concerning them as absurd and monstrous? How can he be devout in his feelings, who, with his intellect disowns the truth which awakes devotion? How can he live unto Christ, who rejects the truth as it is in Jesus? But we need not multiply questions which speak their own answers.

ART. IV.—*Jeremias librorum sacrorum Interpres atque Vindex*: scripsit AUGUSTUS KUEPER. 8vo. pp. 202.

De Jeremiæ Versione Alexandrina: scripsit JOANNES WICHELHAUS. 8vo. pp. 188.

WHILE the unbelieving criticism of modern times has denied and to its own satisfaction disproved the genuineness of the Pentateuch, Daniel, large sections of Isaiah, and other books of the Bible, it is remarkable that Jeremiah has not been similarly assailed. This is, we confess, attributable solely to the forbearance of the critics, and they are entitled to all the credit which such unexpected generosity deserves. Jeremiah has no claim to any better treatment than his compeers. His writings are no more certainly his, than theirs belong to them. The external testimony to his authorship, and the internal evidence by which this is corroborated, though conclusive, have no peculiar weight in this case more than in the others. And grounds of cavil might as readily be found here as there. Indeed the great advantage of the mode of reasoning employed by our critical opponents is, that they are never at a loss for proofs whatever may be the conclusion that they wish to establish. This facility of argumentation is, it is true, attended with the inconvenience of setting the critics at irremediable strife with one another, each deducing with equal positiveness from the same premises his own foregone conclusion. And this might give rise to the suspicion that arguments so readily gathered on behalf of any cause and made to sustain the most opposite results, are of no great intrinsic worth. This variance, however, it is to be remarked, is an amicable one; being all agreed upon the main point of refusing credit to whatever establishes prophetic foresight or the reality of a supernatural revelation, the mode of compassing this end is esteemed of secondary importance, and the most irreconcilable diversities may here be tolerated as of small account.

Nor are there wanting sufficient motives for the application of the critical knife. If the mere love of novelty and paradox were not enough of itself, as it often is, there is much in

this book to awaken suspicion of its genuineness in any mind imbued with the principles of the modern school. According to the first chapter, Jeremiah foresaw at the outset of his ministry in the thirteenth year of Josiah, the character and subject of his future predictions and the opposition with which he would meet in their delivery. "This," says Hitzig, (*Der Prophet Jeremia erklärt* p. 2,) "is only conceivable as a deduction from actual experience, as a prediction *ex eventu*. He could not know this until the middle or the end of his course, and *therefore* the composition belongs to this later time." Fortunately for the genuineness of the chapter, this, like many other predictions of Jeremiah, was fulfilled during the prophet's own life. The great burden of his prophecies, in fact, as it was the grand lesson demanded at that period, was the approaching destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the people. The application of the argument just recited will convince its author at least that a large majority of these prophecies could not have been originally delivered with the definiteness with which they are now recorded. But here again it is only necessary to suppose, that when the prophet committed his discourses to writing, after the destruction had occurred, or at least after things had gone so far that this issue was plain to ordinary sagacity, he consciously or unconsciously modified the form of his earlier anticipations so as to include his later knowledge and experience. Thus the maxim "prophecy is impossible" may be made to consist with Jeremiah's authorship. This to be sure would involve an imputation upon the honesty of the prophet and the sense of the people, which it might be difficult to explain, that he should claim to have predicted repeatedly, long in advance and with the utmost particularity what he never did predict at all, and that they who had been his constant hearers should admit the truth of his claim; still the ends of unbelief are answered, and its advocates are content.

When, however, predictions occur of so stubborn a sort that they cannot thus be compounded with, it might be expected that they would without further ceremony be declared fit subjects of the ban, which criticism stands ever ready to pronounce upon unmanageable cases. When, for example, Jeremiah

xxvi. 11, xxix. 10, fixes the duration of the captivity at seventy years, and chap. l. 51, announces the overthrow of Babylon by the Medes, combined with other Asiatic nations, there is a knot which no patience nor ingenuity can untie, which only the sword can sever. The fulfilment is too signal to be denied. The prophet did not outlive the event. The conclusion would seem to be inevitable, that these chapters did not come from Jeremiah, and yet the critics hold their hand! Hitzig himself, the very last from whom such a favour could have been looked for, enters (p. 391) into a formal argument to establish the genuineness of the prophecy against Babylon, remarking that there is not one spurious prophecy in the entire book.

It must, however, in justice to Hitzig and his fellows, be remarked here, that they have no idea in all this of abandoning their principles. This departure from their accustomed method of procedure elsewhere, is to be accounted for by the fact that the desired end is sought to be accomplished in another way. Each prophecy as a whole is suffered to stand unchallenged, but every passage which is irreconcilable with their ideas of what Jeremiah could have spoken, is set down as an interpolation, or a corruption of the text.

There are two external grounds from which it has been argued that there are errors in the existing Hebrew text of Jeremiah. One is found in the verbal discrepancies in parallel passages in the Hebrew itself, and the other from the comparison of the Septuagint translation of this book, which departs from the Hebrew to a remarkable extent. Before inquiring into the reality of the alleged disordered state of the text, however, it is important to observe that the amount of the corruption, if any exist, must be determined by the evidence, and is not to be assumed *ad libitum*. If the Hebrew requires correction from parallel passages and from the Septuagint, be it so: let the requisite correction be applied. But let it not be left at the mercy of the critics to expunge what they please, on the pretence of errors and interpolations, of whose existence there is not the shadow of a proof, and which there is no reason for suspecting, other than the maxims of unbelief. The interpolations most insisted upon, are in fact passages in which all external authorities concur in the exist-

ing text. Whether the readings of the Hebrew, the Septuagint or of the parallel passages, be adopted, no important evidence of prophetic foresight will be called in question.

The differences between the Septuagint and the Hebrew are, as has already been intimated, very considerable, and abound in all parts of the book. In a vast number of instances individual words, clauses, or sentences, are omitted, altered, or transposed; whole verses, and even paragraphs of considerable length, are not to be found in the Greek, e. g. x. 6—8. 10; xvii. 1—4; xxvii. 1. 21; xxix. 16—20; xxxiii. 14—26; xxxix. 4—13; xlviii. 45—47; li. 45—49; and the predictions respecting foreign nations, chapters xlv. li., not only succeed each other in a different order, but the entire section containing them is in the Greek transferred to a different part of the book, so as to stand immediately after xxv. 13. The twofold arrangement of these predictions is as follows, viz.

<i>Hebrew.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>
1. Concerning Egypt.	Concerning Elam.
2. " the Philistines.	" Egypt.
3. " Moab.	" Babylon.
4. " Ammon.	" the Philistines.
5. " Edom.	" Edom.
6. " Damascus.	" Ammon.
7. " Kedar.	" Kedar.
8. " Elam.	" Damascus.
9. " Babylon.	" Moab.

These discrepancies are remarked upon by Origen and Jerome, the latter of whom, in addition to his frequent censures of the negligence or license of the translators, brings here the charge of carelessness against the transcribers. Buxtorf repeats, without adopting it, the opinion of R. Azarias, that the Septuagint version was made from a faulty manuscript. The idea of two varying texts of the original thus suggested, has given birth to numberless theories in which their existence is assumed, and various speculations indulged as to their origin and respective merits. Thus according to J. D. Michaelis, one edition of

the prophet's writings was prepared in Egypt after his death, which was followed by the Greek translator, and another in Chaldea, which was preserved in its original Hebrew form by the Jews of Palestine. The ingenious and complicated hypotheses of Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers, will be presented with more detail hereafter. It will be sufficient here to say, that in the judgment of Eichhorn the Palestine edition, or the common Hebrew text, contains the writings of Jeremiah with his latest additions and emendations; while the Egyptian edition was drawn from his unrevised papers, which, as they consisted not of a connected roll but of separate sheets, were by some accident deranged to the extent that we now find them. Bertholdt attributes the differences of text mostly to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor, whose taste was offended by the diffuseness and repetitions of Jeremiah, and who accordingly allowed himself great liberties in abbreviating. The prophecies against foreign powers he thinks to have been at first put into circulation singly, then separately collected and incorporated with the rest of the book both in Palestine and in Egypt, whence their various order and the different location assigned them. According to Movers two independent collations were made of the manuscripts of this book, one in Palestine by Nehemiah, and the other in Egypt, about B. C. 330, which resulted in the establishment of a distinct text in the two countries respectively. With regard to these he lays down the maxim, which is at variance with the evident characteristics of Jeremiah's style, that the briefer is in all cases to be regarded as the true reading. This rule leads him to the conclusion that neither edition was entirely accurate; most commonly he decides in favour of the Egyptian, though sometimes he prefers that of Palestine, and sometimes he thinks both to be erroneous.

The decisive objection to all these theories, and others like them, is that an Egyptian, or any other edition of the original differing from that represented in the common Hebrew Bible, is a figment unsupported by a particle of evidence. Movers, it is true, endeavours to prove a variant text from 2 Kings, Baruch and Josephus. He supposes that he has found in 2 Kings, chap. xxv. the primary form of the text by which the

corresponding verses in Jeremiah, chaps. xl., xli. and lii. may be judged, and he avers that the comparison establishes that the Septuagint has in the main followed the correct edition. But the verbal variations in these and other parallel passages of Scripture can be better accounted for than as errors in the text of one or both. There is no good reason for the assumption that they were at first coincident in every word and letter, and that the existing divergence between them is proof of want of care in their preservation. The differences, such as they are, are without doubt original. The similarity is such as to afford convincing proof that they were derived from a common source, and they may possibly have proceeded from the same pen. But as written in the books of Jeremiah and of Kings there is no reason to believe that the passages were ever more nearly identical than they are now. The general fact brought out by a minute comparison of them is that the language of Jeremiah is fuller even to redundancy, and that of Kings is more concise. Now as the Greek translator betrays the constant tendency to abbreviate and lop off what seemed to him a needless amplification and unessential to the sense, and as moreover he may have had the text of Kings in his thoughts, it has happened in four instances, but only in four, that the Greek version of Jeremiah agrees with Kings in opposition to the Hebrew text of Jeremiah. In other places, however, the translator departs from the text of Jeremiah where it is the same with that of Kings, or agrees with it where that of Kings diverges.

That Baruch, in which large use is made of the language of Jeremiah, mostly follows the Septuagint, is simply because that book was written in Greek. This, therefore, has no bearing upon the question of a Hebrew original with the readings of the Septuagint. The argument from Josephus is, if possible, feebler still. He almost always follows the Hebrew; but inasmuch as in Ant. x. 7, 4, he speaks of Jeremiah as threatening such as stayed in the city with famine and sword, the Hebrew adding in such passages, e. g. xxi. 9; xxvii. 9, 13, a third evil, the pestilence, which is omitted in the Greek, this is adduced as showing that he there drew from a manuscript exhibiting the same text as that from which the Septuagint version was

made. But apart from the fact that Josephus, who wrote in Greek, might readily have drawn from the version itself, he speaks in the very same paragraph of a pestilence prevailing in the city during the siege, which he could not have learned from the account in Kings, and Ezekiel who, in v. 12, vi. 11, etc. according to Movers himself, imitates the language of Jeremiah, names the three evils together, and consequently must have found them all in his Hebrew copy.

The entire subject of the relation of the Greek to the Hebrew text is examined in detail by Kueper, and still more elaborately and exhaustively by Wichelhaus, by the former in an appendix, and by the latter in the body of his treatise named at the head of this article. It is shown by them both conclusively, from the nature as well as the multitude of the variations, that they are not traceable to the ordinary liabilities to error in transcription. The changes have been purposely made, and from the general consistency of the principles on which this has been done they are in all probability the work of the same hand throughout: and they may be more naturally referred to the translator than to some editor of the original, inasmuch as there is no evidence that any Hebrew copy ever existed in which they were to be found. They consist of 1. Abbreviations; the omission or contraction of the customary formulas at the beginning or in the course of a prophecy, vii. 1, 2, xvi. 1; the omission of unimportant words, or of one of two synonymous words or parallel clauses, xxx. 19, xxxi. 28; of a passage which has occurred before, viii. 10—12: comp. vi. 13—15, xxvii. 12—14, (where *αὐτοὶ* of verse 14 has thus been deprived of its subject,) or one which the translator could not reconcile with his ideas, e. g. xxxiii. 14—26, where the perpetuity and multiplication promised to the house of David and of Levi appeared to him not to consist with the fact. 2. Additions; these are much less frequent than the preceding. Words which seem necessary to the sense are occasionally supplied from the connection, xlix. 4, and expressions are sometimes enlarged from parallel passages, xix. 3; comp. xvii. 20. 3. Alterations affecting either the matter or the form. There are many errors in translation, which appear to be due to the incompetency of the translator. Some words are rendered

differently every time that they occur, or nearly so, any sense being given to them apparently that would suit the connection; e. g. שָׁפָרָם, iii. 2. 21, iv. 11, xii. 12, xiv. 6; for others the sense of some word which resembles it has been substituted, iv. 6, נָס φεύγετε, as if from נָס; or they are omitted entirely, xxv. 26. 34, תַּפְסוּזוֹתֵיכֶם יִשְׁעָךְ. Some passages seem to be translated at random, iv. 15, xxix. 24, 25. Frequent changes are also made in number, person, and tense, xxx. 5; or, in the order of words or verses, xxxii. 35—37, 39. In like manner, as has been stated already, chaps. xlv. —li. are removed from their true position and the prophecies which they contain are disposed in a different order. Chap. xxv. 13, speaks of what Jeremiah prophesied against all the nations. This seemed to the translator the appropriate place to introduce the predictions referred to, and he accordingly inserts them, although he is thereby led to drop verse 14 altogether. It is difficult to see upon what principle the re-arrangement of them has been made. It has the appearance of a purely artificial inversion. Each alternate prophecy is first transposed with the one before it. Egypt, which heads the list, is carried back before Babylon, Moab is set before the Philistines, Edan before Ammon, Kedar before Damascus. The three great powers, Elam, (or Persia,) Egypt, and Babylon, are then transferred to the beginning of the series, exchanging places with Moab, which, as the subject of the largest prediction relating to the minor powers, seemed to form the most fitting close.

That these discrepancies are due to the translator is further apparent, from the general character of the Septuagint, which nowhere confines itself to the original with the rigorous exactness demanded in a modern version. And in the various fidelity with which different portions have been executed, some other books have suffered as seriously as Jeremiah. The order is greatly disturbed in Exodus, chapters xxxvi., xxxix. The passage 1 Sam. xvii. 12—31 is omitted. In Proverbs chapter xxx. xxxi. 1—9 is removed from its proper place, and attached to chapter xxiv. Several entire chapters are added to Esther and Daniel; and the latter was besides so badly translated that a different version was substituted for it in ecclesiastical use. That the author of Chronicles had before

him the present Hebrew text of the book of Jeremiah may be inferred from the reference in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 20 to Jer. xxvii. 7, a verse which has been dropped in the Greek.

The relation of the Septuagint version of this book to the Hebrew has been so complicated with the question as to the plan of this book itself, as to require some consideration of this topic in order to its proper exhibition. The manifest departures from the chronological order have led many commentators to complain of a confusion and an entire want of arrangement. Thus Lightfoot: "The prophecies of Jeremiah are either utterly undated, and so not easily if at all to be referred to their proper time, or those that are dated are most generally dislocated, and it is not easy to give the reason of their dislocation." And Blaney: "The disorder complained of is common to both the Hebrew and Greek arrangements, and consists in the preposterous jumbling together of the prophecies of the reigns of Jehoiakim and Zedekiah, in the seventeen chapters which follow the twentieth according to the Hebrew copies; so that without any apparent reason many of the latter reign precede those of the former, and in the same reign the last delivered are put first, and the first last. As such an unnatural dislocation could not have been the result of judgment, nor scarcely of inattention in the compiler of these prophecies, it follows that the original order has most probably by some accident or other been disturbed." Blaney has consequently rearranged these chapters with the view of restoring their true order, in the following way, viz.

Chapters xx.	xxx.	xxxix. 15—18.
xxii.	xxxi.	xxxix. 1—14.
xxiii.	xxvii.	xl.
xxv.	xxviii.	xli.
xxvi.	xxi.	xlii.
xxxv.	xxxiv.	xliii.
xxxvi.	xxxvii.	xliv.
xl.	xxxii.	xlvi. etc.
xxiv.	xxxiii.	
xxix.	xxxviii.	

There has been no lack of hypotheses to account for this condition of the book. Spinoza fancied that the prophecies of

Jeremiah were brought together as they were gathered out of several different records of his life. Eichhorn, Bertholdt, and Movers seek to explain, each in his own way, both the duplicate form of the text, and the supposed derangement of the book.

According to Eichhorn, Jeremiah's predictions were unwritten until the fourth year of Jehoiakim. The prophet then dictated to Baruch, xxxvi. 1, 2, what he had up to that time delivered, and after the destruction of that first copy, repeated the dictation, verse 32. As his discourses were thus drawn from memory, no strict order was observed in recording them. Some were recalled only in part, others were blended together, and no definite dates were given. His subsequent prophecies were written upon their delivery, and their dates recorded, these last like the first being preserved not on one connected roll, but upon detached pieces of paper. After the destruction of the city, he prepared an edition of his prophecies for the exiles, which was transcribed from his private papers, the casual order in which they were used upon this occasion being maintained ever after. At a later period, he revised this edition, and introduced numerous emendations and explanatory remarks; the book thus corrected has been perpetuated in the Masoretic or common Hebrew text. Subsequently after the prophet's death, his unrevised papers were transcribed in the order in which they were found, only the prophecies against foreign powers, which had accidentally become deranged, were transferred to the middle of chapter xxv. as their most appropriate place. This was the Egyptian edition afterwards translated into Greek. The agreement and the difference of these two editions seem thus to be explained; and the confusion existing alike in both is laid to the account of an imperfect memory and loose papers.

To all this Bertholdt objects that Jeremiah *read* יקרא xxxvi. 18, his prophecies to Baruch; they must therefore have been already in writing, and a failure of memory can have had no share in deranging them. Besides the same confusion reigns in prophecies since that date, as is observable in those before it, which leads to the suspicion of a common cause. Baruch also wrote upon a single roll xxxvi. 2. 32, and not upon a

number of papers. Or if the prophecies were upon detached papers, as Eichhorn assumes, it would for that reason have been the easier to arrange them chronologically, and it is the less explicable that the first casual order was adhered to in spite of its manifest incorrectness. Nor is it easy to see why the revised form of the prophecies was not circulated among the Jews in Egypt as well as in Chaldea or Palestine.

Bertholdt's own hypothesis is that the prophecies of Jeremiah were put in circulation singly as they were delivered, but no collection of them was undertaken by him nor during his life. When at length this came to be thought of, the prophecies were so dispersed that it could only be accomplished by successive steps. Those concerning foreign powers, chapters xlv.—li. were gathered first in Palestine. Some one who had seen this collection and consequently incorporated none of its contents in his own, succeeded in getting together chapters i.—xxiv. transcribing them upon his roll just as he happened to discover them without any regard to their proper order. This second collection finding its way into Egypt, incited some one who had not seen the first to a fresh search after Jeremiah's predictions respecting foreign nations; he found the same that his predecessor had done, but put them together in a different order. A further collection made in Egypt upon the hap-hazard principle embraced chapters xxvi.—xlv. This did not at first contain xxxiii. 14—19 and xxxix. 4—14; but these passages were afterwards discovered in Palestine and introduced into copies circulating there. Chapters xxv. 1—14 and xxv. 15—38 remained by themselves on separate manuscripts. The work of putting all these together was performed independently in Palestine and in Egypt, and resulted in the twofold form of the book as represented in the Hebrew and the Greek. The derangement common to both is upon this theory referred to the casual order in which the scattered prophecies were recovered; the differences of arrangement to independent collections, and the divergencies of text for the most part to the unscrupulousness of the Egyptian editor.

This notion of partial collections is pushed to still greater lengths by Movers, who fancies six successive publications by Jeremiah, each comprising a portion of his prophecies, and

each being in itself arranged in the true chronological order. 1. The prophecies written by Baruch in the fourth year of Jehoiakim in two parts; (a) chap. i.—xx. xxvi. xxxv. xxxvi. xlv.; (b) chap. xxv. xlvi.—xlix. 2. Chap. xxii.—xxiv.; and 3. Chap. xxvii.—xxix. in the beginning of Zedekiah's reign. 4. Chap. xxx. xxxi. xxxiii.; and 5. Chap. l. li. after the destruction of the city. 6. Chap. xxi. xxxiv. xxxvii. xxxii. xxxviii.—xliv. published in Egypt. The collection of Baruch forms the basis of the book in its present form; and the existing derangement arises from the fact that the subsequent collections were incorporated into this piece-meal upon no just principle, but according to some accidental association. Thus chap. xxi. was put next to chap. xx. because Pashur occurs in the first verse of both: and chap. xxxii. follows chap. xxxi. because of the resemblance of Hanameel xxxii. 7, and Hananeel xxxi. 38.

Hitzig seeks to account for the constitution of the book by a theory of its gradual accretion; but this is so complicated in its details, and so interwoven with his individual critical conclusions, that it could not here be made intelligible.

In regard to these various hypotheses, and others like them, it may be remarked, 1. That they are built upon a false assumption. The disorder, for which they are professedly framed to account, can be shown not to exist; of necessity, therefore, they fall to the ground. 2. They are mere figments of the brain. There is no external evidence in their favour. The only solution which they offer of the assumed fact of confusion and derangement is to resolve it into chance or accident; and thousands of other chances might be suggested equally plausible and equally unentitled to credit. 3. Nothing can be safely built upon the contents of the roll dictated to Baruch, chapter xxxvi; for the particular prophecies which were found in it are not known and cannot be ascertained. There is no reason to suppose that it was incorporated in that form in the present book, for the prophecies delivered up to that time are not preserved distinct from later ones; and Baruch's roll was prepared not for permanent preservation but for a special occasion, and it is distinctly stated that it embraced much upon the second writing which had not been contained in it before,

xxxvi. 32. 4. These theories regard the formation of the book as a purely mechanical affair. Pieces are thrown together at random in violation of any proper order; and this preposterous relation once established is retained inviolate, while other changes are freely made for much slighter cause. This excludes almost of necessity the participation of the prophet in the construction of the book in its existing form, and imputes such a method of procedure to the nameless and gratuitously assumed collector as no sane editor in ancient or in modern times was ever guilty of. It would be better frankly to confess the thing inexplicable than to rest in such explanations.

Germany itself has at last grown weary of these insipid theories, and Ewald, one of her acknowledged masters in hypotheses, has led the way in a wholesome reaction toward a more rational construction of the book. He enters upon the inquiry, which had been strangely enough overlooked by his predecessors, whether there is not after all an orderly distribution of the materials, and finds cause to answer it affirmatively. In this he is followed with some modifications by Hävernick, in his *Critical Introduction*, and Stähelin in an essay published in the third volume of the *Transactions of the German Oriental Society*. They all, however, assume a structure which is needlessly cumbrous and artificial. The most recent attempt which we have seen to exhibit the connection of the book of Jeremiah is that by Neumann in his *Commentary upon this book*. This is highly ingenious and sufficiently simple, but not adequately borne out by the facts of the case. He thinks that the two visions of the first chapter contain a summary of the entire after ministry of the prophet, which is therefore to be regarded as a simple expansion of these initial lessons. The vision of the almond tree is expanded in the first seventeen chapters; and after two symbolic actions significant of the people's rejection, the vision of the seething-pot is expanded in the chapters which follow. Without dwelling, however, upon the various views of these and other writers, we proceed to develop what we conceive to be the true state of the case.

That the book in its present form proceeded from the prophet's own hand, is shown among other things by the frequent use of the first person, not only in the body of various prophe-

cies, but in the headings and formulas of transition. This, in the extent to which it occurs, proves that he was not only the author of the individual discourses, but that he likewise collected and arranged them. This is particularly evident from xxvii. 12, where, after reciting a prophecy delivered in the reign of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah, speaking in the first person, assigns as a reason for adding in immediate connection, one delivered in the reign of Zedekiah, that it was upon the same subject. This affords us also the welcome hint from an authoritative source, that the guiding principle in the arrangement was topical rather than chronological.

In the fourth and fifth years of Jehoiakim, Jeremiah twice reduced the prophecies to writing, which he had delivered up to that date, xxxvi. 2, 32. He was again directed, xxx. 2, probably in the reign of Zedekiah, to write what had been communicated to him. That the present book could not have been produced upon any of these occasions is apparent from the fact that some of its contents bear a still later date. That it was not gradually prepared, receiving fresh accessions as new prophecies were delivered, but is in so far a single composition that it received its present written form about one time and under a single impulse, appears from several considerations. 1. Prophecies from different portions of his ministry are often put together, while those belonging to the same period are dispersed through the book. 2. Remarks are occasionally introduced which are manifestly of later date than the prophecies in connection with which they are found. Thus, xxvii. 1, introduces a prophecy from the beginning of the reign of Jehoiakim; but that this was not recorded as we now have it until the reign of Zedekiah, appears from verse 3, which states that an injunction here made was carried into execution at that time. Chap. xxv. belongs to the fourth year of Jehoiakim, verse 1, but was not written until the prophet could speak of the desolation of Jerusalem as already accomplished, verse 18. 3. There are allusions in the course of the book to succeeding portions of it, which show that the prophet as he wrote had a definite conception of what was to follow. Thus, xxv. 13, refers to the prophecies against Babylon and against all the nations, which are "written in this book." These not only stand at its

close, chap. xlv. — li., but some of them were delivered in the following reign of Zedekiah, and it would appear that this was the case with that against Babylon in particular, xlix. 34, li. 59. 4. The systematic disposition of the matter, as that is now to be exhibited, shows that the writer began his work with all his materials before him, and proceeded throughout upon one consistent plan.

Leaving out of view chapter lii., which is a historical appendix, the book divides itself into three parts, viz.

1. Chapters i. — xxxiii. Prediction of the judgment upon Judah, and the future restoration.

2. Chapters xxxiv. — xlv. The history of the judgment.

3. Chapters xlv. — li. Predictions respecting foreign nations.

The first section is again divisible into four parts, viz.

(1.) Chapters i. — xx. General denunciation of the people as a whole.

(2.) Chapters xxi. — xxxiii. Denunciation of their civil and spiritual leaders.

(3.) Chapters xxiv. — xxix. The design and duration of the judgment.

(4.) Chapters xxx. — xxxiii. The blessings which would succeed it.

In this whole section rebuke and threatening greatly preponderate, there being but a few words of promise in each division, except the last, which is entirely occupied with encouragement and consolation. The first division does not consist of separate discourses delivered upon different occasions, and in different reigns, as may be inferred from the absence of dates, or of anything to indicate the existence or mark the limits of such discourses. The same predictions substantially were uttered by him from the beginning to the end of his ministry, and there was consequently no reason for keeping what he said at one time separate from what he said at another. Only one date is given, viz. iii. 6, "In the days of Josiah the king," in order to show that these warnings were uttered even at that early period, and under the reign of so pious a monarch. The substance of all that he

delivered upon the subject of this first division is wrought up into a connected form, in which he follows a definite train of thought, and the only partition to be made is that which arises from the logical distribution of his theme. Promises are here made to Israel, iii. 12—iv. 2, whom Judah regarded as utterly apostate and cut off, and to the gentiles, xii. 14—17, who were thought to be excluded from the covenant of mercy, but there is scarcely a word to break the heavy and reiterated denunciations upon Judah. The only words which bear the semblance of a promise to this branch of the people, iii. 18, xvi. 14, 15, respect the distant future, and contain an implication of the woe which was just at hand. If they are to be brought back from their captivity, they must first be carried into captivity.

In the second division sentence is passed upon the unrighteous leaders of the people, who are guilty of their ruin, and in contrast the reign of a better prince is promised, xxiii. 3—8. In the third division the true intent of the judgment thus far denounced is declared to be to separate the people. The abandoned portion are left in Jerusalem to be extirpated; the better portion are carried into exile. And with the heavy doom pronounced upon the former, and the protracted sentence which even the latter must bear, are mingled a few words of promise to the exiles, xxiv. 4—7, xxix. 10—14. These denunciatory chapters are followed, and the entire section closed, by the fourth division, in which upon the eve of the catastrophe the assurance was given, that amidst the apparent wreck, nothing which was really precious should be lost. The covenant which secured it was as unalterable as that of day and night.

The second main section of the book, in which the history of the judgment is traced, may be subdivided as follows, viz.

(1.) Chapters xxxiv.—xxxviii. Evidences of ripeness for judgment.

(2.) Chapter xxxix. The destruction of the city.

(3.) Chapters xl.—xlv. The fortunes of the surviving remnant.

Before reporting the grand catastrophe, it is justified in the

first division of this section, by the recital of various facts adduced as specimens and evidences of the universal corruption and the desert of judgment. Their reprobation was proved by their persistence in transgression in the prospect of the divine retribution, and by the evident hypocrisy and hollow-heartedness of the seeming submission which was extorted from them. Chapter xxxiv. In the extremity of the siege the people had solemnly bound themselves to set their Hebrew servants free, but upon the siege being temporarily relaxed, they reduced them to bondage again, in palpable violation of the law of Moses, and their relation to them as brethren equally in covenant with God. Chapter xxxv. The Rechabites obey generation after generation the arbitrary requirements of their ancestor, but Judah, even with the enemy at their gates, verse 11, will not hearken unto God. Chapter xxxvi. Jehoiakim, instead of heeding the divine warnings read before him on the day of the public fast, commemorative of the recent capture of the city, verses 6—9, showed his contempt and defiance of them, by deliberately cutting up the roll on which they were written, and throwing it into the fire, and seeking to take the prophet's life. Chapters xxxvii. xxxviii., Jeremiah's instructions are unheeded by Zedekiah and his princes, and the prophet himself is cast into prison, and his life is repeatedly in peril.

Then upon the account of the destruction of the city and the captivity of the people, follows in the third division, the sequel to this sad history, in which the fortunes of the surviving remnant and Jeremiah's ministry among them are traced to its abrupt termination. The slight reviving under Gedaliah's administration was soon extinguished by his murder, chapters xl. xli. In opposition to the divine mandate, the people remove into Egypt, chapters xlii., xliii., deserting of their own accord the Holy Land, distrusting God's protection, and preferring that of a heathen power. There they, chapter xliv., openly and boldly renounce the worship of God, and declare their determination to serve instead the queen of heaven. Whereupon the curtain drops upon the prophet's labours, his last recorded utterance being the Lord's solemn oath of their utter rejection and extirpation. They have by this

avowal of apostasy cut themselves off from being the Lord's people, and they shall be dealt with accordingly.

There is not in all these chapters a single promise to the people as a whole, only three promises to individuals are in each division, that they should be preserved amidst the general ruin, to the Rechabites, xxxv. 18, 19, to Ebed-melech, xxxix. 15—18, and to Baruch, chapter xlv.

The other quarter from which unfavourable conclusions have been drawn respecting the text of Jeremiah is parallel passages. Mention has already been made of the deductions of Movers from the slight verbal discrepancies between this book and Kings in a section common to them both. There have been inferences of a like character from the numerous phrases and expressions borrowed by Jeremiah from earlier writers. Every discrepancy in a word or letter has been charged to inaccuracy of transcription, whereas these diversities are properly to be regarded as original. In transferring or alluding to the language of other inspired writers, Jeremiah is in the habit of introducing slight alterations, in place of making exact citations. The allusion remains evident, though a different turn is frequently given to the thought or form of expression; and the seal of inspiration rests upon it in the shape in which it proceeded from his pen, no less than in that which was employed by his predecessor. Thus for קרקר, Num. xxiv. 17, Jeremiah substitutes קרקר, xlviii. 45; for גרועה, Isa. xv. 2, גרועה, Jer. xlviii. 37; for אֲשִׁישִׁי, Isa. xvi. 7, אֲנָשִׁי, Jer. xlviii. 31; for נַמְרִים, Hab. i. 8, נְשָׂרִים, Jer. iv. 13.

A more serious and sweeping charge, however, has been based not upon the discrepancies, but the correspondences of this class of passages. It is alleged as the result of a recondite investigation, that many of them are interpolations, and it is contended on this ground that certain chapters must have been wrought over again by a later writer. Some elucidation is needed to discover the secret spring of this conclusion.

The dependence of the sacred penmen upon their predecessors in thought and language was denied by some of the older writers, under the impression that such an admission would be to the prejudice of their plenary inspiration. They

preferred to assume in all cases of coincidence of language, even where this was continued through considerable paragraphs, as in Isa. ii. 2—4, Micah iv. 1—3, that the words were independently suggested to each writer by the Holy Ghost. But while this assumption is plainly unnecessary, it is quite as foreign from the truth to regard these coincidences as indolent appropriations of the language of their predecessors, or as evidencing a lack of original and independent thought, or a period of declining taste. They serve to mark the unity of the book of revelation. Each writer by adopting and repeating what had been uttered before, both recognizes the inspiration and authority of his predecessors, and gathers confirmation from them for his own announcements. This is done not only by intentional citation and direct appeal to antecedent revelations, but incidentally likewise, and perhaps even unconsciously by the frequent employment of language shaped by intimate familiarity with those writings, which were at once the standard authority in religion and models of good composition.

This conscious or unconscious relation of the sacred writers to those who went before them, is attended to us with the incidental advantage of establishing the existence of the books referred to, and the manner in which they were understood at the time that the citation or allusion was made. And hence these references from Scripture to Scripture, found throughout the sacred volume, interpose a formidable barrier in the way of those who would bring the genuineness of any of its parts into discredit, or who would impose upon them a false interpretation. Hengstenberg was one of the first to exhibit this in its true importance and bearings in respect to the Pentateuch, and to add to the other proofs of its Mosaic origin, that derived from the fact that its existence is recognized or pre-supposed in the entire subsequent history and literature of the Israelitish people. And what is of special significance, its binding obligation was confessed not in Judah alone, but in the schismatical kingdom of the ten tribes, who were from their fundamental organization under the strongest temptation to reject it if that were possible: yet its institutions and laws were still perpetuated amongst them, in spite of their apostasy, with only such

modifications as their severance from Jerusalem and their worship of the calves compelled them to make, and even these were made with a consciousness of their sin. This is abundantly proved from the history of the disruption in Kings, and from the books of the two prophets of that kingdom, Hosea and Amos.

Kueper, as the title of his treatise indicates, has undertaken to exhibit what the prophecy of Jeremiah contains toward vindicating the genuineness or establishing the correct interpretation of earlier books of Scripture. All the coincidences of expression between him and other Old Testament writers are carefully examined in detail with a view to the light shed upon the points referred to. At the time of Jeremiah's ministry a great crisis in the affairs of Judah was just at hand. The cup of the people's transgressions was almost full, and the punishment long ago foretold, was about to be meted out to them. The prophet Jeremiah in labouring to arouse the besotted people, plants himself upon these ancient predictions, and reiterates them with the greater earnestness, as the period of their accomplishment was approaching. Hence the great abundance of his allusions and appeals to the earlier Scriptures, particularly to the Pentateuch, especially the book of Deuteronomy with its solemn recapitulation of the law and words of warning, and to the books of the preceding prophets. It is conclusively shown by Kueper, among other interesting and important consequences, that Jeremiah performs the same service in relation to the book of Isaiah, which, as has been already mentioned, Hosea and Amos perform in relation to the Pentateuch. The use which he makes of Isaiah, and the frequent expressions which he borrows from him, prove him to have been in possession of the book of his prophecies, and that the book was of the same compass then as now. His references to the book in all its parts are abundant and undeniable, not only to those portions which modern criticism allows to pass as genuine, but quite as frequently to those which have been pronounced spurious, and alleged to proceed from some nameless author at or near the close of the exile. So that to the other evidence by which all the prophecies found in the book accredited to him

are proved to be the production of Isaiah, is added the proof that they were actually in existence, and were used by Jeremiah before the exile had begun.

But then forsooth the conclusion from which neological criticism revolts, will be established. The Babylonish exile, and the deliverance by Cyrus will have been predicted not only before Cyrus was born, but before the empire of Babylon itself had attained to separate and independent existence. This must not be admitted. Hypothesis must be brought to sustain hypothesis; the baselessness of both is nothing in the account, if they afford escape from so unwelcome a conclusion. The allegation of the spuriousness of the suspected writings of Isaiah must therefore stand at every cost, and in spite of any conclusiveness of evidence. If Jeremiah quotes them, his own writings must in consequence fall under the ban. The forger of Isaiah's prophecies has had the book of Jeremiah, and re-written some of its chapters, introducing passages here and there in his own peculiar style. Everything which looks like a testimony to Isaiah's genuineness is straightway dismissed as an interpolation. "*Die Schreibart ist pseudo-jesaianisch*"; and this settles the matter. It might not be difficult upon the same method to maintain that the American Declaration of Independence was a forgery produced within the last decennium; and when confronted with proof that it had been mentioned, quoted, and referred to long before, the reply would be always ready, that all such allusions prior to the date assumed were interpolations, made by the forger himself in these various works. Such proofs of an erroneous text may be estimated at what they are worth.

ART. V.—Primeval Period of Sacred History.

IN former numbers of this journal,* we have had occasion to present what we believe to be the most correct, though not perhaps the most familiar, view of the Old Testament history in general, and of the structure and immediate purpose of the first book in particular. The last of the two articles referred to, enters, at some length, into the patriarchal history, prefixing a mere sketch of the foregoing narrative, to which, or rather to a part of which, we now propose to call the attention of our readers somewhat more minutely, recapitulating only so much of our previous and more laconic summary as may serve to render what we say intelligible.

The unity of Genesis being once established or assumed, as well as its preliminary, introductory relation to what follows, it may be divided, in accordance with the view already taken of the history as a whole, by making the call of Abraham a line of demarcation. The first eleven chapters will then be an introduction to the patriarchal history, which occupies the remainder of the book. And this introductory design or character may be observed, not only in this whole division, (chapters i.—xi.,) but in the mutual relation of its minor parts. Thus the history of Noah and his sons would not have been complete without that of the flood; and this could not be understood without a knowledge of the previous corruption; and this again could only be explained by going back to the fall; and that implies a previous condition from which man fell; and that previous condition is the one in which he was created; and the origin of man is but a part of the whole work of creation, with which this primeval history begins. There is something more in the connection which has now been pointed out than simple chronological succession. This view of the design and purpose of the history, and of its several parts, is not without its use, as a key to the

* See *Biblical Repertory* for July 1854, page 284; and for January 1855, page 24.

interpretation. It teaches us, at least, not to look for that which the historian did not mean to give, and not to judge either the truth or the completeness of the narrative by an unfair standard. If, for instance, the creation of the world is here recorded, not for its own sake, not even to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, much less to answer the demands of physical science, but for a moral purpose, that of tracing back the history of man to its commencement, this very view of its design precludes a large class of objections which have been made to the cosmogony of Scripture, namely, all those founded on the fact, that the form of the description is rather popular than scientific.

Another striking fact in this part of the history is that we have two distinct accounts of the creation, one comprising the first chapter and three verses of the second, the other filling the remainder of the second. Between these accounts there are two very obvious diversities, one of form, and one of matter. The material difference is, that while the first briefly records the formation of the first man, in its proper place, as a part of the general creation, the other seems to be designed to amplify this portion of the narrative and make it more particular, in order to prepare the way for what ensues, by distinctly recording the formation of woman, and describing the position in which man was placed. The difference of form is, that while the second and more definite account is simple and prosaic, there is something rhythmical and strophical in the arrangement of the first, as marked by the periodical recurrence of the formula, "it was evening, it was morning, the first day," etc. As metrical arrangements of this sort are commonly supposed to have originated in mnemonical contrivances, designed to aid the memory in retaining compositions of some length, especially before the art of writing was invented or in common use, it is not impossible, though insusceptible of proof, that this cosmogony is older than the time of Moses, perhaps as old as that of Adam, handed down by tradition, as much longer passages, and even entire books, have been in other cases, and at last incorporated, by divine authority, in this most ancient history, or perhaps prefixed to it as a kind of text or theme, like the genealogy of Christ at the beginning of Matthew's Gospel.

This last hypothesis enables us the better to account for two distinct cosmogonies, by supposing that Moses, having introduced the old traditional account, proceeds to comment on it, as an introduction to the history of redemption. It is scarcely necessary to observe, that this hypothesis of older documents embodied in the history is altogether different from that of subsequent interpolations, and preserves intact the inspiration and canonical authority of the whole book, while it greatly increases the prestige of antiquity in certain parts. It ought however to be looked upon rather as a pleasing speculation, than a necessary inference or certain fact.

The poetical character ascribed by this hypothesis to the first cosmogony in Genesis, has reference merely to the metrical or rhythmical arrangement of the narrative, and not to any thing fictitious or imaginative in its substance. On the contrary, the simple, unadorned, historical recital of events in this most ancient of all histories, when taken in connection and comparison with the monstrous combinations and inventions of all other cosmogonies, without exception, is among the strongest proofs of authenticity. The further we go back in tracing ethnic traditions of the origin of all things, the more childish and incredible, the more contradictory of one another and themselves, do they become; whereas the very oldest of the Jewish Scriptures, the relative antiquity of which, whatever be their absolute or actual date, cannot be reasonably questioned, furnish not only specimens but models of coherent, natural, self-evidencing, self-explaining history.

As our design is not minute interpretation, nor the solution of specific difficulties, but the suggestion of more general views which may conduce to both, no further notice will be taken of the scientific difficulties urged against the biblical cosmogony, than to remind the reader that the truth of Scripture, as a whole, does not rest upon the vindication of particular parts, any more than man's belief in his existence is dependent on his capacity to solve the metaphysical objections which may be urged against it. On the contrary, the proofs of its divine authority are so convincing as to justify us in withholding our assent to the most plausible objections, founded on specific difficulties, even where we cannot satisfactorily solve them. This

right becomes a duty, when there is a method of solution even possible, to which the benefit of every doubt ought to be given; much more when we are at liberty to choose from a plurality of such solutions. It is not even indispensable to make the choice, in order to confirm our faith in the entire revelation, of which the disputed passage forms a part. It is enough to know that there are solutions of the difficulty, any one of which is more probable than the supposition of an error or a falsehood. A striking illustration is afforded by the geological objection to the narrative in Genesis. Even admitting the results of geological investigation to be certain, with respect to the age of the earth, nothing can be more unreasonable than to deny the inspiration of the narrative, so long as both the witnesses may be harmonized by modifying the meaning of the verb *create*, so as to make it presuppose a previous formation out of nothing; or by assuming an indefinite interval between the first and second verse of Genesis; or by distinguishing the demiurgic days, as periods of great length, from the natural *νυχθήμερον*; or by supposing a creation *statu quo*, analogous to man and other animals in their maturity. However improbable any one of these hypotheses may be considered, it cannot possibly be so improbable as that of a gross error, much more of a deliberate deception, in a book which is proved to be from God by such abundant, various, and cumulative evidence. How much less rational is this last supposition, when the very facts assumed in the dispute are far from being certain, or at least admit of very different explanations! It is not necessary, therefore, to go through the whole inquiry for ourselves, or even to adopt implicitly the positive conclusions reached by others upon all these intricate and doubtful points, in order to justify a steadfast adherence to the biblical account of the creation as a true one.

What is called the astronomical objection to the scriptural account of the creation is still less entitled to impair our faith, because philosophers themselves are not agreed as to the nature of light, and among their many theories there is more than one that may be reconciled with what is said in Genesis, as to the creation of light upon the first day, and of the sun and moon upon the fourth. Let science understand itself, and its ex-

pounders come to an agreement with each other, before either shall presume to charge the word of God with ignorance or error, even as to scientific matters.

All that is here intended to be urged upon this subject, is the right and duty of all those whose minds are satisfied with the positive evidence in favour of the Scriptures as a revelation, to prefer any mode of solving scientific difficulties, not intrinsically absurd or impossible, to the irrational conclusion that a book so attested can teach falsehood, simply because it does not agree with our view of scientific facts and principles.

The account of man's original condition is not only very simple and historical in form, but very brief in compass, being plainly intended, not to gratify a morbid curiosity, but merely to introduce and make intelligible the account that follows of the great apostasy. The image of God, in which man was created; his dominion over the inferior creation; the simple but inexorable test of his obedience; the prospect of immortal life as its reward; the possibility of learning by experience the distinction between moral good and evil; the institution of the Sabbath, and of marriage; and the absence of that shame which has its origin in sin; these are the main points of the narrative, and all of them are stated in the most laconic manner, without explanatory amplification, even where the enigmatical expression might seem to require it, as in the case of the two trees—that of life, and that of the knowledge of good and evil. Upon one particular of this original condition, on the other hand, the history does dwell with a minuteness which at first sight may seem unaccountable; to wit, the place of man's primeval residence. The precise situation of the garden of Eden is as much a mystery, and as much a subject of dispute as ever. The latest and most learned dissertations on the subject contain little more than an enumeration of the various solutions which have been proposed, together with a tacit or express admission, that no one of them is wholly satisfactory. These hypotheses have now become so numerous, that a full exhibition of them, if it were practicable, could have no effect but that of perplexing and confounding. Nothing more will be attempted here than to classify the theories, according to their principle, in which way they may all be reduced to

three great classes. I. Those which deny the literal historical character of the description. II. Those which regard it as a literal description of a state of things no longer in existence. III. Those which suppose it to refer to boundaries and landmarks, which may still be traced and ascertained.

The theories of the first class are chiefly of two kinds; those which regard the passage as a sort of philosophical myth, in which certain facts, as to the origin and progress of mankind, are set forth under the disguise of topographical description; and those assuming it to be a fanciful poetical picture, in which real and familiar facts are blended with fictitious ones, as in the old Greek fables of the Happy Islands and the Garden of the Hesperides. All these hypotheses suppose a previous denial of the truth and inspiration of the record, and are therefore entitled to no further notice.

The second general hypothesis proceeds upon the supposition that the flood made such changes in the surface of the earth as to render this description no longer applicable. This view has the advantage, or at least the convenience, of rendering all investigation needless. The objection to it, independent of all scientific difficulties, is that it affords no reason for the description being introduced at all, and still less for its being expressed in terms belonging to postdiluvian geography.

By far the greatest number of these theories fall under the third head, and assume that the description is, or was meant to be, a literal account of places still in existence. They also coincide in taking as their starting-point the identity of the third and fourth rivers with the Tigris and Euphrates; the latter being only a Greek modification of the Hebrew name, and the former a demonstrable, though much less obvious derivative of *Hiddekel*. The only question, therefore, is in reference to Gihon and the Pison, and to the mutual relation of the four, as fixing the position and extent of Eden. The expression *eastward*, (Gen. ii. 8,) is so vague as to throw little light upon the subject, and is commonly admitted to mean east of the meridian under which the book was written.

The difficulty of the problem is enhanced by the fact, that the two remaining names of rivers are significant of *overflow* or *outburst*, and might therefore be applied to various streams, as

one of them actually is in Arabic geography; while, on the other hand, the names of countries joined with them are variably and loosely employed elsewhere. The innumerable combinations which have grown out of the attempt to ascertain these vague particulars, may be reduced to two great classes; those which assume the tract described to be a small part of Asia; and those which make it co-extensive with a large portion of the surface of the earth, or of the eastern hemisphere. The usual course of theorists has been to determine this point *a priori*, and then seek for the Pison, and the Gihon, Cush and Havilah, either near together or in distant regions, as may best agree with this foregone conclusion.

Each of these general assumptions may be plausibly defended from the context and from usage. In favour of the first, is the admitted fact, that the third and fourth rivers are the Tigris and Euphrates; and as these are never very far apart throughout their course, it is alleged to be improbable that the other names denote streams more remote from these or from each other. In favour of the second, is the fact that *Cush* (as given in the margin of the English Bible, in the text translated *Ethiopia*,) however variably or doubtfully applied, always elsewhere signifies a land much further to the south than the one watered by the Tigris and Euphrates, to include which the two remaining rivers must be sought at a considerable distance. On the first of these grounds, the Pison and the Gihon have been identified with the Phasis, the Oxus, the Araxes, and other streams in Eastern Asia; on the other, with the Nile, the Ganges, the Indus, and the Danube. Ancient tradition, as recorded by Josephus and the Christian fathers, is decidedly in favour of the wider hypothesis, towards which the course of modern speculation seems to be now tending, after having long inclined in the opposite direction.

The description of Havilah, as abounding in gold, bdellium, and the onyx-stone, may seem to give a clew to the precise locality intended, but has not, in point of fact, served to reconcile discordant opinions, as the meaning of the last two words is doubtful, and more than one country, far and near, might be described as producing gold and precious stones.

Besides the doubt which overhangs the names of these two

ivers, and the bounds which they encompass, no small difficulty has arisen from the four streams being not called "rivers" but "heads," into which one river was divided "thence," i. e. on leaving Eden or the garden. The difficulty here is twofold; first, in the expression, and especially the strange use of the word "heads"; then, in the thing itself, to wit, the representation of one river as becoming four, which seems directly to reverse the ordinary course of nature. Among the numberless attempts which have been made to solve this enigma, there is none more ingenious than that of Calvin, who supposes the one river of Eden to be the Tigris and Euphrates *after their junction*, while the "four heads" are the two streams above that point, and the two into which they again diverge before they reach the sea. The objections to this explanation are, that it puts the two unimportant arms of the united river on a level with the two great streams of the Tigris and Euphrates; that it takes the verb *went* (or more exactly, *going*) *out*, in two different senses; and that it leaves the unusual term "heads" as mysterious as ever.

If it be worth while to add one more to the many vain attempts which have been made to solve this riddle, it may be suggested as a possibility, though far from certain, that "went out," or "going out," refers not at all to the natural course of the stream downwards, but to the ideal line of its direction when traced upwards; as if it had been said, "Follow this stream up, and you will find it branching off in the direction of four sources." The Pison and Gihon would then denote the two main tributaries of the Tigris and Euphrates respectively. The sense thus put upon the verb may not be obvious or justified by usage, but it is easily deducible from it, and is not double, as in Calvin's explanation, while, on the other hand, the noun (*heads*) has its usual and proper geographical meaning.

To this unsatisfactory but faithful view of the disputed question, in all its darkness and confusion, may be added a suggestion with respect to the simultaneous meagreness and fulness of this singular description. That these should be the only geographical details which have survived the flood, and that al-

though brief they should be so circumstantial and minute, is a very striking fact in itself, and rendered more so by the singular collocation of the passage, as a kind of parenthesis between the ninth and fifteenth verses, as if this account of the river were in some way necessary to explain the connection of what follows with what goes before. However dubious this connection may be, to suppose that the choice of topics in a history so brief and pregnant was made at random and without design, is, if not irreverent, at variance with analogy, and with the view already taken of the book, as an explanatory introduction to the law of Moses and the history of Israel. In this relation of the Antediluvian Annals to the later Scriptures, the solution of the question now before us is no doubt to be sought, and will be ultimately found.

The next great subject of primeval history is the Fall, which is recorded, with some particularity, in the third chapter of Genesis. According to the plan which we have hitherto pursued, we shall confine ourselves to general suggestions as to the relation which this great event sustains to the whole history, without going into questions of minute interpretation. The first suggestion which we make is, that the narrative is evidently not an allegory but a history, and intended to be literally understood; because there is nothing to intimate the contrary; because it is preceded and followed by plain history, unless the whole book must be viewed as allegorical; because if this part may be so explained away, there is no part that may not be; and because the later Scriptures and especially the books of the New Testament, refer to Adam's fall as an actual occurrence.*

This historical character of the passage requires us to believe, that a literal serpent was the visible agent in seducing Eve; but not that it was the responsible prime agent. Reason itself would have led to the conclusion, that the serpent was the organ of a wicked spirit; and accordingly we find the two ideas often blended by the later inspired writers.†

* E. g. Job xxxi. 33, Hosea vi. 7, Isaiah xliii. 27, 2 Cor. xi. 3, 1 Tim. ii. 13, 14, Rom. v. 12, etc.

† See, for example, John viii. 44, 2 Cor. xi. 3, Rev. xii. 9, xx. 2.

In like manner, the divine denunciation, although terminating really upon the spiritual agent, is clothed in the garb of a curse upon the more irrational and animal instrument, in which indeed it was fulfilled symbolically, whether we assume, with some, that the relative position of the serpent in the animal creation was now lowered; or with others that this relative position underwent no physical or outward change, but was judicially invested with a humiliating punitive significance, in which case the natural repugnance of the human to the serpentine genus must be recognized as one of the most striking tokens of fearful retribution.*

Our next suggestion has respect to the mode of the temptation, as to which there are two points worthy of attention; first, the artful duplicity of the Satanic assurance, which keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the hope. In one sense, but not the one which they attached to the expressions, our first parents did not die, but were enlightened in the knowledge of moral good and evil, and became as gods unto themselves, emancipated from that childlike dependence on their Maker which belonged to their primeval state. But this change, far from rendering them happy, was itself their misery and ruin.

The other salient point in the mode of the temptation, is the threefold aspect under which the bait was offered to the woman, corresponding to the threefold temptation of our Saviour, Matt. iv. 3—9, to John's trichotomy of worldly lusts, 1 John ii. 16, and, as some imagine, to the various temptations incident to different periods in the life of man, and in the history of nations.

But by far the most important part connected with this great apostasy is the first promise of a Saviour, included in the very curse pronounced upon the tempter, and significantly called in later times the *protevangelium* (or *embryo gospel*.) It predicts a hereditary warfare between two great parties, to be waged throughout a course of ages, and diversified by

* These arguments against the allegorical interpretation of the passage will be found more fully and most ably stated in Hengstenberg's *Christology*, vol. i. pp. 5—18, ed. 1854.

many fluctuations, each of the belligerents obtaining temporary partial advantages, till one should become finally triumphant, and destroy the other. The descriptive terms applied to the two parties admit both of a wider and a narrower interpretation, or rather there are three distinct gradations, all of which are verified by the event. The "seed of the woman," in the widest sense, is the whole human race, as opposed to evil spirits; in the narrowest sense, it is Christ, the Head and Representative of redeemed humanity, as opposed to Satan, or the Prince of Devils. But between these two there is an intermediate sense of much importance to the first interpretation of the later history, which indeed derives its whole complexion from it. According to this third view, which is really involved in both the others, and therefore perfectly consistent with them, these figurative terms denote two great divisions in humanity itself; those akin to devils in their character and destiny, and thence, by a familiar oriental idiom, called the "seed of the serpent;" and those who, through Divine grace, should escape from this infernal parentage and doom, by faith in the promised "Seed of the woman," and may therefore, as his spiritual brethren, be distinguished by a wider application of the same expressive phrase. Into these two classes the apostasy divided the whole race, and in their mutual relations we may trace, not only the most vivid exhibition of the deadly and protracted warfare here foretold, but also the great furrow which the ploughshare of God's righteousness and mercy was to run throughout the whole extent of human history, determining its character, and furnishing its primary division into two great antagonistic but inseparable portions.

ART. VI.—*Die Lehre von der Person Christi* geschichtlich und biblisch-dogmatisch, dargestellt von J. A. DORNER. Berlin: Gustav Schlawitz. 1852—55.

THIS learned, thorough, and important work has already become settled in its place as a standard contribution to Christian theology. The exegetical and dogmatic treatment of the subject, as promised in the above title, has been carried no further than some more or less incidental discussion at the close of what is thus left a purely historical work. The first sub-title becomes the title proper. *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die neueste: "Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ from the earliest times to the present." We take it up now neither for review nor for criticism strictly speaking, but for some reflection on the fact itself of such a history—the nature and office of such theological labour as this work represents.

The work is not a mere indifferent history, written for its own sake. It is a great argument; and we have to do with it now in this particular aspect. In one sense it does not claim to be a disinterested representation: in the sense, we mean, in which rationalism would demand all prepossession of Christian faith to be laid aside. "A historical picture without a theological back-ground I have not attempted." Yet in the only proper and positive sense it does aim to be impartial; and herein lies all its force. It truly disclaims all arbitrary construction, and disowns all interest to put into the history as its reigning principle, a foreign and spurious idea; but not so as to leave the history without any reigning principle at all. It professes to reproduce the mental movements of christendom in developing and settling the doctrine of the person of Christ in their original spirit and intent. The prepossession which it confesses, it holds to be simply that Christian spirit or consciousness which is essentially the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. And this it carries in no spirit of bigotry and intolerant assertion, virtually taking for granted the very thing to be

proved; but simply with a view to present it fairly, and submit it to the candid judgment of the great public of the present age. If the personages, and tendencies, and events concerned be shown up instinct with the present faith of christendom as their proper life and power, the object is accomplished. Then let the same phenomena be set in due array in the spirit of any other prepossession, or in the pretence of none at all; and let the world judge which is the body breathing its own natural life, and which the galvanized corpse.

A general impulse towards historical work, especially on the theological field, seems to exist in the reflective spirit of our age; in the prevailing and hopeful disposition to investigate the past as the substratum, the root, the key of the present. But besides this, the monograph before us had an immediate occasion in a peculiar and powerful anti-christian phase of speculative philosophy. The reaction of theology against the recent rationalism had fully set in, and the Christian mind of Germany was fairly come to itself again, and awake to the new task, or rather the new form of the old task, now devolved upon it. Dr. Dorner's work itself has a history with reference to the tactics of the enemy. It began in two quarterly articles in 1835, '36, dogmatically and exegetically discussing the orthodox view of the person of Christ. In the modern cycle of the conflict between faith and reason, it had come to be matter of fresh interest, that "the forces of both parties were all collecting around the person of Christ, as the point where the contest must be decided," the key to the whole territory on either side. "Certainly a great advance towards the decision. And all depends on whether such a Christ as is presented in the spirit of the church, if not always in her words—a Christ in whom the full personal unity of the divine and the human appears as historical fact—is necessary and has actually existed. Should philosophy succeed in convincing all thinking men that the idea of such a person is self-contradictory and impossible, the contest were closed and all Christian theology reduced to a mere province of philosophy. Should philosophy, on the other hand, be brought to acknowledge the necessity of a Christ historical as well as ideal, should a philosophy of the

person of Christ be attained, the antagonism were resolved in essential inward harmony."

The heresy in view is, in a word, only a special form of the familiar one, which makes Jesus a mere man. It now proceeds, indeed as by necessary consequence, to construct a Messiah for itself; and as it cannot go back to Jesus and find a docetistic Messiah there, it goes forward and finds the Christ in the ideal perfection of the human race as a whole, and its present theanthropic constitution on the pantheistic principle; the very denial of the Deity of Jesus Christ still involving a certain deification of mankind, and Ebionism and Gnosticism meeting together. A speculative and biblical vindication of the Christian doctrine against this error was Dr. Dorner's original effort.

To much the same purpose these articles were reproduced three years later in a volume. And finally, in 1846, the author began a very much enlarged and entirely reconstructed edition of his work, which was completed in its present form some four years ago. Meantime appeared a new development of the heretical philosophy, which called for this reconstruction. So mighty is this ideal Messiah, so sweeping the momentum of this ultra free thinking, that it proposes to carry all history with it. Instead of conforming itself to history, it would conform all history to itself. It must in the nature of the case come to this. If it reconstruct the present faith of Christendom, it must reconstruct the whole genealogy of it. If it idealize the present, it must idealize also the past. Men do not gather figs of thistles. So this Tübingen school, as it is sometimes called, with the masterly and unscrupulous Dr. Baur at its head, and the almost fanatical Dr. Strauss at its foot, proposed the famous mythical scheme of history, to supplant the whole biblical argument for the actual appearance of God-man in Jesus Christ. According to this scheme the dogma of the Logos, as the second person of the Godhead incarnate in Jesus Christ, was a mere notion, hit upon amidst the great Ebionistic and Gnostic controversies, a spark struck out by the concussion of thought. Then, at the instance of this happy idea, Jesus and the apostles were taken up by the glowing imagination of the church, and like the heroes of the pagan mythology, decked out

in every way needful to furnish what might be thought a sufficient historical basis for the new faith. And the ruse has imposed upon the world from that time to this. The rise of Christianity is thus detached from the actual person of Jesus Christ, and traced only to the Logos doctrine of the second century, or at earliest to the religious and philosophic conceptions of Paul. To meet this radical revolutionary theory Dr. Dorner's Christology took its present historical form. The history of the doctrine for the first four centuries, which had before only been referred to by way of introduction, became by far the most important part of the work, and occupies almost as large a part of the whole work as that devoted to all the fourteen centuries since.

Thus at the same time that the contest between reason and faith comes to centre upon the person of Christ, the defence of faith is cast into this historical form. The nature and validity of this species of apologetics is well worth our earnest reflection. It is to the same purpose with some recent earnest discussions, which have been called forth in our own country by the diffusion of virtually the same naturalistic spirit here, but which have approached the question from a different direction, and seem to us to stand on less firm and positive ground; particularly the masterly volume of Dr. Bushnell on "Nature and the Supernatural."

The question is precisely, whether the mythical or the orthodox system of history in the case is the true one. And of course there is no criterion outside of the history itself. The evidence on either side must be altogether of the internal sort, although it covers the whole field of what is commonly called external evidence also. The external evidence of Christianity given by history has to be weighed according to its intrinsic character. The veracity of the witness himself is in question. The argument before us is virtually a direct appeal to the moral judgments of men; and an appeal on the grandest scale in a cause of vital importance to the world. It assumes the standard conception of the person of Christ. That the actual Jesus of Nazareth was constitutionally God-man, organically uniting the divine and human natures in one person for ever, without conversion, composition, or confusion. It holds that this concep-

tion in its very nature gives evidence of having originated in the veritable fact of such a person; and that the history of it does actually trace it home to a source in real life. And then it traces the history of opinions concerning Christ from beginning to end, especially during the first four centuries of the Christian era—the period most directly in dispute—to show at once that this conception is, and always has been, precisely the one contended for; that it has been insisted on with the most discriminating resistance of all deviation from it; and that it takes its rise legitimately and solely from Jesus himself. It leaves the history thus breathing its original life, to make its own silent appeal to mind and heart, and stand or fall upon its merits alone.

Not that Christianity betakes itself to this sort of argument in desperation, as if to the forlorn hope of its army, but as if to its real and true stronghold. Indeed the appeal of all truth is, in the last instance, to intuition or faith. Mathematical demonstration rests throughout upon its axioms, its *self-evident* truths, as they are significantly called. A result reached by what appears at the time a sound logical chain may *show itself* such as to lead to the detection of a fallacy in the logic itself. In scientific speculation that theory will always in the end be accepted, which meets this intuitive perception. And in religion, God comes not to demonstrate himself to men, but demands their faith. This self-evidencing power is infinitely greater than a mere logical chain or mathematical calculation. In the bosom of this, all logical science lives and moves, and has its being. It is true, history may come in here with a certain dialectic force, by way of exposing fallacy in the reasoning of heresy. We value an opinion more or less, when we see how it strikes others; and on this principle a clear historical survey of the struggles, through which the doctrine of Christ as God-man has made its way and established itself in the public mind, must have great weight in favour of the truth of that doctrine. That, which has so thoroughly enlisted the most earnest speculations; which so stirs the world of mind to its centre; which so takes hold upon the deepest interests, the religious interests of men, whence all thought primarily springs;—must be some real and paramount fact. Else the world of mind is never to

be trusted; much less, therefore, that small portion of it, which would repudiate its great perceptions. But the pantheistic theory before us rather refines and idealizes, than denies, the Christian doctrine of God-man. And this brings out history in her highest office, simply *showing herself*, as the positive assertion of her own objective reality; as, when Berkeleyism reduces all the objective to a mere idea, every object stands a positive protest against such negation.

The history of the doctrine of the person of Christ has chiefly two elements of force for the enlightened mind, as against the mythical system, and at the same time against all skeptical effort to undermine religion, and all the troublesome intrusions of doubt upon those who cannot give up their faith. In the first place, it presents the doctrine as intrinsically probable. In the second place, it traces the doctrine to an adequate basis of fact.

1. It presents the doctrine as intrinsically probable. And that not in the sense of mere analogy or parallel to nature, as the characters of a fictitious story or a picture may be probable; not only such as *may* be real, but such as *must* have been; at once lying in a sphere above nature, yet constitutionally real, natural, *life-like*—natural, we mean, not as opposed to supernatural, but to unnatural. The Christian conception of the God-man is not fantastic, grotesque, monstrous, or superstitious, like the myth of the centaurs, or of the springing of Minerva from Jupiter's head. It is not constitutionally fabulous, but reasonable, commending itself as a conception of *real life*. This is no secondary and incidental matter. It is but a special application of the great principle, on which the belief in God rests, as intrinsically reasonable and necessary; or on which the spirit of faith infallibly distinguishes miracles and the word of God from all Satanic caricatures, or merely natural productions, by their self-evident divine character. If the Christian conception look like a mere freak of fancy, if it be unnatural and monstrous in its very constitution, putting together things palpably incongruous, and thus contradicting itself upon its face, it were absurd to bring history to support it as objectively valid and true. The idea were *unhistorical*, *unfact-like*, so to speak, in its nature. No one would ever think

of claiming that Æsop's fables were historically true. And there may be, on the other hand, just the opposite appearance in the doctrine of the God-man; an appearance, which not only allows of the doctrine being founded in fact, but demands such foundation as positively as the fable forbids it. It may be such that, even if we had the history yet to discover, we might expect to find the doctrine to be but the statement of a fact. We instinctively demand a foundation of fact, and could not be satisfied unless we should find, that the idea had originally cropped out in concrete form somewhere in the history of the world. The thought is evidently a copy of life; too *life-like*—though it be like a higher than any natural life—to have risen from the fancy; the *thing* must have been seen.

It is doubtless in this view, at least in part, that Dr. Dorner devotes much of an elaborate introduction to the precise defining of the Christian idea of God-man over against both heathen and Jewish ideas, with which it might be compared. The particular object in this is indeed to show, that the Christian doctrine cannot be attributed either to heathenism or to Judaism as its source. It cannot be regarded as a development of the dreamy, docetistic incarnations of the eastern heathenism, nor of the fabulous demigods of the western, nor of the angelophanies and theologic ideas of the Jewish religion. It does not belong in a region so above the world, the region of superstition, or of theophany. It comes not in the train of a history which had no beginning in the world, and whose course lies through the air. This demonstration in itself, however, proves nothing; for if the Christian doctrine did not originate *from* the heathen ideas, it might still have originated *like* them. To show that it has no direct affiliation with the myths of Vishnu or Prometheus, does not of itself prove it not a myth. But it does gain no little ground against the mythical system, to show a specific difference between that doctrine and all heathen conceptions of the same subject, and a difference in favour of the intrinsic probability of the Christian doctrine. If the Christian idea have not the look of a myth, in all probability it had not the origin of one. The

character of the doctrine must be a strong witness as to its pedigree.

This is so in every department of knowledge and judgment. The appeal is here to no mere logical postulate or mathematical axiom, but to the vital principle of all our intellectual comfort and progress. On this principle, for example, our present system of astronomy commends itself to every scientific judgment. It looks and feels true. We never think of its being merely provisional, but consider it substantially unchangeable, *the* theory of the solar system. To be sure it is supported by ever new inductions. But there is a certain *a priori* satisfaction with it, which makes induction rather demonstrative than tentative in the case. It bears in itself the impress of origin in truly scientific reflection. It is an intrinsically scientific view, not a fabulous one, nor a mere fantastic guess, or empiric theory, like the old Ptolemaic system. It seems to go to the bottom. It feels like fact, and we feel it to be the true point of observation for all the relevant circle of facts. On the other hand, even scientific men feel that in the way of geological theory they have not yet fairly touched bottom. Even many who consider it certain that the traditional idea of creation must go the way of the Ptolemaic firmaments, and the Cartesian vortices, are yet not prepared to say upon what positive terms that idea is to yield. And the present suspense in the geological department is as instructive as the present satisfaction in the astronomical.

Is it objected that the Christian doctrine early took the form of a decree of an œcumenical council, and has, therefore, stood upon external authority rather than upon its intrinsic merits; that this implies internal weakness, and forbids the illustration we have just employed? Even supposing the doctrine to be received on that œcumenical authority, the reception is not necessarily unfree. Where it may most decidedly seem so, where the receiver may never have had a choice, nor have struggled with a doubt, it may still be a free and earnest consent from intelligent perception of truth. But apart from this: the symbolical form of our idea is rather a testimony *for* than *against* its vital importance. It presents

the definition as the fruit of the most earnest and concentrated exercises of Christian thought; thought which could not rest till it rose to be outwardly, as it was ever to be inwardly, a supreme power in the world. Those œcumenical decisions are great facts, perfectly unique. They are not to be despised, nor neglected, nor set aside, at the pleasure of an individual. No theory of history can be true, which does not satisfactorily, scientifically account for them. They *have actually* determined the faith of christendom ever since, and are at least as significant and mighty as the Reformation itself, on the authority of which free-thinking professes to proceed. They are not superseded by the Reformation. History repeals none of its acts.

Another illustration of the acknowledged validity of this intrinsic evidence, appears in the satisfaction often gained by a student mind after long wandering upon some subject of earnest thought. The planning of a sermon, an essay, or a book, of comprehensive philosophical thought, would often exhibit a singular growth, were the whole process arrested and examined. The mind passing from one point of view to another; working awhile upon one train, till a better opens; at last hitting upon one which satisfies, which it could not exchange for any former one, and upon which as a whole it has no wish to improve. This is, for that mind, *the* view of the given subject. The search ends in finding; the fact of the search itself implies the possibility of such an end; and the mind knows when it reaches the end. So the rationalistic speculators in fact pass restlessly from one theory to another; they have no reason in one theory, why they should not take another; and Dr. Dorner in his prefaces mentions several distinct phases of the rationalistic philosophy appearing in the same school within the compass of a few years. *Their* searching leads not to rest, because they begin not *with* the old doctrine, but *behind* it, or rather repudiate it. But the œcumenical definition of the person of Christ remains a *settlement*. The mass of mind will feel it to be so, and call for no improvement or revision of it. It is *the* view of that highest subject of human thought, the relation of God and the world.

Once more: In every day experience one meets with

thoughts, which approve themselves as those of a true *man*, an intelligent and sensible man, amidst the throng of superficial ideas, which are more like mere chatterings than like thoughts. The suggestion may be entirely new and unique in its sphere, as much so as the veriest fable or fairy-tale; it may be disguised in some allegoric dress; yet commend itself to every thinking mind as weighty and true, as bespeaking deep discernment, and opening the reality of things. We may not have known the particular author before; we may still not know his name. But we feel as if we knew the man. We judge him at once a man, a thinker. We judge not the thought by the man, but the man by the thought. The conception certifies itself as that of a mind not rambling in the air of commonplace, or nonsense, or superstition, but in vital sympathy with the real world. So with the conception of the God-man. It might appear alone among the motley mass of myths, with no pretence of a history at all, yet acknowledge no possible affinity with its company, and surprise and win the merchantman of ideas, amidst the profusion of painted trash, as a pearl of great price. *That* looks like truth. He may hardly care from what individual it comes, or whether it come from any. Howsoever it got form in words, it came from fact.

It is therefore a very familiar and most valid law of evidence, to which the historical apology before us appeals; in fact *the* fundamental principle and law of all certitude. This sort of argument brings the question of Christianity home to the intuitive judgments of men; not only to that spiritual perception, which belongs peculiarly to devout doers of the truth, but to that religious common sense, so to speak, which is the living soul of Christendom, and the substratum of Christian civilization. Before that tribunal Christianity is ever to be tried, and before that she will ever prevail, until error prove stronger than truth. It is not to our purpose to pursue the particular application of this great argument, and show what the peculiarity of the Christian conception is, as compared with the heathen superstitions, or the Jewish provisional revelations.

2. We need now hardly do more than mention again the second element of force in the historical argument before us: that it traces the Christian doctrine to an adequate basis of

fact. In the first place, it presents the actual divine-human person of Jesus, which could not have been a fiction, because it is at once altogether too natural, and altogether too supernatural. And in the second place, it brings down the idea of theanthropy without interruption from him; showing his own associates and the next succeeding generation full of the same consciousness respecting him, which dwelt as self-consciousness in him. And besides, it shows the later actors in the history of the doctrine not at work to invent and construct a dogma, so much as to define and state a mysterious fact, which they had seen. This finishes the argument by showing, that the recorded and accredited facts sustain and verify the presumption; at least by boldly professing and offering to show it as credibly as any facts can be shown. The Christian doctrine is not afraid to give its authority in history. The pagan mythologies could never make such an offer. Like meteors they seem to form themselves in the air, and of the substance of the air itself. We do not ask an authority for them. But when the soberest history offers us in Jesus a divine-human person as a fact, it solves a riddle for us. Whatever difficulties it gives are as nothing, both in number and especially in character, compared with those which it saves.

The question might here arise (in this line of all possible questioning:) Why not *allow* Christ to be thus ideal? Is the mere interest of history worth all this trouble, if Christ be not denied, but only thus refined? The great point is safe after all, that is, the final and the progressive elevation of the race, the salvation of the world. Christ will still appear at last in his body, the church. Is not such an ideal Messiah enough? But the fact, that a Christ thus merely ideal *is not allowed*, ought to be a sufficient answer. And to reason the matter, we might say that our nature demands objective authority. The idea of God is itself a reaching after something *objectively* supernatural; the heart can be satisfied with nothing less; and that objective authority must show itself upon earth as an integral element of history, in order to be *real* for man, to take hold of him practically, and give the yearning heart something to rest upon outside of itself. There was a deep and broad truth, a reference to the interest not of a mere dogma, but of human

nature itself in these words of John: "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God." The very activity of mind, which shows itself in the Gnostic speculations, can find a basis of true satisfaction only in historical fact. Of this the heathen mythologies give incontestable proof, though it be but of a negative sort; and the hypothesis of the modern mythical system itself adds testimony all on the same side. Why *did* the Christians of the third and fourth centuries take up Jesus at all, and pretend the historical verity of their high and glowing fancies; but that the heart *must* have a reality without and above itself to rest upon? As God had his revelations in actual fact for the Jews, and even in some way for the Gentile world, in ancient times, so in these last days he has given his Son. The philosophy which would deny the latter, must and does deny the former also, and, could it live long enough, would have to deny the realization of its own ideal Messiah. If man has an outward world of history to live in, he must have a God in history, a Christ of history, to live under. The philosophy which would deny the God of objective revelation, might as well deny the world at the same time. It proves quite too much.

It were most interesting to consider from this point of view the fact itself of such attempted refinements of the Christian doctrine as are here in hand. It also would go only to commend the established Christian theory. It would show how the Christian theory can account for all the facts in the case—the fact of the pantheistic tendency among the rest—while the mythical theory, whatever else it may seem to explain, can give no reasonable and worthy account of the church and objective Christianity. For example: The anti-christian excesses, from the primitive Ebionism and Gnosticism down to their latest and most refined posterity, may be regarded at best as very natural anticipations of the great result; the fantastic ambitions of the childhood of the church (if we consider them as working within the church) in haste to reach its manhood. They are the risings of natural self-dependence, false independence, upon the strength of a paternal gift already received. They presuppose some suggestive fact or facts in veritable history, looking in the pretended direction, as certainly as the youth's conceits

and precocious mannishness presume the existence of actual manhood before him and around him. When history shows such a fact as the actual theanthropy of Jesus, it accounts for these overweening assumptions. It does not at all conflict with them, save in referring the power of human progress to heaven instead of earth, to grace instead of nature, to God instead of man himself; and there every true heart must feel that it ought to condemn them. But with *such* a promise given to man, he might be expected sometimes to run wild, forget the Giver, and set up for himself. He were far more likely to do so with such promise, than without it. Where in fact does this school get its notion of a theanthropy of humanity, or of theanthropy at all, if there has been no theanthropic fact in the world? The pretensions of idealism can be explained from the basis of reality; but the pretension of reality is inexplicable on the presumptions of idealism. Thus rationalism itself, though its words go the other way, by its nature confesses the probability of divine revelation in history.

Having thus analyzed the argument residing in such historical discussion of the Christian faith against the idealizing rationalism, let us think a moment of its importance. Its simplicity may deceive us as to its force, and in many cases as to its pertinence.

In regard to the argument itself, for example, it might be replied: If the doctrine of the person of Christ as it stands in the ancient creeds so intrinsically commends itself, it can be trusted to take care of itself. Why all this labour to defend it? Of course the simple answer is: This is the way it takes care of itself. It takes possession of earnest minds, and they insist on giving it a fair exhibition. Men know not what they do when they oppose it. They mistake it. They do not feel its real power. And it is not willing to go down unheard. If it is to sink out of the world, it will at least not be cast overboard through sheer misapprehension. So far as in it lies, it will have itself known. And the Christian heart delights to see the truth thus turn itself every way, becoming as it were all things to all men. It delights to be the agent of the truth in thus turning itself, and showing its full proportions.

But this granted, such an analysis of the argument as we

have endeavoured to present, might be thought quite superfluous. It might be thought that such common-place considerations are taken for granted on both sides; that thus to expatiate on them, is like proving a truism, makes no progress, does not help at all to clear the question; or, that the point in discussion needs not such urging, need only be suggested to be admitted to all proper weight. We are persuaded, however, it is otherwise. The law or fact of self-evidence in the case is indeed taken for granted; but we may say it is more than taken for granted. It is considered so secure as to be quite forgotten. Its force is not practically felt. Carried away by their own speculations the theological visionaries do not stop to think. They do not take time to look at the bearings of their notions, and fairly compare them with the standard conceptions in calm, disinterested judgment. Idealism in its soaring loses sight of common-place truths. It lacks the general conservative sense. It throws out all ballast of authority and tradition, and cuts loose from all hold upon the past, and therefore upon the present real world (for the present is the fruit of the past,) and rises by its own gaseous lightness in the atmosphere of reality, which continually closes in under it and drives it ever further from the reach and sight of men. It does need to be urged upon minds of this turn, which are still within reach, that the great facts of the past are reasonable and demand attention, and that all true progress must be made in good faith upon the basis of the past. The old doctrine of Christendom on the person of Christ is worthy to be compared with any scheme of modern illuminationism as to solid reasonable and intuitive truth. It must be insisted, that the Christian doctrine be fairly allowed that test.

We are equally persuaded that such reflections as these are both timely and in place. Such an apologetic work as Dr. Dorner's has not exhausted its mission, when it has refuted the particular school against which it was at first directed. The humanitarian or naturalistic tendency, which is embodied in the various forms of Unitarianism and Universalism, and which is so widely spread, and so insinuating in our own day and country, is of the same blood with that speculative rationalism of Germany. It not only organizes its own special body or bodies

of confessors as a denomination or congregation of Christians, (where it does not lead them even to throw away the Christian name and all religion,) but also works its way into the bosom of the evangelical church, and steals away the hearts especially of intelligent youth. It is the theoretical side of the practical religious looseness, which every earnest observer sees with growing concern in the rising generation. It disturbs the mind. It shakes the foundations of faith. It may overthrow in a day what it has taken centuries to build; simply because those formation centuries cannot be reviewed and appreciated in a day. In some respects it is most useful. It creates a basis for delightfully fresh interest in the truths of the gospel. It raises profound questions, which must be met and answered, before the Christian theology can fully triumph. It must in the end sink the foundations of faith more deeply than ever in the general mind. But in other respects it is painful, and for the present dangerous, exposing multitudes even to shipwreck of the faith. It works discomfort in many minds unable or unwilling to follow it to its skeptical results. It makes them long for a new kind of satisfaction with their old faith. These especially are within reach of help, and in them the most precious fruits of a scientific apology are to be expected. And this naturalistic turn of thought, account for it as we may, has the peculiar fascination of an opening sense of strength and freedom, which leads not only to the healthful play of youth, but also to waywardness of every kind. It involves denial of the person of Christ. If it begin not in Unitarianism, it ends in that; and that is its central fallacy.

This state of mind some such truly critical and scientific historical investigation as that before us is precisely adapted to meet. Into this age of radicalism, which casts off all tradition and claims to see and judge for itself, it comes with great facts for the age to see and judge. It does not merely offer proof-texts from Scripture, or exegetical or dogmatical speculation upon biblical doctrine, and require implicit submission. It can accomplish nothing so; for Scripture itself is in question, and stands or falls with the historical verity of the person of Christ. In this case Christ is the proof of Scripture, not Scripture of Christ. Or, if we take it the other way, it is not enough that

the Scriptures commend themselves as divine; the history of them, or the history of the church, must do so likewise. The Bible and history must go together, the history of opinions consistently carrying out the character of the Holy Scriptures. Not that the religious spirit of the age really rejects all authority. It wants authority still; but the authority must be that of *fact* and *life*, not of letter and tradition. In the progress of physical science and metaphysical speculation, the civilized mind is all fresh, and proud, and wakeful in its own strength. In the new, scientific cycle of its development, it can no longer take truth on what seems to it an abstract divine authority. It must see that authority rooted organically in the nature of things, and in the history of the world. Before this spirit religion must and can appear in the peculiar forms fitted to command its faith and submission. As Christ came in the flesh attested by the laws of Moses, and by the superstitions of heathendom; so now he must, as it were, come again in his church, his word, and all his institutions, attested by the laws of nature. As the Jewish mind was then shaped to receive him in the form of a prophet like unto Moses, and the Gentile in that of an incarnation like unto the avatars and apotheoses of old; so now it is shaped to see him through the glass of nature and reason, as real life, and indeed the great phenomenon of the world. The active mind now wants a theology as agreeable to reason as its cosmology is; that is, a theology clearly based on real and unmistakable facts, not upon anything which it can charge with being an abstraction or an assumption, like the apparent motion of the sun. The charm of the pantheistic speculation lies in its offer to meet this want; but in the nature of the case it cannot make that offer good, because it leaves some of the most solemn facts unaccounted for. And the Christian truth can be and must be so shown up as to meet all the real wants struggling in humanitarian and pantheistic error. So with regard to religious institutions and ordinances, the church, the ministry, the sacraments, and all the means of grace. We cannot but feel even among ourselves a want of definite and uniform views of their nature and import, views worthy of our general intelligence and rational culture in other respects. Questions connected with these are per-

plexing our highest theological authorities from year to year. This is one form of the great call, of which we speak, for a rational conception of spiritual authority in general. The naturalistic state of mind still in many ways acknowledges its need of supernatural ordinances; but it cannot receive them upon what is to it blind authority, that is, as *abstractly* supernatural. It would see their divine authority through the nature of things, as a living fact, of a piece with the real world. It would see, in other words, the supernatural and the natural, the divine and the human, vitally united in them all, as they are in the person of Christ, according to the standard conception of that person. The better nature even of avowed Unitarianism feels its own central tendency to be astray, and half unconsciously confesses its weakness in such vague and random proposals as the "Broad Church" of Dr. Bellows, and in the more considerate, tangible, and earnest argument on "Nature and the Supernatural" of Dr. Bushnell; though not even the latter of these rests on the basis of full and proper Christian conceptions.

All this want can only be met by bringing fairly home to the public mind the great doctrine of the person of Christ, the way, the truth, and the life, as only a straight-forward history of its symbolic development can present it. We need not fear an exorbitant demand. The same great substratum of religious common sense, whence these natural demands arise, forms also a safe foundation on which to meet them. Though it asserts its claims without reserve, yet it will know when they are met. And history will meet them. It reminds men of the great things which have undeniably taken place in the world; it brings them in their original spirit before the eye, and asks men to judge what those facts mean. It is the preaching of fact to science, as in its original occurrence it preached to Jewish and Gentile religious instincts. It is the cord which binds us to the kingdom of objective reality; the spinal column which roots the mind in the system of the real world, and the disturbance of which sets the brain reeling amidst a chaos of wild conceits. With no mere chimerical superstition on the one hand, nor pantheistic idealism on the other, but with a positive, living supernaturalism, it meets the wants of reason and of faith alike.

ART. VII.—*Christian Life and Doctrine.* By the Rev. W. CUNNINGHAM, D. D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh. 1859.

Ueber den unterscheidenden Charakter des Christenthums, mit Beziehung auf neuere Auffassungsweise. Von C. ULLMANN, Professor an der Universität zu Heidelberg. 1845.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, in its Relation to Mankind and the Church. By ROBERT ISAAC WILBERFORCE, A. M., Archdeacon of the East Riding. First American from the second London edition. Philadelphia: H. Hooker & Co. 1849, pp. 411.

IN his lecture at the opening of the recent session of the Free Church College in Edinburgh, Dr. Cunningham chose as his subject the nature of Christianity. It might seem that in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, it was rather late to discuss that question. There is, however, very little that is stable in human thought. The questions which now agitate the church are those about which Athanasius and Augustine contended, in their respective ages. Every man and every age have to determine anew for themselves all really life questions. We cannot take our faith by inheritance, if it be really ours. We are under the necessity of thinking it out for ourselves, and incorporating it into our own consciousness. The same general problems are constantly presented under new conditions, and must be perpetually rediscussed. The question, therefore, What is Christianity? although the same which engaged the earnest inquiries of our predecessors, comes up before the minds of this generation in a new form, and complicated with new modes of thought. In discussing this subject Dr. Cunningham says there are "two notions which seem to pass very much current in the present day as received maxims, but which, I think, can easily be shown to be specimens of real one-sidedness, and at the same time to be fitted, when believed and acted on, to exert an injurious influence

on theological study." These notions are, "First, that Christianity is not a doctrine, but a life; and, second, that the proper object of true faith is not a proposition, but a person." With his characteristic discrimination and force, the writer proceeds to show that these are indeed one-sided notions, that Christianity is both a doctrine and a life, and that the object of true faith is both a proposition and a person. It is not what the foregoing notions affirm, but what they deny, that is to be objected to. It is true that Christianity is a life, but it is untrue that it is not a doctrine. It is true that Christ as a person is the object of faith, but it is untrue that the proposition, "Jesus is the Son of God," and others of like kind, are not the objects of faith. All language is either ambiguous or inadequate, and hence all controversy degenerates into logomachy, unless we understand each other as to the use of terms. Christianity objectively considered, is the testimony of God concerning his Son, it is the whole revelation of truth contained in the Scriptures, concerning the redemption of man through Jesus Christ our Lord. Subjectively considered, it is the life of Christ in the soul, or, that form of spiritual life which has its origin in Christ, is determined by the revelation concerning his person and work, and which is due to the indwelling of his Spirit. In one sense, therefore, we may affirm that Christianity is a doctrine, and in another sense we may with equal truth affirm that Christianity is a life. This subject, however, is not to be disposed of in this summary way. What is meant by those who in our day assert that Christianity is a life? They answer by saying, "The life of Christ is Christianity." If we ask, What is meant by the life of Christ? the answer is, "It is Divinity united to our humanity." In consequence of this union, the divine and human are made one. "Christ's life is one." His Divinity, soul and body, are united in one life. Wherever, therefore, this life is, there are Christ's soul, body, and Divinity. If we inquire how this life of Christ is Christianity, we are told that the law of life is development; that Divinity and humanity united in Christ as a truly human life, is a germ which unfolds itself in the way of history, and constitutes the church. God became incarnate not in a man, but in humanity. In the church God

is still manifest in the flesh. That is to say, "Christ's life as a whole, (i. e. including his Divinity, soul, and body,) is borne over into the person of the believer as a whole," so that each individual believer and the faithful as an organic whole (the church,) are the dwelling place of this theanthropic life. The church is the form in which this life of Christ projects itself in space, and unfolds itself in history. The church, therefore, is theanthropic as truly as Christ himself was. The only difference is, that in him the Divinity is immediately united with humanity, whereas in us the union is mediate. That is, the Logos does not dwell in us personally and individually, but he dwells in that nature which comes to personality in the believer. Our connection, therefore, is with the human life of Christ, but in that life the Divinity enters and combines as one life. The church, therefore, in which God is incarnate has supernatural powers, and her sacraments are "the bearers of the Divine-Human life of the Redeemer," "divinely instituted for the purpose of bringing this theanthropic life into real contact with our nature." Vastly more, therefore, is meant by saying that Christianity is a life than strikes the ear. The words are few and simple, but they contain a whole system of Anthropology, Christology, Soterology, and Ecclesiology.

As the system above referred to has been adopted by men of the highest eminence, not only in Germany, the land of its birth, but also in England and America, as it has exerted a very extensive and powerful influence on the whole department of modern theological literature, doctrinal and practical, and as it has worked its way even into the popular mind so that its formulas and phrases are constantly reappearing, even in quarters where its principles are either not understood or not adopted, it is entitled to serious attention. Its advocates claim for it absolute truth. All other views of Christianity are represented as behind the age, and treated with contempt. We propose a brief exposition of this system that our readers may know the answer given to the question, *What is Christianity?* by many of the leading minds of the present day. We are aware that we have undertaken a very difficult task which we have little hope of accomplishing to the satisfac-

tion of the advocates of the system itself. This difficulty is manifold. It arises partly out of the fact that the subjects involved are in their nature the most profound which can engage the human mind—the nature of man, the nature of God, his relation to the world, the constitution of Christ's person, his union with his people with all its consequences here and hereafter. Besides this, every theology is in one sense a form of philosophy. To understand any theological system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives it its peculiar form. But the philosophy of which this system is the expression is almost entirely foreign to the ordinary modes of thought among Americans and Englishmen. It is, therefore, not to be expected that it should be thoroughly understood or appreciated without much previous training. Then again, the system itself is presented by its adherents in very different forms. The general school of Schleiermacher has been split into numerous divisions, all of which depart more or less from the great master whose authority they recognize. One man, therefore, is not responsible for the teachings of another. The substratum of Schleiermacher's system was Pantheism, yet most if not all his disciples are avowed Theists. Such being the difficulties which surround this subject, we shall not be so bold as to attempt any philosophical account of the genesis of the system. We shall not attempt an exposition of the philosophical principles to which it owes its character, but content ourselves with presenting in a concrete form the doctrines to which those principles have led.

It may be proper before entering on this exposition to remark that this system is new. It does not pretend to be in harmony with the church doctrines, whether Romish or Protestant. Ullmann, one of its most amiable and effective advocates says, indeed it is "*Nicht etwas schlechthin Neues,*" (*not out and out new.*) "We find it," he says, "in another form in ancient mysticism, especially in the German mystics of the middle ages. With them too, the ground and central point of Christianity is the oneness of Deity and humanity effected through the incarnation of God and deification of man." P. 59. The Mystics, he adds, ignored the sinfulness of men, and the necessity of redemption. At the Reformation, the conviction

of sin and a sense of the need of a Redeemer, determined the form in which Christianity was conceived and presented. The Reformers, however, looked too much to the work of Christ, and too little at the constitution of his person. They did not recognize the fact that it was the perfect unity of Divinity and humanity in him which made him not only the Redeemer, but the ideal man, the model and type of manhood. We must, therefore, go back to the German Mystics of the middle ages, according to Dr. Ullmann, to find the generic idea of this modern conception of Christianity. That idea is, as Dr. Ullmann states, the oneness of God and man, of Divinity and humanity. Another admitted fact is that this system is the product of the German pantheistic philosophy. The results, says Ullmann, which were reached by the Mystics under the guiding impulse of religious feeling, have in our days been attained in the way of speculation, thought and reflection. The unity of the divine and human, of God and man, is the conclusion at which modern speculation in the hands of Hegel and Schelling has arrived. This, too, is the central truth of Christianity. Hegel therefore said that "Christianity is the absolute truth of religion." It was on this ground that he endeavoured to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, that is, with pantheism. This, however, was but a sham alliance. What Christianity asserts of Christ, the perfect union of the divine and human in his person, Hegel, in another form, asserted of the race. It is the nature of God to become man, and of man to recognize himself as God. The absolute spirit comes to existence, consciousness and self-manifestation in the race of men, and they return to God. This is not the uniting of two different principles in one life, but it is only the manifestation of an original and eternal oneness, in virtue of which men at a certain stage of their development come to the knowledge that they are God. P. 37. This view of the matter is utterly destructive of the true idea of God and of man. It is the worst form of Atheism, for it is the deification of man—besides it acknowledges no God. The doctrine of Schelling and Hegel, therefore, was soon recognized both by its advocates and opponents as irreconcilable with Christianity. Nevertheless their philosophy was regarded as a great advance. Its

great principle of the union of the divine and human, not merely in an individual, but in the race, was in some form to be retained. The *Mercersburgh Review*, January 1851, pp. 57, 58, acknowledges the intimate relation between the speculative philosophy and this theological system, and represents "the christological ideas" of Hegel especially, as "very significant and full of instruction." "If we are bound," says the Reviewer, "to allow this much even to Hegel, who will pretend that a still greater regard is not due to the professedly Christian speculations of Schleiermacher and others following more or less his theological influence, as occupied with the same profound and deeply interesting themes?" Schleiermacher, whose philosophy was scarcely less avowedly pantheistic than that of Spinoza or of Hegel, had a profound devotional spirit, which he retained from his Moravian training. He proposed therefore to divorce theology from philosophy, to allow the latter full swing in her own sphere, and to construct a theological system out of the religious consciousness alone. This, from the nature of the case, was an impossibility. No such divorce is possible, and in no system is the union of these elements more apparent and pervading than in Schleiermacher's own. The attempt, however, has had far reaching consequences. It served to present, in a Christian garb and under orthodox names, many philosophical ideas which could not otherwise have made their way into the church. Even in his theology, Schleiermacher, in the judgment of one-half of Germany, is pantheistic in his doctrine concerning God and his relation to the world, and in the judgment we presume of all parties his doctrine concerning sin is not essentially different from that of Schelling and Hegel. See *Martensen's Dogmatik*, p. 188. The great problem with Schleiermacher's more orthodox successors has been to bring the main idea of the modern philosophy, the union "of the divine and human fully as one life," into harmony with Theism and the gospel. This has given rise to that system of which we are now speaking, and has led to the modification of all the great doctrines of the Bible.

I. As to anthropology. The doctrine concerning the nature of man which underlies the common theology of the church is, that he consists of two distinct subjects or sub-

stances, the soul and body, associated in an intimate life-union in the same person, but capable of separate existence, and as regards the soul, susceptible of continued consciousness and activity in a disembodied state. The common doctrine also supposes that the soul is a distinct subsistence, a substance constituting an individual being. It is evident that these views of the nature of man which seem to be everywhere assumed in the Bible, must determine in large measure the view taken of our relation to Adam, of the nature of original sin, of the constitution of Christ's person, and of other important doctrines of the Scriptures. If Christ took upon him our nature, we cannot agree as to what he assumed, unless we are agreed as to what human nature is. In the modern mystical system, the old doctrine concerning man is repudiated. That system denies the essential dualism between the soul and body, and it represents humanity as a generic life. As to the former of these points, Schleiermacher in his *Dialektik*, pp. 245—255, says: "There is not a corporeal and spiritual world, a corporeal and spiritual existence of man. Such representations lead to nothing but the dead mechanism of a pre-established harmony. Body and spirit are actual only in and with each other, so that corporeal and spiritual action can only be relatively distinguished."* The late President Rauch says of the theory which admits of two substances in the constitution of man, that "it supposes the body has a life of its own, and the soul likewise; both are however intended for each other, and the former receives the latter as the engine the steam. . . . A dualism which admits of two principles for *one* being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life."† Soul and body are only a two-fold expression of the same energy. "It would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances of earth and soul; but he is *soul only*, and cannot be anything else. This soul however unfolds itself externally in the *life* of the body, and internally in the life of the mind." "The soul has no real existence without the body, which is as necessary to

* Thomsen.

† Rauch's *Psychology*, pp. 180, 184.

it as the sheet of rain is for the rainbow." Olshausen in his Commentary, 1 Cor. xix. 20, denies that (*die Seele für sich subsistirend zu denken ist*), the soul subsists of itself. Dr. J. W. Nevin says that "commonly the idea of human life is split for the imagination into two lives, and a veritable dualism thus constituted in our nature, in place of the veritable unity that belongs to it in fact." "This," he adds, "is as false to all true philosophy, as it is unsound in theology and pernicious for the Christian life. Soul and body in their ground are but one life; identical in origin; bound together by mutual interpenetration subsequently at every point; and holding for ever in the presence of the self-same organic law. We have no right to think of the body as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form *one* life. The soul to be complete, to develop itself as soul, *must* externalize itself, throw itself out in space, and this externalization is the body. All is one process, the action of one and the same living organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete."* It may be here remarked in passing, that if the soul and body are thus one life, mutually dependent and inseparable, if the soul externalizes itself in the body, we can well understand how God, according to the same mode of philosophizing, may externalize himself in the world, and God and world be thus mutually dependent, the different forms of one and the same life, "dividing itself that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete." Schleiermacher accordingly taught, that although God and the world are distinguished in thought, they are in fact "nothing but two values for the same postulate (*zwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung*.)"† He says it is vain to attempt to conceive of God as existing either before or out of the world, just as Olshausen, Nevin, and others teach, that it is vain to conceive of the soul as existing without the body. *Ohne Leib keine Seele*, (no body, no soul) and "no world, no God," are propositions very nearly allied, and are inseparable at least in Schleiermacher's system.

What then is man according to the mystical system? The

* Mystical Presence, p. 171.

† Dialektik, p. 433.

answer to this question is by no means uniform. Schleiermacher himself says, "Der mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in seinem ewigen Seyn, und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet."* *Man as such is the recognition of the earth in its eternal existence, and in its perpetually changing development: or God (der Geist) in the form in which he comes to self-consciousness on our earth.*" If this definition had been adhered to by his followers everything would be plain. But it is so obviously pantheistic in its origin and bearing, that the theistic portion of his disciples have modified it in various ways. In the *Mercersburgh Review* for November, 1850, p. 550, we are told that "the world in its lower view is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the midst of its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life, which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." To the same effect in the number for January, 1850, p. 7, it is said: "The world is an organic whole which completes itself in man; and humanity is regarded throughout as a single grand fact which is brought to pass, not at once, but in the way of history, unfolding always more its true interior sense, and reaching onward towards its final consummation." According to this view, man is only one form in which "the power of a single life" pervading the world reveals and completes itself. It is hard to see wherein this differs from the previous statement. The two become identical by substituting (der Geist) God, for "the power of a single life." And that substitution would make little change in the meaning of either, as both seem to proceed on the assumption of "the essential oneness of God and man," which is the admitted groundwork of Schleiermacher's system.†

* Dorner's *Christologie*, (first edition,) p. 488.

† Schleiermacher distinguishes between two kinds of Pantheism. The one he denounces as a mere "masked materialistic negation of Theism;" the other, which retains the formula "one call," still makes God and the world at least as to their functions different. This latter form he maintains is perfectly consistent with the highest state of the religious feeling. The religion of such a Pantheist, he says, differs little from that of many Monotheists. B. i. p. 54.

The more common mode of statement among the avowed theists of this school is, that humanity is a generic life, revealing itself in a multitude of personalities. The *Mercersburgh Review*, November, 1859, says: "Personality unites in itself the presence of a spiritual universal life, which is strictly and truly the fountain of its own activity in the form of intelligence and will, and a material organization as a necessary medium and basis of its revelation." P. 559. Take away her material organization (the body,) and you have only "this spiritual universal life," which, however, has no active existence in and of itself, that is, apart from the material organization by which it is revealed, any more than vegetable life has active existence out of vegetable organism. "The human race," says Dr. Nevin, "is not a sand heap. It is the power of a single life. It is bound together not outwardly but inwardly. Men have been one before they have been many, and as many they are still one." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. Archdeacon Wilberforce, who is endorsed by Dr. Nevin as a true representative of the system in all its main features,* insists much on this point. From page 41 to page 57 of his work on the Incarnation he labours to prove the reality of human nature as a generic whole, of which individual men are the partakers and manifestations. Of this generic nature it is taught, 1. That it has "a real objective existence." "It would be vicious nominalism," says Archdeacon Wilberforce, "to deny an objective reality, where an inherent law prevents the possibility of re-arrangement, and confines individuals to the peculiar classes to which they severally belong." P. 49. This generic nature is declared to be an "entity." Dr. Nevin calls it "a substance." "Such a collective existence," he says, "in the case of our race, not the aggregate of its individual lives, but *the underlying substance*

* *Mercersburgh Review*, March, 1850. Ullmann's Treatise on the Nature of Christianity, originally published in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1845, is translated and attached as a "Preliminary Essay to Dr. Nevin's work on the Mystical Presence. The principles of that Essay are developed in Dr. Nevin's book with more clearness and thoroughness than by Ullmann himself. And the principles of Wilberforce on the Incarnation "agree substantially," says Dr. Nevin, "with views presented in our own book." All these works are reproductions of the Schleiermacher school of theology.

in which all these are one, is everywhere assumed in the Bible as a fact entering into the whole history of religion."* 2. It is not only a substance, a real objective entity, but it is declared to be a life, a life power, the real source of all the activity, "of intelligence and will," as well as of the physical organism in individual men. 3. Everything, therefore, that ever comes to actual existence in the individual lies potentially in this generic life. Everything that is in the oak was potentially in the acorn, and nothing can be in the oak that was not in the life of the germ. 4. This generic human nature as a life is of course subject to all the laws of life. It is governed by fixed laws. It remains immutably the same. Vegetable life cannot pass into animal life, nor the form of life peculiar to one animal pass into that which belongs to another. Like uniformly begets like. It is subject also to organic development. "It is a universal property of life to unfold itself from within, by a self-organizing power, towards a certain end, which end is its own realization, or in other words, the actual exhibition and actualization in outward form of all the elements, functions, powers, and capacities which potentially it includes. Thus life may be said to be all at its commencement which it can become in the end." 5. Partly from this view of humanity as a generic life unfolding itself from within, containing potentially in itself all that can become actual in its manifestation, and partly from the primary idea of the whole system, viz. the essential unity of God and man, it would seem to follow that humanity in its process of development must come at last to the conscious union of the divine and human in one life; that this is involved in the very idea of humanity, so that Christ as God-man is the ideal man, our nature reaching in him the state potentially involved in its original constitution. The incarnation, therefore, is not a grand supernatural interposition for the redemption of man from sin. It is the necessary result of the law of humanity itself, and would have occurred though sin had never entered the world. This is the avowed doctrine of some of the advocates of this general theory. Dr. Liebner of Göttingen, in his *Christology*, carries

* *Mercersburgh Review*, March 1850, p. 177.

out this idea to its full extent. Dr. Nevin teaches, in less explicit terms, but in our apprehension no less clearly, the same doctrine. In his review of Dr. Liebner's work in the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1851, he says, "That must be a false and mutilated view of the nature and history of man, which rests not on a firm apprehension of his true relationship to God, as this comes out ultimately in the constitution of the Messiah. That must ever be a false and defective view of the nature of God as related to the world, which stops short of the theanthropy, as the true and necessary central sun that serves to irradiate and complete all other revelations by which he is known." P. 56. There is not a word of objection to Liebner's doctrine which it is the design of the review to unfold. All that is said is on the side of defence. The objection of Thomasius, one of the first and most mystical of the modern Lutheran theologians in Germany, that the system is essentially pantheistical, Dr. Nevin pronounces, in his usual authoritative way, "a mere sound without any force whatever." He says, we need "a truly Christian pantheism" to oppose to the anti-christian pantheism of the day. Pantheism, however, is pantheism, whether baptized Christian or antichristian. It is not, however, only in that particular article that this idea is advanced. It is involved in his whole system as developed in his "Mystical Presence." "Humanity," says Dr. Nevin, "is never complete till it reaches his [Christ's] person. It includes in its very constitution a struggle towards the form in which it is here exhibited, which can never rest until this end is attained. Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The *idea* which it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form. The incarnation then is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal Man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is of course the crowning sense of the world, or that in which it finds its last and full signification." "History, like nature, is one vast prophecy of the incarnation, from beginning to end. How could it be otherwise, if the idea of humanity, as we have seen, required from the first such an union with the divine nature in

order that it might be complete? What is history but the process by which this idea is carried forward according to the immanent law of its own nature, in the way of a regular development towards its appointed end?" Pp. 200, 201. Nothing can be more explicit than this. Humanity includes in its original constitution the idea of that union with God which is found in the person of Christ, and it reaches that end according to a law immanent in its own nature, by a regular process of historical development. We are not surprised, therefore, to be told on page 174 that Christ's "divine nature is at the same time human in the fullest sense." In man there is self-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of self; world-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of the world; and God-consciousness, or the immediate knowledge of God. Schleiermacher over and over says, that the only difference between Christ and other men was that the *Gottesbewusstsein*, (God-consciousness) which he represents as a real *Seyn Gottes* (existence of God) determined in him all his activity from beginning to end. Thus he was the ideal man, that is, the man in whom the true idea of humanity was realized. But as Christ was God manifest in the flesh, the true idea of humanity must be the unity of divinity and humanity in one life, or God in the fashion of a man. "The *Grundbestimmung* (the fundamental idea) of Christianity," says Ullmann, "is the oneness of Christ and God, but therewith connected the equally original certainty that this oneness is not to remain individual, isolated, transient, but passes over with the Spirit and life of Christ to believers, and gradually to mankind."* Humanity reaches its culminating point of essential unity with God, first in Christ, and then through him in his people. The object of the whole system is to find some middle ground between pantheism and dualism, that is, between the doctrine that God and the world are one, and the doctrine that they are two. This middle ground must be narrower than a hair, rather too narrow for the foundation of a stupendous structure of Christian doctrine. It is a wonderful hallucination of self-conceit which leads these builders to condemn as rationalists, and, worse yet, as Puritans, those who will not trust their souls to their cobweb edifice.

* *Studien und Kritiken*, 1845, p. 40.

Such then is the anthropology of the mystical system.* It denies any real dualism in the constitution of man. He is soul, and soul only, revealing itself outwardly in the body, and inwardly in mental activity. A man is not an individual subsistence, but the revelation of a generic life in connection with a particular external organism. And in virtue of the essential unity of Divinity and humanity, the latter by a process of organic development arrives at last to a conscious oneness with God. This view of man's nature is made consciously and avowedly to determine the whole scheme of Christian doctrine. It determines the nature of our relation to Adam, and of original sin. It decides all questions concerning the constitution of Christ's person. It determines the nature of redemption, and the mode in which believers are made partakers of its benefits. And it involves also the decision of every important question concerning the nature of the church, and the design and efficacy of the sacraments. Our immediate object, however, is to expound the teachings of this system in reference to the present state of man.

Those of its advocates who retain sufficient reverence for the Scriptures, (which was not the fact with Schleiermacher,) to feel bound to attempt a conciliation between their doctrine and the admitted facts of the Bible, apply their anthropology to explain our connection with Adam, and the nature of original sin. As humanity is a generic life, Adam was not merely *a* man but *the* man. He was humanity itself; its original germ and fountain-head. His act, therefore, was not the act of *a* man, but of humanity. That generic life, including intelligence and will which afterwards was developed in a multitude of personalities, then existed solely in his per-

* We have felt no little embarrassment in determining on a suitable designation for the system under consideration. It might be called "The Schleiermacher System," from its acknowledged author, but that designation is too restricted, considering the numerous and important modifications the theory has undergone since it left his hands. It might be characterized as *Transcendental*, but that term is vague and indeterminate. The word *mystical* has much to recommend it. It is inoffensive. It refers to the remote genesis of the system as connected with the mysticism of the middle ages, and it is occasionally employed by the advocates of the system themselves. At any rate it serves to distinguish it from the common doctrine.

son, and acted in and by him. Adam's sin was, therefore, strictly and properly, and not merely representatively or by imputation, the sin of the race. The intelligence and will which comes to self-consciousness in the successive generations of men, were the agents of that sin in the person of Adam. The only sense, therefore, in which that sin is imputed to us, is that it is strictly and properly our own act, not of our persons but of our nature, of that generic life which we have in common with Adam, and which is as much ours as it was his. "In him was comprehended in its generic form a general life, which was to develop itself by the course of natural generation to the end of time. As such he was called upon to say in the name of the general life which he embodied, whether or not he would take the Lord to be his God. In his response we have the act of not only *a* man but of *the* man, of humanity as a general conscious life." *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, p. 256. "Humanity was not an abstraction while Adam the individual was conscious. . . . It found in him a real conscious existence, in the free exercise of its mighty powers—a living personality, reasoning and willing for itself." P. 258. "Humanity rebelled." P. 259. "We all were comprehended in Adam in the form of a general conscious life. The *will* of this life perpetuated the rebellion. . . . So that his act was in fact our act." P. 260. "His individual personality was limited wholly to himself. But a whole world of like separate personalities lay involved in his life at the same time, as a generic principle or root. And all these, in a deep sense, form at last but one and the same life. Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he ever lived in his own person. They participate in his whole nature, soul and body, and are truly bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh." *Mystical Presence*, p. 161. "The fall of Adam is adjudged to be the fall of his posterity because it was so actually. The union in *law* here is a union in *life*. The fall itself forms a certain condition or state, which supposes life as its subject, and how then could the one be imputed without the presence of the other? May an attribute or quality be made to extend in a real way beyond the *substance* to which it is attached, and in which only it can have any

real existence? The moral relations of Adam, and his moral character too, are made over to us at the same time. Our participation in the actual unrighteousness of his life, forms the ground of our participation in his guilt and liability to punishment." P. 160. Everything, therefore, is made to depend on the real objective existence of a generic life, which is an "entity," a "substance," which is at once corporeal and incorporeal, that is, which is one life developing itself outwardly and inwardly. In this life is consciousness, intelligence, will. It is "a conscious life." Individual men are but the separate manifestations of this life in connection with an external organism. On this ground, it is assumed that the act of Adam was the act of his posterity, being the act of the intelligence, will, and conscious life common to them all. And the moral character and relations, the inward pollution as well as the guilt which attached to him attach also to us, because they pertain to the life common to him and to the whole human race.

As our object is exposition and not refutation, we might pass this exhibition of the anthropology of the mystical system and its application to our relation to Adam without remark. It may be well, however, before proceeding further, just to say a few words on the subject. First, in reference to the assumption that there is no real dualism in the constitution of man, that the body is the necessary condition of the existence of the soul, that the two are only the different forms of manifestation of one and the same life, we would remark that this doctrine is inconsistent with the common consciousness of men, who uniformly refer certain acts and states to the mind as one subject or substance, and certain others to the body as a different subject or substance. The attributes of mind and of the body are in their nature so different as to render it impossible to refer both classes to the same subject. Both belong to the same person, but the person in our present state of existence, is mysteriously constituted of two distinct substances. As this is a fact revealed in the common consciousness of men, it enters into the avowed convictions of men of all ages and in all parts of the world. Every nation, ancient or modern, civilized or

savage, has believed in the separate existence of the soul. This is manifest from their doctrines concerning a future state. This is also the faith of the universal church. The Greeks, the Latins, the Lutherans, the Reformed, in short the whole Christian world believe that the soul lives and acts in the full exercise of all its faculties, after it has left the body. This the mystical system, as we have seen, denies. Olshausen in support of his position, "No body, no soul," reduces the consciousness of the departed soul to a minimum, and then asserts that this feeble flickering of its life is sustained in connection with the scattered elements of its body.* The theory, therefore, is

* The reader may be interested in seeing what Dr. Nevin has to say in answer to this fatal objection to his whole theory. Anything feebler or more unsatisfactory we have never seen in print from the pen of an able man. "To some," he says, "possibly this representation (viz. that the body is the necessary condition of the activity of the soul) may seem to be contradicted by what the Scriptures teach of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection; and it must be admitted that we are met here with a difficulty which it is not easy at present to solve. Let us, however, not mistake the true state of the case. The difficulty is not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory; but to bring it into harmony with itself. For it is certain that the Scriptures teach such an identification of soul and body in the proper human personality, as clearly, at least, as they intimate a continued consciousness on the part of the soul between death and the resurrection. The doctrine of *immortality* in the Bible, is such as to include always the idea of the resurrection. It is an *ἀναστάσις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*. The whole argument in the fifteenth chapter of 1 Corinthians, as well as the representation, 1 Thess. iv. 13—18, proceeds on the assumption, that the life of the body, as well as that of the soul, is indispensable to the perfect state of our nature as human. The soul then, during the intermediate state, cannot possibly constitute, in the biblical view, a complete man; and the case requires besides that we should conceive of its relation to the body as still in force, not absolutely destroyed but only suspended. The whole condition is interimistic, and by no possibility of conception capable of being thought of as complete and final. When the resurrection body appears, it will not be as a new frame abruptly created for the occasion, and brought to the soul in the way of outward addition and supplement. It will be found to hold in strict organic continuity with the body as it existed before death, as the action of the same law of life; which implies that this law has not been annihilated, but suspended only in the intermediate state. In this character, however, it must be regarded as resting in some way, (for where else could it rest?) in the separate life. as it is called, of the soul itself; the slumbering power of the resurrection ready at the proper time, in obedience to Christ's powerful word, to clothe itself with its former actual nature, in full identity with the form it carried before death,

in direct conflict with the Scriptures, which not only everywhere teach the distinction between the soul and body as two subjects, but specially the full conscious existence of the soul between death and the resurrection. With difficulties of this sort, however, the authors of this system were untrammelled. They received nothing on the mere authority of the Bible, and discarded what did not harmonize with their theory. Schleiermacher did not believe in a creation in time, an extra-mundane God, in angels, Satan, or sin, or disembodied souls. Those who adopt his principles are reduced to the sad necessity of either holding a philosophy in conflict with their theology, or of explaining away the plainest teachings of the Bible. The latter alternative is sure to be chosen.

As to the doctrine of a generic life as a real objective reality, an "underlying substance" in which all individual men are one, we would say that it is a sheer hypothesis. From the nature of the case there can be no direct evidence of its existence. It is an assumption to account for certain phenomena. If those phenomena can be as satisfactorily accounted for on another hypothesis, the whole foundation of the theory is gone. Again the theory in its present form, notwithstanding its affinity with ancient realism, is new. Both Ullmann and Dr. Nevin teach that the ignoring of this idea of a generic life vitiated the theology of the Reformers. Then again this modern theory is neither one thing nor the other. If men would say with Schleiermacher that God is "not a Being by the side of other beings," (*nicht Ding neben Dingen*) but the "Totality and system of all things;" if they would say that he is the "underlying substance in which all lives are one," that as the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God externalizes himself variously in the world, then we could understand what is meant by this generic life. But although this seems to be the esoteric sense of many of the utterances of the professedly theistic portion of the Schleiermacher school, yet it is so baldly pantheistic that it has to be stated with so many limitations and

though under a far higher order of existence. Only then can the salvation of the soul be considered as complete. All at last is one life; the subject of which is the totality of a believer's person, comprehending soul and body alike from the beginning of the process to the end."—*Mystical Presence*, p. 171.

modifications that the real idea intended becomes altogether confused.* There is nothing in the Scriptures in favour of this doctrine of a generic life of the race having objective reality of its own apart from the personalities in which it is revealed. It is not indeed the design of the Bible to teach us ontology, but the Bible teaches facts. It teaches, for example, the fact that the soul is in a state of conscious activity when separated from the body, and it therefore teaches that the doctrine which denies the possibility of such an existence is false. There are no facts of this kind in the Bible which contradict the common doctrine concerning the nature of man, and necessitate the assumption of this generic life. The Scriptures indeed recognize a common nature as belonging to all men; that is, that all men belong to one and the same class and species of beings, have a common origin, the same physical structure, the same rational and moral faculties, and that they are in the same state of alienation from God as they are born into this world. They also teach that this nature, thus identical in all its essential elements and characteristics, is propagated from parent to child, and thus comes down to us from the progenitors of our race. With this scriptural teaching all the facts of experience agree. Experience also teaches that this nature, thus common to all mankind, may be modified by circumstances of climate, culture, social habits and other causes, so as to assume permanent varieties or types; and still further, that within these varieties there may be lesser peculiarities induced and rendered permanent, as seen in different nations and even families. All this is agreeable to the analogy observed in other departments of nature, animal and vegetable. Every distinct species, whether of animals or vegetables, is found in permanent varieties, more or less marked and more or less permanent. To account for these facts of Scripture and experience, there is no necessity to adopt the theory of a generic life having objective reality. There is no need to

* This is a vice inherent in the whole system. Strauss says of Schleiermacher himself, "That he betrayed philosophy to theology, and then again theology to philosophy, and precisely this double-facedness and double-meaningness is the essence of his position in the history of theology. And hence his influence from both sides can only be regarded as a blessed curse, or a curse-bearing blessing."—*Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 175.

assume that there is an entity or substance in which the lives of all horses, or all tigers, or all elephants, or all oaks, or all palms inhere, and in which they severally are all one. Who believes in any such generic life of tigers or of oaks? Why then should it be assumed in the case of man? All the Bible assumes, and all that experience teaches, is that God ordained the permanence of species, and fixed the law that like should beget like. If it be demanded how this permanence of species is secured, it may be answered that the knowledge of the *how* is not at all necessary to faith in the fact. If a further answer is required, it may be enough to say that the greatest naturalists assume that the organic germ received from the parent plant or animal is imbued with an immaterial life principle, which determines not only the species but the variety. This life principle is just as individual as the source whence it is derived. Thus in the case of Adam, he was an individual man, with no more of the generic life of the race than any other man. He transmitted to his children his own nature, just as in any other case of reproduction in the animal or vegetable kingdom. The race were no more physically *in* him, than the Hebrews were *in* Abraham, or the Ishmaelites *in* Ishmael. His act was no more the act of the race, except on the ground of a divine covenant, than an act of Abraham was an act of all his posterity. It is very true that any act of Adam which altered his physical or moral constitution, i. e. his nature, might lead to a corresponding change in the physical or moral constitution of his descendants. If he had done anything to change his complexion from the olive of an Asiatic to the black of the African, he might, and probably would, have transmitted that hue to his posterity. But the same may be said of any head of a family or tribe. If any man chooses to account for the hereditary corruption of our race on this principle, though we regard it as both unsatisfactory and unscriptural, as a solution of that dreadful fact, it is at least intelligible. The statement contains a meaning. But when it is said that the act of Adam was truly the act of the race, because he was a generic man, or that humanity as a general life acted in him, the words have no meaning. They convey no idea. As Dr. Nevin would say, they are an empty sound. An act implies an agent, and a

rational act a rational agent, that is, a person. Unless, therefore, humanity is a person, it could not as a generic life have acted in Adam. This, however, is not the theory; humanity as such is impersonal; it comes to personality only in the individual. Into the application of this theory, however, to the solution of the question of original sin, we designedly do not enter. We have far too much work on our hands, in the further exposition of the mystical system, to be accomplished in any reasonable limits of a single article. We must, therefore, content ourselves with remarking, that the consequences drawn from this particular theory of a generic life, in its application to the great doctrines concerning the person of Christ and the method of salvation, are its most effectual refutation. These consequences are such, as we shall proceed to show, that the theory itself must be renounced, or the faith of the church universal be given up.

II. This leads us to the second great division of our subject. The Christology of the mystical system is its centre and sum. All its other doctrines are subordinate to this, and are held for its sake, or are determined by it. There are three general classes of theologians included in the school of Schleiermacher. First, those who are in fact, as he himself was, pantheistic in their interior convictions; secondly, those who are Theists but not Trinitarians; and thirdly, those who sincerely endeavour to bring their theory into harmony with the doctrines of the Bible, and especially with the doctrine of the Trinity. Of course the Christology of these several classes must present important differences, into which it is impossible for us here to enter. We must content ourselves with the general features of the system, and especially in the form in which they are presented by those belonging to the third of the three classes just mentioned. The three principles which determine the Christology of the mystical system, as we have before stated, are, 1. That there is no real dualism in the constitution of man; 2d. That humanity is a generic life, a real entity or substance; and 3d. That there is a (*Wesenseinheit*) real oneness between God and man. As to this last point, Dorner, after endeavouring to show that the old church doctrine as adopted by the Reformed, and as generally modified by the

Lutherans (to suit their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body) is beset with insuperable difficulties, says that these difficulties and contradictions can only be avoided by giving up the idea that the divine and human in Christ are two different natures, and admitting that they are (*innerlich eines*) inwardly one.* On a subsequent page (182) he says, we must either reject the doctrine of the Incarnation, or construct a Christology without the assumption of a twofold nature in Christ.

The general statement of the doctrine of the Incarnation, in which all Christians agree, is that the Word was made flesh, God was found in fashion as a man, or, God assumed our nature. This may mean what the Church universal understands it to mean, as her faith is expressed in the decisions of the first six œcumenical councils, adopted by the Greeks, the Latins, the Reformed, and Lutherans. Those councils declared that in the one person of the Lord Jesus Christ the two natures, human and divine, are united without mixture or confusion, inseparably and perpetually, so that he is perfect God and perfect man. The union does not destroy the difference of the natures, but the properties of each are retained. In the Council of Constantinople it was decided that there are in Christ two wills and operations, the one human and the other divine. To the integrity or completeness of the human nature "a true body and a reasonable soul" are declared to belong. Christ, therefore, is declared to be as to his divine nature consubstantial with the Father, and as to his human nature consubstantial with us men. In opposition to this catholic statement of the doctrine, some modern theologians, such as Martensen and Ebrard, seem to adopt a view very similar to that of Beron in the early ages, who held that the Logos assumed the form of a man, that is, subjected himself to the limitations of humanity. The infinite became finite, the eternal and omnipresent imposed on himself the limitations of time and space, God became man.† The statement of Ebrard is, the Logos assumed "the existence form of man." He illustrates his idea thus. "In the case of a king's son, his

* *Christologie*, p. 178 of the first edition.

† See Dorner, vol. i. p. 541 of the edition of 1851.

royalty is his original nature, servitude an assumed form of existence." In other words, he adds, Der ewige Sohn Gottes sich in freiem Selbeschränkungsakte bestimmt hat, in die Existenzform eines menschlichen Lebens-centrums einzugehen, so dass er nun als solches agierte von der Empfängniss an, und als der in diese Form eingegangene sich einen menschlichen Leib bildete u. s. w." i. e. *The eternal Son of God, by a free act of self-limitation, determined to assume the existence form of a centre of human life, so that he acted as such from the conception onward, and having assumed this form, he fashioned for himself a body, &c.** By God's becoming flesh, therefore, he understands, ein Eingehen des Logos in eine neue Seynsform. According to this view there are not two natures in Christ (in the established sense of the word nature), but only two forms of existence, a prior and posterior, of one and the same nature. Another form of statement is, as we have seen, that humanity, by a regular process of historical development, attained the point of oneness with God in the person of Christ. Another is, that this process having been disturbed, or being in its nature inadequate, God by a supernatural act constituted the person of Christ, as the ideal man, and made him a new life-centre, or point of departure; so that from him a new development of humanity begins. The most common mode of presenting the doctrine is, that the Logos assumed our fallen humanity. By this, we are told, is not to be understood that he assumed an individual body and soul, so that he became a man, but generic humanity, so that he became *the* man. And by generic humanity is to be understood a life-power, that peculiar law of life, corporeal and incorporeal, which develops itself outwardly as a body, and inwardly as a soul. The Son, therefore, became incarnate in humanity, in that objective reality, entity, or substance, in which all human lives are one. Having assumed this life-power, whose law is to develop itself inwardly and outwardly, Christ had a soul and body, but the incarnation was in the "substance" lying back of these. On this fact the whole significance and efficacy of the union is made to depend. Otherwise it would be a theophany, without

* Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 77.

permanent value to the race. Olshausen, in his comment on John i. 14, says, "It could not be said that the Word was made man, which would imply that the Redeemer was a man by the side of other men, whereas, as the second Adam, he represented the totality of human nature in his exalted comprehensive personality." To the same effect he says in his remarks on Rom. v. 15, "If Christ were *a* man among other men, it would be impossible to conceive how his suffering and obedience could have an essential influence on mankind; he could then only operate as an example; but he is to be regarded, even apart from his divine nature, as *the* man, i. e. as realizing the absolute idea of humanity, and including it potentially in himself spiritually as Adam did corporeally." To this point Archdeacon Wilberforce devotes the third chapter of his book, and represents the whole value of Christ's work as depending upon it. If this be denied, he says, "the doctrines of atonement and sanctification, though confessed in words, become a mere empty phraseology." Dr. Nevin, in his *Mystical Presence*, p. 210, says, "The word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but *flesh*, or humanity, in its universal conception. How else could he be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such? How else could the value of his mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only? The entire scheme of the Christian salvation requires and assumes throughout this view of the incarnation, and no other. To make it a mere individual case, a fact of no wider force than the abstract person of Jesus himself, thus resolving his relationship to his people into their common relationship to Adam, is to turn all at last into an unreal theophany, and thus to overthrow the doctrine altogether." Thus the whole scheme of salvation is made to depend on a certain view of anthropology. Unless we believe in a generic humanity as an objective reality, a substance underlying all individual lives, we cannot believe the gospel. And unless we believe that the Son of God became incarnate, not "in an individual case," but in this generic nature, we deny any real incarnation, and resolve the whole matter into a mere ocular illusion. In the *Mercersburg Review*, January 1850, in

answer to an article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Dr. Nevin says of the critic, "His own idea of the incarnation is plainly that it did not enter into the organization of the world at all, as a fact of permanent force. Probably he has no sense whatever of this organization as a vast whole completing itself in man, and thus reaching forward as a single historical process from the beginning of the world to the end. The world is for him neither organism nor history, but a vast sand heap, in which men are thrown together outwardly, to be formed for eternity as so many separate units, each perfect and complete by itself. The incarnation, of course, in such view becomes one of those naked units only, the man Jesus mysteriously made God for himself alone, an abstraction that comes into no real connection with our general humanity beyond the limits of his person. He stands in the world a mere theophany, not of a few hours only, as in the days of Abraham, but for thirty-three years; a sublime avatar, fantastically [!] paraded thus long before men's eyes only to be translated to heaven, and continue there (for the imagination) in no real union with the world's life whatever. This, thus left behind by the transient apparition, pursues its old course, including in its living stream nothing more than has belonged to it from the beginning." P. 7. It belongs to the force of Dr. Nevin's character to outhrow Herod on all occasions; and he generally does it, as in the above extract, by the way of implication and negation rather than by direct assertion. We have to transmute his negative statements into the relative affirmations to get at his real meaning. The world is an organism. Men are not units. Humanity is a stream of life. Individual men stand related to that stream as the waves to the sea. The Son of God became incarnate, not in one of those waves, but in the stream itself. Jesus alone did not become God in virtue of the incarnation. The race becomes God. Humanity is deified and flows on, not as of old, a stream of mere human, but of theanthropic life. Unless we take this view of the incarnation, he elsewhere says, "all pretended orthodoxy is reduced to a mere empty sham." *Review*, March 1850, p. 173. What Christ assumed we are told was "that living law or power, which, whether in Adam alone, or in all his pos-

terity, forms at once the entire fact of humanity, irrespectively of the particular human existences in which it may appear." P. 178. In the *Review*, April 1853, Christ is said to have assumed "our nature as a general life," "the substance of the human world," "the whole humanity generically," which was brought "into union with Divinity in his person," and thus it was "restored to its lawful relation to its Creator." "This for all time is henceforth the measure of its true idea." "This is true humanity." "Christ did thus restore our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea." P. 263. It was not, therefore, an individual human body and soul that was brought into personal union with the eternal Son of God in the incarnation, but humanity as a general life, as it was henceforth to exist in the persons of believers. "This is true humanity," that is, humanity in that personal union with God which took place in Christ is the true idea of human nature; and the normal relation of man to God is that which Christ, who was at once God and man, sustains to the eternal Father. "This divine-human life, as it has come to exist in Jesus Christ" "perpetuates itself by its own inherent law," and is Christianity. We have here the answer to the question, What is Christianity? It is a life. It is the life of Christ. It is the "conscious union of Divinity and humanity in one real life."

It is to be remembered that humanity as a life includes body and soul; the one cannot be without the other. That is, such is the law of this life, that it manifests itself not only in thought and feeling, but in an external physical organism. Christ, therefore, in assuming humanity as a life-power, developed for himself a true body and a rational soul, and wherever his humanity is, there it is both corporeally and incorporeally, and as it is inseparably united with his divine nature, and as that nature is omnipresent, so is Christ everywhere present as to soul, body, and Divinity. "Christ's life," says Dr. Nevin, "was one; to enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality. To divide the humanity of Christ is to destroy it; to take it away and lay it no man can tell where. . . . Christ's humanity is not his soul separately taken;

just as little as it is his body separately taken. It is neither soul nor body as such, but the everlasting, indissoluble union of both." "Either Christ's human life is not formed in us at all, or it must be formed in us as a human life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form and project itself in space." *Mystical Presence*, p. 170. "We may divide Christ in our thoughts, abstracting his Divinity from his humanity, or his soul from his body. But no such dualism has place in his actual person. If then he is to be received by us at all it must be in a whole way." P. 181. Calvin, he says, "dwells too much on the life-giving virtue of Christ's *flesh* simply; as if this was not necessarily and inseparably knit to his soul, and to his Divinity too, as a single indivisible life; so that where the latter form of existence is present in a real way, the other must be present too, so far as its utmost nature is concerned, to the same extent." P. 157. In the *Mercersburg Review*, March 1850, it is taught at length that there is a perpetual presence of "Christ's manhood" in the world, that his man's nature is here now; that the acts of Christ in the world are the acts not of his Divinity only, but of his manhood, and therefore that manhood must be here. This ubiquity of Christ's human nature is not to be conceived of as an ubiquity of his individual body, or as a material extension. A distinction is to be made between "the simple man and the universal man here joined in one person." This universal man or humanity is "a law," "a life power," raised above the limitations of time and space, but it is nevertheless the whole of humanity in its true force and idea. "The flesh of Christ, as begotten by the Holy Ghost, and as rising generically into, and uniting with, his divine life, becomes itself a πνευματικόν; so that whilst all its attributes, holding only in time and space, are left behind, its inward power comprehending all that is really necessary as the germ of an actual humanity, remains permanently and for ever linked with his person." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 512. It was very generally objected to Schleiermacher that he reduced the historical to a mere ideal Christ, or if he admitted a historical God-man, he represented his existence after his course in this world as merged in a general life. To this the above representation

would seem to agree. The flesh of Christ rises "into his divine life;" all that belongs "to time and space," i. e. all the limitations of time and space are left behind; nothing remains but "a power." The common statement, however, is that Christ is both an individual and universal man, so that while his human nature, as the germ of a new life, is ever and everywhere present in the world, his own human body and soul are in heaven.

The hypostatic union, therefore, is the assumption on the part of the eternal Son of God not simply or primarily of a true body and a reasonable soul, but of humanity as a generic life, of our fallen humanity, of that entity or substance in which all human lives are one. The effects of this union are, 1. That humanity is taken into Divinity, it is exalted into a true divine life. The life of Christ is *one*. It may be designated as divine, or as human. It is both, it is "divine human." On this point, more than any other feature of the mystical system, its advocates are specially full and earnest. We have already seen that Schleiermacher, the father of the system, ignores all essential difference between God and the world. They differ in our conception, and functionally, but are essentially one. We have seen that Dorner, the learned and accomplished historian of the doctrine concerning Christ's person, avows that the church view of two distinct substances in the same person involves endless contradictions, and that no true Christology can be framed which does not proceed on the assumption of the essential unity of God and man. We have also seen that Ullmann makes this Wesenseinheit, (essential oneness) between the divine and human, the fundamental idea of Christianity. We have further seen that Dr. Nevin denies any real dualism in Christ, saying that while we may separate the Divinity from the humanity as united in his person in thought, they are nevertheless one; that his divine nature is human in the strict sense of the term. It is, therefore, taught, "that the properties of the divine nature attach, through the central consciousness, to the human," and "the properties of the human attach, in the same way, to the divine." The Lutherans had taught that divine attributes in virtue of the hypotastical union belong to the human nature of Christ,

but the assertion that human attributes were transferred to the divine nature, they pronounced with one voice to be *blasphemia horribilis*. This difficulty, or rather the contradiction of infinite attributes belonging to a finite subject, and of the attributes of the divine nature and not the nature itself being transferred to humanity, has been gotten over, as we have seen, in the mystical system, by denying any essential difference, any difference in substance, between the divine and human. As in man there is no dualism between soul and body, so in Christ there is no dualism between his divine and human nature. They are *one* life. But human nature is a life and the divine nature is a life; if the life is one, the nature is one. As, therefore, in man the soul externalizes itself in the body, so God reveals himself in human nature. He takes it up into his Divinity so as to constitute with it one nature or life. The divine and human, therefore, in Christ can only be distinguished in thought. They are one. The hypostatic union is only humanity in its ideal state. The human nature is thereby exalted into a "higher sphere;" it becomes divine but remains human. These are only different forms of one and the same life. Therefore, it is said that humanity itself is raised into the sphere of the same life [i. e. the divine life] and completely transferred with its power, in the everlasting glorification of the Son of Man." *Mystical Presence*, p. 224. "The glorification of Christ then was the full advancement of our human nature itself to the power of a divine life." p. 226. The divine Logos, it is said on the same page, "sunk for the moment into the limitations of the fallen mortal nature with which it became thus incorporated," for the purpose of raising that nature "into the same order of existence." The great design and effect of the incarnation was thus to raise our nature into "the same order of existence" with the eternal Logos; in other words, to bring humanity to the knowledge and consciousness of its oneness with God. This idea pervades the whole system. Divinity and humanity are united as one life. The latter is so far identical with the former as to be only different as the mode of manifestation. When we receive the one we receive the other. If Christ dwells in us, it is this divine human life which dwells in us, the incarnate

Logos. If in the Lord's supper we are partakers of the body of Christ, it is "the divine human life of the Son of Man himself" of which we are the participants.

2. As, however, the humanity which God took into personal union with himself was our fallen humanity, the elevation of that nature to the sphere of a divine life required a protracted and painful conflict. Our nature had to be healed before it could be merged as one life in the life of God. The second effect of the incarnation, although the first in order of sequence, was this struggle or conflict by which it was reconciled to God, and brought back to its normal relation of oneness with the divine nature. In consequence of the entrance of the Logos into the generic fallen humanity, a new life-power was communicated to it, which overcame all its infirmities, and raised it ultimately into the life of God. This was at once the work of redemption and atonement. The reconciliation of God and man, as Ullmann and all other advocates of the system say, was effected not *by* Christ, but *in* him. The personal union of the divine and human in him was the reconciliation of heaven and earth. The two natures became united and merged in one life. Generic humanity, therefore, before and apart from its manifestation in individuals, was healed, sanctified, imbued with righteousness and holiness, and in this restored and elevated state was prepared to pass over to Christ's people, and as Ullmann says, gradually to the whole world. The whole work of redemption and reconciliation was effected *in* the person of Christ, by the mere fact of the incarnation. This idea is more or less distinctly brought into view in the numerous citations already given. It is not necessary, therefore, to multiply proof passages. In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said, "If Christ did take up the life, and so the substance of the human world, *the whole* humanity generically, into union with Divinity in his person, and restore it to its lawful relation to its Creator, then verily are its sins taken away, and it will be, rather it *is* saved." P. 263. In the *Mystical Presence*, p. 166, it is said, "The assumption of humanity on the part of the Logos involved the necessity of suffering, as the only way in which the new life with which it was thus joined, could triumph over the law of sin and death it was

called to surmount. The passion of the Son of God was the world's spiritual crisis, in which the principle of health came to its last struggle with the principle of disease, and burst forth from the very bosom of the grave itself in the form of immortality. This was the atonement, Christ's victory over sin and hell." That is, the atonement was the successful struggle of the Logos with "the law of sin and death," in that generic humanity which he had assumed. The advocates of this system, it may be remarked in passing, always speak of Christ as sinless. They say he assumed "our fallen human nature, sin excepted." It is hard, however, to reconcile this with their other statements. The nature which he assumed is said to be fallen, to be diseased, which can hardly mean anything else than morally corrupt; it was infected with "a law of sin and death." At the same time it is said that his life was *one*, and therefore he had in himself, in his own conscious life, not a pure, but a diseased humanity, a law of sin in his own person. They doubtless have some way of reconciling these apparent contradictions. What that way is we do not understand, unless with Schleiermacher's other doctrines they adopt his view of the nature of sin, as only a necessary and temporary limitation, and having no existence for God as sin. That the work of redemption was effected by the fact of the incarnation, and in the person of Christ, is taught by Ullmann very distinctly when he says, Christianity "represents God and humanity as united not merely in idea, but in a real human life, and, therefore, assumes a real redeeming power as infused into our nature, which, not indeed by a single act of consciousness, but by a severe moral process, but thus only the more thoroughly, effects the union of God and man." P. 40. The healing process effected in Christ by the union of the Logos with fallen humanity in his person, is repeated in the case of every believer by the power of Christ's sanctified humanity, introduced as a new principle of life into that humanity, as manifested in the believer's person. "It is the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ, which not simply qualifies him for the work he was appointed to perform, but of itself involves in his person that reconciliation between heaven and earth, God and man, which the idea of redemption requires, and for which

there could be no room in any other form." March 1849, p. 154. "The reconciliation of heaven and earth" it is said, p. 161, "lies in the mystery of incarnation itself, and involves potentially and necessarily all the atonement and redemption that follow." Such is also the doctrine of Wilberforce, "The name Mediator," he says, "is not bestowed by reason of any work," but because "of the permanent union in one person of God and man." "His incarnation," says Dr. Nevin, "is not to be regarded as a device *in order* to his mediation, the needful preliminary and condition of this merely as an independent and separate work; it is itself the mediatorial fact, in all its height and depth, and length and breadth." *Review*, March 1850, p. 170. "Christ has redeemed the world, or the nature of man as fallen in Adam, by so taking it into union with his own higher nature as to deliver it from the curse and power of sin; meeting the usurpation of this false principle with firm resistance from the start; triumphantly repelling its assaults; and in the end carrying captivity captive by carrying his man's nature itself, through the portals of the resurrection, to the right hand of God in glory." P. 181.

3. The third effect of the incarnation was the introduction of a new principle into the life of the world. As the Son of God took upon him the universal life of the world, and as the effect of the hypostatic union was to overcome "the law of sin and death" with which that life was infected, this renovated, sanctified human nature by the law of development passes over to others. As generic humanity once existed in Adam, and was communicated by him to his posterity, so that same humanity united with Divinity as one life, is communicated to those in Christ. It is as much a germ, as much an universal life to be revealed in numberless personalities, in the one case as in the other. This idea is abundantly asserted in the passages already quoted. In no other way, it is said, can we be made partakers of the benefits of the incarnation. "That the race might be saved, it was necessary that a work should be wrought, not beyond it, but in it; and this inward salvation to be effective must lay hold of the race itself in its organic, universal character, before it could extend to individuals. . . . Such an inward salvation of the race required that it should be

joined in a living way with the divine nature itself, as represented by the everlasting Word or Logos, the fountain of all created light and life. The Word accordingly became flesh, that is, assumed humanity into union with itself. It was not an act whose force was intended to stop in one man himself, to be transplanted soon afterwards to heaven. Nor was it intended merely to serve as the necessary basis of the great work of atonement, the power of which might be applied to the world subsequently in the way of outward imputation. It had this use indeed, but not its first and most comprehensive necessity. The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos, as a permanent source of life." *Mystical Presence*, p. 165. The incarnation "is the supernatural linking itself to the onward flow of the world's life, and becoming thenceforth the ground and principle of the entire organism." P. 167. This new life "is in all respects a true human life. It is in one sense divine. It springs from the Logos. But it is not the life of the Logos separately taken. It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his own person, but passes over to his people." "The process by which the whole is accomplished is not mechanical, but organic. It takes place in the way of history, growth, regular living development." P. 167. This is the grand idea of the whole system. Humanity as developed from Adam impeded and weakened by sin could never work out its true idea, could never attain the end contemplated in its original constitution. But united with the divine Logos it is imbued with a higher life, and being developed from him it attains in his people, by a regular process of growth, its full perfection. The life of the believer is as much an organic continuance of the humanity of Christ, as the life of the men of this generation "holds" in organic continuity with the life of Adam. The generic human nature, the substance which underlies the lives of men, and in which they are all one, is, since the incarnation, (so far as the church is concerned) the divine human nature of Christ, that is, Divinity and humanity united as one life. Christ's humanity constitutes the church.

III. Soterology. The whole theory of salvation as modified by the mystical system, is determined by the idea presented at the close of the preceding paragraph. Humanity as a whole was in Adam. He was the race. Human nature, as a generic life, sinned in him—became guilty and polluted; and, as this same life is the underlying substance, in which all men are one, it follows that the act of Adam was the act of all men—its guilt and pollution belong to them in the same measure and for the same reason that they belong to him. There is no imputation of his sin to his posterity further than the recognition of the fact that it is their sin. In like manner, humanity, as a whole, was in Christ in personal union with the eternal Logos. “He was the race.” Human nature, as a generic life, united with the divine nature, conquered the law of sin in the old nature, fulfilled all righteousness, triumphed over death, and was exalted to the right hand of God. This divine human life, this sanctified human nature, is the generic life of believers, in which they are all one. They therefore did all Christ did, performed all his acts. Those acts were the acts of the life which passes over to them, or is inserted in them, with all its merits, its righteousness, its holiness and power. At first it is feeble, (as in the case of our natural life, derived from Adam,) but it is gradually developed, and ultimately triumphs over sin and death. The resurrection of Christ was not a miracle. It was the natural, legitimate working of his divine human life, as much as waking out of sleep is the proper working of our ordinary nature. In like manner, the final resurrection of believers is not miraculous; it is the development of their theanthropic nature, the legitimate result of the law of life which they derive from Christ. The following points are involved in the above statement: viz. 1. That the divine human life of Christ is communicated to his people; 2. That that life includes his body, soul, and Divinity; 3. That it bears with it the merits, the righteousness, the holiness and power of Christ, and is their salvation; not its ground or procuring cause, but the salvation itself; 4. That this generic humanity, in union with the divine Logos, is the common life of Christ’s mystical body, constituting all his people one. All these points are included in the passages already quoted from the advocates of the

theory. Our time and space admit of only a few more citations in support of the representation just given. Ullmann, in a passage already quoted, says that the "oneness of Christ with God" is not something individual, isolated, or transient, but with his life is communicated to believers.* In the *Mercersburg Review*, April 1853, it is said: we do not "partake of his Divinity alone, but of his manhood, his glorified humanity, bound with his Divinity in the bond of a common life." P. 273. The saint "partakes of his divine human life as really as by nature he partakes of the corrupt life of Adam." P. 272. The resurrection of Christ was not "the fruit of his creative and omnipotent energy, as is the case with miracles in the world of nature." His "life asserted its victorious power over death, and raised the body of Christ from its bondage, just as our natural life asserts its power over sleep, and by its own energy throws it off." The saints will be raised at last not "by a miracle in the ordinary sense," but "by the activity of their Saviour's life, which has its abode in them." P. 270. Christ himself is "the ground and source of salvation, rather than his works. His merits are reached only through his life." P. 267. "Christ's acts were the acts of the life which dwelt in him, the activity of his divine human personality, and, as such, are the acts of that same life, whatever form it may put on in the process of outward development;" that is, were the acts of all his people in whom it is developed. "Christ restored our nature to its right relations; brought it to a union with God. This is necessarily involved in the fact of the incarnation, and is the whole substance of its idea. And if we, as individuals, would stand in the like relations, we can do so only by standing in living union with this new humanity, in it as our life element. No simple reckoning is sufficient in the case. It requires an actual transfer of our whole being, an ingrafting into the stock of living humanity. Thus do we partake of the salvation of Jesus Christ, only as we are penetrated with its true idea, with human nature in its true relation to God; that is, in living union with him. Christ, therefore, himself gives us the true mode of imputation, when he says, 'Ye must be *born again*.'" P. 263.

* Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 41.

The points insisted upon by Dr. Nevin in Section II. Chap. iii. of his *Mystical Presence*, are, 1. That our nature as derived from Adam is incapable of raising itself to its true relation to God. 2. That the union in which we stand to Adam "extends to his entire person, body as well as soul." 3. That in Christ our fallen "humanity was exalted again to a new imperishable divine life." "The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos as a permanent source of life." 4. The value of Christ's sufferings depends on this view of the incarnation. 5. "The Christian salvation, as comprehended in Christ, is a new life." "It is a new life introduced into the very centre of humanity itself." 6. This new life "is in all respects a true human life." "It is the life of the Word made flesh, the Divinity joined in personal union with our humanity." 7. "Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; thus constituting the church." 8. "As joined with Christ, then, we are one with him in his life." "Christ communicates his own life substantially to the soul on which he acts, causing it to grow into his very nature. This is the *mystical union*; the basis of our whole salvation; the only medium by which it is possible for us to have an interest in the grace of Christ under any other view." 9. Our relation to Christ is immeasurably more deep and intimate than our relation to Adam. 10. "The mystical union includes necessarily a participation in the entire humanity of Christ." "The life of Christ is *one*. To enter us at all in a real way it must enter us as a totality." 11. So we too "are embraced by it in a whole way." This new life "must extend to us in the totality of our nature," body as well as soul. "We have just seen it to be a true human life before it reaches us. It is the life of the *incarnate Son of God*." Christ's human life "must be formed in us a *human* life; must be corporeal as well as incorporeal; must put on an outward form, and project itself in space." 12. This is effected, not by different forms of action, one for the soul and another for the body, but by one undivided process, as the humanity of Christ is one living organic process. 13. This does not involve a material, or actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people; nor, 14, any ubiquity or

idealistic dissipation of his body. "Adam was at once an individual and a whole race." So in the case of Christ. 15. This union is more intimate than any other. 16. It is effected by the Holy Ghost. 17. It is apprehended by faith. 18. This new life includes degrees and is completed in the resurrection. "The bodies of the saints in glory will be only the last result, in organic continuity, of the divine life of Christ implanted in their souls at regeneration." "We can make no intelligible distinction here," it is said, p. 181, "between the crucified body of Christ and his body as now glorified in heaven. Both at last are one and the same life." "We partake not of his Divinity only, nor yet of his Spirit as separated from himself, but also of his true and proper humanity." On page 189, it is said, "The judgment of God must be according to truth. He cannot reckon to any one an attribute or quality which does not belong to him in fact. He cannot declare him to be in a relation or state, which is not actually his own, but the position merely of another." No federal union or legal fiction, we are told, will here answer. "Righteousness, like guilt, is an attribute which supposes a subject in which it inheres, and from which it cannot be abstracted without ceasing to exist altogether. In the case before us, this subject is the mediatorial nature, or life of the Saviour himself. Whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy, or moral value in any way, in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in his life, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the presence of which only it can have either reality or stability." P. 191. "That which is imparted to us through our faith, by the power of the Holy Ghost, is the true divine human life of the Son of Man himself." P. 243. And this divine human life which wrought all Christ's righteousness, is imbued with his holiness and power; becoming our life, we thereby have his righteousness, holiness, and power inherent in us, as truly and really as they are in him. "The supernatural, as thus made permanent and historical in the church, must, in the nature of the case, correspond with the form of the supernatural as it appeared originally in Christ himself. For it is all one and the same life or constitution. The church must have a theanthropic character throughout. The union of the divine

and human in her constitution must be inward and real, a continuous revelation of God in the flesh, exalting this last continuously into the sphere of the Spirit." P. 247.

It is not worth while to multiply citations. The whole thing is plain. We are one with Adam because he was the race; humanity was in him as a generic life, and sinned his sin, and incurred his guilt and pollution. Guilt and pollution are attributes which must inhere in a subject or substance; that substance is generic humanity, which unfolds itself in a multitude of individual persons. Its acts, therefore, are their acts, its qualities or attributes belong to them. The eternal Son of God assumed this fallen humanity into personal union with himself, whereby it was constituted a divine-human life. That life triumphed, through suffering and conflict, over "the law of sin and death," inherent in our fallen humanity, and sanctified it, and exalted it into the divine nature. This new life, therefore, is divine-human. It is truly divine and truly human. It is the union of Divinity and humanity as one life. This divine-human life is communicated to the people of Christ by the new birth, as they receive the nature of Adam by their natural birth. And as the nature derived from Adam comes laden with guilt, pollution, and death; as it develops itself outwardly in a frail, natural body, and inwardly in a blinded, guilty, and polluted soul; as it begins feebly in the infant, and gradually reaches maturity, and then succumbs to death, and ripens in perdition; as it develops itself not only personally in individuals, but in the whole course of history; so on the other hand, this divine-human, or theanthropic nature of Christ comes to the believer fraught with righteousness, holiness, and immortality; it develops itself in him as body and soul, as a glorious spiritual body, and a righteous, holy soul; it begins feebly, but matures gradually, until it bursts into the resurrection, and culminates in glory; and as a generic life it reveals itself not only in the individual, but in the church, which is a living organism. It is Christ's divine humanity in a concrete form. That is, it is the form in which Christ's theanthropic nature unfolds itself in the world. This is the foundation of

IV. The Ecclesiology of the mystical system, of which our limits forbid our saying anything more than is involved in the

preceding exposition. The church, as we have seen, is declared to be a real and permanent "revelation of God in the flesh." The church "is not a mere outward organization, but a divine-human life power, originating in the person of Christ, with an inward, historical connection with the world, containing the very help we need and must have as sinners." *Mercersburg Review*, October 1854, p. 529. "Christ's presence in the world is in and by his mystical body the church. As a real human presence, carrying in itself the power of a new life for the race in general, it is no abstraction or object of thought merely, but a glorious living reality, continuously at work, in an organic and historical way in the world's constitution. . . . This is the idea of the church. It comes from within, and not from without. It grows out of the mystery of the incarnation, apprehended as an abiding fact." *Review*, March 1850, p. 186. "The idea of the church, as thus standing between Christ and single Christians, implies of necessity visible organization, common worship, a regular public ministry and ritual, and, to crown all, especially grace-bearing sacraments. To question this is to give up to the same extent the sense of Christ's mediation as a perennial fact, now and always taking effect upon the economy of the world, through the church as his mystical body. Let it be felt that the incarnation is a mystery not simply past, and not simply beyond the world, but at this time in full force for the world, carrying in itself the whole value of Christ's sacrifice and resurrection as an undying "ONCE FOR ALL"—the true conception of the mediatorial supremacy, as the real headship of Christ's manhood over all in behalf of the church, and for its salvation; let it be felt at the same time that this mystery teaches men in and by the church, which itself is made to challenge their faith for this reason, as something supernatural and divine; and it becomes at once impossible to resist the feeling that the powers of the world to come are actually at hand, in its functions and services, with the same objective reality that attaches to the powers of nature, under their own form, and in their own place. To see no more in the ministry and offices of the church, in this view, than the power of mere outward declaration and testimony, such as we might have in

any secular school, betrays a rationalistic habit of mind, which only needs to be set free from the indolence of uninquiring tradition, that it may be led to deny altogether that Christ has ever or at all come in the flesh." P. 187. "The church contains ordinances and sacraments divinely instituted, for the purpose of bringing this *theanthropic* life of the Redeemer into real contact with our nature." October 1854, p. 518. "The divine-human merits of Christ's life are not received immediately and directly from his person by faith, in an abstract way, but mediately through the church, and especially by the sacraments which are instituted definitely for this purpose." P. 519. "The sacraments are bearers of the divine-human life of the Redeemer." P. 520.

Such is the answer which modern speculation has given to the question, What is Christianity? It is the theanthropic life of Christ. The eternal Logos having assumed our fallen humanity, and taken it into life union with himself, his divine-human life is generic human nature, exalted and sanctified; and, developing itself in the church, it is communicated to individuals by the sacraments, which are "the only channels of his grace." It is unfortunate that the sun does not rise on America until it begins to set on Germany. This *Vermittelungstheologie*, (*mediating-theology*), as it is there called, of which Ullmann is the great representative, standing, as Schwarz says, *im centrum des centrums*, has, if we may credit the Germans themselves, already passed away.* It served for a while to occupy the German mind, and then was shipped to America. Here it has been seized upon with avidity, and presented as the only possible form of Christian theology. It is, however, Christian only in name. You may leave out the name of Christ and every distinguishing fact of Christianity, and the system retain everything essential to it. That humanity, as a generic life, became impeded in its development so as to be unable to realize its true idea without assistance *ab extra*; that God united himself with the world as an organism, and thus enables humanity to attain a true life-union with himself, is the whole system. All the rest is formulas and phrases. The theory, as a theolo-

* See Schwarz's *Geschichte der neuesten Theologie*, 1856.

gical theory, as an exposition of the method by which sinful men may be restored to the life of God, may be held by a pagan or Mohammedan as well as by a Christian. Even as a philosophy underlying Christian doctrines, it is so uncongenial that it alters the whole nature, objective and subjective, of Christianity. That is, it changes essentially its doctrines, and it alters the whole character of our inward religion. 1. In the first place it alters entirely our relation to Christ. To the believer, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the eternal Son of God, clothed in our nature, very God and very man, in two distinct natures and one person for ever, is the supreme object of love and worship. All the religious affections terminate on him. The believer lives in daily and hourly communion with him; relies on the merit of his righteousness as something out of himself, neither done by him nor wrought in him, as the ground of his acceptance with God. Everything either done by himself or wrought within him, he knows to be finite, human, polluted, and insufficient. He needs an infinite righteousness; he demands immeasurably more than he can either do or experience, to give him confidence with God. He looks to the Lord Jesus as a priest for ever at the right hand of God, continually presenting before God the merit of his satisfaction, and making intercession for us. He looks to him as his Shepherd to guide and feed him day by day; as his King to rule in, reign over, and to protect him from all danger and every enemy. He longs for his personal presence, to be with him that he may behold his glory, worship at his feet, and be perfectly devoted to his service in heaven. According to this new system, all this is altered. We have nothing *now* specially to do with Christ. Adam corrupted humanity, which we receive as a generic life from him. But what have we now to do with Adam? He is nothing to us, any more than the first acorn is to the present oak. So Christ healed and sanctified humanity, which we derive from him. This is an infinite good which he did two thousand years ago, as Adam did us a great harm six thousand years ago. But we are just as much separated from the one as from the other. The life of the one, as of the other, comes to us in the regular course of organic, historical development. No true Christian will allow any philosophy thus to separate him from his Saviour.

He cannot do it. The whole religion of the New Testament and the whole experience of the church suppose each individual soul to be in immediate contact and intercourse with the incarnate Son of God AS A PERSON, and not as an internal life; coming to him directly, each for himself, and living in constant and conscious fellowship with him.

2. Not only does this system change our whole relation to Christ as a person, but our whole relation to his mediatorial work. All that Christ did or does in the way of atonement, or satisfaction, or sanctification, according to this theory, was done in humanity as a generic life. He withstood and overcame the law of sin in our fallen nature, he suffered, but triumphed in that conflict, and transmits that sanctified humanity to us. This was the atonement, this is redemption. This system, therefore, sends the sinner naked and shivering into the presence of God, with nothing to rely upon but the modicum of theanthropic life that flickers in his own bosom. He has no righteousness but what is inherent. All he has of righteousness, holiness, joy, or glory, is in himself, in that life which is as much his as the life he derived from Adam, the heights and depths of which are sounded by his own consciousness. If he feels himself to be wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, he is so, and there is no help for him. All his treasures are within himself. If his theanthropic life does not make him righteous, and holy, and blessed, there is nothing else can do it. The nature he derived from Adam made him subjectively unrighteous as well as miserable; so the nature he derives from Christ must make him subjectively righteous and inwardly blessed, or he must for ever remain unrighteous and condemned. We have nothing but ourselves. Words are of no avail here. It does not help the matter to call our poor, cold, worldly, polluted, sinful life, "divine-human," "theanthropic," "humanity raised to a higher sphere," "imbued with divine power," &c. It is nevertheless something which our own conscience condemns, and our own consciousness tells us is poor and wretched. So that if our inherent righteousness is all we have, we are of all men most miserable.

3. This system not only takes from us Christ and his right-

eousness, but the Holy Ghost. According to the real author of the system there is no Holy Ghost. Schleiermacher did not believe in the Trinity. So far as he was theistic at all, he was a Sabellian. God as God he called the Father; God in the world, the Son; God in the church, the Spirit. It was a mere modal distinction. The common life of the church he designated as the Holy Spirit, but that life was not a person. It had no existence except in the church. In those of his followers who retain speculatively the doctrine of the Trinity, the office of the Spirit almost entirely disappears. It may be safely said that the Holy Spirit is mentioned on the pages of the New Testament one hundred times, where he is mentioned once in the same compass in the writings of the theologians of this school. We do not recollect that he is mentioned more than once, and then only by the way, in the sixty-one passages of Ullmann's dissertation. And no wonder; the system makes no provision for his person or work. What need is there of the supernatural work of the Spirit, in conveying to us the nature of Adam, or in its historical development? And what need is there of his intervention, if the divine-human nature of Christ is the source of all life and even of the resurrection to believers? Or, if we assume that the Spirit by regeneration must insert us in the theanthropic nature of Christ, as our natural birth inserts us in the generic life of the Adam, it is an unnecessary assumption. It lies outside of the system. It is simply a shred of traditional orthodoxy not yet shaken off. The theanthropic life of Christ is propagated by the law of development just as naturally as the life of Adam. "The supernatural," says Dr. Nevin, "has become natural." Exactly so; and therefore it ceases to be supernatural. It is all nature, since the incarnation, just as much as it was before. The blessed Spirit of God, for whose presence, illumination, guidance, sanctifying and consoling power the whole church longs and pants, as a thirsty land for the rain from heaven; whose fellowship with the individual believer and with the whole body of the faithful, is invoked daily and hourly, somewhere in the church, in the apostolic benediction, this blessed Spirit, τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ζωοποιῶν, is in this system reduced to a name. One writer in the *Mercersburg Review* says the

Spirit is the *modus* of Christ's theanthropic nature in the soul. Dr. Nevin says, it is the force of that life. So far as the system is concerned it is nothing. We need say no more. A theory which takes away a present, personal Saviour; which takes away his righteousness; which ignores the blessed Spirit of God; which makes faith a mere consciousness of the divine-human life within us, and represents regeneration as imputation, the feeble principle of life therein implanted being all our interest in the righteousness of Christ, all we have to plead at the bar of conscience or the tribunal of God, is not a doctrine on which a soul can live.

CORRECTIONS.

Page 124, foot note, *for* Thomsen, *read* A. U. Thomsen's Die Schleiermachersche Philosophische Grundansicht, page 10.

Page 126, foot note, *for* "one call," *read* "one and all."

Page 127, line 9, *for* her, *read* the.

lines 11 and 13, *for* active, *read* actual.

Page 146, line 17 from bottom, *for* "transferred," *read* "transfused."

line 3 do. do. *for* "as," *read* "in."

SHORT NOTICES.

The First Adam and the Second. The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man. By Samuel J. Baird, D. D., pastor of the Presbyterian church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860. 8vo. pp. 688.

This imposing volume has just issued from the press. It is so large and so full of important matter, that its perusal is a serious task. For this task we have not as yet been able to command the time. We have examined it sufficiently to satisfy ourselves that it is a work of no common value. It evinces ability, research, careful preparation, and earnest zeal for the truth. It is a remarkable illustration of what may be done by a man of talents giving years to a special object, reading and digesting everything within his reach which bears on his subject of inquiry. Dr. S. J. Baird has thus been able to produce a book on the two great themes of the fall and redemption of man, which is an honour not only to himself, but to the country. There are not many works in the history of American theology of higher rank than this volume is destined, in our judgment, to take. It is immeasurably above many of the productions of the last century, which have secured for their authors a lasting reputation. It is to us a matter of deep regret, that a work which has so much to recommend it, and which we believe will vindicate for itself a permanent place in the theological literature of the country, takes ground on the subject of imputation, which we are fully persuaded is unscriptural, and contrary to the standards of our church, and to the theology of the great body of Protestants. This, however, although in our judgment a great drawback to the value of the work as a means of theological training, will not diminish its worth to mature scholars.

The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks. With an Introductory Essay, by Edward A. Parks, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology, Andover, Mass. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, Chauncy street. 1859. 8vo. pp. 596.

The name of EDWARDS stands so prominently before the world, that, "The Edwardian Theory of the Atonement" cannot fail to be understood to mean the theory of the atonement

taught by EDWARDS. There is but one historical Edwards, as there is but one Luther or Calvin. This book, however, does not pretend to give the theory of Edwards, but of his successors, and especially of his son, the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, D. D., President of Union College. There is, therefore, some historical propriety in the designation, but as it is adapted to mislead, it is on that account to be regretted. This work presents in a single volume the ablest and most authoritative exhibition of that theory of the atonement, which entered so largely into the New-school theology of this country. It belongs, indeed, to the past, rather than to the present. The public mind has passed beyond the standpoint occupied by the authors of the discourses here republished. The past, however, belongs to history, and the history of doctrine, and of religious thought, is of all departments of history the most interesting, and the most important. It is as a record of the light in which many great and good men of the last generation regarded this great doctrine, rather than as either a representative or guide of modern thought, that this volume is to be welcomed and estimated.

Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edited by the Rev. Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D. Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. 8vo. pp. 718.

In our notice of this work in a preceding number, it so happened that a copy of the English edition was before the writer, and consequently no reference was made to that which had already been published in this country, by Messrs. Gould and Lincoln of Boston. We regret this oversight, not only because the American edition is eminently creditable to the distinguished house whence it issues, but because some of our readers may have been led to infer that the work was accessible only by the costly method of importation. As the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is daily attracting more and more the attention of students, it is important they should know that the work has been published in an elegant form in our own country.

The Puritans: or, The Church, Court, and Parliament of England during the reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In three volumes. Vol. I. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. 8vo. pp. 549.

There is no period in the history of England more important, either in a civil or religious aspect, than that contemplated in this work. Of the great parties which then struggled for

the ascendancy, the Romish, the Anglican, and the Puritan, the last, as the true authors, defenders, and propagators of English liberty and English religion, has the greatest claim on the gratitude of posterity. To Americans, especially, as the political and religious descendants of the Puritans, such a work as this is of peculiar interest. The word Puritan, indeed, had in the age of Elizabeth a much wider sense than we commonly attach to it. But the general principle and spirit of the party, in its more comprehensive, as well as in its more restricted form, were the same. The grand idea with all Puritans was, that God is to be obeyed rather than man, and man only so far as God commands. To develop the history of a party animated by that idea, is a great work. The present volume contains the history of the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, from 1549 to 1575. We have reason to be proud of such a work as this, which bids fair to sustain the reputation of our country, earned by such historians as Bancroft, Prescott, and Motley.

The Words of the Lord Jesus. By Rudolf Stier. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition. By the Rev. William B. Pope, London. New Edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

As our readers are acquainted with the well established character of this work, we simply subjoin the bookseller's notice for their information. It is to be published by subscription in five volumes, 8vo., averaging for the first four volumes nearly a thousand pages each. The fifth volume is to contain a translation of the author's recent addition to his work, "The Words of the Risen Jesus." The price is three dollars per volume for the first four volumes, and two dollars for the fifth. Though published by subscription, the book may be obtained from booksellers in the usual way.

The History of the United States of America, from the Discovery of the Continent to the close of the first Session of the Thirty-Fifth Congress. By J. H. Patten, A. M. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway. 1860. 8vo., pp. 806.

The design of this work is to meet the wants of those who need a history intermediate between a mere compend and elaborate works extending through many volumes. The class of readers to which such a work is adapted must be large. Almost every family contains members who have not time nor courage to attempt the mastery of our larger national histories, and who yet desire more information than can be obtained from school books. It is another advantage of this work that it brings down the history almost to the present time. The period from

the inauguration of Washington as President to the time of Jackson is almost a *terra incognita* to the majority of middle-aged persons. It is not embraced in ordinary histories, nor does it fall within their personal recollections. The work of Mr. Patten is clearly and pleasantly written, and, as far as we have examined it, the spirit of the book is temperate, and the views which it expresses just.

Letters of John Calvin, compiled from Original Manuscripts, and edited with Historical Notes. By Dr. Jules Bonnet. Vol. III. Translated from the Latin and French Languages, by Marcus Robert Gilchrist. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street.

This is an additional volume of the valuable collection of Calvin's letters, noticed in our last number, to be completed in four volumes. It is a work essential to a due knowledge and appreciation of the character of the Reformer, and to a proper insight into the nature and hinderances of the great religious movement in which he was engaged.

The Book of the Twelve Minor Prophets, Translated from the original Hebrew. With a Commentary, Critical, Philological, and Exegetical. By E. Henderson, D. D. With a Biographical Sketch of the Author, by E. P. Barrows, Hitchcock Professor in the Andover Theological Seminary. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: John Wiley. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860. 8vo. Pp. 458.

Dr. Henderson was born in Scotland, A. D. 1787. His father was an agricultural labourer, and his early education was very defective. He was for some years devoted to mechanical employments; but his talents and piety attracting attention, he was placed for two years in a seminary at Edinburgh, and then devoted himself to the work of foreign missions. He went to Denmark in hopes of being able to obtain a passage to Serampore, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. Finding abundant opportunities around him, he continued to labour several years in Denmark; then went to Sweden, and then to Russia. He was engaged for twenty years, principally in efforts to promote the circulation of the Scriptures on the continent of Europe. In 1826 he was appointed Theological Tutor in the Missionary College at Hoxton, and in 1830 he accepted the Tutorship in the Ministerial College at Highbury, where he remained until 1850. His laborious and useful life was closed on the 16th of May, 1858. He was a copious writer; his Biblical Researches and Travels in Russia, his work on Inspiration, Commentary on Isaiah, and this work on the Minor Prophets, are among his most esteemed publications. This, as well as his other biblical works, evinces great labour, a familiar acquaintance with the Hebrew and its cognate languages, and a religious spirit. As

a prophetic interpreter, he is a good deal of a literalist, and too much disposed to limit the Old Testament predictions to specific events; but everything he wrote is replete with valuable information.

Graham Lectures. Human Society: Its Providential Structure, Relations, and Offices. Eight Lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, New York. By F. D. Huntingdon, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. 8vo. Pp. 307.

Mr. Graham of Brooklyn left an endowment for an annual course of lectures in the Brooklyn Institute, "On the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested in his works." The first series of lectures was delivered by Richard S. Storrs, Jr., D. D., "On the Constitution of the Human Soul." These lectures have already been published in a style uniform with this volume, which is one of the most beautiful of the publications of the Messrs. Carters. The subject chosen by Dr. Huntingdon is not only of great importance but specially suited to the present state of the country. All questions relating to the constitution of society and the social relations of men are now exciting unusual attention. The reputation of the author as a sincere, thoughtful, and highly cultivated man, is universally known, and constitutes the only recommendation this volume can need.

The Palace of the Great King: or, The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, illustrated in the Multiplicity and Variety of his Works. By the Rev. Hollis Read, author of "God in History," "India and her People," "Commerce and Christianity," &c. New York: C. Scribner, 124 Grand street. 1859. Pp. 408.

This is a form of natural theology. The facts of geology, zoology, anthropology, astronomy, and other branches of science, are here presented in their relations to God, as revelations of his being and perfections. The book, therefore, combines instruction with religious culture. It is an interesting and valuable work.

The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua. With an Original and Copious Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By Robert Jamieson, D. D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1860.

The Historical Books of the Holy Scriptures, with a Critical and Explanatory Commentary. By the Rev. Robert Jamieson, D. D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow, Scotland. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 360.

A compendious, popular commentary on the historical books of the Old Testament is a real desideratum, which these works are designed to supply. The English text is printed on the left

hand page, and the notes on the right hand. The one therefore occupies no more space than the other. This allows room only for the briefest comments, which however meet and illustrate the main points in the history. The two together form a very available help in the study of all the historical books of the Old Testament.

The Eighteen Christian Centuries. By the Rev. James White, author of the History of France. With a Copious Index. From the second Edinburgh edition. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1859. Pp. 538.

The history of the church for eighteen centuries, compressed in a volume of little more than five hundred pages, must of course be a mere compend. As such, however, it may serve a valuable purpose both for students and for general readers.

Family Religion; or, the Domestic Relations as regulated by Christian Principles. By the Rev. B. M. Smith, Professor in Union Seminary, Virginia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 210.

This is a prize essay. It consists of six chapters, in which the family constitution, the duties arising from it, the means of securing the ends of that constitution, its relation to the church, the importance of the subject, and the pleas for the neglect of family religion, are discussed at length. The book is fraught with wisdom, and is adapted to be eminently useful.

The Hart and the Water-Brooks. A Practical Exposition of the Forty-Second Psalm. By Rev. J. R. McDuff, D.D., author of "Morning and Night Watches," &c., &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 229.

Leaders of the Reformation: Luther, Calvin, Latimer, Knox, the Representative Men of Germany, France, England, and Scotland. By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. Author of "Theism," &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 309.

As this book is printed in a condensed form, though with a clear type and fair page, it contains a good deal of matter, and serves to present the characteristic aspects of the great work of the Reformation in the four countries mentioned in the title page.

Historical Vindications; A Discourse delivered before the Backus Historical Society, &c. With Appendices, containing Historical Notes and Confessions of Faith. By Sewall S. Cutting, Professor of Rhetoric and History in the University of Rochester. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 224.

The Discourse on "The Province and Use of Baptist History" occupies fifty-four pages of the volume, much the larger portion being taken up with the Notes and Confessions. As

an authentic exposition of the views and faith of a large denomination of Christians, this work has an interest for the religious public generally.

A Dictionary of the Holy Bible, for General Use in the Study of the Scriptures. With Engravings, Maps, and Tables. Published by the American Tract Society, New York, 150 Nassau street. Pp. 533.

This work is founded on Dr. Edward Robinson's Bible Dictionary, first published in 1833. About two-thirds of that work have been retained in this, and large additions made from other sources.

Haste to the Rescue; or, Work while it is called To-day. By Mrs. Charles W. With a Preface, by the author of "English Hearts and English Hands." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 324.

"This book contains a series of facts and incidents which occurred during an intercourse of eighteen months with above five hundred working men and their families in the town of Shrewsbury." It is designed to awaken the sympathy of the educated classes with the sufferings of the poor, and to excite to greater efforts for their improvement.

The Three Wakings. With Hymns and Songs. By the author of "The Christian Life in Song." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 228.

The three wakings are three periods of life. The volume is made up of sacred songs and hymns, breathing a devotional spirit, and evincing much poetical skill.

The Christian Home; or, Religion in the Family. By the Rev. Joseph A. Collier, Kingston, N. Y. Author of "The Right Way." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 198.

This also is a prize essay. It is inferred from the fact that the rather larger work of Dr. B. M. Smith on this subject received the first prize, as stated in a preceding notice, that this production of Mr. Collier's was deemed by the Board too valuable to be allowed to pass with the unaccepted essays. It goes over much the same ground as that indicated in the notice of Dr. Smith's work; and its publication, under the circumstances, is an indication of the high estimate placed upon it by the Board.

History of the Old Covenant, from the German of J. H. Kurtz, D. D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. III. Translated by Rev. James Martin, B. A., Nottingham. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

This volume of a well-known standard work, contains the history of the chosen people during a period of forty years,

whilst sojourning in Arabia Petræa and the land of Moab. This monument of the learning and piety of Dr. Kurtz has already often been noticed in our pages.

The Protestant Theological and Ecclesiastical Encyclopedia; being a condensed translation of Hertzog's Real Encyclopedia, with additions from other sources. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D.D. Part X. Pailadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston.

We continue to call attention to this valuable work, which has been some time in the course of publication. Each part contains 128 pages in double columns, and is sold at fifty cents. The whole will form three super-royal octavo volumes. In no other work within our knowledge can the same amount of varied and valuable information be found in the same compass.

Bunsen's Bibelwerk. Vollständiges Bibelwerk für die Gemeinde. In drei Abtheilungen. Von Christian Carl Josias Bunsen. Erste Abtheilung. Die Bibel. Uebersetzung und Erklärung. Erster Theil: Das Gesetz. Erster Halbband. Einleitung und Genesis, Capitel 1—11. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. B. Westermann & Co., 290 Broadway, New York.

This is the first half volume of the first of the three divisions of Bunsen's great work on the Bible, for the Christian public. He addresses himself to the congregation, the mass of readers, and not exclusively to the learned. This half volume is in quarto, containing ccxciv. pages of introduction, and thirty-two pages devoted to the translation of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, with annotations. The introduction is made up of many separate dissertations, on the need of a new version of the Bible, on the canon, on the names of God, on the principles of interpretation, comparative view of the different translations of the Scriptures, chronological tables and discussions, &c. The author tells us he has been consciously preparing himself for this work for forty years. He had it, more or less, definitely in view during his academical career, while studying Arabic and Persian with De Sacy, in Paris, through his twenty-two years residence in Rome, and fifteen years residence in England, in the most diversified studies and pursuits, and in intercourse with all the most distinguished literary men of the age. During this protracted period, he published numerous fragmentary and preparatory biblical works; as, for example, on the Life of Christ, on the Gospels, on the Psalms, a translation of the prophets Joel and Jonas, &c. At last, after an absence of forty years, he returned, in a vigorous old age, to his native country, to devote himself to giving form and completeness to the great work of his life. Its central idea is a new German translation of the Bible, with explanatory notes, but this is to be attended with accompanying introductions,

dissertations, excursus, appendices, and tables, to serve as receptacles for the stores of learning and speculation accumulated during his long and most laborious career. In this first half volume the translation and notes stand to this accessory matter in the proportion of thirty-two pages to three hundred and ninety-four. Whether this is to be the rule for the rest of the work we cannot say. In any event, the accumulated results of the labours of such a man as the Chevalier Bunsen, must prove a treasure-house, whence the less favoured, the less laborious, and the less able men of this and coming generations may derive stores of knowledge. He is a man, however, to be thankfully used, but not blindly followed.

Turretin on the Atonement of Christ. Translated by the Rev. James R. Willson, D. D. A new edition, carefully revised by collation with the last edition of the Latin original. New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church, 61 Franklin street. 1859. Pp. 195.

Turretin is almost the only theologian, among the immediate successors of the Reformers, whose writings are still sought after with avidity, and kept in constant use. This is conclusive evidence of their intrinsic merit, and especially of their scriptural character. It is because they so nearly represent the mind of God as revealed in his word, that they answer the convictions of Christians now as well as when they were first published. Although his discussion of the Atonement had special reference to the form of opinions prevailing centuries ago, it meets the popular objections of our own times, and expresses substantially the views of the great body of the theologians of the Reformed church. We understand the religious public are indebted to Dr. T. W. Chambers, of New York, for this new and improved edition of this valuable work.

Preachers and Preaching. By the Rev. Nicholas Murray, D. D., author of "Kirwan's Letters to Bishop Hughes," "Romanism at Home," "Men and Things in Europe," "Parish and other Pencillings," "The Happy Home," &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1860. Pp. 303.

The author of this volume was appointed to deliver the charge to the Rev. Dr. McGill, on his inauguration as Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, in September 1854. He took for his subject "The Ministry We Need." That discourse was the germ of the present book. It has, therefore, borne good fruit. Dr. Murray has here recorded the lessons derived from an experience of thirty years in the ministry. This volume abounds in wise counsels, not only in reference to the preaching and conduct of ministers, but also

to many related subjects—as the pastoral office, duties of parishes, the education of candidates, and others of like kind. It is also enriched by his personal recollections of distinguished preachers, and with the fruits of his diversified studies. It will probably prove one of the most useful and acceptable of the author's numerous publications.

History of Independence Hall; from the Earliest Period to the Present Time; embracing Biographies of the Immortal Signers of the Declaration of Independence, with Historical Sketches of the Sacred Relics preserved in that Sanctuary of American Freedom. By D. W. Belisle. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Brown, Taggard & Chase. Cincinnati: Rickey, Mallory & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1859. Pp. 396.

This long title-page is a full account of the work. It is animated with fervent patriotism, and it will prove a blessing to the country, should it in any measure serve to rekindle the spirit with which Patrick Henry closed one of his most eloquent orations, in Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia, where the first Congress met, with the words, "I am not a Virginian, I am an American."

Thoughts and Reflections on the Present Position of Europe, and its probable consequences to the United States. By Francis J. Grund. Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, publishers, No. 602 Arch street. 1860. Pp. 245.

The attention of the civilized world is turned with anxiety to Europe in its present state of transition. Old things are there passing away. The accession of Louis Napoleon to the imperial throne of France, the Crimean and Italian wars, the changes thereby effected, and the still greater changes thereby foreshadowed, may well call for the serious consideration of all interested in the welfare of Christendom. For the time being God has placed the controlling power in the hands of the French Emperor, and he has mercifully made it his interest to use that power for the promotion of civil and religious liberty in Europe. This work of Mr. Grund, discussing the recent past and the present of European affairs, with evident familiarity with facts, and with a clear and strong mind, cannot fail to command general attention.

A Commentary, Explanatory, Doctrinal, and Practical on the Epistle to the Ephesians. By R. E. Pattison, D. D., late President of Waterville College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1859. Pp. 244.

The writer says that in preparing this work he has had his eye "kept steadily on one class of readers—intelligent experienced Christians." The matter is arranged under twenty-one

separate lessons, which form in part so many lectures or expository discourses. At the close there is a series of questions for each lesson, for the benefit of those who use the volume as a text book. As far as we can judge from the hasty examination we have been able to give it, it is a pious, sound, and judicious exposition of the doctrines and precepts of the Epistle.

The Presbyterian Historical Almanac and Annual Remembrancer of the Church for 1860. By Joseph M. Wilson. Volume Second. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1860. Pp. 316.

This volume contains a wonderful amount of statistical information laboriously collected and skilfully arranged. The only thing of which we are disposed to complain is the lithograph portraits.

Youth's Bible Studies. Part VI. The Acts, Epistles, and Revelation. American Tract Society. 12mo. pp. 246.

The Deaf Shoemaker, and other Stories. By Philip Barret. New York: M. W. Dodd, 506 Broadway. 1859. 12mo. pp. 216.

Shadows and Sunshine, as illustrated in the history of Notable Characters. By Rev. Erskine Neale, M.A. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1859. 12mo., pp. 281.

Who is my Neighbour? or, The Two Great Commandments. By the author of "Little Bob True." Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 216.

A Basket of Chips for the Little Ones. By Luola. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 237.

The Pastoral Office, embracing Experiences and Observations from a Pastorate of Forty Years. By the Rev. Reuben Smith. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board. 18mo., pp. 105.

The Divine-human in the Scriptures. By Taylor Lewis, Union College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

This volume, the author informs us, "has grown out of what was intended as an introduction to another work on the Figurative Language of the Scriptures, and which, with the divine permission, he hopes soon to give to the public." It is substantially a plea for, including a refutation of some modern plausible objections against, the plenary, verbal inspiration, and self-evidencing divine light and authority of the Sacred Scriptures. By the term "divine-human," the author does not mean that monistic, transcendental theory of the person of Christ, and of the mutual relation of God and man, which denies or confounds the proper dualism of essence and nature as between the human and divine, of which the phrase, as used of late, is so ominously suggestive. He rather means that God in becoming incarnate assumes true and proper manhood, not a

superhuman or angelic nature; and that in discoursing to men, he uses a true and proper human language, and not some instrument of discourse that is either superhuman or extra-human. He contends that the plain unscientific, yet intensely human phraseology of Scripture, is stronger proof that it is the word of God, than if it were cast in abstract and philosophic moulds. These views he maintains with his usual affluence of learning and force of logic.

We regret to notice that Professor Lewis adopts that perversion of the word "supernatural," as we must consider it, which Dr. Bushnell and others have taken from Coleridge, and which forms the key-note of his recent work, entitled, "Nature and the Supernatural." This is simply, that whatever is above or can control physical laws is supernatural—therefore the human will, or man, is supernatural. Says Dr. Lewis, "Is there in us a power of will, and do we exercise that power to control the physical forces around us within certain limits . . . is there in us, we say, such a supernatural power, and shall it be no where else in the worlds above us—in God, or in higher superhuman beings acting as the ministers of God?" P. 50. Such a conception of supernaturalism deranges the whole discussion between its advocates and their adversaries. The only supernaturalism, which rises above mere naturalism, is that which rises above the powers of man as well as of physical nature.

The Life of the Rev. Richard Knill of St. Petersburg: being Selections from his Reminiscences, Journals, and Correspondence. By Charles M. Birrell. With a Review of his Character; by the late Rev. John Angell James. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

This biography may be read with interest and profit by ministers and private Christians. It is a memoir of a most zealous, discreet, and successful minister of Christ, whose labours in his own and foreign countries were remarkably honoured of God. His labours as missionary in the East, then for a long period at the Russian capital, and afterwards in home evangelism, give the memoir the interest arising from varied incident, and the value which attaches to information concerning the spirit and methods of Christian activity, which have been crowned with success in various and difficult circumstances.

The Missing Link: or Bible-Women in the homes of the London Poor. By L. N. R., author of "The Book and its Story." New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

This volume consists of a series of graphic narratives of efforts made to relieve the sufferings and improve the character of the London poor. It abounds in matter of interest to the

Christian and philanthropist. Its special object is to illustrate the peculiar efficiency of Christian females among the destitute and degraded strata of the population of cities—of women as distinguished from ladies—and especially of women who have themselves been reclaimed from the debasement from which they undertake to rescue others. To state the conclusion towards which the book tends, in its own words: “It certainly seems that a Native Female Agency, drawn from the classes we want to serve and instruct, has hitherto been a *Missing Link*, and that such supplementary work might now perfect the heavenly chain, which shall lift the lost and the reckless from the depths of their despair.”

Sermons by the Rev. H. Grattan Guinness. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The extraordinary power of Mr. Guinness's preaching over crowded auditories in our great cities, will of itself serve as a passport for this volume to the reading Christian public. This peculiar power, so far as we can judge from a cursory inspection of this volume, lies in the simple, clear, fervid articulation of evangelical truth, in such a way as to bring it home to the hearts and consciences of the people. It does not, so far as we can see, lie in any originality of thought, in exuberance of imagery, or magnificence of diction, but in the plainness and force with which it sets forth the simple and pure gospel. Indeed this, and not any merely human excellency of speech or wisdom, must always constitute the power of preaching, because it is itself the “power of God unto salvation.”

The Precious Things of God. By Octavius Winslow, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

Those who are acquainted with the devotional and experimental character of Dr. Winslow's writings, will be led from the title of this volume to look for a high degree of unction in its pages. They will not be disappointed. They will find it laden with rich scriptural thought, adapted to enlighten, correct, comfort, and edify all who hunger and thirst after righteousness.

Parochial Lectures on the Psalms. By the late Rev. David Caldwell, A. M. Psalms 1—50. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1859.

The lamented author intended, had his life been spared, to prepare and publish similar expository lectures on the entire Psalms. He was, however, arrested in his useful labours by death. His object was to supply a practical commentary and

exposition more suited to the wants of the people, especially those of his own communion, than such as have been within their reach. He was a zealous and successful Episcopal clergyman in Virginia. These lectures breathe that catholic, evangelical spirit which has so generally and honourably characterized Virginia Episcopalians. They are full of sound, judicious, spiritual, and edifying reflections.

Gotthold's Emblems; or, Invisible things understood by things that are made. By Christian Scriver, Minister of Magdeburg in 1671. Translated from the twenty-eighth German edition. By the Rev. Robert Menzies, Hoddam, England. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

The facility and felicity with which the most familiar objects and events are here turned into mirrors, through which spiritual and divine truths are seen in this volume, are truly marvellous. The author detects beams of divinity in everything. Nothing is so insignificant that he does not contrive to extract from it sententious, devout, quickening suggestions; to

"Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and God in everything."

The quaint and beautiful thoughts of this book are all aglow with the fervour of ancient German piety, free of any taint of modern German scepticism.

The Crucible; or, Tests of a Regenerate State. Designed to bring to light suppressed hopes, expose false ones, and confirm the true. By the Rev. J. A. Goodhue, A. M. With an Introduction, by the Rev. Edward N. Kirk, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

We have here a work quite beyond the average grade of recent experimental and casuistical works, for depth of insight and delicacy of discrimination. It more nearly approaches the grade of works of which Edwards's Treatise on the Affections, Shepard's Parable of the Ten Virgins, and Flavel's Touchstone, are types, than any recent production that has fallen under our notice. The author thoroughly abjures all Pelagian and naturalistic views of whatever kind or degree. The absolute dependence of man on the Spirit for all genuine piety; the absolute sovereignty of God in the gift of the Spirit; the utter spuriousness of all supposed symptoms of a regenerate state which are not the work of the Holy Ghost, are cardinal principles of the work, which interpenetrate all its teachings. The author shows uncommon skill in probing the heart, and indicating the tests which distinguish genuine piety from its counterfeits. In fact, sometimes we find ourselves ready to

fear that the white heat of his "Crucible" will consume not only the dross of carnality and hypocrisy, but the fine gold of weak, yet genuine, faith. Viewed in other portions, and on other sides, however, the work seems peculiarly designed and fitted to cheer and invigorate the trembling believer, and to evoke into palpable manifestation a latent, undeveloped faith. Indeed, we think the chapter on "unrecognized regeneration," which maintains that a regenerate state sometimes exists, especially in children, and from childhood onward to maturer age, although not recognized as such by the subject of it, or, in all cases, even by others, of great importance at this time. It will awaken attention to a truth that has been widely ignored or rejected, to the great damage to the church, and discouragement of youthful piety. The chief drawbacks to these and other high merits of the book, as they strike us on a very rapid glance at its contents, are: 1. A disposition to place all genuine religious experience in a state of mystical or "indescribable feeling," aside from intelligent apprehension. 2. It teaches that "it will be unsafe to urge the distressed sinner to put his trust in Christ, just as he is." 3. Hence it makes faith not the initial and fontal, but a subordinate Christian grace. 4. In a righteous revulsion from the selfish scheme, it seems at times almost to imply that any regard to our own happiness vitiates religious experience. There is also an occasional tendency to overfly a just moderation in some analogous things. 5. It argues at great length, that Christians and church officers may so judge of the internal state, as to be "certified of the regeneration of others," or the absence of it. This is a false and pernicious principle.

The Gospel in Leviticus; or, An Exposition of the Hebrew Ritual. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., author of "Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews," "The Last Times," &c. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

Dr. Seiss is the pastor of St. John's Lutheran church, Philadelphia. This exposition of Leviticus was delivered in lectures, first in Baltimore, and afterwards in Philadelphia, which are now published at the request of large numbers who heard them. They appear to be well worthy of this honour, and adapted to benefit those who may read, as well as those who heard them. Some of the interpretations of the ancient ritual may be fanciful; but, on the whole, the gospel is ably shown to be its truest, deepest meaning. This is highly important to be apprehended by the church, not only that the profound unity which pervades

the Bible may be seen, but also that all its parts may appear reciprocally to illumine each other, and converge all their scattered rays in Him who is the light of the world, the Sun of Righteousness.

Manual of Public Libraries, Institutions, and Societies in the United States, and British Provinces of North America. By William J. Rhees, Chief Clerk of the Smithsonian Institution. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1859.

The vast amount of statistical information in this work could hardly have been collected by one less favourably situated than the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. It will be specially prized by all who take an interest in the literary, scientific, educational, religious, and charitable resources of our country. Of course, in such a work, some defects and omissions are unavoidable. Our wonder, however, is not that these are so many, but so few. The volume contains a valuable chapter on the proper construction of rooms and buildings for public libraries.

The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical; with Quotations and References. For the use of Students. By William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Second edition, revised and enlarged. London and Glasgow: Richard Griffin & Co. 1858.

The great value of such a work as this title-page describes, must be evident to all intelligent men. It is well executed. The technical terms of philosophy are not only defined, but the definitions are sustained and illustrated by copious quotations from the best authors in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy generally. It must, therefore, be useful not only to students of philosophy, but to all scholars and cultivated men. We call the attention of our publishing houses to it. We do not doubt that by republishing it, they would serve their own interests as well as the cause of philosophy.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

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W. Ayerst, *The Pentateuch its own Witness; or, the Internal Evidence of its Antiquity and Inspiration.* 12mo.

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MSS. containing various portions of the Greek New Testament, and an Introduction entitled Contributions to the Criticism of the Greek New Testament. 8vo.

Biblia Pauperum, re-produced in *fac-simile* from one of the copies in the British Museum, with a Historical and Bibliographical Introduction, by J. P. Berjeau. 4to.

C. D. Marston, Manual of the Inspiration of Scripture. 12mo.

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History of Georgia from the most ancient times to the Nineteenth Century, translated from the Georgian. The last volume. 4to. pp. 312. St. Petersburg.

GERMANY.

F. W. Schultz, *Deuteronomy Explained*. 8vo. pp. 717.

Books of Judges and Ruth according to the Syro-Hexaplaric Version, from the MS. of the British Museum, edited by T. S. Rordam. No. 1. Judges, ch. 1—5. Pp. 94.

J. A. Nickes, *De Estheræ libro et ad eum quæ pertinent vaticiniis et psalmis*. Part II. 8vo. pp. 496. Rome.

F. Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Psalter*. Vol. I. Ps. 1—89. 8vo. pp. 675.

O. Strauss, *The Psalter as a Book of Song and Prayer*. 8vo. pp. 32.

E. W. Hengstenberg, *The Preacher Solomon (Ecclesiastes) Explained*. 8vo. pp. 272.

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Codex Vaticanus, The Greek Text of the New Testament from this most ancient manuscript, edited by Cardinal Mai. 8vo. pp. 502.

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G. B. Winer, *Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*. Fourth edition. 8vo. pp. 178. In Latin.

K. Wieseler, *Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians*. 8vo. pp. 622.

J. G. Reiche, *Critical Commentary on the New Testament*, reviewing the more important passages of doubtful reading. Vol. II. Paul's Minor Epistles. 4to. pp. 445.

Meyer's *Critical Commentary on the New Testament*. Part 16th, being an Exposition of the Book of Revelation, by F. Düsterdieck. 8vo. pp. 578.

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Aurora, or Select Library of the Writings of those who sought to reform the Church before Luther. Vol. V. 8vo. pp. 76, containing a treatise of G. Zerbolt on Reading the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue, and vernacular prayers, and others from J. Gerson, Peter de Alliaco, and Gerhard Magnus.

F. Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages, from the Fifth to the Sixteenth Century*. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 484.

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R. J. Berlin, *Additions to Nathan ben Jehiel's Lexicon "Aruch"*. Part II. 8vo. pp. 260.

U. Seetzen's Travels through Syria, Palestine, etc. Vol. IV. and last. 8vo. pp. 524. The work is now complete.

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ARTICLE I.—*Theories of the Eldership.**

IT is not intended in the present discussion to raise the question of the scriptural warrant of ruling elders in the church of Christ, nor any quarrel about the propriety of the designation—ruling elders—in the *general* meaning of both terms—as happily descriptive of their official dignity and office as the representatives of the Christian people, and assessors with the Christian ministry in the government of the church. But as names are things, and principles precede and prepare for practical results, it is, we think, of great importance to have it clearly understood and definitively established that the name of ruling elder is applicable only in the general, and not in the official sense affixed to it in the New Testament and by the early church, and indeed by the church universally until long

* As it is designed to make this a constitutional argument, it will be necessary to review all the works on the subject of ruling powers, from Dr. Miller's work to the present time, including the separate works of Dr. Wilson, Dr. King, McKerrow, Lorimer, Guthrie, and Robinson's Church of God, Dr. Addison Alexander's Primitive Offices, Dr. Breckinridge's Knowledge of God, vol. ii., Dr. Thornwell's Review of it, Dr. Adger's Inaugural Address, and Dr. Killen's Ancient Church. The nature of the argument will require the frequent exhibition of authoritative standards.

after the Reformation; and that the true basis and authority of these official representatives of the people are to be found in other terms contained in the only recognized constitutional code of doctrine, order, and officers in the church of God.

"It is a disreputable truth," says Dr. Thornwell, "that there are many Presbyterians and Presbyterian ministers who are very imperfectly acquainted with the characteristic principles of their own system," and that it "is still disputed whether he (the ruling elder) is the proxy of the congregation, deriving all his rights and authority from a delegation of power on the part of the people, or whether he is an officer divinely appointed, deriving his authority from Christ the Lord. It is still disputed whether he belongs to the same order with the minister, or whether the minister alone is the presbyter of Scripture, and the ruling elder a subordinate assistant. It is still disputed whether he sits in Presbytery as the deputy of the brotherhood, or whether he sits there by divine right as a constituent element of the body; whether, as a member of Presbytery, he can participate in all Presbyterian acts, or is debarred from some by the low nature of his office."* *Southern Presbyterian Review*, 1859, p. 615.

To this "disreputable" diversity and "imperfect acquaintance with the characteristic principles of their own system," Dr. Thornwell opposes what he approves and commends to Presbyterians as "indisputable"—the theory of Dr. Breckinridge—which with characteristic powers of analysis he thus sums up: "That all government is by councils; that these councils are representative and deliberative; that *jure Divino* they are all Presbyteries, and as Presbyteries composed exclusively of presbyters; that presbyters, *though one in order, and the right to rule, are subdivided into two classes*; that all Presbyteries, whether parochial, classical, or synodical, are radically the same; that the church in its germ, and in its fullest development, presents the same elements; that her whole polity is that of a free commonwealth," in which the ruling

* To this *argumentum ad invidiam* we may at once reply, that no office in the church of God can be *low*, and that Israel's greatest king would rather be a door-keeper in the house of God than be a ruler or an heir presumptive among the ungodly.

elder can participate in ALL Presbyterian acts, including, of course, ordination, imposition of hands, &c.

But is this theory—*novel* so far as it is different from the established doctrine and practice of Presbyterian churches—an Irenicum or an apple of discord? Even as a philosophical analysis it seems to us imperfect; for surely, in the last analysis, preaching the glad tidings of a glorious gospel is the chief end and characteristic of the church, as God's instrumental agency for the salvation of lost sinners. Preaching and preachers, and not ruling and rulers, must be the ultimate characteristic of that church which is the pillar and ground of the truth, and through which the manifold wisdom of God is made known unto principalities and powers in heavenly places. Neither does this theory give us a faultless classification or a real unity. A *class* is more general than an *order*, and includes it; and since they are distinguished from each other by constant forms of diversity, two *classes* or *orders* of officers cannot make *one order*. Besides, our Constitution, and that of probably every other Presbyterian church recognizes a third class or order of officers—DEACONS. These are united with the others in the oversight, ministration, and even government of the church within their sphere—that is, the management of the temporalities and charities of congregations. In the early Christian church, and in the church of Scotland, deacons actively united in the distribution of the elements in the Lord's Supper. In the First Book of Discipline they are spoken of as with elders having authority to judge in the kirk of God, and, like them, were elected "every year once." "One of the seniors and one of the deacons once in the year notified the life, manners, study, and diligence of the minister," &c. "They may also assist in judgment with the minister and elders, and may be admitted to read in the assembly if they be required, and be able thereto." The "Deacons' Court" is now a fundamental part of the constitution of the Free Church of Scotland, the members of which are—1. the minister or ministers of the congregation; 2. the elders; and 3. the deacons. According to the theory of the Presbyterian church, the greater office includes the less. The minister and elders can therefore be deacons, and can sit and act as mem-

bers of this court. All the members are thus deacons, and have equal rights, and hence the appropriateness of the name—the “Court of Deacons.”*

Now, in the analysis given us of this theory so “ably, scripturally, and unanswerably established” by Dr. Breckinridge, the existence of such officers as “a characteristic principle of the Presbyterian system” is ignored as *one* of the three “ordinary and perpetual officers in the church.”

To reduce our system to a philosophical unity, we must therefore generalize the officers of the church, so as by the omission of specific differences of order, to make one class for the united government and oversight of the churches. This is the unity to which the Presbyterian polity was reduced by the Second Book of Discipline in 1578. “The whole policy of the kirk consisteth in three things, viz. in doctrine, discipline, and distribution. With doctrine is annexed the administration of sacraments, and according to the parts of this division arises a three-fold sort of office-bearers in the kirk, to wit, of ministers or preachers, elders or governors, and deacons or distributors; and all these may be called by one general word—ministers of the kirk.” But we may also arrive at a unity still more suggestive of the propriety of our Presbyterian name, by referring it at once to our doctrine concerning the presbyter, or, to use the language of the same Book, of “pastors, bishops, or ministers who are appointed to particular congregations, which they rule by the word of God, and over which they watch—in respect whereof sometime they are called pastors—sometime *episcopi* or bishops—sometimes ministers—and sometimes also presbyters or seniors.” By their belief in this one and only order of ministers, Presbyterians are characteristically distinguished

* Forbes’ Digest, pp. 8, 9. It is added in a note: “It must never be forgotten that the elders are also deacons.” The Rev. Stuart Robinson speaks of the office of deacons as a power of government in the church for accomplishing its design in “the provision for and care of the revenues of the community.” (See “Church of God,” pp. 89 and 120.) We will have more to say on this subject however hereafter, and on no subject does our church require more quickening than on the true nature, relations, and functions of deacons. Dr. Breckinridge, however, if reported aright in the Assembly, seemed to attribute to them independent sovereign rule in their sphere, while he ignores them as rulers. This is an extreme.

from those churches which believe in an order of ordained ministers higher than presbyters, to whom is restricted, by divine right, the exclusive power of ordination and jurisdiction in the church. According to the Presbyterian church, the presbyter is the only order of permanent ministers in the church—the only order ordained by imposition of the hands of the Presbytery—the only order clothed with the power of ordination by imposition of hands—the only authorized administrators of the sacraments, and public teachers of doctrine; and an order which being, as our standards declare, “the first in the church both for dignity and usefulness,” contains within itself both the eldership and the deaconship, and may therefore properly be taken as the representative of all. And that this is the true exposition of our modern denominational title, there is, as we will show, satisfactory evidence.

Let this however be as it may, the theory propounded by Dr. Thornwell as “ably, scripturally, and unanswerably established” by Dr. Breckinridge, has not relieved *even its friends* from the “disreputable charge of being ignorant of the characteristic principles of their own system,” and cannot therefore be satisfactory *to us*. In the previous number of the same *Review*, in which Dr. Thornwell announces this theory, Dr. Adger proclaims the one which, as professor in the same Theological Seminary, he maintains. Says he:* “The other view, and *I think the true view* of the nature of this office, makes the ruling elder to be the *aboriginal* presbyter, and makes the *essence* of the Presbyterate to be *ruling*. It makes the overseers or bishops of the church at Ephesus, whom Paul summoned to Miletus, to be ruling elders. It makes the description which Paul gives to Timothy of the bishop, relate to the ruling elder. It makes those whom Titus ordained in every city, ruling elders, in distinction from teaching elders. It denies that presbyter and preacher were originally synonymous; but views preaching as a function—a *charisma* (or gift,) as Neander expresses it, which came to be superadded to certain of the rulers. They had suitable talents, and so were chosen and called to that work.” Dr. Adger therefore simpli-

* Inaugural Discourse on Church History, &c., in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1859, p. 171.

fies the analysis by denying "one order subdivided into two classes," and by rejecting altogether any *office* or order of the ministry of the word and sacraments to be of divine institution, and admits only the *work* or *function* of the ministry by such presbyters as are *gifted* for it. The ministry, therefore, is not a permanent divine office, having spiritual relation to the whole employment of the ministry, in a person qualified and specially called and ordained thereto, but a *work* performed by those who were ruling elders—"a function, a *charisma* or gift, which comes to be superadded to certain of the rulers," as Neander thought was the case—only, however, in the very beginning of Christianity.* This is a very simple theory, and very confidently set forth by Dr. Adger. "Beginning," says he, "with the elders of Israel, in the days of Moses, and coming down to the elders of the synagogue, after the return from Babylon; and thence still further descending to the elders, or presbyters, or bishops, or pastors of the New Testament, this view finds them always to be *rulers*, in distinction from *teachers*. And scrutinizing carefully the testimonies of the apostolic Fathers also, and of the primitive church, this view finds the presbyter, or the elder in the early church, to be simply a ruler and a shepherd of Christ's flock." "Paul says that a bishop (or ruling elder) must be 'apt to teach,' but not because the duty of public instruction belongs to him officially. He teaches indeed from house to house, . . . yet he is not himself a teacher, but simply a ruler in God's house." Again Dr. Adger says:

"In their own congregations, many elders there are whom the people respect as good citizens; industrious, honest men; kind neighbours and pious Christians; but they get none of the respect which is demanded by the high spiritual office they wear. The reason is, that the elder himself is not sensible

* Neander admits that *he was not able to say* "whether, in the appointment of presbyters, care was taken that only those who were furnished with the gift of teaching should be admitted into the college of presbyters." At a later period, as appears from Titus i. 9, he thinks "care was taken that overseers should be appointed who would be able, by their *public instructions*, to protect the church from the infection of false doctrine;" or in other words, the presbyters were all ministers and preachers.—See *History and Planting of Christianity*, vol. i.

that 'the Holy Ghost hath made him an overseer over the flock, to feed the church of God;' and, accordingly, he does not go about, as he ought, both with and without the minister, 'from house to house, warning every one night and day with tears.' The people do not have the remotest conception that he is a pastor of the flock, because there is no visitation or other pastorate of the flock by him. I have heard it said, that in the old country the children look on the visit of the elder with the same reverential awe, and yet the same filial delight, as on the visit of the minister. *There*, he is a minister; he is a pastor; he is a bishop of souls." "He is a shepherd of the blood-bought flock." "When he (Christ) ascended up on high, he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists. These were extraordinary officers, that do not belong to a settled state of the church. Then he gave also, for ordinary officers, some pastors and teachers. I (that is, Dr. Adger) do not say the office of rule is superior, nor yet in every respect even equal to that of instruction; *but I say*, the Holy Spirit here names it *first*: 'Some *pastors*, (i. e. *ruling elders*,) and (*or then*) teachers.' "

We have brought these passages together from the same article, because "extreme cases prove principles," and the theory we are considering is here presented in its plain and legitimate development.

Dr. Adger, however, is not alone in such conclusions. Dr. Thompson, of Buffalo, New York, in his opening discourse before the last General Assembly of the New-School Body, "denied," as reported in the *New York Observer*, "the propriety of the distinction which exists between clergy and elders, and declared that even if church law made such a distinction, the law of the Scriptures did not support the law of the church. The Scriptures know of no distinction in the office of elder, but all elders are bishops. A minister is an elder to labour in word and doctrine; an elder is a bishop called from word and doctrine to labour in the government and oversight of the church. Having defined the bishop's office in this comprehensive manner, the preacher devoted the remainder of his discourse to a presentation of the bishop's good work."

Dr. Thompson agrees and differs fundamentally with Dr.

Adger. He agrees in reducing all church officers to one order, but he diametrically differs in making that one the *clergy*, and not *elders*. Dr. Thompson's theory is the one which, by the irresistible necessity of logic and of facts, must be adopted in any attempt to reduce to one order the officers of the church. It has therefore found voice in our own church from independent investigation and analysis in a review of two publications on the Ruling Eldership, in the *Central Presbyterian* for September 17, 1859. Uniting with his author in lamenting the inefficiency of our church, he lays it down that "the theory of the Presbyterian church is defective in regard to the office of the eldership, and that defect militates against her efficiency in this work, and perhaps lays the foundation for most of her deficiencies in other respects. We accept Presbyterianism as a thoroughly scriptural system in its doctrines, and in all essential points of government. As a whole we believe it impregnable, but in one point we conceive it inconsistent with itself and with the word of God.

"In the tracts noticed, and in all the discussions of this subject, we have seen, as well as the Form of Government itself, it is assumed that there are two distinct and independent classes of elders, the ruling and the preaching. . . . The teaching eldership is self-perpetuating, judged as to qualifications, elected and ordained by a Presbytery which may be constituted, and perform all its duties without one ruling elder. And in no case do the ruling elders participate in the 'laying on of hands.' The ruling elder is the representative of the people elected and judged by them, and ordained by their representatives. The distinction is an official and a permanent one. The ruling elder must be re-ordained, to become a teaching elder. The theory that makes this distinction we think defective and unscriptural. That there is a distinction between ruling and preaching elders made in the Scriptures, we admit; that it is official or permanent—we deny. In order to show this, we propose to examine briefly the common arguments for the office of ruling elder."

The reviewer then takes up the argument for such a distinction from the Synagogue, and shows that it is based upon ignorance of real facts, and upon contradictory and uncertain

traditions, and is clearly against Scripture in 1 Tim. v. 17. That passage he avers "does not necessarily, nor even naturally, make an official distinction," and it is the only one he has been able to discover. "Some passages speak indeed of 'governments' as distinct officers in the church, and also of 'teachers.' But if the 'teachers' include the 'governments,' by a parity of reasoning, the 'governments' might also include 'teachers,' and we would have still but one office. It may be very well doubted whether the whole of this theory is not a false one. It proceeds on the ground that teaching being the higher office of the two, necessarily includes the lower—which is only true when both offices belong to the same department of service. The first magistracy of our country, includes all the lower offices of the executive department, but not the judicial or legislative. And it can be just as easily proven, and by precisely the same argument, that the judicial branch of any government—because it expounds the laws, includes the executive that executes them, as that expounding God's law includes governing in his house. Two things in fact are assumed without proof, in order to make an argument: 1st. That teaching is a higher office than ruling; and 2d. That the higher must include the lower—both of which are, to say the least, questionable."

This reviewer next replies to the argument for the twofold distinction of ruling and teaching elders, based on the plurality of them ascribed to every church. This he conclusively refutes, by showing that it has no force as applied to the incipient state of the church, when no limitation of territory was assigned to any church; when all were missionaries, and all was missionary ground; that in no instance is a hint dropped leading us to suspect that two offices bearing the same name are held forth, both of which may and must teach, but one class alone do this publicly.

"It seems clear to our mind that the whole argument by which the fundamental principle of the Presbyterian system is supported, is just as strong against this particular point in the system. It establishes these points: 1st. That there is but one class of elders, having the same official character and standing, the same duties, and the same responsibilities. 2d. That there is but one ordination, and one standard of

qualification for ordination. The distinction between ruling and teaching elders, is a concession to Episcopacy—an attempt to construct three orders of church officers without diocesan bishops. The real distinction, recognized in the Scriptures, is not in official character, but arises naturally and necessarily from the diversity of gifts bestowed on different men. All elders have the same title—elders, bishops, pastors, preachers, watchers, and rulers; and of necessity ought to possess all the powers and prerogatives implied in the titles. The same qualifications are required in all—even in the matter of teaching—‘apt to teach.’ Hands are to be ‘laid suddenly on no man.’ No novice is to be admitted into any office. Elders are ordained in every church, but no intimation is given that one was ordained to teach *publicly* and rule, and the other to teach *privately* and rule. The very necessity which has led our church to distinguish her two classes of elders, in popular usage, by the different names—ministers and elders—would have led to a similar distinction in the writers of the New Testament, had such a distinction existed, as now exists. (It might be a question whether the effort of our General Assembly to ignore ministerial titles does not grow out of the felt inconsistency between *the Book*, and *our Book*.”)

This calm and very candid and bold-spoken reviewer concludes on this wise: “Both the documents noticed, and the whole course of our recent newspaper discussions show, that the mind of the church is awakening, if not to the view presented above, yet to an approximate one. Now if the present distinction be erroneous, it is not difficult to see the bad effect it must have on the efficient working of our system. More than perhaps any other one thing, it had contributed to produce the present apathetic state of the eldership, by degrading the office below the scriptural standard—by introducing incompetent and unqualified men into it—by relieving those well qualified for the duties from a sense of responsibility. . . . This, however, we may affirm, that if our view be correct, every elder would be required to possess some gift both for ruling and teaching, and to exercise the gifts bestowed upon him. Every one would be a teaching elder, authorized to perform all the duties of the ministry, whenever and wherever, in the provi-

dence of God, he might be called to do so. All need not give themselves exclusively to the work of the ministry, but all might be required to work, as occasion demanded. Some would still give themselves exclusively to the work, and occupy the same positions they now do, save in the matter of official distinction. Rules might be adopted in accordance with this view, regulating the exercise of gifts—even demanding some superior attainments in those given wholly to the work. Then, without the evils resulting from the system adopted by some other churches, we would have all their advantages for the effective occupancy of both new and partially supplied fields.”

“If these views are true, they show a great evil in our system. If they are not true, we would be glad to see some more full and satisfactory presentation of the authority for our present distinction between teaching and ruling elders. Nor are we alone in this wish.”

Now this able reviewer is involved in his logical labyrinth by adopting as true, the reiterated dictum that our standards teach that there is one order of presbyters, divided into two classes—the teaching and the ruling presbyter. This, however, is not their doctrine. The order of *presbyter*, and its collateral terms, bishop and pastor, which the advocates of this theory apply to the ruling elder, and to this class of officers primarily, our standards restrict to ministers exclusively, and never apply to ruling elders. They recognize, therefore, but one order and one office of presbyters and bishops, and call it emphatically “the pastoral office;” and in proof of this they quote the very texts relied on by these theorists—1 Pet. v. 1; Tit. i. 5; 1 Tim. v. 1, 17, 19. They also declare that “the ordinary and perpetual officers in the church are of *three orders*, and *not one*, viz. bishops or pastors (or presbyters—see ch. iv.); the representatives of the people *usually styled* ruling elders; and deacons.” (Form of Gov., ch. iii.) Ruling elders (*not presbyters*) are defined to be properly the representatives of the people, (lay delegates,) chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline in conjunction *with* pastors or ministers,” who are therefore the primary, pre-existing, and essential rulers and teachers, and the only class of presbyters or bishops. Such is the definition

given by our standards of ruling elders and presbyters; and to *describe* the former, they add "*commonly called*," but not authoritatively *defined* to be, ruling elders. For the suggestive origin of this *common* name they quote 1 Tim. v. 17, in which the terms occur, and, as some suppose, in reference to it. That this was the purport of the quotation will be further apparent from the fact that the *definition* given of the office is an exact transfer from the Church of Scotland, from whom our church confessedly derived her nomenclature and her original standards, only that the official title given by her is *elders*—not *ruling elders*;—and in whose standards they are not even called elders, but "other church governors;" and in which this text is not quoted in proof. It was necessary, therefore, in introducing the name ruling elder, to show the ground on which the office is "commonly so called." But of this again.

We have quoted thus fully from this review, because it shows where we are tending, by the inevitable gravitation or magnetic power of the theory of two classes of divinely instituted and permanently distinct officers, with only one name and one order. And let it be further remarked, that the title by which "a great part (*great part* is added to the Scottish Standards) of the Reformed churches understood" ruling elders to be designated, was not *ruling elders*, but "governments;" (and hence their title as given by Calvin, Knox, the Books of Discipline, and the Westminster Assembly, of "*governors*," "and of those who rule well, but do not labour in word and doctrine." Now, it is evident that this long description is not a title, otherwise it would be as long as that of some German princes. Neither are these the words of Scripture, but a paraphrase and addition of eight words, which just put into the text the thing assumed as true. "*Rule well*," in English, suggests the surname RULING, which the original (*οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες*, *those who preside, officiate, or administer well*) does not. The English word *elders* gives the name which the original (*πρεσβυτεροι*) only in its appellative or general sense does; and *in this sense only*, as we shall see, did a great part of the Reformed churches understand their "*governors*" to be *elders*, while many, and all the Presbyterian Standards, regard presbyters to be in 1 Tim. v. 17, as elsewhere, defined to be those

who specially, as their chief business, labour in word and doctrine, and yet also rule or officiate, and administer ordinances; so that while to do this latter acceptably and to edification, was deserving of all honour and support, the faithful performance of the former was eminently worthy of being esteemed very highly in love for the work's sake.

The Rev. Stuart Robinson, in his very beautiful analysis of the church of God in its relation to the gospel, and as a natural, necessary development of it, holds, with the Reformers and our church always and everywhere, that for the development and accomplishment of its great purpose—to gather an elect body out of the race during successive ages, and to train and prepare them for the kingdom of heaven—the church requires THREE classes of officers, and three only. These are what he terms “the ministry of the ordinances; the preserving the order and harmony of the body, that is, government and discipline; and the provision for and care of the revenues of the community.” This rings with the sound of the genuine, sterling metal, and is indeed, as we have seen, the exact teaching of the Second Book of Discipline. “The Scriptures,” he adds, “exhibit as the three divinely appointed officers, first, ministers, who both rule, and administer the ordinances—a double office, necessarily growing out of the essential connection between the word and the spiritual government founded upon it; second, ministers of rule only, and in spirituals only, . . . ; third, the minister of temporal things, for the keeping prominent that ordinance through which is expressed the relation of one to another, and of one part to another part of this body, even as the other ordinances and government are expressive of the relation of one and all to the great Head.” In pursuance of this design of the church, the apostles formally transferred to elders, (i. e. *presbyters*,) as to their successors in office, all the responsibilities which had devolved upon themselves as ordinary ministers, and all authority,” &c. . . . “Thus it is manifest that the ordinary and permanent ministry of the church was shared by the apostles with the elders (*presbyters*) as . . . officially their equals in so far as concerns all the functions of an ordinary and permanent ministry in the church.” In quoting as proof of this apostolical succession of *presbyters*,

Acts xx. 17—35, Mr. Robinson calls attention to the illative particle *οὖν*, in ver. 28, and remarks, “Take heed, *therefore* directly connects the charge to the elders (*presbyters*) with the previous recital of the apostles’ duties among them, and implies that in his absence, *these*, as well as what follows, devolve upon them. He formally recognizes the elders (*presbyters*) as his successors.” His conclusion, therefore, from all his premises is, that “the general familiarity with this branch of the subject, renders unnecessary any argument in detail to show that the *last* and complete development of the church, under the apostles, exhibits as the THREE ordinary and permanent officers thereof, elders, who rule, . . . ; elders, who both rule and labour in word and doctrine; deacons, who represent the fellowship of the members of the church in each other’s gifts, and who have care of its revenues and the necessities of the poor.” And yet, strange to say, within a page of the preceding classification, and under the same head of Church Government, Mr. Robinson puts that *second*, and as less “fundamental,” which before he had made the *chief end* of the church, that is, the “ministry of the ordinances;” and he makes that “*the fundamental* office of the church, *from first to last*,” which he had made *secondary* and *subservient*. And to sustain this arrangement, he quotes the two verses in Hebrews xiii. 17, 7, in both of which the very same term, *ἡρώμενος*, occurs in reference to the same parties, who, in ver. 7, are to be remembered and revered, though dead, and in ver. 17, to be obeyed while living; that is, those presbyters who *formerly* and those who *then* guided, ruled, and watched over them. So plainly do these passages refer to one and the same class of officers, and to the ministers of the gospel—to “all (as Owen on ver. 7 interprets) who had spoken or preached the word of God unto them, whether apostles, evangelists, or pastors”—that Poole, in his Synopsis, only alludes to Grotius as including, in ver. 17, “other spiritual guides.” The reference to pastors, and to the work of the ministry, seems never to have been questioned until this theory required support.*

* See Bloomfield’s Digest and his New Testament; McLean, Olshausen, and Ebard; Doddridge, Gill, Poole’s Annotations, Matthew Henry (full on,) and Owen on ver. 7, which fixes the meaning. Cartwright, who himself believed

Still, however, Mr. Robinson chimes in with the old familiar song of Presbytery, as it has been chanted by our sainted martyr-fathers, by maintaining in Christ's church a THREEFOLD order of officers, even as there is in Christ a threefold order of offices. The ministry is analogous to Christ's prophetic office. The eldership accords with Christ's kingly office; and the deaconship with his priestly, self-sacrificing office. May we not also find adumbrated in the triplicity of church officers, the trinity of the church's God, the monarchy of the Father, the mediate rule and dominion of the Son, and the ministration of the Spirit?

The church of Christ is, as it always was, a supreme Theocracy, of which God the Father is the original founder, over which Christ is set as King, and of which the Holy Spirit is the Ruler. This Theocracy is perpetual and immutable, and is carried on through the ministerial agency of appointed men, especially through the ministry by which it hath pleased God to save them that believe, and by which He represents himself to the people; but also by elders, by whom all the rights and interests of the people are represented to Him and secured for them; and by deacons, by whom the people, in all the gifts and graces bestowed upon them severally and jointly by God, are represented to each other and hold fellowship and enjoy mutual communication one with another. Such is the ministration by which the body of Christ is edified in love and unity. No part is inferior or unimportant. Each in its measure is essential to the health and happiness, to the unity and liberty, and to the power of the church, as being in its Head a divine theocracy, and in its members a spiritual representative, conservative republic. An imitation and adaptation of this is found in the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country, in

in and framed a Discipline, including elders, confutes the Rhemish translation of *prelates*, by largely showing that it should be *pastors*, (Confut. of Rhemish Testament, pp. 650, 651.) Calvin interprets ver. 7 as exclusively referring to pastors, i. e. ministers; and ver. 17—though he thinks it includes "*other rulers*"—he enforces as chiefly and emphatically bearing on *pastors*, as opposed to *prelates*. Bengel is unusually full and strong, and Valpy's New Testament. Stuart says, "it is clearly used in the sense of teachers." Boyse also, in Doddridge. Chrysostom says he never read these words without trembling.

which the presbyters and lay representatives form a chamber of deputies, and the bishops a senate, and in which the joint concurrence of both houses is necessary to any legislation. In our government the one order of clergy meets in one body with the representatives of the people, and they deliberate and decide as one body, the ministry still remaining independent as the sacred order, and acting as such in the presidency and administration of all ministerial offices and acts. By this balance of power, the conservative and popular elements are both secured, and the church preserved from becoming either a hierarchy or oligarchy of ONE order, (as this theory would make it,) or a mere democracy.

Be this as it may, a threefold distinction of officers—ministers, elders, and deacons—has been held forth always, everywhere, and by every Presbyterian church throughout the world, and nowhere more clearly than in the Books of Discipline and Westminster standards appended by Mr. Robinson to his volume.*

Nowhere, also, we may here observe, will he find the preëminence of the order of the ministry as the most especially to be honoured with a double honour, and as inclusive of all the others, more emphatically declared than in these noble declarations of the independence and spirituality of Christ's kirk and office-bearers? "According to the theory of the Presbyterian church, the greater office includes the less." Ministers are elders; the ministers and elders are deacons, and, as such, sit and act in the Deacons' Court, of which conjointly the pastor, elders, and deacons constitute the members.† The office of the elder (*presbyter*)—that is, the pastor, according to the Westminster standards, includes "that which the pastor is to do *from God to the people*"—such as "public reading of the Scriptures," "feeding the flock of God by preaching of the word," "catechizing," "the dispensation of

* In publishing these he has rendered valuable service. He might have added the Book of Common Order, Craig's Catechism, and other early documents.

† Forbes' Digest of Rules and Procedure of the Free Church. Edinburgh, 1856, p. 9. We repeat this remark and reference.

other mysteries," "blessing the people from God," "taking care of the poor;" and he hath also a "ruling power over the flock as pastor." "Other *church governors* are to join with the ministers in the government of the church." "For officers in a particular congregation there ought to be one, at the least, to labour in word and doctrine, and to rule."* "It is also requisite there should be others to join in government, (1 Cor. xii. 28.)" Calvin everywhere exalts the preëminent dignity and authority of the ministry. "The preaching of celestial doctrine is," he says, "committed to pastors." "Magnificent titles . . . are used for no other purpose than to procure respect, love, reverence and dignity to the ministry of heavenly doctrine; . . . therefore to teach us that God himself appears, and, as the author of this ordinance, requires his presence to be recognized in this institution." By these words (Eph. iv. 4—16) Calvin shows that the ministry of men, which God employs in governing his church, is a *principal* hand, &c. "Whosoever, therefore, studies to abolish this order and kind of government of which we speak, or *disparages* it as of *minor* importance, plots the devastation, or rather the ruin and destruction of the church; for neither are the light and heat of the sun, nor meat and drink, so necessary to sustain and cherish the present life, as is the apostolical and pastoral office to preserve a church in the earth."† In his commentary on 1 Tim. v. 17, Calvin says: "Yet he (the apostle) *prefers* those who labour in word and doctrine." In short, our own standards express the uniform testimony of every reformed church in the world when it pronounces "the pastoral office to be *first* in the church both for dignity and usefulness." *Form of Gov.*, ch. iv.

When, therefore, we find Mr. Robinson, with these ancient testimonies in his book and in his mind, and in contradiction to his own analysis, order of thought, and positive affirmations, making "elders who rule, the fundamental officers of the

* Proved by 1 Tim. v. 17, and other texts. See in Robinson's "Church of God," ch. lxxii.

† Institutes, B. IV., ch. i. and iii.

church, as a government from first to last,"* we are constrained to use the words of Dr. King, and say, "the language develops only the necessities of a system."† To sustain the unity of this theory of the eldership we are considering, Mr. Robinson, in his concluding parallel comparison of the three systems of church government, uses this language: "The fundamental office of government in the church is the eldership—of two classes. . . . Besides this, the *only* power of government in the church is the office of the deacons, which concerns temporalities *only*," (p. 120.) As if one *office* could have "two classes," with distinctive and exclusive offices; and as if deacons were any the less officers in the government of the church because their jurisdiction has reference only to *all its temporalities*, to all its charities, and to the poor. Deacons, though named, are ignored as a distinct, necessary, and important order of church officers, and yet he had previously declared this office to be "a power of government in the church," (pp. 89, 120.) This confusion is the necessary result of this new theory, which is based upon the indefinite and equivocal term *πρεσβυτερος*, as it is rendered by *elder* in English, and will be found inseparable from it, since it founds upon it both its two-fold distinction and its attempted unity, which is, however, only that of an equivocal name.

The presbyter or pastor is, we have seen, by his very nature, an elder and a deacon also—that is, *their* functions are included under the authority and rule implied in his office. The reverse, however, is admitted not to be true. In the presbyter, therefore, we have a *generic order*, including in it the other two, and a *generic name*, which, in its broad and comprehensive sense, is equally applicable to elders and deacons. But it is *only* in such a *general* sense it can be applied to orders and offices so essentially and permanently distinct in their sphere and functions. In this ambiguity and double meaning of the term, and especially in the English term *elder*, is to be

* The Westminster standards, under the very head of the ministerial functions, compare them with those of the priests and Levites under the law, and as having "as ample a charge and commission as they had." See in Robinson, p. lxxix. and lxxx.

† On the Eldership, p. 16, note.

found the source of confusion and disagreement in this and every other author who adopts the theory in question.

“The word *elder*,” says the Second Book of Discipline, (ch. vi.) “in the Scripture sometime is the name of age, sometime of office. When it is the name of an office, sometime it is taken *largely*, comprehending as well the pastors and doctors as them who *are called* seniors or elders. In this our division *we call them elders* whom the Apostles call *presidents or governours*.” Thus plainly does this fundamental constitution of the Church of Scotland confine the term presbyter (or elder, in its strict official sense,) to ministers, and apply it only in its *large* sense to those representatives of the people whose proper name is governor or ruler, or as the Westminster standards, (which are now the actual constitution, and bound up with the Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and Ireland, and England, and the numerous branches in Canada, in the United States, and elsewhere,) call them, “others to join in government,” “other church governors,” “other public officers as are agreeable to, and warranted by, the word of God, to be church governors, and to *join with* the ministers in the government of the church,” and in the chapter of *Synodical Assemblies*, “other church governors, as also other fit persons when it shall be deemed expedient.” Gillespie and Rutherford, who, with others, represented the Church of Scotland in the Westminster Assembly, had adopted the newly-coined title of *ruling elder*, founded, as Gillespie teaches, on “the elders that rule well.”* They laboured long and earnestly, both by the press and by their powerful pleadings, to introduce their views into the Assembly and the Church of Scotland. Their first form of proposition to the Assembly was “that beside those presbyters who both rule well and labour in word and doctrine, there be other presbyters who especially apply themselves to ruling.” This, however, was rejected as “*almost a novelty in England*.”† Gillespie preserves another form of the proposition voted upon—“*ruling elder or church gover-*

* See Works, vol. i., “Government of the Church of Scotland,” ch. i., p. 10.

† Hetherington, Hist., p. 141.

nor.”* Both terms in this proposed title were however rejected, and after ten days’ discussion, and “many a brave dispute,” which led Baillie to “marvelling at the great learning, quickness, and eloquence in speaking,” the Assembly settled down upon the terms above given, and repudiated altogether, as a proof text for the office, 1 Tim. v. 17, from which the name of *ruling elder* was professedly drawn, and from which Gillespie infers not merely a twofold, but a threefold distinction of elders—the preacher, the doctor, and the ruler.†

A perfectly similar use of terms, *i. e.* in a strict official and in a large and general sense, is found in the name *deacon*. The word *διδάσκαλος*, says the Second Book of Discipline, chap. viii., sometimes is largely taken, comprehending all them who bear office in the ministry . . . but now, as we speak, is taken only for them unto whom, &c. The office of the deacons so taken is an ordinary and perpetual function in the kingdom of Christ. And just as it would be absurd to say that the deaconship is the fundamental office of government in the church of Christ, or that ministers are only deacons, because they are called deacons—and yet in one sense of the term this is true;—so also, is it a mere sophistical play upon the double meaning and present general use of the term *elder*, to argue that because all ministers are elders, therefore all ministers are what are *now* understood by ruling elders.

The early advocates of this twofold distinction of ruling elder and teaching elder, founded upon 1 Tim. v. 17, recognized therefore the *general* and also the *strict official* sense of the term *elder*. They applied the term in its *general* meaning, as our standards do, to representatives of the people, and the term *presbyter* (the Greek word) exclusively to ministers. This will be found to be the case, with almost no exception, in all the old writers on Presbytery, as designedly as in our own standards, who employ 1 Tim. v. 17, as we have observed, only to justify the “common” use of the name ruling elder. These early writers prove the divine right of the office from the terms “governments,” “rulers,” “THE brethren,” and, until the

* See Robinson’s “Church of God,” p. lxxii., and Gillespie’s Works, vol. ii.

† See *ibid.* Beza and others did the same.

period of the Westminster Assembly, left all the other passages in which the term *presbyter* is translated in English as *elder*, to refer to the ministry.

Neander suggested the interpretation which gives to the word in every passage its general appellative sense, and this theory was adopted and ably presented by Dr. Miller in his work on the Ruling Elder. He quotes, therefore, in proof of the office of ruling elder every passage in which the term *elder* is employed, and justifies his doing so, by saying that the plurality of such elders existing in many churches, determined the fact that both teaching and ruling elders must have been referred to. Contrary to the opinion and practice of Calvin, Knox, Gillespie, and the Reformers generally, he agreed with later authorities in making the office of the ruling elder permanent and constant. He was of opinion that elders should be ordained with imposition of hands, but that they were still subordinate to ministers and incapable of uniting in the ordination of ministers by imposition of their hands.

While, therefore, Dr. Miller accepted the theory of one order of presbyters with two classes, originated by Neander, and referred all passages alluding to them indiscriminately to both, nevertheless his form of the theory differs essentially from his followers, and is an *a priori* protest against it. He agrees with our standards in believing that "there ought to be three classes of officers to carry into full effect the laws of Christ's kingdom; at least one teaching elder, bishop, or pastor; a bench of ruling elders and deacons." *Ruling Elders*, pp. 28, 29. He makes ministers primary, and the elders "to assist in the inspection and government of the church." *Ibid.* He applied the terms bishop and pastor properly to the ministry. *Christian Ministry*, 66 and 57. He regarded the ruling elder as "an inferior officer," and "denied his right to lay on hands in the ordination of a superior." *Christian Ministry*, p. 74; *Ruling Elders*, pp. 286, 293. He denied "this office or any particular form of government to be of divine right," or "essential to the existence of a church." *Ruling Elders*, p. 19.

Neander's premises, as adopted by Dr. Miller, have, however, been carried out to their legitimate logical conclusions in

contrariety to his own. There being but one name elder or many synonymous names; but one formula of qualifications, responsibilities, and duties; there is but one order of elders, who should ordain and be ordained, alike. If called to different functions by different gifts they are still one order, and yet so essentially different and distinct, that no lawful assembly or court of the church can take place without the presence and concurrence of both. The preacher and the ruler are both alike, bishops, presbyters, pastors, and teachers, "shepherds of the blood-bought flock," "made by the Holy Ghost overseers of the flock to feed the church of God, from house to house, warning every one night and day with tears"—and yet only *one class* of this *one order* can publicly preach or administer sacraments, or marry, or pronounce sentence of deposition or excommunication, or even moderate a session, (not to say a Presbytery, Synod, or Assembly), or publicly and authoritatively conduct public services on the Sabbath, by reading, praying, and blessing the people. "It is obvious," says Dr. Adger, "that this view of the office of the ruling elder (*the other class of this one order*) so far from merging that office into the ministry of the word, *distinctly separates it* from the ministry, and shows plainly wherein the ruling elder is *inferior* to the teacher. He is *inferior* to him in respect to the word and sacraments. Paul says, that a bishop (or ruling elder) must be 'apt to teach,' but not because the duty of public instruction belongs officially to him. He teaches, indeed, from house to house, and he teaches also, whenever in the church courts he helps, either by advice or by mere voting, to make the deliverance of the body which decides some question of doctrine or order. And he must, therefore, be an intelligent man, qualified to disseminate the truth he learns from the teaching eldership, and from the word of God. *Yet he is not himself a teacher, but simply a ruler in God's house.*" *Southern Presb. Rev.* as before, p. 173.

But this theory, if it thus exalts *one class* of this *one order*, is not less efficacious in humbling this same class when represented in church courts. "So far is it from being 'the sense of our book,'" says Dr. Adger, "that in these courts the complete and regular members are ministers, while the elders are only

admitted for a particular purpose, and on a special ground—that, on the contrary, preachers or teachers, *as such*, have indeed *no place at all in them!* They are assemblies of ruling elders, many of whom have the superadded *charisma* of preaching, but all of whom belong to the order of rulers. These courts are not ‘bodies of ministers,’ nor yet bodies of ministers with certain ‘delegates of the people’ *admitted to sit with them* upon some special principle, such as that which admits ‘corresponding members.’ But both the ministers and the elders appear in that body as rulers.”

“Moreover,” says Dr. Adger, “it is provided that ministers themselves shall appear among the rulers or representatives, *because* they are themselves also rulers or *representatives*. Such is the representative government which the Lord has given to his church. Her ministers are her representatives, for none of them ordinarily is ordained except upon her call. She must choose them, and they appear in all the courts as *chosen* by her. It is as being a ruler that we meet the minister in the session.” “When our Book says (chap. v.) ‘Ruling elders are properly the representatives of the people,’ it proceeds immediately to add, by way of explanation of this term, ‘*chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline.*’ They are representatives of the people because they are *chosen rulers* of the people; and the Book says they are ‘properly such representatives,’ because they are *nothing more* than such representatives, or chosen rulers, and do not like ministers, have the function, also, of labouring in the word and administering the sacraments.” Pp. 174, 175.

According to Dr. Adger there is but one order of officers in the church, and that is ruling elders, “the aboriginal presbyters,” and “the essence of the presbyterate is ruling.” Well, therefore, may he take up a lamentation over the inadequate and erroneous views of our church. “The whole volume (of Minutes) seems to say that the church does not value much her ruling eldership, that very special ascension gift of her Lord! Accordingly, when an elder is to be elected and ordained in a congregation, very often, simple personal respectability, conjoined with hopeful piety, is considered as amply qualifying any man for the office. Rarely is it insisted upon that he shall

be well acquainted with our Book, or thoroughly grounded in his attachment to our system—and yet he is to administer the rules of that Book and govern according to the principles of that system! Sometimes a very moderate share of ordinary education is deemed sufficient for this pastor or bishop—and yet this pastor or bishop must be ‘apt to teach!’ Frequently the office is given to a man deeply immersed in worldly cares—and yet he is a high spiritual officer, who must be devoted to the interests of the kingdom! How can it be imagined that an hour or two of some evening every week, or even perhaps every month, to be spent in attending the meetings of the session, is enough for the discharge by such an officer of *that awful cure of immortal souls which he has suffered to be bound for life upon his shoulders!*”

The facts of Scripture in reference to preaching and presbyters cannot, however, be arranged by all the advocates of a “one order” theory under that of ruling elders; and hence we have seen this one order must, as some of its advocates hold, be that of pastors or preachers. This undoubtedly would have been the last analysis, if compelled to make it, of all our fathers, as it is of all Congregationalists, and, indeed, of the whole Christian world. Presbyterians, according to Dr. Miller, believe “that there is but one order of gospel ministers, and that there are two other classes of church officers, viz. ruling elders and deacons; but that neither of these are authorized to labour in the word and doctrine, or to administer either of the sacraments.”* “In the Presbyterian church, a presbyter without a pastoral charge is not a bishop. He is not an overseer of the flock. But when he is a presbyter placed in a pastoral charge, he is a scriptural bishop.”† And again, in speaking of “ruling elders, or those who are appointed to assist in governing the church, but who do not preach or administer the sacraments,” he says: “But this is not all; bearing rule in the church is *unequivocally* represented as a *less honourable* employment than preaching or labouring in word and doctrine. *The mere ruling elder*, who performs his duty well, is declared to be worthy of double

* Christian Ministry, p. 26.

† Ibid. p. 28.

honour; but the elder who, to this function, adds the *more dignified and important one of preaching the gospel of salvation*, is declared to be entitled to an honour of a still higher kind.”* Our conclusion therefore is, that a theory which leads its advocates to the most opposite and antagonistic conclusions, and to conclusions subversive of the intuitive instincts of the Christian heart, and of the doctrine of the ministry held with perfect uniformity, *ubique, semper et ab omnibus*, and on the supreme importance of which all Presbyterian churches are, and have ever been, most explicit and harmonious, must be sophistical, unscriptural, and un-presbyterian.

The sophistry of this theory will be painfully evident to any one reading the argumentative chapter of Dr. King on the ruling eldership.† He does little more than bandy the word *elder* in its double ambiguity of meaning, first to Prelatists, and then to Congregationalists. He *assumes* that “by elders and bishops, Scripture denotes *one order* of functionaries,” and therefore as “the identical persons are called elders and bishops,” elders and bishops are the same, and the *only* order of ministers. Thus far he says nothing about his *two orders or classes of elders*, nor does he seem to have remembered that while bishops—that is, the ministers authorized to preach and administer ordinances—may be the same as those who in the English version are called *elders*, they may not be, and are not, what is understood by *ruling elders*. Elders, and ruling elders—which is neither a scriptural, nor a patristic, nor an original, nor a constitutionally presbyterian title—are not the same. Dr. King having thus inconclusively determined that because, in the English version, presbyter is translated elder—in order, as we shall show, to avoid the more proper term *priest*,‡ (which is *presbyter* contracted,) because of its Romish perversion—that therefore the order of presbyters, or of *Priests* in

* Christian Ministry, p. 65.

† Rev. David King, D. D., LL.D. Carter's ed., Part I.

‡ The Westminster Form of Government, which is the standard of the Church of Scotland, and of all other Presbyterian churches, even in this country beyond our own and its off-shoots, declares that “under the names of Priests and Levites, to be continued under the gospel, are meant evangelical pastors.” (Ch. on Pastors.) Priest is presbyter contracted—*prestre, priest*.

some Christian churches are *elders*, turns his attention to Independents. From Dr. Wardlaw, Mr. James, and Dr. Davidson, he quotes the statement that their "pastors," by the very nature of their office, are clothed with spiritual authority and rule, and he infers—by what process we cannot imagine—that "since all elders rule, ministers might all, *in this sense*, be called ruling elders. So a minister rules, and he is officially a ruling elder." And yet, in the next sentence, he states that Presbyterian churches call him who "*both teaches and rules*" minister or pastor, while they who are charged only with rule or superintendence, are ruling elders. (Pp. 14—16.) Again, Dr. King argues that because every church *originally* "had *bishops* and deacons," and because *now* Independency, (and every other church in ordinary cases,) "assigns to each church a single *elder*"—the term in his proposition was *bishops*—"therefore these *bishops* must include *ruling elders*." He is willing, with Dr. Davidson, that this plurality of bishops or presbyters in each church "should be pastors, and empowered to teach as well as rule," and earnestly wishes his denomination would reduce this scheme to practice—"call them teaching elders or call them ruling elders." The whole argument for *ruling elders*, whom he nevertheless distinguishes by essential functions from the more important office of the ministry, is founded on the use of the term *elder* "*in this sense*" in his premise, and "*in another sense*" in his conclusion.

This confusion and sophistry are, however, inseparable from the theory which identifies presbyters and ruling elders. In arguing with Episcopalians, and maintaining the divine right of presbyters to teach, rule, and ordain—in short, to do all that is permanently delegated to the successors of the Apostles "for the work of the ministry"—we are compelled to show that ALL THIS is attributed to PRESBYTERS in the word of God. But if the term means *rulers* in *general*—if ruling is the essence of the office designated by it—if "the best authorities are agreed," as Dr. King (p. 24) says they are, "that in the first instance the office of eldership had respect *only* to superintendence,"—if this ruling is the fundamental and permanent order in the church, then it is no argument for the divine right of presbyters, as the successors of Apostles in ALL the permanent

office and functions of the ministry, to prove that they may *rule*, (whatever that means) but not labour in word and doctrine, not publicly preach, nor pray, nor preside, nor administer ordinances, nor ordain. There is no argument in telling Prelatists that the terms presbyter, bishop, &c. are so indefinite that they may mean any office of authority in the church—even prelatie bishops themselves—for which any sanction may be found in the words, or in the facts, or in the precedents of Scripture. This is just what they want, and what most of them teach, and the very assumption upon which they rest the claims of their system.

This was the policy, as we shall show, of the opponents of Dr. Mason, and the position (unanswerably sustained) that the terms *presbyter* and *deacon*, are definite, fixed, and invariable in their meaning, so as to admit in no case of any doubt as to the office and officer intended, is his triumphant reply. The employment of one term to entitle *two* classes of offices and officers, distinguished by untransferable and permanent and essential prerogatives, powers, and functions, is an absurdity for which no precedent can be found in the universal language and uniform custom of man, and cannot, without disparagement to his wisdom, be attributed to God.*

And hence we find that it is *only* in their argument with Presbyterians, “the *large*” sense of this term is employed to sustain a novel theory of the eldership. The opinion that the reference to a plurality of other officers in the churches besides deacons was in every case made to *ONE* general class with *TWO* orders was, we think, first published by Dr. Miller, and yet no man could more carefully and powerfully sustain in all his arguments against Prelacy the fixed and full meaning of the terms presbyter and bishop, as referring to the office and work of the ministry. “The reader is earnestly requested,” says Dr. Miller, ‘to remember at *every step* that by a scriptural or primitive *bishop* is ALWAYS meant a *presbyter*, pastor, or whatever else *he* may be called who has the pastoral care of a particular congregation.” *Christian Ministry*, p. 28. “The great question then to be decided is, does the New Testament teach,

* See Dr. Mason’s Works, vol. ii., and our argument hereafter.

or intimate, that there are three classes or grades of gospel ministers, all of them authorized to labour in word and doctrine." P. 36. "The word *presbyter*, or elder, became in process of time an *established* title of office. . . . THE APOSTLES gave the name of ELDER to the PASTORS and rulers of the churches they organized, and the rather because *these pastors* were," &c. P. 52. "In short, the title of bishop, as applied to *ministers of the gospel*, occurs only four times in the New Testament; in THREE of these cases there is complete proof that it is given to those who are styled *presbyters*, and in the FOURTH, there is strong presumption," &c. P. 58. "Were these officers prelates, or did they belong to that class which Episcopalians denominate the second order of clergy, *priests*, or, in other words, *presbyters*?" P. 58. "The *presbyters* had in apostolic times, as they now have, authority to preach the word and administer sacraments," p. 62; "the power of government or of ruling also," p. 63; "to ordain," p. 67, &c.

Such is the tenor of Dr. Miller's able and conclusive arguments against the claims of *prelates* to a superiority by divine right over *presbyters*, and such is the course pursued by every standard writer on the question between Prelacy and Presbytery. Let the reader examine the very clear and masterly exposition of this argument by Principal Hill in his Lectures on Divinity; or the recent elaborate work of Dr. Killen, "The Ancient Church;" or *any other*, from Blondel's Apology for Jerome to the present time, and he will see that a *fixed official* application of the terms presbyter, bishop, pastor, &c. to ministers of the gospel, in the New Testament, and by the apostolical, primitive and ancient church, is the chief corner-stone of the whole argument for the claims of presbytery to be the scriptural and primitive polity of the churches.

It was only, therefore, when Dr. Miller turned his attention to Independency, and to the very defective condition of the eldership in our own church, he was led to adopt Neander's interpretation, though completely subversive of his prelatic arguments. In his work on the Eldership, therefore, we could scarcely know that such a word as presbyter occurred in the New Testament. "We find bishops, *elders*, and deacons everywhere appointed. We find a plurality of *elders* ordained in

every church. And we find the *elders* represented as overseers or inspectors of the church; as rulers in the house of God; and the members of the church exhorted to submit to them and obey them." P. 52. And as "a specimen of the New Testament representations on the subject" we have a rehearsal of every passage in which elders (in the original *presbyters*) are spoken of, although in his former volume the divine right of *presbyters* was made good against the claims of prelates by these very passages. Having thus prepared the way, Dr. Miller proceeds to the inference which he thinks inevitable from the (*assumed*) fact that in *every* church, and not merely in some of the largest, a plurality of *elders* were ordained. "The idea that it was considered as necessary, at such a time, that every church should have two, three, or four pastors or ministers, in the modern popular sense of these terms, is manifestly altogether inadmissible," and "some therefore were rulers who, as in the synagogues, formed a kind of congregational presbytery or consistory." P. 54.

Now in this statement, which is the foundation of the recent and variously developed theory, it is assumed, *first*, that in every case reference is made to a *single* congregation organized and complete within itself; limited in its sphere of operations to its immediate bounds; and not to a missionary centre of Christian evangelization, "from which," as the apostle expressly states to the praise of the church at Thessalonica, "sounded out the word of the Lord not only in Macedonia and Achaia but also in every place." But as the church at Philippi, like the church at Antioch, at Rome, and at Jerusalem, was a missionary centre of evangelistic labour in the word and doctrine, we are explicitly taught—what reason would necessarily presume—that every church in the beginning was a missionary station, where missionaries from all the region round about located, and lived, and loved together, and had all things in common, and in united prayer and pains-taking planned and carried out their schemes in works of mercy. Or, the body in each case may have been, not any *one* congregation, in any one place, but *all those* who at Jerusalem, at Antioch, at Rome, at Ephesus, at Philippi, called upon the name of the Lord and were called Christians. And that it is so, is *certain*, since the

address is not the congregation or particular church, but "ALL the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, and (ALL) the bishops and deacons," also, which are there. So again it is "ALL that be in Rome called to be saints . . . whose faith is spoken of throughout the whole world"—by those of course who had been among them and who had gone forth everywhere preaching the word. So again, by "the church which is at Corinth," it is immediately declared is meant, "them (all) that are sanctified in Christ Jesus . . . with all that in *every* place (in the region round about) call upon the name of Jesus Christ." And thus it is that the apostle proceeds to mention several ministers, who had each of them a separate congregation calling itself by their name. In the second epistle to "the church of God which is at Corinth" is added, as included under this missionary station, "*all* the saints which are in *all* *Achaia*." So it is in every case. It is "the saints and faithful brethren—brethren in Christ—which are at Colosse" and elsewhere, and not to any *one* particular congregation, that allusion is made when a plurality of presbyters or bishops are spoken of, and the farewell address of Paul to the presbyters of Ephesus was doubtless to *all* within the bounds of that missionary circuit who could be gathered together.

The assumption of this theory, "that a plurality of presbyters was ordained in every congregation," is contrary, therefore, to the fact that reference is in *every* case made to ALL the Christians in every city or place, however numerous might be their private congregational assemblies, and to *all* in the missionary region round about them. The assumption that those early presbyters—that is, presbyter missionaries—were "pastors or ministers in the *modern*, popular sense of those terms, is manifestly altogether inadmissible." The assumption that even if there were a plurality of them in every missionary station, or even in every particular church, this would require us to consider them as in part not missionaries and ministers, is equally gratuitous, since, under their circumstances, believers could not depend on one, nor feel two or more burdensome on their plan of having all things common, of living plainly, of every one coöperating, and all freely giving as they were able. Even now, as Dr. Owen in several places admits, a plurality

of pastors is just as conformable to the nature of a single organized church—which is the only kind he thinks Christ authorizes—as one pastor; and yet in addition to a pastor, whom he considers to be the proper presbyter or bishop, he would add, as necessary to a complete church, one or more ordained doctors, who are also ministers, and not ruling elders.* And when this theory assumes, that because in a *general* sense the term *elder* may be given as a warrantable translation of the Greek word *presbyter* in its official sense during the apostolic age, (when the names of office were, it is said, used without scrupulosity and with much license,)+ that therefore it includes *ruling elders* as now understood, there is a glaring *non sequitur*. In these assumptions, this theory abandons Presbyterian ground and our constant and irrefragable argument against Independency and Prelacy, and actually adopts and endorses the arguments of Prelatists in favour of the apostolical succession, name, and power of prelatical bishops on the one hand; and of Dr. Owen on the other hand for absolute Independency and the exclusive divine right of single churches, each complete within itself, and having power to elect and ordain its own officers, and officers only for itself. Dr. Owen ridicules the idea either of an universal or œcumenic minister or church which only a few could either see or hear.‡ From Owen also Dr. Miller received the idea that ruling elders should be ordained with imposition of hands—a novelty which, after experiment, he was constrained to abandon, and for which he could find no precedent in any Presbyterian church in the world.§ Dr. Owen fully understood, and explicitly states, the *wide* application of the term *elder* to *any one* having rule or office under another, and so little stress does he put upon either the name *elder* or *ruling elder*, that he considers the office no distinctive peculiar characteristic of *any* denomination. “The truth is,” says Owen, “and it must be acknowledged, that there is *no known church in the world* but they dispose the rule of the church in part into the hands of per-

* See Works, vol. xvi., Edinb. ed., pp. 5, 44, 55.

† Dr. Miller on the Ministry, p. 66.

‡ See *ibid.*, Pref., and pp. 24, 25, &c.

§ See Owen, *ibid.*, p. 73, &c. Miller on Eldership, Pref.

sons who have not the power of authoritative preaching of the word and administration of the sacraments committed unto them;* and yet, to give more plausible weight to an argument in favour of ruling elders which do not define nor even distinguish the Presbyterian from Independent and other churches, this theory abandons the distinctive character of the presbyter, the fundamental argument for a presbytery from the multitude of Christians in one place, and the plurality of presbyters or pastors among them; and abandons every fence by which even Prelacy might be kept out of the fold. Dr. Owen exalts the ministry—his bishop, presbyter, or pastor. He proves its divine office, and authoritative rule, and preëminent dignity and responsibility by Acts xx., Eph. iv., and all those passages in which it is denominated ποιμην, *pastor, teacher*; and after quoting Acts xx. 17, 18, 28, he says: “If elders and bishops be not the same persons, having the same office, the same function, and the same duties, and the same names, it is impossible, so far as I understand, how it could be expressed.” P. 45. Quoting for the same purpose 1 Pet. v. 1—3, where presbyters are to feed the flock, ἐπισκοποῦντες, taking oversight, and Heb. xiii. 17, where they are ἡγούμενοι, who watched for souls, and “whom others were bound to obey,” he reiterates, in even stronger language, adding to the preceding “the same qualifications and characters, account and reward,” “concerning whom there is in no one place in Scripture the *least mention* of inequality, disparity, or preference among them; they are essentially and *every way* the same.” Pp. 45, 46. The theory of Owen was precisely that of Gillespie, and Rutherford,† and other Presbyterian divines of that time, in regard to the officers of Christ in a *particular* church. And although in the work quoted, which was corrected by him immediately before his death, and published in 1689,‡ he reprobates any other kind of church, yet we know that he thought the two parties in the Westminster Assembly “did in his judgment agree well enough if they could have thought so,” and that had Presby-

* Owen on the Ministry, pp. 107, 42, 43, &c.

† Due Right of Presbyteries, Pastors, Teachers or Doctors, Elders, and Deacons, pp. 14, 15.

‡ Works, vol. xvi., Pref., note, p. 2.

terian government been established at the Restoration, without a rigorous imposition of everything . . . Presbyterians and Independents would have been both to blame if they had continued in a state of separation from each other.”*

We have thus dwelt on the theory of Owen, with his four classes of officers; his very limited and qualified appropriation of (what he admits to be of very general and of various application) the name *elder* to ruling elders as now known; his restriction of all the passages (except 1 Tim. v. 17,) in which it and the correlative terms bishop, shepherd, teacher, overseer, &c., are used, to the ministry; his general approval of the views agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly; and his persistent rejection of any other than particular churches;—because the promulgators of the novel theory of one order and two classes of elders, and the promiscuous application to it of all the passages above referred to, claim much consideration for it, from the supposed concurrence of this eminent man.

Next to Owen, if not above him in the scale of authoritative determination of this question, is the late illustrious Neander. Upon his profound antiquarian and linguistic knowledge the theory of an originally one order of elders, and these ruling elders, is mainly founded. By him, probably, was Dr. Miller led into his interpretation of the New Testament use of the word *elder*. Neander is now made the chief corner-stone of their building by Dr. King, Dr. Adger, and others. But surely Neander’s theory of church polity cannot be understood, or it would never be made authoritative by those who believe that Christ has established, by divine right, a fixed and permanent order of government and officers in his church, and that that is the order of *rulers*. What Neander’s theory of church polity was, may be learned not only from his general Church History, and his History of the First Planting of the Christian Church, but also from his more recent Introduction to Dr. Coleman’s “Primitive Church,” written in 1843. To understand Neander’s views, it must be borne in mind that he believed the external polity of the church to be an outgrowth of its gradual development; so that it was not the same at any two periods

* Works, vol. xv., p. 433.

of the apostolic history. "The form of the church," says he, "remained not the same even through the whole course of the apostolic age from the first descent of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost to the death of John the Apostle." "Under the guidance of the Spirit of God they gave the church that particular organization which, while it was best adapted to the circumstances and relations of the church at that time, was also best suited to the extension of the churches in their peculiar condition. . . . But forms may change with every change of circumstances. Many of the offices mentioned in that passage (Eph. iv. 11) were either entirely unknown at a later period, or existed in relations one to another entirely new." And after stating that there was a difference between pastors and teachers as they possessed the qualifications for ruling or preaching the word, he remarks that "there may have been persons endowed with the gift of teaching, and qualified thus to be teachers, who still belonged not to the class of presbyters. The relation of these offices to one another seems not to have been the same in all stages of the development of Christian churches."* "The name *presbyter* was derived from the Jewish synagogue; but in the Gentile churches they took the name of bishops." "The name of presbyters denoted" not *ruling*, as our theorists assume, but "the *dignity* of their office. That of bishops was expressive rather of the nature of the office." "But in process of time, some *one* might . . . come to be designated by the name *bishop*, which was *originally* applied to them *all* indiscriminately." "This change in the relation of presbyters to each other was not the same in all the churches, but *varied* according to their different circumstances. It may have been as early as the latter part of the life of John, when he was sole survivor of the apostles, that *one*, as president of this body of presbyters, was distinguished by the name of *bishop*." In other words, episcopacy may have been established *during* the life of the apostles.† The angels of the churches he considered to be figurative and symbolical representations of the whole church.‡ Neander consistently be-

* Introduction to Coleman, pp. 16, 17.

† Introduction, pp. 20, 21.

‡ Introduction, note. Dr. Killen adopts this theory.

lieved that not all the forms of church government which were adapted to the exigencies of the church at this early period, can be received as patterns for the church at other times; neither can the *imitation* be pressed too far. "Whenever at a later period also any form of church government has arisen out of a series of events according to the direction of divine providence, and is organized and governed with regard to the Lord's will, He may be said himself to have established it, and to operate through it by his Spirit."* Neander, therefore, believed not that an honest difference of opinion on these subjects was disreputable, or a sign of ignorance of fixed and certain principles, but that "men may honestly differ in their views on these minor points," since all else is mutable except "the great principles." He very affectionately urges all to abide by "the form of church government they find best suited to the wants of their own Christian community; only let them not seek to impose upon all Christians any one form as indispensably necessary. Only let them remember that the spirit of Christ may be carried on under other forms also;" and this he presses by name upon "Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Calvinists, and Lutherans."† Neander did not, therefore, have any views in accordance with our theorists, who found their inferences on his interpretation of the *first* temporary arrangements in the very beginning of Christianity, when *all* were rulers and all teachers, until necessity required a division of services corresponding to diversity of gifts. He admits, however, that soon "the gift of teaching, and the order of teachers who were endowed with it, are spoken of as constituting an entirely distinct function and order.‡ In the Epistle of Paul to Titus, when he requires the bishop to hold fast sound doctrine, and to be able to establish others in it, this, he thinks, certainly implies in it the bishop (and presbyter) must possess the gift of teaching or "the ordinary regular office of teaching." P. 258. He considered "the brethren" in the council at Jerusalem as "*as representing all, and acting in their name,*" and, of course, as representatives of the people in distinction from the *presbyters* and apostles.§

* Introduction, pp. 16, 17, 18.

† Introduction, pp. 17, 22, &c.

‡ Church Hist., vol. i. p. 260, Lond. ed.

§ Ibid. p. 205.

The necessity which compelled the theorists under consideration to resort to Owen, the champion of Independency, who does not believe the officers called by him ruling elders to be *peculiar to any one church in the world*, nor that there exists any gospel church beyond particular congregations, nor any officers having authority beyond their particular churches;*—and to Neander, who found nothing in the apostolic churches settled, and believed no form or order of church polity permanent or prescribed;—proves the conscious weakness and insufficiency of the *foundation* on which they build, for they are all master workmen. But even master workmen cannot make brick without straw, nor build without brick, for assuredly the polity approved by Owen and Neander, whatever it may be, is not Presbyterian.†

But if deprived of any support from Owen and Neander, they fall back upon Calvin, as being *alone* a tower of invincible strength to any cause. But are these brethren, or are we, prepared to adopt and subscribe to the views of even Calvin, great and glorious as he was, and in his works and influence *still is*. The representatives of the people, associated by Zwingle in 1532, with the presbyters or pastors for discipline, were “pious men allowed him as his assistants.” The members of the Consistory and Synod were preachers, “except the lay presidents. There were no representatives or deputies of several congregations. The protocols were issued by the court.”‡ Calvin introduced such assemblies of “clergy and laity. But still these laymen were not representatives of the congregation.” In 1535 Calvin, in his Institutes, in their first compendious form, defined preachers, bishops, and elders. His elders or presbyters were still spiritual teachers as opposed to Popish prelates. It was not till long after he found in 1 Tim. v. 17, a foundation for a distinction, in a *large* sense of the term, between teaching and ruling elders, and he always, even afterwards,

* He thought a church had no right to ordain a man to preach to the heathen. Works, vol. xx. p. 457, Lond. ed.

† On the alleged dying regret of Owen, and favourable opinion of Presbyterianism, see the confutation by the editor, in Works, vol. xvi. Pref. Note, recent Edinb. ed.

‡ Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 368, 369.

restricted the term presbyter in its proper official designation to pastors (who were preachers) as we might largely show. In expounding that very passage he is studiously careful to confine its full and proper application to pastors. The apostle, he says, "enjoins that support shall be provided chiefly for pastors who are employed in teaching," and quotes Chrysostom as understanding by "double honour" "support and reverence." With "the pastor," he says, "there were united in a common council men of worth and good character that were chosen from among the people." In verse 19 he identifies the term "presbyter" with "pastors and godly teachers." "All, therefore, to whom the office of teaching was committed they call presbyters, and in each city *these presbyters* selected one (a presbyter) to whom *they* gave the *special* title of bishop."* It is in this sense he uniformly uses the term presbyter in the *Institutes*, that is, as synonymous with bishop and pastor, as they "who receive in commission to preach the gospel and administer sacraments," who are ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God; "holding fast the faithful word," &c. "In giving," says he, "the name of bishops, presbyters, and pastors, indiscriminately to those who govern churches, I have done it on the authority of Scripture. To all who discharge the ministry of the word it gives the name of bishops." And in proof, he proceeds to quote Titus i. 5-7; Acts xx. 17; Eph. iv.; also, Phil. i. 1; Acts xiv. 23; 1 Peter v. 1, &c., *the very passages* adduced by our theorists to substantiate their application to ruling elders. These, however, Calvin immediately proceeds to notice as "*other offices*"—"two (*others*) of perpetual duration, viz. government and care of the poor. By these governors I understand SENIORS selected from the people to unite with the bishops."† "From the beginning, therefore, each church had its senate, (*conseil ou consistoire*) composed of pious, grave, and venerable men, in whom was lodged the power of correcting faults."‡

In 1538 Calvin gave an outline of his own church government at Geneva to the Synod of Zurich for imitation. The city was divided into parishes, each having its own minister,

* *Institutes*, B. IV. chap. iv. § 2.† *Ibid*, B. IV. chap. iii. § 8.‡ *Ibid*.

with "respectable and prudent men selected from each quarter of the city to join *with us* in watching over the proper mode of its (i. e. excommunication) infliction. A becoming order must be observed in the call of the clergy, that the laying on of hands, *which belongeth only to the clergy*, may not be taken away."*

In his Plea for the Necessity of Reforming the Church, presented to the imperial diet at Spires in 1544, while under the head of Discipline, he dwells pointedly on "the pastoral *office itself* as instituted by Christ," and makes no allusion to elders or seniors. "Scarcely one in a hundred of the bishops will be found who ever mounts the pulpit in order to teach." "The pastoral office we have restored, both according to the apostolic rule and the practice of the primitive church, by insisting that *every one who rules in the church, also teach.*"† Ancient synods he quotes as defining the several duties of a bishop, among which is "holy discipline," and says, "in *all* these duties *presbyters* ought to be the *bishops'* coadjutors." In his Remarks (1544) on the Pope's Letter to the Emperor, in which he urges "restoring the ancient deaconship," "Then," says he, "this profane, that is as they term it, lay correction might not only travel to other churches, but," &c.‡

In 1548 Calvin introduced his famous Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques, in which it is provided that "the choice of preachers depends in the first instance on the clergy." The elders are to share with the ministers in watching over the conduct and education of the clergy; but THE COUNCIL (a political body) was to determine disputes and punish offenders. The preachers were to give the bread, the elders AND DEACONS the cup. The elders were chosen by the larger council, and confirmed by the preachers. They were also elected annually. The consistory was convened by the civil court. The elders were not chosen out of the congregation to represent them, but out of the civil courts.§ Surely these were laymen, and not clergy, with whom they are contrasted, and by whom their choice was ratified.

* Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 283, 284.

† Ibid. pp. 32, 85, 86, 175, Edinb. ed.

‡ Ibid. vol. i. p. 281, 282.

§ See Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. pp. 386, 389.

Calvin overthrew the caste of the Catholic clergy by establishing an order of presbyters who were ALL, as he declared, preachers and co-equal, and upon this is based the Presbyterian character of his polity. His *elders* were not spiritual officers appointed in and by the church, and could not possibly have given the name of Presbytery, first introduced by Beza, to the Presbyterian system. In France, where Calvin's Constitution and Confession were adopted, their courts consisted of preachers and laymen—*anciens* (the most *general* meaning of the term presbyter,) and *anciens diacres*, so that deacons were *elders* in the same sense with *elders*, and *were also members of the consistory*. Neither was the office of elder made obligatory upon the churches, but left to their own choice.* “We agree, says that church, in 1645, the office of deacon is of divine appointment, &c., and whereas divers are of opinion that there is also the office of ruling elders who labour not in word and doctrine, and others think otherwise, we agree that this difference make no breach among us.”†

From all we have stated it is evident how very different were the views of Calvin from that theory, to sustain which his authority is pleaded. His presbyters were our pastors or ministers. His elders or *anciens* (for he never uses the title of *ruling elders*) were laymen, and appointed by laymen—representatives of the people, but not of particular congregations, and were annually elected; and so far from attaching to them the *name* or scriptural character, qualifications, functions, and responsibilities claimed by this theory for *ruling elders*, he attributes them exclusively to the pastors. And while he believed his system to be in accordance with Scripture and ancient usage, he did not hold any form of polity and discipline to be so perfectly and paramountly required by divine appointment as to be essential to the being of a true church, to the unchurching of those who hold the truth under other forms. This is made manifest by the whole tenor of his writings, but most plainly in his celebrated letter to Somerset; his form of polity proposed to Sigismund, King of Poland;

* See Paul Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. i. p. 393, 395.

† Quick's Synodicon, vol. i. p. 229, and vol. ii. p. 472.

and from his retaining a permanent presidency over the clergy of Geneva until his death, although in 1580, as appears from the city registers, the preachers expressed their fears that the office of president, if its possessor were not elected weekly, might be converted at length into that of a bishop. Beza, as Casaubon declares, said to him that Calvin, who had rejected episcopacy, was in fact bishop of Geneva, and that a little before his death he proposed to make him his successor.* We know also that in 1543 Calvin established the Liturgy, which still constitutes the foundation of the Liturgies of the Reformed churches, and was adopted and introduced by Knox into Scotland, where it was incorporated with their book of Psalmody; and in this Liturgy, Calvin embodied the Confession of Sins from the Mass Book, and also the Preparation for the Communion.

No authority, therefore, can be pleaded for any one feature of the theory of the eldership, now put forth under great names and with confident boldness, from Calvin, Neander, or Dr. Miller. Dr. Miller, indeed, broached the principle of interpretation, and initiated the form of ordination from which it has gradually sprung. This was given only in his enlarged edition of his work on the Eldership, in 1831. In this he was "led to modify some former opinions," and acknowledges that in asserting the divine warrant and authority for the office, "and probably in several other opinions respecting the office advanced" in his pages, he "knew that some of his brethren do not concur with him," but "differed materially."

This opposition was manifested in a series of very able and learned articles by Dr. James P. Wilson, of Philadelphia, first issued in the *Christian Spectator*, and embodied, in 1833, in a considerable volume on "The Primitive Government of Christian Churches," and published, after his death, as "a defence against unfounded pretensions . . . and making *mute* presbyters a characteristic of the primitive church." The author employs his powerful and acute intellect, and close and cogent analysis and reasoning, upon an examination of the writings of the Fathers and later ages, and by a critical investigation of

* See Paul Henry's *Life of Calvin*, pp. 400, 401, 402.

Scripture, to prove that "but two orders or kinds of officers were instituted—*presbyters*, who were called also pastors, to teach, ordain, administer baptism and the eucharist, and to govern—and *deacons*, to serve. Among the *presbyters*—a bench of whom was at first in every church, and but one *presbytery* in a society or city—there was one who presided, denominated the *προεστως*, *angel*, and by other names. Our ruling elders are "but another name for deacon, and in a large portion of the American Presbyterian Church no other deacon exists." P. 6. The ordination, charge, authority, and duties of both being the same, they have, he thinks, been practically merged into one, which is true also, as Principal Hill remarks of the Church of Scotland, and, we may add, of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, provision being made for it in its Book of Discipline. See § 6, pp. 7, 8.

The controversy, and especially Dr. Miller's earnest, able, and spiritual appeal on behalf of a neglected eldership, excited very deep and general attention, and a growing interest both in the church and among elders themselves, the beneficial effects of which are yet increasingly manifest in the larger attendance of elders in our church courts, and in those conventions of elders and deacons which are so happily characteristic of our times, and so well adapted to lead to a proper appreciation of the dignity, the design, and the duties of both classes of officers. On Dr. Miller's principle of interpretation, the term *presbyter* is appellative, and not official. It designates one generic class, one order, one office, without distinction in name, nature, qualifications, or functions. The only difference is in work, not in office; and this is created by gifts from God and the call of the people, and not by a divine institution as well as a divine call. The efforts to sustain one order and two classes, where no difference exists in name, nature, qualifications, and functions, as set forth in Scripture, are manifestly and increasingly hopeless and insuperable. A choice must be made between one order of ministers or one order of rulers, labouring in common according to their diversified gifts and graces. To this conclusion, under the great weight of Dr. Breckinridge's lead and influence, a portion of our church has been tending. Since 1842 our General Assembly, and our

church generally, have been agitated by those who considered that the limitation of the power of imposing hands in the ordination of ministers, to ministers, involves the denial that they (i. e. ruling elders) are scriptural presbyters, which denial seems to them to undermine the foundation of Presbyterian order, "and who hold that it is *only* as ruling elders that ministers are entitled to seats in our church courts."* This, therefore, is the logical conclusion from the premises, that Scripture uses the term *presbyter* and its collateral names, appellatively, for one order, to which are to be referred all its deliverances concerning office, qualifications, functions, responsibilities, and rewards, the fundamental idea conveyed by the order being considered that of rule. But if, on the other hand, the idea fundamental to Christianity, as a dispensation of mercy, most unquestionably is the proclamation of a glorious gospel to guilty, but not abandoned sinners; and if presbyters are spoken of under every variety of form as the official agents through whom it pleased God, by this foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe, then the logical inference from the same premises is, that the one fundamental order of the church of God which has never been wanting, and never can be;—of which Christ himself was the *chief* Shepherd and Bishop, (or Presbyter) of souls; and with whom his apostles were also fellow-presbyters;—is *preaching* and not *ruling*, preachers and not rulers, and that ALL presbyters must therefore, as indeed the word of God imperatively enjoins, be *apt* to teach, and to convince gainsayers also—that is, be preachers of the word. In 2 Tim. ii. 24, speaking of Timothy, and of all the presbyters ordained by him, the apostle says, "for the servant of the Lord must be *apt to teach*." And such we have seen, is the conclusion of Dr. Wilson and others, and, as we shall yet see, of many more.

To one or other result the theory of the indiscriminate appellative character of presbyters inevitably leads. There is no *consistent* middle ground. A distinction adjectively between teaching and preaching presbyters can make no difference where name, nature, qualifications, functions, and responsibili-

* See Baird's Digest, pp. 74, 79.

ties are one and the same, and spoken of one and the same parties; and the difference between preachers, who are the only authorized heralds of the gospel, teachers of the truth, administrators of ordinances, ordainers of a perpetuated ministry, presiding officers in all ecclesiastical assemblies, and who are the only fixed, constant, and absolutely essential members of any one of them—the difference, we say, between these and ruling elders—*whom they ordain*, and authoritatively induct into office, can never be logically nor properly defined by an *adjective* distinction appended to the name of presbyter, which officially applies to ruling elders alone.

The unsatisfactory arguments and insufficient proofs brought to sustain such a nominal unity between two orders so essentially diverse, and a nominal distinction for a generic, fundamental, permanent difference in authority and functions, are palpable evidence that the failure is not in the theorists, but in the theory; not in the analysis, but in the facts. An agreement in one kind and measure of rule, while essentially differing in other kinds of rule—as in that of the word, and sacraments, and ordination, and presidency, and position, and publicity—is surely no reasonable warrant for applying to both the same name, nature, order, office, qualifications, and responsibilities. Deacons agree with both in a certain kind of rule, equally important and necessary in its place, and only differ in other kinds of rule; and the unity of name, nature, &c., might, therefore, as well be extended to them. And as their name certainly is applied to all church officers, so is presbyter, as an appellative name, applied to deacons, and both names may in this sense be properly applied to any church officer.

On the basis of this appellative use of the terms presbyter, bishop, &c., the argument from plurality as a proof of a plurality of *ruling elders* in each church, has led Mr. Guthrie, of Scotland, in a very able and lucid presentation of the entire substance of Dr. Miller's work, to prepare a form of church government for the Morrisonian body, adopting the principles of our system, only limiting them, as his argument requires, to *particular* churches as *alone* authorized by Scripture. He also rejects, as proofs of a *ruling eldership*, every passage

of Scripture, except 1 Tim. v. 17, and the admitted indiscriminate appellative use of the term *elders*.*

The Plymouth Brethren in England, and the Campbellites in America, on the contrary, have carried out the argument to the opposite extreme, and while holding only to particular churches reject all other officers than rulers, or managers under some name, leaving every man, as among the Quakers, to exercise his gift by becoming, for the occasion, or statedly, the preacher.

Dr. Breckinridge takes for granted the same premises, and delineates, as among the permanent officers of the church, "elders in whose hands the government of the church is permanently and exclusively lodged." Of this order the essence is rule. "Being presbyter, he is ruler." Ministers are a class under this one order. "They feed the flock; they have the oversight of the flock; they are its teachers, its rulers, its pastors, its bishops, all under the one name—elders." "The ministers of the gospel, therefore, are rulers—not as ministers, nor as stewards, but as elders. On account of *gifts* and callings of God, they become a separate *class of elders*—not by any means a *different order*."† "On ministers, however, great additional honours are laid by God." "The great function of the ministry in word and doctrine, and that of stewardship of the mysteries of the kingdom of God, is divinely committed to them; and this is a delegation from Christ, and the most glorious of all." P. 641. This function Dr. Breckinridge denominates "the power of order—*potestas ordinis*. The distinction between this and *potestas regiminis* (i. e. the power of rule or government,) is fundamental, and the difference in the use and exercise of the two powers is also fundamental." A minister is further distinguished from a ruler in that his "power is *several*, never *joint*"—that is, it is personal and inherent in him—"ex ordine, by virtue of his being what he is;" whereas "the power of regimen or rule (that is, of the ruling elder) is a joint power, and never several. No presbyter has any several powers of

* A Manual of Church Government, with a special reference to the office of Elder, by John Guthrie, Minister of Zion Chapel, Kendal. London: S. Ware & Co. 1846.

† Knowledge of God, vol. ii. p. 629 and 641.

rule; the power itself is joint, and can be exercised only by a tribunal, never by a single person, nor by any number of single persons taken severally.”* And yet these powers, so diverse and so fundamentally distinct in use and exercise, are to be concentrated in one order!

But though there is but one order, with two functions or powers fundamentally distinct in nature and exercise, there are other office-bearers, deacons and evangelists; so that on the whole we have *one order* of office-bearers, and four classes.

Dr. Killen, in his recent elaborate, and, to some extent original, and in all respects able and interesting work, “The Ancient Church,”† has, we regret to find, adopted also Dr. Miller’s premises, and with equally unsatisfactory and inconsistent results. No genius—no erudition—no logic—no eloquence—no dogmatism, however authoritative—can bring order out of confusion, unity out of diversity, or harmony out of discord. The premises being fallacious, the conclusions must be untenable, and the building unsound. A statement of Dr. Killen’s attempted exposition of the officers of the Christian church will illustrate these remarks. And, for the present, this is all we propose doing, either as it regards his theory or that of Dr. Breckinridge, as they will come before us in another article.

In his exposition of the ordinary office-bearers of the Christian church Dr. Killen finds it impossible to harmonize the statements of Scripture with the theory of a one order of elders with two classes—one ruling and one teaching. “The ordinary office-bearers of the apostolic church were pastors, teachers, and helps; or teachers, rulers, and deacons.” There are good grounds for believing that the “pastors” mentioned before the “teachers” in one text are equivalent to the “governments” mentioned after them in the other. The *only* reason, however, given is, that “the *lay* council of the modern synagogue are called parnasim or pastors.” “Nor is it strange that those intrusted with *ecclesiastical government* should be styled pastors or shepherds; for they were the guardians and rulers of the flock of God.” Acts xx. 28; 1 Pet. v. 2. “The

* Knowledge of God, vol. ii. p. 642.

† The History, Doctrine, Worship, and Constitution of the Ancient Church for the first Three Centuries. New York and London, 1859.

elders, or bishops, were the same as pastors." 1 Tim. iii. 1, 2, 5. "Hence elders are required to act as faithful pastors under Christ, the chief Shepherd." 1 Pet. v. 1, 2, 4, and Acts xx. 17, 28. It appears, too, that while some of these (*same*) elders were only pastors or rulers, others were also teachers. 1 Tim. v. 17. "We may then see that the teachers, governments, and helps . . . are the same as the bishops and deacons mentioned elsewhere." Compare, he says, 1 Cor. xii. 28, Philip. i. 1, 1 Tim. iii. 1-8.

Now, let us try to arrange them. We have first, pastors, or rulers, or governments. Secondly, teachers or bishops. Thirdly, helps or deacons. But we are told that elders (and, of course, governments and pastors,) and bishops are interchangeable—that elders were also teachers—that when it occurs alone, *bishop* includes under it, pastors, governments, rulers, and teachers—that elders were not all preachers—that "these elders were appointed simply to 'take care' (!) of the church of God," and "it was not necessary that each individual should perform all the functions of *the pastoral office*." He had just determined that the pastoral office is that of the ruling elder. And yet he is constrained by the necessary use of the universal and invariable *usus loquendi* of the church universal to employ it, in order to designate the ministry, for in the next sentence he says, "the preacher is to minister to a single congregation." But in further proof that *pastors* were ruling elders he affirms that, because the apostle (1 Tim. v. 5, 7) speaks of "presbyters who rule well," (which Dr. Killen, in contrariety to Dr. Breckinridge and others mentioned, admits to be a function, though a subordinate one, of the preacher *ex officio*,) therefore they did not preach also. This, however, is an evident *non sequitur*, since Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Adger also hold, that in order to be a preacher a man *must* first be a ruler—the rulers and the *charisma*, or function of teaching, constituting a minister. A good minister must, therefore, be a good ruler, though he may excel in one or other department. Another proof of his position is, that in enumerating the qualifications necessary for a bishop (1 Tim. iii. 2-7,) the apostle employs only one word alluding to his teaching, that is—"apt to teach;" while as to his ability "to propagate his principles," he

“scarcely refers to it or to his oratory at all.” “It is *remarkable*, not that this is so, but how accurately it accords with the constant spirit of him who spake not in the words of man’s wisdom—who was not ashamed of the despised gospel—who regarded the foolishness of preaching as God’s appointed instrumentality—the power of God ‘to save them that believe’—and who could write such passages as 1 Cor. i. 11—31.”

But further, Dr. Killen urges that this teaching, and aptness to teach, does not imply that he must be qualified to “*preach*, for *teaching* and preaching are repeatedly distinguished in the New Testament,” and yet we have been told by him, that *teachers* means preachers in passages where the same apostle uses the same word, (see 1 Cor. xii. 28, Rom. xi. 7, and Ephes. iv.) and that the *charisma* of *teaching*, (the very same word,) added to a ruling elder, makes a preacher. In confirmation, however, of his last position, Dr. Killen quotes 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25, where “the servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, *apt to teach*, patient in meekness, *instructing* those that oppose themselves if peradventure,” &c. Here he says “apt to teach” refers apparently to a talent for winning over gainsayers by means of instruction communicated in *private conversation*. And yet, while all that has been ever deemed peculiarly solemn and authoritative as bearing upon a soul-saving, Christ-loving ministry, is thus weakened down to the generalities of private Christian instruction, we are reminded in the next paragraph that “still preaching is the grand ordinance of God, as well for the edification of saints as for the conversion of sinners.” “It thus appears that, after all, preaching held the *most honourable position* amongst the ordinary functionaries of the apostolic church. Whilst his office required the highest order of gifts and accomplishments, and exacted the largest amount of mental, and even of physical exertion, the prosperity of the whole ecclesiastical community depended mainly on his acceptance and efficiency.” “The preaching elder was very properly treated with peculiar deference. He was accordingly recognized as the stated president of the presbytery or eldership.” “Even the apostles repeatedly testified that they regarded the preaching of the word as the *highest* department of *their* office. It was not as

church rulers, but as church teachers, (although teaching had previously been distinguished from preaching, and attached by highest sanctions and weightiest responsibilities and most solemn texts in all Scripture to *ruling elders*) they were specially distinguished, and the people were bound to respect and sustain and communicate to him that *teacheth* (who were just proved to be rulers) in all good things." P. 231—236.

Can it then be possible that the office, or work, or functions, or charisma—call it what you will—of preaching, is so transcendently important that Dr. Killen, as soon as he turns his attention from a foregone theory of the eldership he felt called upon to maintain, once more reminds us that "the business of *ruling* originally formed only a *subordinate* part of the duty of the church *teacher*?" P. 238. What will he, and our own theorists, say to that? Is it true that "the apostles instituted no class of spiritual *overseers* to whose jurisdiction all other preachers are amenable," and yet that Christ, with all his gifts to his church, and with preachers as the one and only order he personally commissioned (*eighty-two of them*)—and with preaching as the one all-comprehending commission given to his church—has not even honoured the ministry with a distinct official title? Can it be that this highest power and province, this final end, of the church, even the calling out, gathering, and garnering lost but blood-bought souls for eternal paradise of rest, has only a partial use of the name of a *subordinate* class or function;—has no existence apart from it;—has only, in distinction from it, a charisma, a superadded gift? Can it be that this great, and glorious, and life-giving, and life-preserving power of the church unto salvation to every one who will believe, is nowhere portrayed, had no institution, no commission, no defined qualifications, no supreme and solemn sanctions, no everlasting recompense holding it up to the reverential regard and the sanctified ambition of the world? Can it be that this more than angelic heraldry cannot even be spoken of in the language of Scripture without confusion of names, as is found in the last sentence quoted above, where the very term *overseer*, which Dr. Killen took pains (p. 232) to restrict to rulers, is employed to express *preachers*; and the very term *teacher*, which he laboured to identify with the same function, (p. 234,)

is employed as officially designative of the preacher, and *overseers*, and *rulers*, and *teachers* (his ruling elders) are identified not only in class, but in order with "all *other* preachers?" No, no!—it is impossible. God is not the God of "confusion worse confounded," such as we have seen the best men and the brightest minds have involved themselves in, and would involve the church of God in.

The *πρωτον ψευδος*, the source of all the difficulty, is in the adoption of the appellative interpretation of *presbyter* given by Neander, and of his theory of the primordial *planting* state of the Christian church in its progressive and even yet immature condition, as actually characteristic of that finished house of which Christ is the builder, and maker, and occupant, and whose foundation is the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone. The confusion we have noticed will be found to run through the whole volume of Dr. Killen. We have been aware for many years that Dr. Killen had adopted the opinion that "ruling elders are very much the same as the presbyters referred to by the writers of the second and third centuries." In sustaining this opinion in his "Ancient Church," we have marked a multitude of passages in which he has substituted the English word *elder* for the original word *presbyter*, and its cognate terms; and sometimes in the same sentence or argument of a writer quoted, he uses the terms *elder*, *presbyter*, *minister*, *ruler*, *pastor*, *preaching elder*, *elders who only ruled*, *moderator*, *session*, *synod*, *brethren*, in evident unfairness to the real and manifest meaning of the writers.* After his discussion of the *ruling elder* question, as noticed above, the whole book is devoted to the question of presbytery *versus* prelacy, and the whole strength of his weighty and conclusive argument is in the fact that the presbyter of Scripture and the presbyter of the Fathers is a minister, and the *only* order of ministers instituted and clothed with the powers of jurisdiction and of order by divine right, what-

* See all these terms on one single page, p. 555. See, e. g., 548, 549, 559, 560, 576, 616, 619, 621, 622; 498, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 528, 532, 524, 533. On p. 525, in quoting Jerome, he uses *elders*, and in referring to it for another purpose on p. 534, *presbyters*; and so with Hilary, p. 541.

ever might be the *custom* of churches brought in, as Jerome Hilary and Tertullian very remarkably testify,—*paulatim*—little by little—as circumstances modified the condition and necessities of the church.

It will be unnecessary to dwell upon the short treatise of Guthrie (1726) on Ruling Elders and Deacons, as it perfectly accords with the views of Gillespie, Rutherford, and others, and only alleges in proof of the divine institution of ruling elders the three usual passages, Rom. xii. 6—8, 1 Cor. xii. 28, and 1 Tim. v. 17.*

The only other works distinctively on the office of ruling elder known to us, are those of Dr. McKerrow,† and the Rev. John G. Lorimer,‡ both of which present a re-statement and skilful adaptation of the views and arguments of Dr. Miller.

But we must close this article, and reserve for another the consideration of the real bearing of, and the magnitude of the interests involved in, these theories of the eldership. It will be our object not to propound another and still later theory, but to show what is the theory of the Presbyterian church throughout the world—for it is one uniform and fixed—and the true nature, dignity, and *relations of the eldership*; that the *one* order theory of the presbyter and elder in all its chameleon variety of forms is novel; contrary in all its assumptions to Scripture and to historical facts; in direct conflict with the standards of the Presbyterian church in Scotland, in Ireland, and these United States; and going back to the beginning—to the discipline of the Syrian, the Waldensian, the Genevan, the Puritan, and the patristic churches; and that it is subversive of Presbyterianism, of the ministry, of the eldership, and of the deaconship.

The discussion has been pressed upon us, and by friends, not foes. There is no rivalry among us but for the truth and order of Christ's blood-bought church. There is nothing personal or private. The question happily cannot be made a fundamental one except in the possible results of a practical working out of what is still, with little exception, *theory*. Our

* This will be found reprinted in Lorimer's work on the Eldership. Glasgow, 1841.

† Edinb. 1846.

‡ Glasgow, 1841.

church only *requires explicit approval* of her Form of Government and Discipline from ministers, elders, and deacons, and *not even this* from licentiates.* She does not believe, as the ever candid and catholic-spirited Dr. Miller expresses it in his work on this very subject,† “with some zealous votaries of the hierarchy, that any particular form of government is in so rigorous a sense of *divine right* as to be essential to the existence of the church; so that where this form is wanting there can be no church. To adopt this opinion is to take a very narrow and unscriptural view of the covenant of grace.” In the introduction to the Form of Government these views in relation to other denominations and our own are *authoritatively* delivered. Hence, also, while asserting “that it is agreeable to Scripture and the practice of the primitive Christians that the church be governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies,” it is added, “in full consistency with this belief, we embrace, in the spirit of charity, those Christians who differ from us, in opinion or in practice, on these points.” *Form of Government*, chap. vii. § 1. And in the whole course and correspondence of our church she has held the unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace with all evangelical denominations—Episcopalian, Lutheran, Reformed, Congregational, and Presbyterian. In his large, liberal, and catholic views every Presbyterian can cordially unite with Dr. Killen.‡ We rejoice in being members of a church of which no one can be *consistently* a member and be either a dogmatist or a sectarian or a bigot. With a catholic creed and catechism, and a church membership not requiring the adoption of all our standards, (which are bonds of *official* and not of *Christian* communion,) but only a profession of repentance toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ; with liberty of conscience, liberty of opinion, and liberty of action, as her motto and her watchword; and acknowledging the principle of common right in every Christian church, or union, or association of particular churches, to declare the terms of admission into its communion,

* See form of licensure and of ordination of bishops or pastors, and evangelists; and also of ruling elders and deacons, which, be it known and observed, is one and the same, and by the minister. *Form of Government*, chaps. xiii. xiv. xv.

† Page 19.

‡ See Preface and closing chapters.

and the qualifications of its ministers and members, as well as the whole system of its internal government; she is ever ready to unite, heart and hand, with all evangelical Christian churches, in all evangelistic efforts for the extension and glory of the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.

In these principles of catholic communion, none more cordially unite than the advocates of the theory we have developed, and towards whom we cherish nothing but love and veneration and admiring regard. Differ we do, but our difference is not "disreputable." Charles I. was wont to say of Presbyterians, "Let them alone. They are only silly folks, and will be sure to quarrel among themselves." Let us not take up the proverb against ourselves. Let us agree to differ, and divide to conquer, attending to the apostolic rule—Whereto we are agreed let us walk by that same rule; let us mind the same thing, and God, in due time, will make plain to us everything in which we differ. And if we must differ about words, let us not make it a wordy strife.

ART. II.—*History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain.*

Translated from the Spanish of Dr. J. A. CONDE, by Mrs. JONATHAN FOSTER. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854.

How brilliant the colouring and how distinct the outline of this panorama of the civil discords that resulted in the dissolution of the empire of the Arabs in Spain! How often it reminds us of oft-repeated instructions of Scripture, such as: Fear God, honour the king, and meddle not with those who are given to change. It was of such rulers as Tiberius and Nero, Pilate and Herod, that Paul spake, when he said: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." "Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath (for fear of punishment,) but for conscience'

sake." "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." (We shall hereafter show that there is a natural qualification of such precepts.) Nothing in history affords us such solemn and impressive warnings of the importance of these precepts, as a description of the moral and social diseases consequent upon a disobedience of them, and of the gradual weakening of the vital powers of a nation engaged in distressing and exhausting civil discords, and of the final death-struggles that end in the dissolution of the body politic. No where are such scenes described with more vivid truth of nature than in the history before us. Arabs themselves have drawn the pictures of the different eras of their history, and our author has collected and translated them for our benefit. A proper study of them will certainly suggest reflections demanding a much higher regard for the above Scripture precepts than is common among us.

It was in A. D. 710 that the Arabs of the Caliphate of Damascus conquered and took possession of the Spanish peninsula. It was governed as a province of Syria until A. D. 755, when the people declared their independence of the Syrian Caliph, and chose a king of their own, Abderahman, the first of the dynasty of the Omeyas. The reign of this dynasty continued, though with much discord towards the end, until A. D. 1086, when a dynasty of Moorish princes, the Almoravides, was called in from Africa. During their reigns internal discords continued to multiply until A. D. 1146, when we find another Moorish dynasty, the Almohades, called over from Africa to establish order. This also was but a temporary relief, and in A. D. 1267 the Almohades had to give place to the Ben Merines, also Moors, who were as unsuccessful as prior dynasties; for diseases within the state and amputation by the Christians without continued to increase, until the Mohammedans were finally conquered by Ferdinand and Isabella, and their kingdom dissolved A. D. 1492, the very year of the discovery of America.

This final catastrophe was not a mere change of sovereigns or of the ruling families, as has so often been the case at the great national eras recorded in history. It was in fact an extinction of all that was peculiarly Arabian or Moorish in the

morality, religion, and customs of the people. The people were neither exterminated nor expelled the country; yet those that did not voluntarily leave it at the conquest were persecuted by the Inquisition, and operated upon by Christian teachings, customs, and intercourse, until they became fused into the common and undistinguishable mass of the Spanish nation; and Arabs and Mohammedans became entirely unknown where once they had swayed a magnificent sceptre, and exerted an immense literary influence.

To regard this as one continuing dominion of nearly eight centuries would be to have no proper idea of its character; for all the four changes of dynasties, to which we have referred, were real revolutions, affecting the people quite as seriously as did the Norman conquest in England. They were, in fact, conquests in the same sense that that was; and there were, besides, many intermediate revolutions of a transient character, which were immensely more distressing and destructive in their immediate effects than the American Revolution. The several African conquests bore some resemblance to the Gothic conquest of Spain, which endured about two and a half centuries without abolishing the language, religion, and customs of the country. The final conquest by the Christians was more like the conquest of the earlier inhabitants, the Lusitanians, Cantabrians, Celtiberians, and Asturians, by the Romans, which endured near five centuries, and effected an entire change in these particulars: it was even a greater change than this. The history which we have sketched embraces in fact a long series of most distressing political catastrophes, all repeating, for our instruction, the same political vices, and the same earnest and fruitless efforts of patriotic devotion. Let us look at it more in detail.

The original invaders and settlers were Moors, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, and many tribes of Arabs. They were all Mohammedans, but they differed widely in language and customs, and all had of course their national and tribal preferences and prejudices. Each were settled in different parts of the country or provinces, with their own leaders for rulers; for they could not be mingled. Each were, in their low state of

civilization, naturally jealous of their respective rights and influence, and ready to resent any real or apparent preferences given to others, and totally unable to make such allowances as were essential to harmony and union.

Here, then, at the very outset of their political organization, we find elements which could not fail in generating the most ferocious discord. Add to this, that few of them had ever learned to submit to any permanent political order, except so far as was necessary for their wild forays upon the territories of their neighbours, and we get some notion of the difficulty of reducing them to order in their new home under one central government.

For the first half century this disorderly and centrifugal tendency was necessarily much moderated by the circumstances in which they were placed. The country and the people of the country were divided among them. The people were reduced to a state of villenage, and the invading leaders were under the necessity of distributing themselves and their soldiers in castles and walled towns all over the country, in order to be able to maintain their conquest over the subject races that had preceded them, and to compel the payment of the rents and tributes which they thought proper to impose. These could not be freely rendered until, by long usage, they became customary, and in the mean time, the conquerors would need to devote the greater part of their vigilance and activity to their subjects, and would have but little leisure for those dissensions among themselves, which were sure to arise so soon as they could be ventured upon.

Even within the first half century there were insurrections and rebellions. Each tribe was offended when any one of another tribe was appointed Ameer or Lord-Lieutenant of Spain by the Caliph. One tribe rebelled because its Ameer had been deposed, and others joined them because they were dissatisfied with his substitute. Under different pretexts several Walies, or governors of provinces, impatient of all superior authority, would rebel against the legitimate Ameer; and if he kindly besought them, for the peace of the country and for the happiness of the people, to respect the institutions of the country and the organs of public authority, they at once

inferred that this patriotic kindness was proof of timidity and weakness, and used this argument to influence the passions and courage of their followers. The death of the Caliph Walid, A. D. 744, murdered by the Syrians, gave rise to a disputed succession, and divided the Walies, Alcaydes, and Xequés into hostile parties in Spain as well as elsewhere, each contending for the honour and power of its leaders. In view of these things their chroniclers moralize substantially in this manner.

The ambitious men of all nations are as the sea, which is always ready to rise, whatever wind may blow. Thus some took arms under the pretext of avenging the death of Walid and punishing the disloyalty of the Syrian people; others, as pretending to approve or defend them; while not a few, availing themselves of the occasion presented by the confusion prevailing in the state, took that opportunity for gratifying their covetousness or satiating their vengeance on such as they deemed their foes. The orderly and quiet portion of the community had no power to resist such combinations, or to suppress the contagion of their example. In some places the people arose against the new Caliph, and in other places in his favour. In some places they murdered their Walies and Alcaydes for their devotion to the new Caliph, and in other places for their opposition to him. Armed bands of miscreants roamed over the land, slaying all that offended them; and this was so especially at night; for men are bold and insolent at night, because not hindered by the blush that naturally arises by the light of day in the commission of a bad action. Thus it hath ever been with the sons of man, and so it will ever be while his nature remains unchanged.

The continued dissensions among the leaders soon divided all Spain into factions and parties, each crying aloud that right was alone with them, and that the safety of the state depended on adhesion to them; nor could the prudent counsels of the good Moslems avail to remedy the evil. If the peace-loving inhabitants could have known that they had power to disperse the local fevers of the state by a quiet resistance of them, matters might have been otherwise; but such is not human nature. The most orderly and patriotic people, in their general conduct

and intentions, followed in all social movements their accustomed leaders, and thus contributed to the spread and virulence of the social disorders.

Under such circumstances, power alone could provide the remedy, and many noble leaders combined in requesting the Ameer of their brethren in Africa to send them an Ameer that could reconcile the discords of the factions then raging, calling themselves Yemenies, Alabderies, Syrians, and Egyptians; a man of prudence, inclining to no party, the enemy of all faction, and desiring only the public good, and with power to compel submission where it should not be freely yielded. Such an Ameer they obtained in General Husam. He landed in Spain with some selected troops from Africa, and was joined by such numbers of patriotic inhabitants that he was soon able to suppress the rebellious spirits of the land, and so to separate the factions and accommodate their differences, as to restore to the afflicted country a reasonable degree of harmony and good order.

But this relief was only temporary. Their constitution had been violated and set aside by the murder of their Caliph and of his legitimate successors, and now they could not even approximate to unanimity in providing a substitute. The new Ameer was not appointed by the Caliph, but was partly chosen by themselves and partly forced upon them. His patriotism and capacity were not adequate warrants of his authority, for they were open to comparison with the patriotism and capacity of other leaders, and few were competent to make the comparison rightly. Other leaders felt that they were wronged by the preference that had been shown to a stranger. They did their best to wake up anew the spirit of discord by means of their partisans, the Alabderies and Egyptians. In the beginning, they confined themselves to secret murmurs and complaints; but contemptuous language and acts, and disobedience to the commands of rulers soon followed. The Ameer Husam laboured to extinguish the sparks of mischief before they should burst forth into a conflagration, and so carry the fires of discord over all Spain; but he did not succeed. The partisans of different leaders, gained over by false or exaggerated accusations against the government, or allured by promises of

plunder, broke out into open rebellion, and the clamor of their arms, the cries of their partisans, and the tumults of their discords prevented the voice of peace from being heard. Soon the tribes and factions divided the country among themselves. None thought of anything but of increasing their own power and influence; to which end they who held authority did their utmost to gain over the Alcaydes and Castellans of the frontiers by granting them immunities of all kinds, while these stood ready to defend all that they had been able to appropriate. Such was the state into which they fell by reason of their selfish jealousies, selfish demands upon each other, and selfish excitements, and the partisan contests that followed.

Sensible of the calamities of this state of things, the most noble and honourable of the Arabs and Egyptians, wearied by the ridiculous pretensions of the conflicting leaders, proposed to hold an assembly for peaceful deliberation for the welfare and protection of the people; but this patriotic proposition was opposed by the passions and interests of the rival leaders, each fearing that his selfish hopes would be thereby disappointed. Yet an assembly was held, and the necessity of one ruler for all Spain was agreed upon, a man who had been at the head of no faction, and who should on no account be a fervid partisan of any one of the numerous sects that held the people in division. Jusuf El Fehri was chosen A. D. 746. He had never raised his voice in favour of any faction, nor was he the rival or enemy of any leader. All Spain applauded the choice, the leaders were abandoned by their followers, and the people were now full of hope.

But, says our chronicler, it would seem to be a fatality attached to human affairs that fortune is ever ready to abandon the man of upright intentions, while she follows the triumphal car of the bold and ambitious evil-doer. The ambition and efforts of the leaders soon began to cause new divisions. The new constitution, or new Ameer, which in this instance is the same thing, had not the aureole of sacredness that encircles and illustrates all customary institutions which have been brightened by the achievements of ancestors, and which, like the banner which has waved in many triumphs, spontaneously attracts the favourable and respectful regards of all the people.

The new constitution could succeed in enforcing respect only by reason; and reason is very slow and uncertain in such conquests, for the rival projects may be infinite in number, and each must be discussed before the selection can be final. It did not succeed. Rival candidates for public favour divided the vote so that no one could permanently prevail. And here our chronicler remarks: Truly it is affirmed that the ambitious are as the sea, which is ever unquiet, and which the slightest wind suffices to put in movement. But such reflections only emphasize the difficulties, without helping us to their solution.

War again broke out between the rival Walies, and soon all Spain was in arms and subjected to the horrors of civil war. The inhabitants of the smaller towns fled their dwellings without knowing where to take refuge, seeing that it was the custom of both parties to burn the villages and hamlets for the purpose of depriving their opponents of the advantage of them. The people were hovering between hopes and fears, and yet from this cruel discord good men succeeded in evoking the general welfare by establishing the empire of the Omeyas.

Up to this period, A. D. 755, Spain was a mere province of Syria and subject to its Caliphs. It was, therefore, more or less subject to all the main disturbances that occurred in Syria, as well as to those that were natural to itself. Its Ameers or Governors were ministers of the Caliphs of Damascus, removable at their pleasure, and governing according to their directions. Thus the government in Spain was naturally somewhat unsteady. Because of the distance of the appointing and controlling power, it was often very weakly administered and badly obeyed or actually resisted; and often its commands were issued in entire ignorance of the real want of the occasion. Much of the sympathy between the two countries which had helped to maintain their union had died out, and there was no necessity of proximity or protection that demanded its continuance. The Ameers of the Caliphs could not receive that cheerful respect and obedience that would naturally be granted to their own independent sovereign, and his hands were often weakened by combinations at home, and by false accusations secretly transmitted to the court at Damascus. The natural position and internal and external circumstances of the country

combined in suggesting that it ought to be independent of the Caliphs, and in familiarizing the subject to the thoughts of the people. Indeed, several of the recent Ameers had been in fact independent of the Caliphs, though rather from necessity, and while still acknowledging their legal subordination. Like their predecessors, they were unable to maintain order. The war among the tribes continued, and every province was thrown into disorder by their violence. Towns were burnt, the cultivated fields were cut up, and all the fruits of the earth were destroyed. The people were without rule or justice, and their dwellings afforded no security to him who hoped for shelter beneath their roof.

Under these circumstances a convention of patriotic leaders and generals was privately held. Relief from the mad passions of selfish leaders and rival factions and disorganizing disputes was felt by them to be imperatively demanded. Confering together without enmity towards either of the two great parties, and with the care and discretion demanded by the momentous nature of their task, they thought only of establishing a firm government for the security of peace and justice, and a tranquil and permanent succession of the constituted authorities. They felt that they could not get along in peace under the distant, and therefore weak rule of the Caliphs, and resolved to have an independent government of their own. And in order to satisfy their reverence for their ancient constitution, they concluded to depart from it no further than was demanded by the necessities of the case. They therefore chose for their sovereign, Abderahman, a son of a former Caliph, A. D. 755. He was then residing in Africa, far removed from all the factions and exciting influences of Spain, and thither they sent for him and he came. His advent was gloriously successful, and he became the head of a dynasty that was not finally set aside for more than three centuries. The spontaneous reverence of the people for a son of their Caliph stood instead of a demonstration of his right, and silenced all opposing arguments.

Of course this effect was not instantly universal. It is wonderful that it was so nearly so. The people had so long listened to the tirades of their provincial and lesser leaders against their

government, that one might suppose that their political demoralization had become complete, that no ruler could succeed in maintaining his position long after he had displaced his predecessors, and that no leader could be respected except while answering as an instrument of revolution or disorder. But such a vice did not spread so rapidly then as it does now-a-days, when the press lends itself to foster the habit. Yet the vice had taken deep root, and it required many years to suppress the insurrections and rebellions that grew out of it, and bring about a habit of orderly submission to the laws of the land. Now some disappointed leader headed a rebellion. At another time some inefficient alcaide suffered an insurrection by not duly restraining the inhabitants of his city. For, says our chronicler, with the populace of large towns there is no medium to be maintained; if they be not rendered anxious for their own safety, they seek to impose fear on others, and when they do not dread their rulers, they may well be dreaded by them.

But order was obtained, and it was reasonably well maintained until near the close of this dynasty. The whole peninsula, except a small portion in the north occupied by the Christians, was subjected to the rule of the Omeyas, and the people were gradually becoming fused into one homogeneous population. Internal peace prevailed everywhere. The farmer and the artisan were secure in their homes, and secure in the rewards of their industry, and in science and civilization no people of Europe surpassed the Arabs of Spain.

All history proves, however, that in the course of a long period of harmony and order, people are apt to forget its value, by forgetting the evils of a contrary condition, and the sacrifices, concessions, mutual self-restraints, and the actual social force that were required in order to obtain them. Forgetting these, they allow the same jealousies, animosities, and disorders to grow up anew, without being able to see whither they are tending; and before they are aware of it the dissolution of their political organism has actually made great progress. They are prone to become vain of their nation, and to flatter themselves that nothing within or without can shake the solid foundations of their social fabric. Then they refuse to listen to the solemn

warnings of the philosophy of history. Even their religion is to them a lying prophet when it tells them, of nations as well as of men, that pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall. When their attention is directed to the fact that the highest functionaries of government are habitually defamed as the worst of men, and that they have really no defenders but those who are called their partisans; they set aside the fact by saying: These are but the detractions of political brawlers for their own advancement; nobody regards them. Yet the fact is plain that partisan leaders act thus because thus only can they get a hearing, and thus they do get a hearing and make all their gains. O! but people know their interests too well to suffer their political organism to be destroyed by excited partisans. And how can they help it, when all their leaders are excited partisans? Men never see any interests equal to those about which they are excited. It is only when the partisan can suppress his excitement that he can see the interests of the state in their true value. And it is only then that his vision can be clear enough to distinguish the true patriot and statesman from those brawlers for freedom and for popular rights, who are the mere drummers-up of party recruits, who are to have much less individual freedom after their enlistment than they had before. This history tells the truth on this subject in terms that cannot be mistaken. Hear a prophetic parable, applied in this history to a ruler, and which we may apply to the process of national dissolution. "I saw a very vigorous vine around which rose a bright flaming fire, which burnt round it for a long time without seeming to do it any harm; but which eventually consumed it to ashes. That fire is civil discord, and that vine thyself: the end of all things is known to God alone."

Advancing some two and a half centuries in our history, about A. D. 1000, we take a survey of the state, and find it enveloped in the flames of civil discord. It began at first in the northern borders, where disorderly wailies, alcaydes, and xequés or chiefs of clans found themselves encouraged to rebel by the aid which they could derive from the Christians of Galicia. This being neglected or ineffectually extinguished, gradually spread itself southward until the whole social organism was

on fire. Some northern lord or castellan or count, accustomed to the disorders and conflicts of the border, and puffed up by successful forays upon his neighbours, became too proud to render due obedience to the commands of the more orderly capital. If force was exerted to reduce him to submission, he found most willing allies in his Christian neighbours, who, for a small slice of Mohammedan territory, were ever ready to help on the strife. Some neighbouring lord, encouraged by a weak reign, or jealous of some personal or factional rival preferred as Hagib or prime minister, and hoping to stir up other lords to follow his example, would join in the rebellion. Even when this was put down the disease was not extirpated; for the disappointments, chagrin, animosities, and faithless and contumacious dispositions which resulted from it, remained in the social soil as seeds for the dissemination of a more abundant harvest of insurrections and rebellions.

After the independence of Spain, Morocco had become annexed to it, and occasioned the introduction of many elements of discord. Rebellions and insurrections there always disturbed the peace of Spain. The two countries being regarded as one, it became a political necessity that the intercourse between them should be as free as possible. All were to be treated as one people. Officers and soldiers from each country aided in the government of the other, and in suppressing its disorders. And yet it seems to be a necessity of human nature, especially in its lower conditions of civilization, that such interferences are sure to give rise to jealousies, or to furnish pretexts for disorder. These circumstances being added to what remained of the old grounds of party divisions, were continually generating new and dangerous factions. Instead of Yemenies, Syrians, and Egyptians, we have now new parties called African, Algibies, Alameries, Aben Hudes, and Selavonians. Sometimes one party and sometimes another, and sometimes both, call in the Christians of the North or the Moors of the South to aid them in their contests. Even Negro regiments were sometimes imported from Africa. The government gradually grows weaker and weaker, and then even its friends fall into discord among themselves. War is everywhere, and peace nowhere. Rival factions unite in war against

a common enemy, the government it may be, only to disagree and fight with each other in case of success. One king after another is slain in his palace or on the battle-fields of civil war. Even the faction that gave him power assassinates him for not allowing them sufficient license. Each lord is contending for the enlargement of his own power or territory. When he finds that his aid is necessary to his superiors, he refuses to grant it without the reward of some increase of his jurisdiction. Famine and pestilence follow the footsteps of civil war, and the people everywhere murmur against the government, or are rendered furious by their calamities. Thus all the cords of national sympathy are gradually sundered, and their political dissolution advances with rapid strides; for social sympathy is the very life of political union; nothing can supply its place; it is the very life of all true political authority and power. When all the nerves of the social organism centre in the government, and act promptly from it, the life and power of the organism is sound and safe. Each nerve severed weakens the functional action and starts the process of decay. Hence all vituperations and factional combinations against government, when not demanded by a most imperious social need, are truly moral crimes against society, even when they are not condemned by law.

When the last of the Omeyas "departed to the mercy of Allah," A. D. 1022, Spain had already become limited on the north and east, and divided into as many kingdoms as there had been provinces. Everywhere wadies, alcaides, viziers, and xeques attempted to become independent of every superior power; and each tried to enlarge his dominions, so that boundaries were nowhere settled, and there was no authority to settle them. Every town required walls and an army for its protection. Every frontier was guarded by castles and fortresses and bands of soldiers, always oppressing and insulting the peaceable inhabitants whom they were stationed to protect or to hold in subjection. The business of the citizens was practically limited to the town or province they inhabited; for in such disorders liberty of commerce was impossible. The cultivation of the fields was abandoned or prosecuted without energy; for man cannot labour without hope of reaping the

reward of his industry. The populace threw off all the restraints of reason, as they usually do when, under any pretext, they have overpassed the barriers of due submission; as though they sought, in wild license, indemnity for their former obedience to law. Often the mob of some city rose in insurrection, crowned their leader, and committed all sorts of violence, while the xeques, generals, and cadies had not the courage or ability to combine the orderly citizens to oppose them. The king stood instead of a constitution, and when he was murdered and his line extinct, their constitution was abolished, and the essential element of public order was hopelessly gone. A new king of another line afforded but a limited and transient relief.

The wadies and kings could not live at peace with each other for the benefit of the state, and would not listen to the few wise men who implored them to offer an example of obedience and union to those who were under them. Even the preaching of the Sacred War against the encroaching Christians, who were everywhere beginning to oppress them, failed to rally the sympathies of the leaders. The evil seemed to be beyond remedy. The state, weakened by long disunion, could not contend with the disorderly principles which had so long prevailed. The habits of disorder had grown so inveterate that they could not and would not be cured, because they would not submit to the proper remedies. The good customs of the past were known no more; all had become vitiated and corrupted, and one of their last good kings said: "This generation can neither govern well nor be well governed." Well might they mourn the death of the last of the Omeyas—"Death fell upon him with unexpected haste, and translated him hence to the Alcazars and eternal dwellings of the after-life." "The duration assigned in the eternal decrees" to the rule of the sons of Omeya were ended. "God alone is eternal; He only is the Lord of a perpetual dominion." "The kingdom in whose chief there is not the principle of unity, and whose captains are of opposite minds, must perish as doth the wicked, and shall soon find its end."

The time had come when even an invader was welcome to all truly patriotic minds. In A. D. 1086 another convention was

called to deliberate on the means of obtaining unity. But it came to nothing, for only partisan leaders were represented in it, and they knew not how to abate any of their present pretensions and powers for the future peace, honour, and glory of themselves and their country. It was proposed to invite the prince of the Almoravides at least to assist them against the Christians; but it was feared that he might encroach on existing powers, and the conference terminated with an empty exhortation in favour of unity of action, where there was no corresponding unity of organization.

But the prince of the Almoravides was invited from Africa. He came with a powerful army of Moors, and having effectually repelled the incursions of the Christians, he then turned his attention to reducing the rebellious provinces to order by deposing or destroying all their disorderly kings and chiefs. "The omnipotent Arbiter of human fates and empires had thus prepared a glorious day of vengeance for the aggrieved and afflicted people, and no human craft or care can impede the events which God the Most High hath decreed." The state was again united under one head. The new dynasty reigned with more or less success for sixty years. We will not weary the patience of our readers by tracing the details of their history. They were succeeded by two other Moorish dynasties, each brought in by reason of renewed civil discords. To trace their respective histories would be only to repeat the unpleasant scenes over which we have already passed. But even at the risk of some repetition, we venture on an outline of the troubles of their later years, in order that we may the better comprehend the closing scene of the tragedy, the death-agony of the dominion of the Arabs in Spain. In doing so we shall, as we have hitherto done, endeavour to convey the very spirit of our historian, and as nearly as is convenient, often weave in his language.

At one time the discord is renewed by the advocates of the old constitution, partisans of a descendant of a deposed wali, who, by his liberality and eloquence, proves that he is wronged by a usurping government. He professes the patriotic purpose of restoring liberty to the cities, oppressed by real or fancied extortions, and of re-establishing the old rates of taxation

instead of the charges imposed by tyrants and heretics; for hard names were a material part of his eloquence. Even the ministers of religion aided his designs, by preaching in the mosques that the opposite party had profaned these sacred places; and they further imposed upon the popular fancy, and excited it to fanaticism, by solemn ceremonies of lustration, in which their political leaders appeared in vestments of mourning.

The very means of protection and defence are made a reason for despising their government after the danger has been averted; and their rulers are branded as heretics and infidels for having secured peace by the aid of the Christians. The energetic action that is essential to repress disorder or rebellion is called despotic, and all the arts of vituperative eloquence are resorted to in order to give to patriotic earnestness the appearance of tyranny. Prudent action or inaction is censured, by rash heads and bold tongues, or by disappointed selfishness, as shameful and treacherous cowardice. No language is too disrespectful, no accusation too gross to be made against the higher officers of government, if it has any chance of being listened to by suspicious ears. No insinuations are too despicable, no plot too dishonourable, no combinations too incongruous, no degree of earnestness too dangerous, when government is regarded as a rival party that is to be overthrown. Thus all the real patriotism that was in the country was suppressed or expelled by the constant presence of a more intense affection that was inconsistent with it. Habits of partisanship, disaffection, complaint, detraction, disorder, insurrection, rebellion, were gradually, but surely, wearing out the broader and nobler feeling that constitutes patriotism. A patriotism that cannot suppress such dangerous habits can find no adequate substitute in conventional arrangements or social compacts or constitutions. These are the expedients of a cold rationalism, and cannot supply the place of those enduring bonds which are wrought out in the fervent heat of patriotic sympathy. Even constitutions must have a foundation in the sentiments of the people. At the period we are speaking of, Spain was bound hand and foot in the bad habits to which we have just referred, and her own wisdom points to the consequences.

“Do the moments pass,
And give no sign and raise no hand to warn thee
That they prepare thy fall? Yet know thou well
That to this end they move and will not halt.”

Again the bond of union is broken, now never to be re-welded. They are powerless to resist the Christians on the north and the Africans on the south. All their energies are exhausted in mutual discords and wars. Each city and province has its standing army for defence against its neighbours, or for encroachment on them. Every frontier bristles with distrust, if not with hostile intent. Taxes are multiplied to the great oppression of the people. Fields are laid waste and towns destroyed by hostile armies. Men and women are butchered in all directions, and whole families destroyed and left unburied, or buried in haste “without ablution, without a shroud, and without prayer.” All property is depreciated, all business depressed, all commerce restrained and uncertain. The mass of the inhabitants could not now choose to be at peace, by refusing to join any party; for that would leave them unprepared for self-defence, and expose them to be overcome by the armies of all parties.

Only occasionally could they unite against the encroachments of the Christians. One city and province after another submitted to their conquerors, and “the mosques and towers thereof were filled with idols and crosses, while the sepulchres of the faithful were profaned.” Yet their civil wars continued, because the bond of sympathy was sundered, and rivalry and enduring hostility had taken its place. All the counsels of prudence had but a transient influence over their rooted passions. The fears of wise men, the predictions of their prophets, and warning signs in heaven and earth, failed to overcome their inveterate habits of insubordination. Now many a leader had to mourn that in his partisan excitement and selfish earnestness his own arm and voice had aided the enemies of his country; and, when too late, he beheld with saddened spirit that dissension and discord had extinguished all possibility of united action. One leader after another submitted to the Christians, and with their followers became vassals of Christian kings or lords. The people rejoiced in the change, and many

towns sought protection from their rulers by becoming subjects of the Christians. Finally, the province of Grenada alone was left to the government of the Arabs, and its king also soon acknowledged himself as vassal of the Christian king.

But it could not yet be quiet. When the Christians were at war, it would rebel or refuse its service. Its own towns sought peace as direct Christian vassals, because they could have no peace under their own king. The habit of discord had so grown that now the most trifling matters had become great causes of dispute. None would listen to reason nor give thought to any other question than that of defeating their opponents. The royal influence was so feeble that if the king favoured one party he was deposed by the other. His civil wars desolated the Vegas of Grenada and watered its pleasant fields with the blood of his people. The throne of Grenada was floating in the midst of a stormy and tumultuous sea. Hear the appeal of the patriot. What fury is this, fellow-citizens? To what further point do you propose to carry this frenzy of rage? Forget not your wives and children and country. Follow not the mad ambition and selfish passions of others. What unspeakable folly, what fatal blindness! Devote your energies to peace and union, and not to discord and division. Turn, or your downfall and the downfall of your country is at hand. Brave and earnest you are; give these qualities to your country, and let party spirit die. If it cannot be thus, Woe! Woe! Woe to Grenada; its fall is at hand; desolation will dwell in its palaces; its strong men will fall beneath the sword; its children and maidens will be led into captivity. Zahara is but a type of Grenada.

But warnings and exhortations were now useless. "The immutable decree inscribed on the tablets of the Destinies had now attained the period of its fulfilment, and from no part did there come succour for the falling kingdom of Grenada." Misfortunes and defeats do not diminish the causes of discord, but only multiply them. Opposite leaders perpetually added fuel to the flames by which the heart of the empire was consumed, and by their private animosities and continual dissensions prolonged the war that was devouring the strength of the land.

At last the people had become so accustomed to be disappointed in their leaders that they had no confidence in any of them, and hence had no chance of union by their inner social forces, and were ready for a voluntary submission to a power without them. The kingdom of Grenada fell, and all its inhabitants that remained in the land became subjects of the Christians, and were finally merged in the mass of the Spanish nation.

And here we may venture the suggestion of a common result of such social disorders when they become chronic. It seems to be a general law of society that where the ruling race is gifted with a great organizing vitality in its social action, and especially when there is added to this a superior intelligence, the race is sure to maintain its position by preserving the predominating influence in the mixed nationality over which it presides, until the subject race, however numerous, becomes merged in it by adopting its language, customs, and principles. The influence of Rome in her best days over all the European nations subjected to her sway, is evidence of this. Her government maintained order among the discordant subject elements, and these gradually became assimilated to the ruling spirit. But when disorders continue after a conquest we see the principle in its reverse aspect. It seems to be a general law of society that, when the ruling race have a very weak organizing vitality in their social action, and are continually engaged in civil wars among themselves, they gradually become extinct or degraded, and the subject races, which were kept in order by their superiors, and not allowed to engage in their wars and political excitements, gradually become the controlling power, and the ruling race becomes merged in them by adopting their language, customs, and principles. There is much evidence of this in the history of all modern Europe, and the subject is worthy of careful reflection; but our chroniclers do not furnish sufficient facts to enable us to discuss it in this connection.

The principle might be further illustrated by the lives of families and individuals. It is only those individuals, families, and nations that are devoted to social order as well as to private virtue, that ever can maintain a permanent and continually rising position in society. Even the greatest names in his-

tory are often only enduring monuments of the consequences of social disorder. The teachings of the Bible are most earnest and frequent against all social disorders, against all social scorn, jealousy, pride, divisions and strifes, in its direct warnings and in its histories of the ruinous consequences of these vices. Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation. There should be no schism in the body; the members should have care one of another. Let not Ephraim envy Judah, nor Judah vex Ephraim. Mark them that cause divisions and avoid them. Cast out the scorner, and contention shall go out. As wood is to fire, so is the contentious man to kindle strife. Seek the peace even of the city where ye are captives, for in the peace thereof ye shall have peace. The period of national dissolution is always a distressing one. "In the last days perilous times shall come, for men will be selfish, covetous, boasters, proud, calumniators, truce-breakers, false accusers, despisers of the good, traitors, heady, haughty; from such turn away." 2 Tim. iii. 1—5.

We do not need to go back into the above details in order to show that the selfishness of leaders, of families, of tribes and of provinces is the principle that gave rise to the calamitous results which our history reveals to us. By its very nature this selfishness grew, as it always does when not kept under due control, into jealousy, suspiciousness, invidious comparisons of services or sufferings for the public, and of rewards received, detraction, factions, open hostility and actual war between leaders, tribes, or provinces, or between some of them on one hand and the general government on the other. This is the natural course of things when selfishness in the leading elements of the state overbalances their patriotism. It is often revealed in our history, and it would be in a great measure inferred from the results, if not actually revealed; for all social disorders have their natural germs in the heart of man. These are the beginnings of evil, and, if not repressed, must grow up into ruinous discord. Selfishness, envy, rivalrous comparisons, and malice, are sure to beget like sentiments and acts in others, and to grow to intensity of heat, until it becomes a necessity for them to break out into deadly hostility; and then "the just upright man is laughed to scorn," and all his counsels go for

naught. This truth is conspicuously prominent in the history of a people divided into small tribes in proximity to each other. A quarrel between individuals of different tribes is dangerous to the peace of both. But an offence against a chief is an insult to the very constitution of the tribe, and rouses the war spirit and rallies the powers of the whole tribe to vengeance.

We have already seen that exhortations to harmony did but little to mitigate the disorders of the state, for usually they were resorted to only in exciting times; and then nothing but a clear perception of fearful consequences can arrest the march of events; and people are then badly prepared to study into future consequences. Even the strong arm of a superior power so often called in, and their continual dangers from the Christians, could not suppress the evil, because its roots always remained, and therefore the relief was but temporary. In the family this selfishness is gradually moulded by parental authority and family influence, and grows into the more generous sentiment of family love; in the tribe it becomes clanishness, and in the nation it grows into the still more liberal and generous sentiment of patriotism. Yet patriotism itself may be so selfishly national as to be a quite disorderly element in the family of nations. Dangers without are often the most efficient conditions for suppressing this undue selfishness of individuals, parties, and tribes; for frequent contests together against a common enemy generate a habit of united devotion to the common welfare, which tends to beget a general harmony of principles, and which does not wear out until the sense of their dangers has entirely passed away, and the memory of their mutual sacrifices has grown dim.

Our history shows us further that there is no reliance to be placed on the most earnest and vociferous professions of devotion to the public welfare. Earnest advocacy of measures is no evidence of their wisdom or their honesty. The most despicable nostrums of quackery are urged in this way. Such professions cannot convert selfishness into patriotism, or partisan struggles into self-sacrificing devotion to the public good. Yet imposition is inevitable. Within the province of our ignorance we cannot distinguish between the confidence of the

man of science and the impudence of the charlatan, and charlatans know how to occupy this province, and honest inexperience is sure to favour their entrance. But charlatanism is naturally forward and imperious, while truth is naturally modest, unpretending, insinuating, and perfectly respectful to the mind which it designs to benefit. It is like seed; the smallest things in nature are the seeds of things. Men walk over them and know it not, and yet all the future is in them. Moral and religious, and political, as well as medical quackery starts on a more pretentious scale, with crowds of followers, lives faster, and dies sooner. Of course quietness and unobtrusiveness are not proof of worth, for they may result from laziness, pride, or incapacity; yet it must be true that a man who is sincerely devoted to fitting himself for public affairs, or to fulfilling the duties of a public office, has but little leisure or inclination for any public exhibitions, except such as naturally belong to the discharge of duty. It is not such men that are usually found as leaders of factions, stirring up the bitter waters of strife, and seeking new means of rousing the public mind into an excitement. They very soon learn that the normal condition of a healthy public progress is quiet earnestness, and not boisterous excitement. Their very selfishness is generous; for all its fibres are interlaced with the enduring sentiments of society around them, and it expects its advantage only as others derive advantage from its efforts for the social good. Their very ambition is patriotic, for it is not the transient honour of public position that they desire; but the enduring one of having done good to their country and to the world through it; and they feel that public excitement is obstructive of this end. Yet we would not judge public men harshly. A soft answer turneth away wrath, and a quiet and clear presentation of truth is usually the best answer to rant and bravado; yet it is a rare talent to be able to act out this principle, and hence it is often transgressed even by honest and ordinarily competent men.

There is a natural and essential distinction between the functions of the ruler and those of the teacher; and though, in practical life, it is impossible to keep them entirely separate, yet it is important to hold their ideas as distinct and separate

as possible; for a large share of our social disorders is due to the confusion of them. The parent, the schoolmaster, and the ruler must all both teach and govern; but the spirit and manner of each function are essentially distinct. As rulers they enforce order within their several spheres. As teachers in the family, the school, or in great or small deliberative assemblies, their aim is to impart higher ideas, to expose pernicious prejudices, customs, and errors, and to convince the judgment of something better; and for this the spirit and manner of the teacher are necessary. He is kind, attractive, persuasive, and insinuating, so as to draw out the hidden germs of mental life, and promote their growth. Even towards defects and sins he is kind and indulgent, in order that he may fully understand them and know how to warn against them, and to marshal the mental forces to their conquest. The spirit and manner of the civil ruler may be, and often must be stern, repulsive, indignant, and imposing; for he has to enforce obedience to the law and order of the state. Civil law is the guide of the civil ruler, except in legislation, and then harmony with the customs and civilization of the people is the essential consideration. But the very aim of the teacher is to elevate and purify the customs and civilization of the country, and thus to elevate the law with them, and by continual changes to bring it into continuous adaptation. This is necessarily a very slow process, for a nation is not new born in a day. The change is marked by centuries rather than by days and years.

With very great diffidence we venture to think that our Saviour expressed something like this to the Jews; and that, abandoning the literal translation of their forms of language and following the analogy of our own, we may express his thought thus: I came not as civil ruler to abrogate your institutions; but as a teacher and a subject to obey and develope them: in their nature they cannot pass away until they have done their work; the most important visible possessions change more readily, and he little understands the principles of true religion who violates or teaches the violation of the least important social institutions, but obedience to them is high evidence of religious character. Matt. v. 17-19. We may not read this rightly; but surely we cannot be mistaken in saying

that this doctrine is not absent from the Saviour's instructions. He paid tribute to a government instituted by conquest, without questioning the authority or the justice of its exaction. He associated freely with tax-gatherers under that government, and chose one of them as an apostle, and yet uttered no condemnation of their office. He alludes to such laws as sanctioned the selling of a debtor and his family into servitude for his debts, and punishments by scourging, beheading, and crucifixion, without stopping to condemn them. He teaches the moral duty of a better practice than was required by law in the matter of divorces, but he refused to announce this moral duty as law, saying: Let him receive it that can. He teaches obedience to law as understood by its authorized interpreters, though they be not themselves good citizens. Matt. xxiii. 3. He forbade covetousness as obstructive of the true life of man; but he refused to decide a dispute between brothers about property. He taught the strictest moral purity, but refused to act as judge of the woman taken in adultery, saying only as a good teacher, Go, sin no more. He adopted freely the synagogue forms of worship, though they were not of positive, divine, but only of customary, origin. He attended, and founded parables on, existing social festivals, without condemning anything in them; while he taught principles which would in time set them aside. He adopted or admitted their expressive symbols and participated in their customs, such as anointing the body and feet and head, repenting in sackcloth and ashes, artificial funeral mournings, shaking the dust off the feet, and ordinary salutations and dress, without thereby changing their nature from transient, into perpetual institutions. He joined in the temple services and did not condemn them, though they were soon to be sloughed off by a new spiritual growth, and though the priesthood were not the legitimate successors of Aaron; but were imposed on the church by a heathen and usurping sovereign. He taught that religious and civil law is founded on love to God and to man, and that, as this principle advances in society, the laws must advance without any necessary shock to the social system, and with that harmony that always exists when laws are measured by the civilization of the people; and that it was not proper to criticise the fitness of institutions by

the true principle of love, because this love is not yet full. Matt. xxii. 40. He was perfectly serene in his knowledge that pure principles will, in proper time, beget their appropriate forms, and set aside all bad ones.

There is a natural order in the growth of mind as well as in the growth of a tree, though we have not yet found it out. There is an order in the hierarchy of opinions and principles of a man and of a people; and if this be deviated from further than is proper for the essential variety of human functions, the mental and national character is out of balance. In the normal order of mental growth, some degree of intelligence, and then desire, go in advance of practice, and yet not so far in advance as to endanger the harmony of the system. Intelligence must appreciate, well or ill, before desire can arise to furnish the stimulus for the necessary skill. Naturally the child has no desire for the sports and occupations of manhood. It is only by artificial stimulants that woman can be turned into man. Ignorance does not aspire to the functions of the man of science. The savage does not envy the order, and decorum, and wealth of civilized society. Thus nature provides that all shall be contented with their position in life, saving only those moderate aspirations after better things which are necessary to progress.

Of course, this contentment may be disturbed by artificial and abnormal processes—as by exciting envy towards those in higher positions; for men can have an apprehension of the honour that accompanies high social position long before they can understand the intelligence and force of character that fit one to fill such positions with advantage to society and with credit to himself. It is seldom that the intelligence of men, who grow rich fast, keeps pace with their wealth, and they fail in making a good use of it. If some of the branches of a tree become unduly developed, some others must be stunted. The mind may dwell upon the superior advantages of others until envy becomes its predominant characteristic, and its generosity is shrivelled up. It may dwell on the evil of certain sins until hatred becomes a rooted element of its character. Even love, unduly excited or indulged in one direction, becomes malice the most demoniacal towards all opposing objects. And the

order or hierarchy of principles may even become so far thrown out of their normal harmony as to amount to actual mental derangement.

And so it is with the hierarchy of political principles. National ambition may grow so strong as to endanger the peace of all surrounding states. Tribal and personal ambition or envy may unbalance their internal harmony. Much intelligence and great purity of private life are not, in fact, inconsistent with a very disorderly social character; for it may be accompanied by a selfishness that has no appreciation of the natural laws of individual and social development, no respect for any customs that do not come up to its standard, no charity for differences of training, and no comprehension of a superior development in a different direction. Such men may really become as legitimately outcasts from society as robbers and assassins, for they may be more dangerous. A very high talent of speaking or writing may become, in its exercise, a mere literary rowdyism. Thus, too, tribes and nations may become so far disorderly as to demand the interference of their neighbours in order to prevent the contagion of their teaching and example from spreading among themselves. For political, as well as for physical diseases, society stands in need of quarantines, and hospitals, and boards of health; but our skill is not yet adequate.

Very obviously the wild conquerors of Spain never succeeded in finding means of settling this conflict between the selfish individualism of their nature and the demands of its political principles; their selfish or individual sentiments were continually overbalancing the political or patriotic ones. This evidently arose from the remaining barbarism of their character; for, of these qualities, selfishness is evidently the first to be developed and to grow by practice into a habit, while the larger patriotic sentiments do not naturally arise until afterwards. The extreme of individualism is shown in savage life, while a large civilization is shown in the harmony of great national systems. Of course, this may run into an extreme, and thus beget or prove a very partial or declining civilization; and this has often happened. We ought to be able to find a way of obtaining some diminution of the librations of the social

scales. When rationalism or sentiment is undermining either of these parts of the social structure, we ought to be able to marshal the forces of an opposite rationalism or sentiment in order to countermine and to foil the effort.

Nothing is plainer than the fact of man's social nature. His intellectual, and moral, and physical instincts make him social, and it belongs to his intelligence to cultivate and train those instincts in accordance with his circumstances and in improvement of them. He is born in society, and it is necessary for a proper development of all the elements of his character, and it is his duty to strive to live in harmony with it, and to promote its moral growth. There can be no schism of the body politic; we cannot divide it as we may a polypus. The hand cannot say to the foot, nor the eye to the ear, I have no need of thee. And there must be approximate symmetry in the growth of society as in that of a tree. The too aspiring growth is sure to have a weakness somewhere, which will yield to the storms. The individual has no strength against society. At his start in life, and in all his ordinary growth, he derives essential portions of his moral life and strength from it. And when he rises above its ordinary level, society is the foundation and the buttresses which alone can, under God, secure his stability.

Society is one of God's appointed means of man's improvement, and no man can with impunity condemn it or its institutions. There are defective and perverted principles producing tares all through the grainfield of the world; but let all grow together till the harvest; their roots are all imbedded in the same soil and intertwined, and you cannot pull up any without injuring the roots, and weakening the supports of all around it. Watch against the *seeds* of evil, if you would be freed from its results. Even in cutting away the deformities, and repairing the defects of the social structure, all its foundations, and columns, and braces, must be respected, else the whole is weakened and may fall to ruin. The growing tree can overcome its crooks and twists only by the force of its inner life, with favouring conditions. If the body politic is diseased, and you have no remedy that you can rely on, or that will be accepted, leave it at least to the *vis*

medicatrix naturae, and it may recover the equilibrium of its vital forces.

Man's nature demands social organization. The meeting of social elements gives rise to social life, and the very first act of all life is a spontaneous commencement of organization, or taking form. The primary purpose of a seed is to contain life, and the very first act of a seed is germination, or the production of an organized plant, and the whole life of this is an effort at perfecting its form or organism for the production of its proper fruit. The very first effort of associated men is the fundamental one of all social life, politism, social organization, taking form. The product of this effort is very various, often very defective, always falling short of our ideas of a perfect social organism. But however defective, let no *man* despise it, let no man condemn it. Even in its most barbarous state, society is making its best efforts at organization. Its structure may be a hut, it may be a palace. Whatever it is, some will despise it. But whatever it is, it is the very home of the social life, and every rent made in its walls, exposes the life within to chilling and shriveling storms.

Life without its forms is incomprehensible. Social life without social organization is nothing for men. The most sacred earthly thing for individual man is his physical organism—the body; and the most sacred earthly thing for social man is the social organism; yet both are often badly treated. Without the latter, all is moral chaos. Even man's individualism is barren without it. The branch cut off from the vine withers and dies. All growth, and improvement, and production are ended. And small tribes have but a small life. They are prone to run into narrow and contracted views of human nature and polity, and to be vain and boastful of their intelligence and independence, even when living under the shadow and protection of larger communities, and used by them for their purposes. In pride and vanity the kindred tribes of Greece never were surpassed, and they did perform heroic deeds; yet they never had sufficient intelligence of political principles to form a permanent union or confederation, and by their continual dissensions they finally destroyed

each other's independence, and brought upon themselves several successive conquering nations, some of them barbarous. Thus their independent national life was much shorter than that of the Arabs in Spain. The splendour of it scarcely lasted a century and a half. This was fast living; and, in accordance with the usual course of human affairs, it left an inheritance of most enduring evil to posterity.

We have said that society necessarily and spontaneously organizes. A part of this process is legislation. Society necessarily and spontaneously legislates: it cannot live without doing so. Legislation is an essential form of social activity. Every man naturally, and most often unconsciously, legislates for himself, and for his own individual life, in naturally forming habits which become the rules of his conduct, and have something of the permanence of laws, in that they yield very reluctantly to inner resolves, or to outer influence. Every society as naturally and inevitably legislates by means of the customs which unconsciously grow up within it; and it cannot lay them aside even with the facility that a man does his habits, though discovered to be defective; for they are naturally enduring, and they exist in such combination with other customs, that people have not skill enough to separate the bad, without injuring the good customs, or to fill up the gap in their institutions which the separation would occasion. Some of these customs arise out of the different forms of combined action of a people with regard to external dangers or aims, giving rise to leaders and to the subordination and coördination of the members of the society. Others arise out of the ordinary intercourse of the individuals with each other, and become the rules regulating that intercourse; and others grow out of violations of those already specified, and give rise to the forms by which the former are enforced, or the violation of them is punished. All of these customs are true laws of society; being at first simple and spontaneous in their character, and awaiting their improvement by the slow processes of experience. In all nations the customs of the country constitute the large majority of its laws; nearly all its written laws are but written definitions of its customary ones.

In all their migrations, people carry their laws with them: they cannot help it, for their laws are part of their life. When the Arabs took possession of Spain, it was still Arab customs that governed them; and Arab customs, varying according to tribes, and modified by their new circumstances, became the law of Spain, however far the subject race may have been allowed their own customs among themselves. No family migrates to a wild country without carrying the customs and relations of the family with them, and these are law. No number of families can migrate thus together without carrying social customs and relations with them, and these are their laws. They go with all their inequalities of natural and cultivated talents and powers, and with all their actual inequalities of age and conditions, and these must constitute laws for them; for this is the natural mode in which laws of the land first arise. Naturally and spontaneously people recognize these differences and act with reference to them; and it is only in so far as this is well done that there can be any harmonious growth in society. If people of differing customs meet on the same land and spontaneously associate, there must be a gradual fusion of these customs until harmony is obtained. Thus it is apparent that legislation about every important interest of social man is a spontaneous and inevitable result of the mere fact of society; and thus legislation appears to be a natural right of every separate society of men. Thus also every branch of human business has its necessity and its right of legislation or forming customs, so far as not to injuriously affect the rights of other portions of the community.

Now here is the result of these principles. If it is a natural necessity for society to legislate for its members, it is the natural duty of individuals to obey. In so far as, and according as society feels legislation to be necessary, it must make laws for the government of its members, and they must act according to them. Customary legislation is always a necessary product of society, because it grows up naturally out of its circumstances and mental and social condition. Even direct and formal legislation by a body constituted for the purpose has a character of necessity about it. Many may not see its necessity, or may even feel that it is wrong; but the legislative

body must have regarded it as necessary, and therefore it is a necessary product of the people's institutions, and to violate it is to violate the very nature of society, which no individual can have a right to do.

This is a startling conclusion; but it seems to be an inevitable logical result of undoubted facts of experience. Yet it cannot be absolutely true; for it is nothing less than the divine and indefeasible right, or absolute sacredness, of human law; and this is little better than the divine right of kings: it is substantially the same. It is apparent then that some essential element of the argument has been overlooked; for all national experience proves that human nature can neither endure nor administer the principle in this extreme strictness. Still it seems to us to come so near to perfect truth as to make every case of violation or resistance of law truly exceptional in its character, and as, therefore, to require the most clear and convincing evidence to justify or excuse it. Our conclusion is therefore true as a general, though not as a universal, proposition.

One omitted element in the argument is doubtless this, that there are other human spontaneities that are quite as natural as the social ones, and that must, therefore, be allowed to act. There are, on one hand, the great social spontaneities of a united people, and, on the other, those of tribes, trades, professions and classes differing in circumstances and intelligence, and those of individuals, including herein those of the individual conscience, guided, or supposing itself guided by divine law. Some one or more of these classes of human spontaneities may become unduly developed to the prejudice of others, and then it is nature itself that resents the encroachment. The mode in which the resistance shows itself, must naturally depend upon the measure of human intelligence that is called in to direct it. Rashness and selfishness will perform it with violence, or attempt to defeat it thus. Respect for the interests of all concerned in the problem, and for all minds that are concerned in its solution, is the sentiment that ought to preside in balancing the conflicting results. When this respect is withheld on either side, a rational accommodation is hopeless, and a change by violent means is the natural

result, if this be possible, and if the interests involved are large enough to induce so fearful a risk.

Different circumstances, dangers, aims, pursuits, conditions, must necessarily give rise to different laws, customs, and institutions. Thus different tribes, classes, and occupations, must naturally have different customs; and nature makes a complete fusion of them impossible. So far, then, as any portion of the body politic has customs which distinguish it in the nation, so far it stands apart from the general laws of the nation. Naturally it cannot give up its customs at the mere command of others; for a people's customs are naturally permanent, even while naturally transient in long periods. They pass away, not by a calculated and voluntary rejection of them, so much as by the spontaneous rise of new and inconsistent ones, growing out of a change of moral and intellectual character, and of external circumstances. A sudden and forcible interference with the existing customs of a people is, therefore, a violation of their very nature, and it cannot be patiently submitted to. God has so created us that our nature enforces resistance, if we have power to resist. Even a subject race gradually acquires customs of thought and action adapted to its position, and then it can have no sympathy with those who come to force relief upon it. The germs of better things are in them, and they ought to be allowed to grow, and in their growth they will generate better customs according to circumstances, and even so as to effect a change of circumstances.

Naturally no tribe can bear any forced invasion of its customs by the power of other, even confederate, tribes. It cannot help insisting that its customs shall be treated with respect, for its customs are part of itself. Without this principle, a man or a people could have no character, no fixed tendencies, or settled purposes, and nothing that would enable us to make any calculations of future conduct. The very language of a people is entirely customary, and the permanence of its nature indicates the true character of all customs. The language of a people is always changing, though the change is perceptible only to a few close observers, unless when we look back a century or two. No people could bear an instant

change of their language; and so it is with other customs. All change in the forms of society must, in order to be permanent and secure, be founded on a change of inner principles. Change the principles, and the forms must change. Our Saviour gives us the thought: "Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you." And we may adapt it to the narrower sphere of our present subject thus: Let a people have a clear and firm reception of the true principles of social life, and their institutions will gradually and surely grow into accordance with them.

As the actual or possible interests of society are very numerous and various, and demand great variety of skill and talent, every people naturally and spontaneously classifies itself according to its developed interests; and as it advances in civilization, these interests multiply, and the classification becomes more various and complex. Among savages there is but little distinct classification, except to distinguish the mass of the people from their civil or military and religious chiefs, and different tribes from each other. No human institutions can disregard such classifications without suffering the penalty of disregarding the natural laws of humanity. Selfish rationalism is always violating this principle by endeavouring to force human nature into conformity to its deductive theories.

These classifications are naturally founded on facts, and not on the will of any one. It is because a man has studied and practises the art of a shoemaker, or physician, or merchant, that he is classified as such; and if he is not then treated as such, his very nature is violated. Naturally, every man is free to belong to any class he may reasonably choose, provided he learns and practises the art that distinguishes it; and without this he cannot belong to it without violating natural distinctions. A people always violates these principles when it inaugurates incompetent men into public offices; and it must suffer for it. Its will cannot set aside the natural law of such relations. It is apparent, therefore, that people's rights vary according to their several classifications. One, and only one law for all is impossible; each class must have its own special customs, which are truly the laws of the class. All laws, im-

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posed upon a class by the general will, which are not truly necessary for the general welfare, are really and truly unnatural restraints upon its action and development, as much as when individual action is unduly restrained.

Apart from the inevitable distinctions of parent and child, men, women, and children, the first class that arises in society is that of rulers, leaders or chiefs. Society cannot possibly do without them; and their functions depend on its aims, occupations, and general interests. The firmness of the social organization, in all spontaneous institutions, depends upon the character of the chieftom; that is the key-stone of the structure. If that has no stability, the whole social system is essentially unsteady, and society makes no advance. The weakness of the social bond makes all united aims and actions fitful and uncertain; and this weakness is not cured until the affections of the people concentrate around a chief and his family, and continue long enough to become habitual and customary, and the chieftom becomes settled in a particular line. This movement and clustering of popular affections is all spontaneous and natural, and it requires great caution, and a very high exercise of intelligence in departing from it. There is no known degree of civilization in which it can be disregarded. Political intelligence should learn how to use it in the construction of its more studied and more rational systems. Society, in its spontaneous development, has always taken this course. This customary organization becomes thus the very constitution of the state. All its principles are simple, and, for ordinary purposes, perfectly defined. No other constitution is possible until the spontaneous forms of social organization have been ascertained by experience and observation, and until their principles become so developed that they can be reasoned upon and systematized.

Such a constitution, if written, would simply declare that the civil power is vested in the king and his heirs; that in all ordinary matters, he shall rule according to the customs of the country and with the aid of his customary officers; and that, in extraordinary emergencies, controlled by no custom, his will shall control. Yet very few of the people, perhaps not even the king himself, would know that such was the constitution of

the state, much less that it must be so. It was not, therefore, respect for their invisible and even unknown constitution that gave stability to their social organism; but respect for its impersonation in the royal family and in the king's ministers. They could not reverence an abstraction. So long as the king and his ministers respected the customs of the country, and the people respected the king as the keystone of the social arch, the peace and development of the state were safe, except so far as they were endangered by discordant customs among the different tribes or classes of society which were not wise enough to respect each other's differences.

It requires a very high state of civilization in order to maintain an equilibrium of respect among the different tribes, classes, and interests of a nation. When this does not exist, the king, or the governmental organization encroaches on the people, or the people on the government, or one tribe or interest on another, and disorder begins to show itself: and the evil is only made worse, or shifted to another position, when violence of temper, language, or action is resorted to, instead of calm and generous deliberation. It requires very high intelligence for a people to perceive how entirely dependent all their various interests are upon the stability of their government; and when this is not seen, or when religious principle does not involve it as a matter of living faith, then all the interests that feel themselves oppressed must necessarily resent the injustice, even at the risk of anarchy.

It requires very high intelligence for a whole people to look through the changing functionaries of their government to the more permanent constitution, written or unwritten, which they represent; and therefore their respect for their social organism must generally be measured by their habitual respect for their rulers. Hence also it is quite common for different parties and interests to respect their leaders much above the constitution, and to follow them with such earnest devotion as to despise their government, and even violate the very essence of the constitution. These facts are abundantly illustrated in the history before us. If people were wise enough to institute a better government or better officers on every such occasion, and could

be convinced that they were better, then their experiment would not be unreasonable; but that cannot be a better government which lacks the public confidence that is necessary to give it stability.

To every serious and reflecting mind there is a character of real sacredness about all that is future and unknown, and especially about the unknown consequences to individuals and society, that follow from human conduct. The presence or absence of this feeling marks the distinction between prudence and rashness, and has much to do with the distinction between religion and infidelity. When the social organism is affected with a serious disorder, all positive interference with it is dangerous, and then it is this feeling that makes prudent patriotism anxious, hesitating, and even inactive, and that

“puzzles the will
And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of.”

“There’s the respect
That makes calamity of so long life.”

It could act more wisely, and with more true public spirit than most of those who do act, and who falsely pride themselves on their courage, chivalry, high spirit, and self-sacrificing devotion; but it sees that most portentous results hang upon all its movements; results which it cannot measure either in kind or degree. It hesitates because of the thought,

“If ’twere *done* when ’tis done,
Then ’twere well it were done quickly.”

It knows that personal interests, and class interests, and sectional interests, and party interests, are all eager in forcing their prescriptions on the social organism; and it knows no antidote for all this, except some mighty man of faith, who can disperse their besieging and destructive regiments. Every other man of prudence feels his utter weakness under such appalling circumstances.

But the Arabs of Spain could understand but very little of these principles; and therefore could not act upon them. They

could not read the lessons even of their own experience aright. Barbarism is always narrow minded, and can make no adequate allowances for popular customs that differ from its own: and hence no union among barbarous tribes can ever be secure and permanent. Even its generosity and its courage are ignorant and selfish; for it will have its own way in exerting them. It forces its favours on others who do not feel them to be favours, or in a mode that is disagreeable. It resents injuries with heroism, and without regard to consequences to itself; but without regard also to the peace and order of the country. Chivalry may be noble barbarism, but it is usually low civilization. That only is high civilization which has a generous respect for society and its customs and institutions, and which studies to do no wrong to either, even by acts, which, on a narrow and one-sided view, would be called generous and courageous. The Arabs were too barbarous to entertain such generous views of human affairs, and hence there could be no permanent peace or union among them. Differences of tribal customs, and the jealousies and rivalries of tribal leaders were continually causing civil wars. Their tribal attachments were always so absorbing as to prevent them from feeling the paramount importance of their union; and hence its integrity was always sacrificed to their sectional passions, and thus the final destruction of the state became inevitable. We might give very full illustrations of the same destructive principles from the history of the Israelites, and show that they led to the same results; but we have exhausted our space, and must stop. We commend the history of the Arabs in Spain to the careful study of our readers.

ART. III.—*Reid's Collected Writings*. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. Third edition. Edinburgh, 1852. (Referred to in the following article by *R.*, and the page.)

Discussions on Philosophy, &c. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. (Referred to by *Dis.* and the page.)

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. Vol. I., Metaphysics. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859. (Referred to by *Lect.* and the page.)

THERE are probably many grateful and reverent students of Sir William Hamilton, who have yet found much difficulty in understanding him, and seen many objections to his views, and who have been anxiously waiting for light from his own promised development of his doctrines. With the publication of his lectures, which are understood to be the last help such will have from his own pen, the time seems to have come for them to state their thoughts, that his more favoured friends and expounders may explain misapprehensions and answer objections, and that truth may the sooner prevail.

This Review has already spoken the praise of Hamilton so freely and warmly, that we shall not be suspected of indifference to his preëminent genius and accomplishments, if we begin at once, and state, as simply as we can, some critical views of his theory of Perception, and of his Philosophy of the Conditioned—the two subjects treated in the lectures on Metaphysics, on which he has expended most labour, and of which his views are most peculiar, and have attracted most attention. The present article will be devoted to Perception.

Hamilton came out on this subject first in the *Edinburgh Review*. He had a three-fold purpose—to vindicate Dr. Reid; to annihilate Dr. Brown; and to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism on a refutation of idealism, materialism, and scepticism.

A brief statement of the position of the Scottish philosophy

on this subject at the time the review was written seems to be a necessary introduction to a discussion of its value.

Bishop Berkeley was troubled by materialists, and so by matter. He could not see that the hard particles are of any use, except as a basis for infidel arguments. He says that all we know of the external world is the sensations, or ideas, which it excites in us. Now matter cannot be the cause of these ideas, for by supposition it is inert; it cannot be imaged or represented by them, for they are in the mind, and as mental, totally unlike anything material; it cannot be the substratum of extension, colour, &c., for these are ideas which exist as they are perceived, and cannot therefore be in any unperceiving substance. The external cause of our sensations, or ideas, must be, he says, a spirit; because that is the only cause which we know; because its ideas alone can be the objects imaged or represented by our ideas; and because in spirit alone can ideas of extension, colour, &c., reside as in a substratum. He concluded, therefore, that God is the external cause of our ideas of sense; that He needs no reminders in the shape of hard particles, of the proper time to act on us; and that spirits are the sole substances—spirits and their ideas our sole knowledge.*

David Hume was troubled by theologians and metaphysicians. He thought scepticism useful to keep them within the proper bounds of inquiry by showing them the utter unfitness of their faculties to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed, and to make them cautious and modest in all their thinking. Among other sceptical reasonings, he argues that our senses and reason contradict each other with regard to our perception of the external world. We see a white table. An instinct common to man and the lower animals compels us to believe that the object of sight is external to our minds, and independent of our perception—the table, namely, which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. The slightest philosophy however teaches us that we are mistaken in these uni-

* Three Dialogues, Works, vol. i. p. 109, ed. of 1784.

versal and primary opinions. When we change our place, the object of sight changes its size and figure. The object of sight cannot then be the table, for that remains unchanged. Philosophers moreover agree that colour is a mere sensation, and that the whiteness is not only no quality of the table, but does not even represent anything external. "No man, who reflects," says Hume, "ever doubted that the existences which we consider when we say *this house* and *that tree*, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent." But reason cannot successfully defend itself in this opinion that these perceptions are copies or representations of anything external. It cannot plead instinct, for that has now proved false; nor experience, for that supposes a prior knowledge of the objects copied; nor understanding of the process by which body impresses an image of itself on mind, for it is incomprehensible; nor the veracity of the Supreme Being, for that would assure us of the truth of the primary instinct which has proved false. (*Phil. Es.* 2, 167.) By showing in this manner that our primary beliefs and our reason contradict each other, and that neither gives us intelligible and consistent knowledge of the external world, a universal doubt was introduced into all subjects of human knowledge and inquiry. The knowledge of mind as distinct from ideas, that of cause and effect, of a future state of rewards and punishments, of a revealed religion, were special points to which Hume directed his sceptical inquiries.

Rev. Thos. Reid, minister of New-Machar, afterwards Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen, had embraced the whole of Berkeley's system; but the consequences of Hume's reasonings gave him more uneasiness than the want of a material world; and he thought that Hume's system was as coherent in all its parts and as justly deduced as Berkeley's. It at last occurred to him, that, as these reasonings turn on the statement that all our knowledge of the external world is by ideas, they might be refuted by showing that there are no such things as *ideas* in the sense which philosophers mean. In common language, *having an idea of a thing* means *thinking of the thing*, and "implies a mind

that thinks, an act of that mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But, besides these three, the philosopher conceives that there is a fourth—to wit, the *idea*, which is the immediate object." (*R.* 226.) Reid thought that if there were no *idea* imagined for an object, the object of knowledge in perception must be admitted to be the external world; and if no *idea* of a cause, a substance, or God, were used in thinking of a cause, a substance, or God, all sceptical deductions would be nought, which had been drawn from the relations of causes and substances to our *ideas*. Reid himself laid great stress on this negative part of his writings. In a letter to Dr. Gregory he says that he thinks the merit of his Philosophy "lies chiefly in having called in question the common theory of *Ideas, or images of things in the mind* being the only objects of thought." "I think there is hardly anything that can be called *mine* in the philosophy of mind, which does not follow with ease from the detection of this prejudice." (*R.* 22.) Reid was perhaps right in this, for this rejection of the current language of philosophers obliged him to re-state the facts of psychology. The Baconian philosophy, concentrated very much in the cry of "no hypotheses; plain facts," was now ruling vigorously, and Reid himself was fully imbued with its spirit. (*R.* 97.) The refutation of definite hypotheses would have been comparatively a small matter. The whole body of language as applied to mind is more or less figurative, and implies, if used as scientific, a perpetual succession of hypotheses of the analogy of mind and matter. Descartes had, to be sure, signalized the fundamental antithesis between them, and it was generally admitted and stated; but in reading Locke, Berkeley, Hume, or Descartes, Malebranche or Arnauld, it is easy to see that language is continually twisting their reason; "*verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant*." (*Bacon, Nov. Organ.* 1, 59.) There was no labour so needed in psychology, as to go through the masses of observation which lay involved in figurative and ambiguous diction, and distorted with every extravagance of hypothesis and polemic bitterness, and restate in simple language the exact facts of consciousness. This work Reid did—did it with clearness, candour, patience, mo-

desty, and good sense, and with an unfeigned piety, which reminds one always of Sir Isaac Newton. His writings are perhaps the most important contribution to Psychology ever made by one man, and he will never suffer in the minds of those who love truth better than search for truth—better than intellectual gymnastics; (*Dis.* 46, 47; *Lect.* 9.) by comparison with his brilliant successors, Brown and Hamilton, or with the greatest names of France or Germany.

The positive side of Reid's system rests on the doctrine, that, in addition to what Locke and his followers mean by the knowledge of ideas and their relations, we have certain "original and natural judgments" or beliefs; "the inspiration of the Almighty;" "the common sense of mankind;" "on which all the discoveries of reason are grounded;" "anything manifestly contrary to which is absurd;" a disbelief in which is lunacy. (*R.* 209, 108, 425, 791.) Such a belief is involved in Perception. Reid's statement is as follows. When certain impressions are made upon our organs, nerves, and brain, certain corresponding sensations are felt, and we have certain perceptions. Perception has two ingredients,—first, the conception of the object perceived, (e. g. Hume's table;) secondly, an irresistible belief in its present existence. (*R.* 325, 326, also, 327, 258, 123, and *passim*.) "In this train of operations nature works in the dark, we can neither discover the cause of any one of them, nor any necessary connection of one with another." (*R.* 327.) The sensations are "a sort of natural signs," which "do suggest," or "conjure up as it were by a kind of natural magic," "the conception of the object," and "create a belief of it." (*R.* 122, 450.) When these impressions are made, by whatever cause, the sensation follows; and if the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us. (*R.* 320.) He further held that "our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities of matter, and inform us what they are in themselves; but of the secondary qualities our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion." (*R.* 313.)

Dr. Thomas Brown was the first person, so far as we know, to shake the ascendancy of Reid in the Scottish schools. He re-affirms the Baconian method, and attempts to carry it farther

by classifying all the phenomena of mind according to their antecedents or causes. He also re-affirms the existence, and the necessity to science and life, of "first truths" or "principles of intuitive belief," and lays down their characteristics, viz. they are "immediate, universal, and irresistible." He thinks, however, 1st. That Reid is mistaken in supposing that modern philosophers in general believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind. 2d. That Reid was mistaken in supposing that the refutation of such a theory of ideas would be a refutation of the idealism of Berkeley or the scepticism of Hume. 3d. That the sceptical reasonings apply as forcibly to Reid's doctrine of perception by *conceptions*, as to the doctrine of perception by *ideas*. The conceptions of which alone we are conscious, are states of mind, and the relation between these states of mind and any states of matter, is just as uncertain and inexplicable, and is exposed to just the same sceptical reasonings as the relation between ideas and matter. 4th. Reid's distinction between our knowledge of the primary and of the second qualities of matter is null. Our states of mind embrace all our knowledge, and anything else than a state of mind can be known only relatively, as the external cause or correlative of a state of mind. Brown's discussion of these four points has been called by eminence his attack on Reid. But he combatted many other opinions of Reid and Stewart. We mention only the following points of difference, regarded by Hamilton as fundamental to the doctrine of perception, and in which Hamilton agrees with Brown. (1.) He rejects consciousness as a distinct faculty. (*B. Lect.* xi., *Dis.* 53, *R.* 297.) (2.) He asserts the relativity of all knowledge. (*B. Lect.* xxv., *Dis.* 60.) (3.) He affirms the representative character of imagination, memory, &c. (*B. Lect.* xxxiii. xxxiv. *Dis.* 58.) (4.) He rejects the doctrine of perception by a medium, e. g. we see light, not Hume's table. (*B. Lect.* xix., *R.* 814.) (5.) He holds the whole nervous system as a unit to be the organ of sensation, not that impressions are transmitted to the brain. (*B. Lect.* xix., *R.* 821, 861.) (6.) He holds extra-organic matter to be known as a resisting object, not by a special instinct. (*B. Lect.* xxii. Hamilton similar only, *R.* 882.) How Brown and Hamilton stand in regard to the four first points—"the attack on Reid"—will soon be carefully considered.

Brown had early fixed on the relation of cause and effect as the true constitutive idea of genuine philosophy; and he attempted to rear by it the fabric of a truly scientific psychology. It is a brilliant conception, and his analysis and shaping of the great facts of mind are a splendid display of metaphysical genius. A young physician, wasting with consumption, his erudition could not be like that of Hamilton; but he played the same part in regard to the modern French philosophers, and the literary philosophic Latin writers, which Hamilton has since played towards the Germans, Greeks, and schoolmen, and the forgotten authors of all centuries and countries. He decorated his temple of mental science profusely with splendid ornaments from these abundant mines. The reception his writings met with, may be judged from the following criticisms:

Brown on Darwin's *Zoonomia* is "the perhaps unmatched work of a boy in the eighteenth year of his age." (*Sir Jas. Mackintosh, Prog. Eth. Phil.*, ed. 1851, p. 108.)

"His first tract on Causation appeared to me the finest model of discussion in mental philosophy since Berkeley and Hume; with this superiority over the latter, that its aim is that of a philosopher who seeks to enlarge knowledge," &c. (*Same*, p. 109.)

"He very justly considered the claim of Reid"—"as a proof of his having mistaken their (philosophers') illustrative language for a metaphysical opinion." (*Same*, p. 112.)

"An inestimable book." (*Dr. Parr, in Lowndes' Bib. Man.*)

"Neither Bacon, nor Hobbes, nor Berkeley, nor Locke, possessed powers of mind so splendid and so various. Brown is, beyond comparison, the most eloquent of philosophic writers. So much power and delicacy of intellect were never before united in an individual." (*Tait's Magazine, in Allibone's Dict. of Authors.*)

"The style is so captivating, the views so comprehensive, the arguments so acute, the whole thing so complete, that I was almost insensibly borne along upon the stream of his reasoning and his eloquence." "In the power of analysis he greatly transcends all philosophers of the Scottish school who preceded him." (*Morell's Hist. Mod. Phil.*, p. iii. 376.)

"That philosopher having, in the author's judgment, taken

a more correct view than any other English writer on the subject, of the ultimate intellectual laws of scientific inquiry, while his unusual powers of popularly stating and felicitously illustrating whatever he understood, render his works the best preparation which can be suggested for speculations similar to those contained in this treatise." (*J. S. Mill, Logic*, p. v.)

We add, also, the following from Mackintosh. It will explain one motive of the next few pages—we love this man:

"The character of Dr. Brown is very attractive, as an example of one in whom the utmost tenderness of affection, and the indulgence of a flowery fancy were not repressed by the highest cultivation, and by a perhaps excessive refinement of intellect. His mind soared and roamed through every region of philosophy and poetry; but his untraveled heart clung to the hearth of his father," (a Scottish minister) "to the children who shared it with him, and, after them, first to the other partners of his childish sports, and then almost solely to those companions of his youthful studies who continued to be the friends of his life." "He was one of those men of genius who repaid the tender care of a mother by rocking the cradle of her reposing age. He ended a life spent in searching for truth, and exercising love, by desiring that he should be buried in his native parish with his 'dear father and mother.'" (*Prog. Eth. Phil.*, p. 110.)

For twenty years from Brown's first delivery of lectures in 1808–9, and ten years from their posthumous publication, he seems to have been generally regarded as triumphant in his "attack on Reid," and to have worn the honours of a victor. But the avenger came in Sir William Hamilton. The article, which Hamilton's admirers speak of as having "annihilated" Brown, can hardly be matched in all polemic literature for its fierceness (*δαιμόνιος*), its art, its diction, its "inexorable march of ratiocination,"* its substantive importance as a contribution to the mastery of the theory of its subject. We do not think so highly of its equal and exact justice. Hamilton begins with charging Brown's posthumous lectures with "radical inconsistencies in every branch of their subject," "unacknowledged appropriations," "endless mistakes," "frequent misrepresentations," an "ignorant attack on Reid." (*Dis.* 50.)

* Jeffrey, quoted in this Review, 1859, p. 655.

He does not undertake to prove the "unacknowledged appropriations;" to establish the other charges he makes four points, which we purpose to examine, in order, first, to compare his statements, while annihilating Brown, with those he afterwards made while commenting on Reid; and secondly, to air the incunabula of his own theory of perception.

First. Brown "has completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position" (*Dis.* 52;) for, (a) Reid's position is Natural Realism—i. e. the doctrine that our knowledge of mind and matter is equally immediate and intuitive, (*Dis.* 60, 61;) while (b) Brown, by "a portentous error," "a transmutation without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy," thought it Cosmothetic Idealism, i. e., (so far as Brown is concerned,) the doctrine that our immediate knowledge is all embraced in consciousness, or states of mind, and that knowledge of the external world is by means of states of mind to which it sustains some perceived relation, or of states which necessitate a belief in its existence. (*Dis.* 62, 63.) As to (a) we remark, 1st. Hamilton admits that neither Reid nor Brown had ever distinguished Natural Realism from Cosmothetic Idealism. (*Dis.* 63.)

2d. He admits, also, that Reid's doctrine must be relieved of errors as to consciousness, memory, imagination, &c., to make it a consistent system of Natural Realism. (*Dis.* 52.)

3d. Reid's statements of his doctrine (see above, page 277) are inconsistent with what Hamilton calls Natural Realism, and do constitute what he calls Cosmothetic Idealism. Hamilton is explicit, and in many places unqualified in making this statement. "Reid, (and herein he is followed by Mr. Stewart) in the doctrine now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Idealism establishes its conclusions." (*R.* 128.) "In all essential respects, this doctrine of Reid and Stewart is identical with Kant's." (*R.* 128.) "It is to be observed that Reid himself does not discriminate *perception* and *imagination* by any essential difference. According to him, perception is only the conception (imagination) of an object, accompanied with a belief of its present existence; and even this last distinction, a mere 'faith without knowledge,' is surrendered by Mr. Stewart. Now, as concep-

tion (imagination) is only immediately cognizant of the *ego*, so must perception on this doctrine be a knowledge purely *subjective*," a system of idealism. (*R.* 183.) He again and again speaks of this idealism in the notes without qualification as "his (Reid's) doctrine," (*R.* 209, 289,) repeating Brown's proof that it is idealism, but, I think, never giving Brown any credit: ("unacknowledged appropriation.") "The doctrine of Reid and Stewart" "bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance." (*R.* 257.) "This appears to be an explicit disavowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception," (*R.* 310,) "a doctrine which cannot be reconciled with that of an intuitive or objective perception." (*R.* 321.) "On this point it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one." (*R.* 269.)

4th. Dugald Stewart, Royer Collard, and the other philosophers of Reid's school before Hamilton, held, like Reid, a doctrine which Hamilton considers Cosmothetic Idealism. The quotations already given show that Hamilton admits this in regard to Stewart; for further details of him and of Reid, and for similar statements in regard to Collard and other philosophers, we refer to Hamilton's Reid. (*R.* pp. 882, 297.)

5th. Hamilton's attempt to show that Reid was what he calls a natural realist is inconclusive. In the first place, his citations do not bear out his conclusions. He gives but two. He cites Reid's statement that "we have the same reason to believe the existence of external objects, as philosophers have to believe the existence of ideas," to prove that Reid maintains that "perception of external things is convertible with their reality;" and as he finds in another part of the book that Reid says that philosophers do consider themselves certain of the existence of ideas, because they perceive them, the march of ratiocination seems to be inexorable. But what does such ratiocination amount to against Reid's positive, detailed, and illustrated statement found in the treatise containing his maturest views, and mentioned above, (page 277,) "that whenever the sensation is produced, the corresponding perception follows, even when there is no object, and in that case is apt to deceive us." (*R.* 320.)

The second citation seems to be what Hamilton would call a "misrepresentation." It is quoted as though it were a classi-

fication made by Reid himself, (arranging all the vulgar on one side for Natural Realism, and the philosophers on the other for Cosmothetic Idealism, in order that he might take his stand with the vulgar.) But Reid is speaking of Hume's statement referred to above, (page 274,) about seeing the table. (*R.* 302.) The statements are Hume's. Again, when Reid takes his place among Hume's vulgar, who think they see a table, or tree, he takes arms against Hamilton and Hamilton's natural realism; for they say that we never see any such thing. (*R.* 303.)

In the second place, if we admit the reasoning, it does not go to the point. The conclusion is only that the aim of Reid's philosophy was a doctrine of intuition, not at all that it did not wholly miss its aim. If Reid's aim was a doctrine of common sense, and his doctrine actually was Cosmothetic Idealism, the logical conclusion would seem to be clear that Reid, as well as Brown, thought Cosmothetic Idealism to be the genuine doctrine of common sense.

But (*b*) Brown thought Reid's doctrine to be Cosmothetic Idealism. 1st. It is not true that he thought it a simple and consistent doctrine, and that it distinctly held that we have no immediate knowledge except of mind. On the contrary, Brown charges Reid with thinking that there is something mysterious in knowledge by perception, as though perception could be something more than a state of mind, and argues at length against Reid's statements. Dr. Reid's view of perception involves, he says, "a false conception of the nature of the process." (*Lect.* xxv.) "Dr. Reid was not sufficiently in the habit of considering the phenomena of the mind merely as the mind affected, but as something more mysterious." (*Lect.* xxvii.)

2d. Hamilton represents (misrepresents) Brown's arguments against these views of Reid as a "vindication of his interpretation," implying that the arguments are an appeal to the consistency of Reid as an avowed Cosmothetic Idealist. But we find nothing of that sort. They are addressed to common reason on the supposition simply that Reid believed mind and matter to be different things. To say that Brown interprets Reid to hold a doctrine, because Brown seems to think that every reasonable man must hold it after it is clearly stated, and then, as he attacks Reid for not holding it, to call

that a "vindication of his interpretation" seems to us more skilful than just. We shall again take up the arguments here referred to, as they are the turning point from Reid's theory of perception, to Hamilton's.

We are now prepared to judge how far the first charge, that of completely misunderstanding Reid's philosophy, is valid. Hamilton himself announces the triumphant conclusion that Brown has been proved guilty of an absolute reversal of its "unambiguous import." But we have now seen that the plausibility of Hamilton's "ratiocination" flows from his obtruding a classification of theories of perception, which neither Reid or Brown had ever thought of, and which their systems will not fit into at all without destructive stretching and lopping, deciding from their inferential aim where they would have chosen to go, and inexorably crushing them in; and from his representing Brown as having treated Reid in the same way; as though Brown represented Reid to actually hold a doctrine, because Brown thinks that as a reasonable man he must have held it, if he had heard the arguments. We have also seen that Hamilton, the annotator, himself states Reid's actual doctrine to be the very doctrine which Hamilton, the reviewer, considers its unambiguous opposite, and that he only argumentatively, and by inferences of the second degree, decides for himself what he admits to be a point not without difficulty; that Reid "intended" a doctrine of Natural Realism. (*R.* 820.) Under these circumstances it is not strange that in republishing the Review, he appends to the word "unambiguous" in his announcement of Brown's guilt, the note, "this is too strong." (*Dis.* 66.) The following is rather strange, "This admission does not, however, imply that Brown is not from first to last—is not in one and all of his strictures on Reid's doctrine of perception, as there shown, wholly in error." (*R.* 820.)

We know little of Hamilton except his writings; but we do know a class of men of whom nothing could be more characteristic than these two notes. Their views may be modified, as they word it, of some particular statement of a truth, but never of their personal relations to absolute truth. To find themselves to-day holding the opinion which they last year

denounced as monstrous, does not ruffle for an instant their constitutional prepossession that any one they have attacked is wholly in error, and that they themselves are, and always were, wholly right—only a little too strong. We cannot bestow unqualified confidence on such men.

Secondly. Hamilton charges that Brown's own theory of perception is Cosmothetic Idealism, and as such is an unnecessary hypothesis, (*Dis.* 68,) annihilates itself, (*Dis.* 69,) is a see-saw between hypothesis and fact, (*Dis.* 70,) destroys and re-creates the phenomena for which it would account, (*Dis.* 71,) attempts to explain a mere hyperphysical chimera, (*Dis.* 71,) and needs subsidiary miracles to eke it out, (*Dis.* 72.)

1st. It takes the chill from the contempt which is poured over Brown for all these absurdities, to learn, that, except a few sceptics and idealists, Reid is the first "among not forgotten philosophers," who has tried to embrace any other system, (*Dis.* 73,) and that Hamilton is the first who has actually escaped this one.

2d. The cosmothetic process has two parts, (a) "mind can form a representative conception of external objects." This power is no hypothesis. It is a fact. The phenomena of dreams, of ocular spectra, of tangible and audible illusions, as in mania a potu; more unquestionable still, the facts of memory and imagination prove it. So in perception;—in listening to a familiar language, for example, our true perceptions are pieced out by conceptions so nicely that they cannot be accurately distinguished. We learn the fact when we hear a foreign language. Would they match so, if they were totally unlike? Hamilton calls space an *a priori* form of imagination, see p. 295. (b) "An external world does exist, and is perceived through our conceptions of it." It exists, and we have no doubt, that if a world of minds having conceptions such as Cosmothetic Idealism says, and no reliance on belief except as a fact to be accounted for, were to be left to reason (we do not suppose, or suggest, that mankind have been so left,) to find out the causes and relations of the mental phenomena, a scientific system of the world would in due time be established exactly as it is now, with just the same conclusiveness as the Copernican astronomy is established. Nothing else

will explain the facts. General assertions that externality cannot be inferred from knowledge of mental states, are null. We must look at the nature and relations of the mental states. Again, is the external world perceived by conceptions? The mind must be in some state in perception. What objection is there to supposing that this state is like the state in conception; and if so, should not reflection inform us of it? It certainly seems to clear up many things to suppose that in perception the mind is forcibly put in a state like that which it afterwards voluntarily assumes in conception.

3d. Most of the alleged absurdities of the doctrine grow out of its alleged assertion that consciousness is a liar. At every turn, it, like all other systems, has to rely on consciousness, and at every turn Hamilton shows up this reliance as a contradiction. The alleged lie is, that we have an *immediate* knowledge of the external world. We deny that consciousness stakes its character for veracity on the *immediateness* of the knowledge. *Immediateness* is not a direct object of consciousness; knowledge begins in the indefinite. The mind may be conscious of no mean, while yet there is one. Hamilton himself advocates the doctrine of unconscious mental acts. (*Lect.* 235.) Brown does not assert that consciousness is deceptive any more than Hamilton, as we shall show by and by.

4th. Much of the talk does not apply at all to Brown, whose theory is not one of representation, properly so called. He holds that we know the external world as the cause (correlative) of certain states of mind, not that there is any ratio of representation between the two. But this is Hamilton's favourite mode of refutation,—to draw up a classification of all possible systems, argue the system he is attacking to be number three, say, in the classification, and then refute his own description of number three.

Thirdly. Hamilton charges that Reid is right, Brown always wrong, as to Reid's opinion that modern philosophers in general—"all modern philosophers," (*R.* 210)—believe that there are ideas distinct from the mind.

Brown says that before Reid's day this old hypothesis had ceased to be distinctly held, and that the language implying it would have been admitted figurative by most of the philosophers

to whom Reid imputes the theory. He mentions six authors in whom the statement is to be found, that ideas are perceptions merely, or states of mind—Descartes, Arnauld, Hobbes, Locke, Le Clerc, Crousaz. We will give a few words to each.

DESCARTES: Hamilton, reviewing Brown, says that “to determine what Descartes’ doctrine of perception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps impossible.” (*Dis.* 76.) Hamilton, the commentator of Reid, has determined it to be exactly what Brown says, and, moreover, that it is less ambiguous than Reid’s own doctrine. (*R.* 207, 272, 273, 296, 297.*)

ARNAULD: Hamilton admits Brown to be right as to Arnauld’s doctrine, but says the question is, whether “Reid admits Arnauld’s opinion on perception and his own to be identical?” If he does, Hamilton gives up the whole argument. (*Dis.* 80.) Hamilton the commentator says: “On this point (perception) it is probable that Descartes and Reid are at one.” (*R.* 269.) And further: “I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes’ doctrine, Arnauld is right.” Arnauld claimed his own doctrine to be that of Descartes. (*R.* 296.) Notice, also, that Stewart approves Arnauld’s doctrine. (*R.* 297.)

HOBBS: Hamilton admits that he did hold idea and perception to be one; but poor Brown, notwithstanding, is more wholly wrong than if he had not been right. (See *Dis.* 79.)

LOCKE says, as quoted by Brown, that “having ideas” and “perception” is “the same thing.” (*Hum. Underst.*, B. II. chap. i. § 9.) So also—“our ideas being nothing but actual

* Hamilton states that the cardinal point of Descartes’ system is, that mind and matter are *naturally* to each other as zero; but we find no such statement in Descartes. On the contrary, he explains at length the mutual action of mind and matter, stating in so many words that they act immediately on each other (agens immediate,) being of that nature (quæ talis est naturæ.) (*De Pass.* xxxiv., xxxv.) Hamilton being perhaps aware of this fact, adds a note, in which he proves that his cardinal point must be involved, by a choice bit of ratiocination, in our language and with our exposition, as follows: Descartes considers extension the essence of matter, and that its motions are due to the ordinary concurrence of God; but if extension (not being a force) cannot move extension without ordinary concurrence, *a fortiori* mind (being more like God than extension) cannot move it, but must have *supernatural* concurrence. (*Dis.* 77.)

perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them." (*Same*, II. x. 2.) Hamilton does not seem to have made up his mind to anything about Locke, except that Brown is wholly wrong. (*Dis.* 83, *R.* 210, 273.)

LE CLERC, CROUSAZ: Brown says the doctrine that *ideas* are states of mind, is to be found in the text-books of schools and colleges, and cites these two. Hamilton admits they have the doctrine, but commenting on Brown's language, asserts that "Reid exploded it (the doctrine) altogether." (*Dis.* 86.) And this language he republishes, without note or comment, after he had printed in his Reid, that "Reid, unfortunately, did not accomplish—did not attempt" what it was "incumbent on him," "indispensably necessary for him" to do, in order to establish Natural Realism against Idealism (*R.* 842, 824); and also, after having asserted over and over again, that Reid's doctrine is not to be distinguished from the one he is here said to have exploded. (*Former citations, and R.* 824.) He adds, secondly—"It is false that this doctrine of perception (Arnauld's) had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools." (*Dis.* 86.) Now compare the following citations from Hamilton's Reid.

"It (the opinion of Arnauld and Brown) is found fully detailed in almost every systematic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first promulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. Arnauld's was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Representations, as mere modifications of the mind, . . . and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems." (*R.* 297, 207.) "This," (a great unanimity as to the existence of ideas,) "as already once and again stated, is not correct." (*R.* 373, 140.)

With this we finish what we have to say on this third charge. No one, who reads what we have adduced, will think the critical opinions of Brown contemptible. On the contrary, it seems plain that he had a remarkable power of seizing the points of a philosophic system, in comparison with his predecessors (whom Hamilton perpetually corrects,) and that he had penetrated

those systems here discussed more deeply than Hamilton himself had at the time of writing this review.

Fourthly. Hamilton charges that Brown totally misconceived Hume's sceptical reasoning, and Reid's argument against Hume.

We have already stated Hume's argument (pp. 274, 275.) In order that it may be seen in its application, we will give the following colloquy, re-written from Hume, (*Phil. Ess.*, vol. ii. 169,) and Hamilton's attack on Brown, (*Dis.* 99.) "Do you follow," says Hume, "your instinctive beliefs in assenting to the veracity of sense?" "I do," says Hamilton, (*Dis.* 90, and elsewhere.) "But these," continues Hume, "lead you to believe that the object of perception is the very table which remains unchanged in size and figure by our change of situation, and is white, whether we look at it or not. Do you disclaim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion?" "It is certain," says Hamilton, "that whiteness is no quality of the table; it is in the strictest sense a passive affection of the sentient ego, (*R.* 858); and it is a fundamental article of my system that the mind must be present in space to what it perceives. (*R.* 809.) The table cannot be an object of perception at all. (*R.* 814.) I must so far recall my admission (*Dis.* 61, *comment first*,) and give the lie to this natural belief." "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," (*Dis.* 92) proceeds Hume; "you renounce all reliance on your natural beliefs. Can you now bring me any convincing argument from experience, to prove the existence of an external world?" "I cannot," says Hamilton; "the reality of our knowledge cannot be inferred. It is to be presumed from the veracity of our constitutive beliefs." (*Dis.* 90.) "Since then," concludes Hume, "you admit that you cannot answer me by reasoning, and since you have given up all reliance on natural belief, you must either admit that I am right in my scepticism, or refuse your assent on no ground whatsoever—Pyrrhonism or absurdity?—choose your horn."

Brown is charged with not seeing that this reasoning turns on the destructive nature of a denial of any single fact of consciousness. Hamilton says that Brown thought he could deny one fact of consciousness, and still appeal to its veracity as to other facts; and that he supposed Reid to admit that reason

teaches that consciousness deceives us in perception, and yet to assert that we must believe our consciousness because we cannot help it. 1st. We cannot find anything in Brown which gives probability to this statement.* What gives it its little plausibility is, that Brown and Hamilton differ as to the precise nature of our belief in an external world. Brown thinks it a belief in the existence of external causes of our sensations, while Hamilton "enounces" it to be "I *immediately* know in perception an external world as existing." Surely to differ with Hamilton in his interpretation of consciousness is not to give the lie to consciousness itself. 2d. Hamilton seems to treat Brown's remarks on the idealistic portion of Hume's argument—namely, the argument against inferring an external world from ideas—as though they were remarks on Hume's Pyrrhonism as a whole. 3d. Hamilton, though he attacks Brown for applying the idealistic argument to Reid, does yet admit its validity, adopt it as his own, and repeat it again and again in his notes on Reid, and without giving Brown credit for it. (*R.* 128, 129, 183, 282, 290, 318, 446, 820, &c.)

We here finish our special criticism of Hamilton's treatment of Brown, with one remark. It seems to us not only that Hamilton did Brown injustice in holding him up to contempt as an ignorant blunderer, but that admirers of Hamilton who love his reputation as a lover of truth, and who themselves love truth more than they admire intellectual gymnastics, should not exult over the dialectic skill, which, in such a state of facts, could "annihilate" the object of its attack, but should rather regret that the amiable prejudices of affection for Reid and Stewart, or other prejudices, could have so blinded or warped the great logician.

We now proceed to develop the progress towards a theory of perception from Hume onwards.

REID saw that to answer Hume's sceptical argument he must adhere to the instinctive beliefs. He, therefore, held to it that he verily saw the white table. The general point he made good in a general way, and it may be considered a solid acquisition to psychology. He purposed further to state the facts of

* Note also that Brown argues against Kant, that having denied consciousness in one point, he can no longer appeal to it. (*Ed. Rev.* vol. i. pp. 266, 267.)

perception free from all hypothesis. The danger which he saw, however, lay in asserting that something else than mind and matter are concerned in perception. He did not see any contradiction of our beliefs, or foundation for Idealism in the statement, that in connection with certain sensations, a conception of extension is suggested, which is accompanied by an instinctive belief in the existence of an extended substance, the object of our perception.

BROWN demonstrated that Reid's description of perception by conceptions affords as firm a basis for Idealism, as perception by ideas. Yet he accepted the description. His relation to Reid is like Hume's to Locke. He also attempted a demonstration that no state of mind can give more than a relative knowledge of matter, against Reid's statement that we know the primary qualities, as they are in themselves. The gist of it follows.

A perception (conception and belief) of extension is a state of mind. We know nothing of the way in which it is caused. God could have so made us that it would have been suggested on other occasions than those on which it is now suggested. He could make it arise if there were no matter in existence. *Matter cannot be necessary to the existence of any other phenomenon than a state of matter.* To assert then that matter is necessary to a perception of extension, is to assert that a *perception is a state of matter*. (It is a state of matter, says Hamilton, see page 293.) But Reid holds that states of matter and states of mind are totally unlike and incompatible; therefore Reid could not consistently hold that perception of extension is a state of matter, (therefore Reid must have held it, says Hamilton,) (*Dis.* 66;) nor, therefore, that matter *in any given state* is necessary to a perception of extension; i. e. he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is the necessary external correlative of a perception of extension; i. e. he could not hold that matter *as it is in itself* is known in the perception of extension. (He could not hold it, says Hamilton, repeating the reason.) (*R.* 313.)

HAMILTON then it behooved, (1) *To state the precise extent of our fundamental belief in respect to the external world;* (2) *To re-state the process of perception, so as to afford no basis for idealism,* showing, one would think, where Brown's argu-

ment is weak against our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter, as they are in themselves.

We have found that a statement can often be made about material facts, which, if not exactly illustrative, will yet be suggestive of the central idea of a psychological theory, and aid even clear minds in readily thinking out its details. We throw out the following.

Reid's idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a plain mirror endowed with consciousness. When brought face to face with an external object, it sees it just as it is. Sight was the sense his thought most turned to.

Brown had dwelt much on cause and effect in the material world. His favourite illustrations are drawn from attraction, magnetism, &c. His idea of the mind in perception may be suggested by thinking of a conscious pile of steel-filings affected by the action and motions of a remote and invisible magnet. The filings know themselves and their own motions, and that there is some external cause of all the motions. All they know of the magnet is how it moves them. Feeling is his sense.

Hamilton, too, had been worried by cause and effect. He conceives an effect as a result of two or more causes. (*R.* 625.) Allow us to define a burning lamp as oil and so much luminiferous ether as pervades it; then (discounting other conditions) the flame is a phenomenon of the lamp and the oxygen of the air—a phenomenon of ether, oil, and oxygen equally—of any one just as truly as of either of the others. Hamilton's idea of man (mind and body) in perception may be suggested by thinking of a burning lamp which is conscious of its flame, and in that consciousness knows at once a phenomenon of ether (mind) and oil (body) directly, and of oxygen (external world) in relation to them. Feeling is his sense also. Knowledge is limited to phenomena, each of which is the joint product of substances within the sphere of our personal presence.

He addressed himself first to the fundamental belief. He was to make it the contradictory of materialism, and of all idealism overt or implied, especially of Brown's Cosinothetic Idealism. The result is as follows, in his own words, but brought together and arranged. In the act of sensible perception I am conscious of two things; of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an extended external reality in relation

with my sense as the object perceived, i. e. known immediately in itself as existing—each apprehended at once as independent, out of, and in direct contrast to the other. (*R.* 745, 747.)

1st. *Conscious of the object* contradicts the idealism lurking in saying that perception is a conception and belief, and that we are conscious of them, but not of their objects. 2d. *Immediately*, i. e. with no intervening thing, which might exist, though the object did not—so that there is no mistake possible, no consciousness of perceiving possible, unless the object actually exists. (*R.* 805.) This position also requires, it should be added, that perception should not be regarded as an effect of any antecedents in time. Reid asserts an intervening conception, and an antecedent sensation, both of which may be grounds of illusive perception. See p. 277. 3d. *In itself as existing*, this involves the *when* and *where* of the object—its presence to the mind both in space and time. (*R.* 809.) Reid asserts immediate perception of remote objects by sight, and immediate knowledge of remote objects in time. As he places the mind in immediate connection only with the brain, all perception is of remote objects. 4th. *Extended*, against Brown's denial of knowledge of extension as it is in the external object itself. But see above, p. 291. (*R.* 745.) 5th. *Each apprehended*, &c., contradicts materialism. (*R.* 747.) Having in this way, as a good logician, injected his whole system into the fundamental belief, the next step was to restate the facts of sensation and perception by our several senses, into agreement with the assumed belief. Reid's statements contradict it at every step. Let us see what Hamilton makes of it. We may be permitted for convenience of statement to suppose that Hamilton saw the following connections of thought. He probably did.

1st. To answer to the statement that we are "*conscious of mind and matter at once*," he asserts that a sensation is a state of mind and equally a state of matter. (*R.* 884, 881.)

2d. To answer to the word "*immediately*" as explained above, he asserts that the mind is present to all sensations, and knows them in their several places, (as phenomena of parts of the body,) (*R.* 821, 2: 880, 16: 884, 39: 809, 11,) so that knowing must be convertible with reality, (*R.* 810, 18: 811, 25;) and that sensation and perception are coexistent

states of mind, perception being only the consciousness of two or more sensations as phenomena of body in their relation in space. (*R.* 880, 17: 881, 21: 882, 31: 883, 34.)

3d. To answer to "*in itself as existing*" he asserts that the mind is present at the periphery of the nerves—the outside of the body, and so present at once to the nerves and to the external object touching them, (*R.* 821, 2: 861: 319, 320,) and that it is only then and there that we have perceptions. (*R.* 145, 302.) All our senses are modifications of touch. (*R.* 247.) Nothing else is perceived than our bodies and things touching them. (*R.* 247.)

4th. To answer to "*extended*," he asserts that we know our bodies to be extended by being consciously present in sensation to different parts of them at once, and perceiving the relations in space of the sensations, and so of the parts of the body of which they are phenomena, (*R.* 884, 39: 883, 31,) and that we perceive the extension of external objects by knowing where they touch the body. (*R.* 881, 26.)

5th. That the mind apprehends matter as independent of, and in contrast with itself, rests as affirmation. Hamilton has written a volume of elaborate distinctions on the generals of his theory; but has never given detailed statements of the operations of the several senses, and it is very hard to make out what he thought actually occurs, in sight, for example. We know no better way to show distinctly what his system is, and display it as justly exposed to strong objections, than by a discussion of vision.

The true philosophy of realism and of common sense rests on two capital facts, which must be accepted as ultimate on the authority of consciousness. We ask attention to the statement that they are given as *indefinite*, as Comparative Philology shows (all) other human knowledge to have been, and brought to precision by the action of our faculties. Sensations and their external correlatives are given indefinitely, e. g. heat, and the hot iron; pain, and the tooth; reflection, by making our knowledge more precise, separates them. So distance and size are given indefinitely in sight, but made definite. (See after, p. 297.)

FIRST. WE PERCEIVE SPACE IMMEDIATELY. (*a*) *We*;—all

conscious minds in the act of consciousness, recognizing self as finite. (b) *Perceive*;—know as real existence, different from, and out of self;—a simple act incapable of explanation. On being confronted with an object, the mind perceives the object as it is;—not its effect on the mind, nor a joint phenomenon of it and mind. Space actually exists, and we know it to actually exist;—know it as it actually exists;—*perceive* it. (c) *Space*;—extension such as it really is in respect to limit and quality. *Space* is one thing; *perception* of space a totally different thing; a *conception* of space, were it possible, would also be totally different from space. (d) *Immediately*;—not by means of any special sense;—in connection with all the senses, and with other acts of consciousness. We are posited in space, and directly know it, as well when the eyes are shut as when they are open. We cannot get out of it, or imagine ourselves out of it.

We think it impossible to have a consistent scheme of real perception without this first principle. The object of perception is perceived in space. No mode of mind can sustain such a relation to extended objects, as we see space sustain. Objects known as *in* a state or mode of mind, as bodies are in space, or any way like it, or analogous to it, must be admitted to be mental states, as Kant supposes, or we are involved in an inextricable tangle of words without thoughts.

HAMILTON PRONOUNCES SPACE “AN A PRIORI FORM OF IMAGINATION”—“a mere subjective state.” (*R.* 841.) Kant’s analysis of space into a form of mind is to him conclusive. (*Lect.* 346.) He admits, however, that it is essential to realism that we *perceive extension* in objects. (*Lect.* 346, *R.* 126, 882, 30.) His *a priori* conception is a mere *obiter* conception, a fifth wheel, as far as perception is concerned; but it will turn up again in his philosophy of the Conditioned, where it works wonders.

SECOND. WE PERCEIVE THE EXTERNAL CORRELATIVES OF OUR SENSATIONS (AND MUSCULAR EFFORTS) AS ACTUALLY OCCUPYING POSITIONS IN SPACE.*

* We add to complete this view: *Conception*, or *imagination*, whenever an actual phantasm of an extended body is a direct object of thought, involves, 1st. the distinguishing some part of this space with imagined qualities. A

These external correlatives are different for different sensations. 1st. Some sensations are intended to give us knowledge of our own bodies chiefly. The correlatives of these are those parts of the body to which they call instinctive attention. They vary greatly in definiteness of location, from toothache to hunger. 2d. Others are intended chiefly to give us notice of the relations of external objects to our physical well-being. These are mostly modifications of touch. The external correlative is two-fold, the body and the object touching it, to which attention is instinctively called. These, too, vary greatly in their definiteness. Smell, so far as use in location is concerned, seems in man to be a sort of rudimental sense, meant for animals of prey. 3d. Two senses we have whose eminent office is communication of mind with mind, and knowledge of material things as they are in themselves, and of their relations to each other; the senses of love and reason, music and beauty;—hearing, namely, and sight. Of these, hearing deals chiefly with the sensations, and its perfection lies in the precision of its distinctions in time—not space. In its higher uses it locates its correlatives but indefinitely. Music, dilating the soul into its highest capacity for worship and the infinite, has something of the infinite in its pervading presence. The perfection of sight, on the contrary, lies in precise distinctions of the correlatives in space.

We may sum up our knowledge of the material world by perception thus: We know that there are objects occupying particular parts of space, which are correlative to certain sensations, or muscular efforts. 2d. Memory being implied in perception, we perceive motion or change of place among these

geometrician draws a diagram in the air with his finger, letters it, and demonstrates upon it, as though it were chalked on a board before him. His object of thought is a part of space dressed in imaginary colours, but as different from a mental mode as the perception of a chalk diagram of the same size.

Fact. The organism of any sense is essential to conceptions of the objects of that sense. *Hypothesis*, (1.) the nerves in a state like that in sensation; (2.) mind in a state like sensation; (3.) space *perceived*; (4.) state of mind like perception; i. e. external correlatives of sensation are now *conceived*, i. e., imagined as located in space under laws like those governing perception.

bodies, and can learn its laws, and all other facts and laws which depend upon, or are connected with motion in bodies or their parts. We perceive also change of qualities—brightness, colour, savour, smell, force; the last is generally ascertained by instruments in which motion indicates it. Hamilton would say of this statement, that, after all, matter is only the *unknown* correlative of certain sensations; that being a logician's way of saying that all we know of it is that it is the correlative of certain sensations, and has certain laws of motion, and change. Having dubbed it an *unknown* correlative, he considers it as labeled for limbo. So might we dispose of gravity, as a name for an unknown cause, and yet there is perhaps nothing in nature more thoroughly and exactly known than gravity. The knowledge we have of matter is by no means slight, though it is limited as we have stated, in its original elements.

HAMILTON'S STATEMENT IS THAT WE PERCEIVE OUR SENSATIONS AS ACTUALLY OCCUPYING DIFFERENT POSITIONS IN SPACE.

We proceed to consider sight. The known facts may be classed as (1) sensation and its antecedents, or (2) facts of perception.

Sensation and its antecedents. 1st. A luminous object.

2d. The forming, by rays of light from the object, of an inverted picture of it on the nervous fibrils which stand in the back of the eye, separate like the hairs of a brush, and receive the rays on their ends, and which run separate to the brain.

3d. Some definite effect on the brain through the action of each fibril; or, possibly, some mutual action of brain and fibrils. The 2d and 3d antecedents are unknown to consciousness.

4th. A sensation of colour for each nervous fibril affected.

Facts of perception. We perceive the external correlative of the sensation for each fibril, as a coloured point, in its true direction from the fibril. A number of coloured points, corresponding to the number of fibrils affected, all seen in their true direction, and, by the action of the entire apparatus of vision, seen instinctively in their true distance and size (indefinitely,) constitutes a perception of the object emitting the rays, in its true colour, size, shape, and distance. Direc-

tion, distance, and size, are all seen, but indefinitely, and to be mutually adjusted by the judgment. Judgment adds no elements, but brings to precision.

The *antecedents of sensation* should not be identified with the *objects of perception*. The mind may, perhaps, not have to travel back the same route to the object. They serve to put the mind in relation (*en rapport*) with the object; then it sees directly.*

Hamilton identifies sensation and the 3d antecedent, or, perhaps, separates this antecedent into a double affection, of which one part is identified with the sensation, and the other is not, and he supposes the mind present to the 2d, and unconscious of the 1st. He holds that the sensation of colour (state of mind) is at the external end of the fibril, and is a state of matter as well; i. e. a phenomenon of (light+nerve;) (nerve =matter+mind.) (*R.* 160, 299, 861.)

Perception is the knowledge by the mind present at the end of several fibrils at once of its sensations as arranged in space just *as*, and just *where*, the ends of the fibrils are. (See above, pp. 293, 294.)

A common-sense man, who was no metaphysician, would get about as near the thought as he ever could, from being told that the mind is spread out behind the eye, and has a feeling just the shape, and size, and colour of the picture on the retina. We do not see the image on the retina (*R.* 160,) but have a bunch of feelings there just the shape of it.

To this theory of perception we make the following objections, placing first those which apply specifically to the sense of sight.

1st. It is untrue as a statement of facts. It is not true that colour is seen at the end of the nervous fibrils. We know

* The elaborate and exact machinery of our organs, which might be used in perception, but of which we are unconscious, strongly suggests some relation equivalent to use between the mind and organs—the latent mental modifications of Leibnitz. Such a doctrine would agree substantially with the perception by intentional species of the schoolmen. (*R.* 814.) A true eye might note a ray in more than one place, as it moves through it, and so give direction, (the superficial eye-spots of some lower animals seem sensitive to light, without giving distance;) but the received law of direction is adverse.

nothing, from consciousness, of the fibrils or the pictures in our own eyes, and colour is seen outside the eye. (a) If the coloured points seen were at the ends of the nervous fibrils, the forms seen as the result of the combination of points would be inverted, as compared with the forms felt; but this is not the fact, the coloured object is right side up. (b) We see coloured points with each eye, as the phenomena of double vision prove. If these points were seen at the ends of the fibrils, we never could see an object single, with both eyes open on it. It is only by seeing the coloured points at a certain fixed distance from the eyes that these points can coincide and we can have single vision; but consciousness assures us of single vision.

2d. It is an abuse of the word *perception* to call by that name the recognition of light as present at the eye and tattooing it in figure. The perception of a white table was the problem of Hume. Such was also that of Descartes, Locke, Reid, and Brown; so that if it could be admitted that we perceive the ends of our optic nerves, the problem of the table still remains, and we have still the real difficulty left, to explain what then truly becomes, as Swift called sight, the art of seeing things that are invisible.

Hamilton seems to have been so devoted to his refutation of all possible idealisms, that perception came to mean with him nothing but a fact that contradicts Idealism. But other philosophers in discussing perception were not seeking the special point where we so come in contact with matter that its existence is most incontestable, but were treating all the knowledge which we have in using the senses.

3d. As a solution of the general problem of sight, (e. g. seeing a table,) Hamilton's theory would seem to be what he stigmatizes as the grossest form of the representative hypothesis, i. e. the perception of the external object by means of a material image present to the mind. That he in effect asserts that the direct object of sight is a material image of the table present to the mind is to us certain. He only escapes "the grossest form of representation" by asserting that we do not perceive the table at all.

4th. Denying the perception of the table, his theory does not give us data for any knowledge of it corresponding to con-

sciousness. He says it is a belief, the result of judgment, and the like; but it seems plain that when we look at the table, we do not contemplate a belief, or a judgment, or any combination of either. It is either a white space-filling table, or something that looks amazingly like one. The passages which bear on this general problem are hard to reconcile.

(a) Some imply perception of the table.

He defends the propriety of saying that he is conscious of an inkstand which he sees. (*Lect.* 158.) Now, as he could be conscious of it only if immediately known, the ratiocination would be inexorable, which would convict him of holding that inkstands are perceived by sight, in opposition to his hundred-times-repeated assertion to the contrary. He describes the perception of a book by sight. (*Lect.* 103.) So he quotes Hume as assenting to his statement of perception in saying that we see a white table. (*Lect.* 201.) So a rose is seen (*R.* 129,) and a wall is known as the subject in which colour inheres. (*R.* 805, 301.)

(b) Some imply the table to be a subject of inference, or a cause of the perceived object.

He generally lets it go with, "all else" (but what is in immediate contact with its organ) "is something over and above perception" (*R.* 145;) but we find "it is only reached by reasoning" (*R.* 186;) "by inference" (*R.* 247;) "only the causes of the object we immediately perceive" (*Lect.* 375;) "by inference, acquired, mediate, and at best always insecure" (*R.* 177;) "only known through something different from itself in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagination" (*R.* 810.)

(c) Now what are the data on which inferences are to proceed? What the materials which are to be constructed in imagination?

We find but three passages that give us any light on these points. "We always see in a particular direction," &c. (*R.* 160.) Vision is "a perception by which we take immediate cognizance of light in relation to our organ"—"and likewise as falling on it in a particular direction." (*R.* 160.) "This natural perception of outness, which is the foundation of our acquired knowledge of distance, seems given us in the

natural perception we have of the direction of the rays of light." (*R.* 177, *Lect.* 393.) These passages seem to contradict Hamilton's principles. What is it we see in a particular direction from the eye?—a ray of light?—but that is known only by its sensation of colour; and is seen only as a luminous point. Is the luminous point seen in a particular direction from the eye?—but Hamilton says it is seen in its true *where*, i. e. where the mind is present to it at the end of the nerve; it is a sensation, and cannot be outside the eye. To perceive the direction of a ray is to perceive a relation between two perceived points of the ray, and involves an immediate knowledge of the ray before it arrived at the organ of sense, "which is a contradiction in terms." (*R.* 305.) It presupposes the perception of outness, which is the unambiguous contradictory of contact; and, sure enough, here is *outness* asserted. Outness of what? Can we perceive outness, and nothing out? Hamilton goes on to say that in the case of the blind boy couched by Cheselden, "the objects seemed to touch his eye, as what he felt did his skin;" "but," adds Hamilton, "they did not appear to him as in his eyes, far less as a mere affection of the organ." This would seem a distinct statement that the objects of sight are seen at a distance.

The materials for imagination to construct the remote object in this case must be either our sensations, or copies of these sensations. To suppose the first contradicts Hamilton's theory that the sensations are known where they are. To suppose the second contradicts consciousness, which knows nothing of a double object.

We do not find these views of outness repeated, and the notes in which they occur are embarrassed and unsatisfactory in other respects; neither, though Hamilton has notes on single vision, and classifies in his fashion all possible modes of explaining it, does he give the slightest hint of his own views (*R.* 163, 814;) nor, though the occasion presents itself often, does he show how his inverted direct object is yet seen right side up—except so far as these statements just quoted may go to explain it.

If, under these circumstances, we may hazard "a wide solution," it is, that Hamilton never could make his theory of

perception agree with the admitted facts of vision, and that he never made up his mind what is the true account of seeing a table. He might have called his essays on Perception, as well as his remarks on the relations of Consciousness to mind and matter, what he does call his essays on the Conditioned—"Hints of an Undeveloped Philosophy." (*Dis.* 587.)

OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY AS A WHOLE.

5th. In limiting knowledge to objects present to the mind in space and time, it reduces knowledge to an infinitesimal—to nothing. The mind is unextended; but Perception is a knowledge of the remote. To obtain any knowledge by Perception, Hamilton has (contradictorily) to extend the mind over the body. Time present is a vanishing point between past and future; but consciousness is a knowledge of the identical. To obtain knowledge by consciousness he has (contradictorily) to declare memory essential to consciousness. (*Lect.* 141.)

6th. It is untrue as a statement of facts.

(a) The mind is not present at the periphery of the nerves, having immediate knowledge—i. e. knowledge convertible with fact—of sensations as *there*. Impressions on any part of the nerves of touch may be located at the periphery. In disease the pain is often located at a part remote from the part affected. A person who has lost a limb still locates sensations in the non-existent member. The elaborate machinery which connects the brain with all parts of the body, and the effects on consciousness of disordering it, are satisfactory evidence to most men that the mind is not an organism, but uses remote organs, and communicates with them through the nerves, as the telegraph operator communicates through his wires.

But when we admit that the mind is primarily present in space only to some sensorium, all perception, except possibly of the unknown sensorium, becomes representative, and Hamilton's immediate knowledge dislimns into judgments and images.

(b) Perception is not dependent on the presence of the mind in space to the thing known. That would involve either that the mind is extended, or that extension cannot be *perceived*. As long as knowledge is thought of as the consciousness of a joint phenomenon of two contiguous substances, one of which is unextended, the sphere of perception cannot embrace extension; but consciousness assures us that it does

embrace it—that the sphere of knowledge is very different from the sphere of personal presence in space.

7th. It is contradictory in placing the nervous organism both within and without the mind. Hamilton himself propounds this difficulty, re-affirms the fact, makes no attempt to explain it, and pronounces it “the mystery of mysteries to man.” (*R.* 880.) It is a single illustration of the results of placing mind under the category of quantity. Let it go for what it is worth!

8th. It is skeptical: for, by denying the testimony of consciousness that the objects of sight are perceived at a distance from the eye, it destroys the veracity of consciousness, and so establishes Pyrrhonism. (See p. 289.)

9th. It compares unfavourably with Cosmothetic Idealism. The statement that knowing sensations of colour (states of mind) in space (a form of mind) constitutes perception, is, so far, pure idealism. Hamilton makes this statement. (*R.* 881, 21: 885, 48.) If now he had added to it this other statement—that the consciousness now described is accompanied by, or involves the necessary belief that these states of mind arranged in this form of mind are the correlatives of external forces (matter) analogously arranged in an external space, that would have been Cosmothetic Idealism—Cosmothetic Idealism, that complex of all absurdities; since any phenomena of an extended substance in an external space are wholly unlike, and incompatible with any mental states, so that to suppose any ratio even of representation between them is absurd.

Observe now how Hamilton avoids this absurdity. He affirms that these two totally unlike and incompatible sets of phenomena are identically one and the same; they are not simply thought as one—they positively are, and are positively known and felt to be one: the mind is immediately present in time and space to the whole thing, and embraces it as one in its consciousness.

Surely this may be characterized in the “matchless style of Hamilton” by saying that “in place of simply originating from the incomprehensible, it ostentatiously departs from the absurd.”

10th. It will promote materialism, or, more accurately, Spinozism, or monism.

(a) The proof of the independent and contrasted nature of mind and matter has been, since the time of Descartes, rested on the incompatibility of their phenomena.

"To mark the boundaries of physiology, and psychology, we must simply inquire—what are the phenomena which we learn by *consciousness*, and what those which we learn by outward *observation*? These two regions lie entirely without each other; so much so, that there is not a single fact known by consciousness, which we could ever have learned by observation, and not a single fact known by observation of which we are ever conscious. A sensation, for example, is known simply by consciousness; the material conditions of it, as seen in the organ, and the nervous system, simply by observation. No one could ever see a sensation, or be conscious of an organic action; accordingly, the one fact belongs to psychology, the other to physiology." (*Morell's Modern Philosophy*, 304.)

But Hamilton makes all sensations phenomena of both mind and matter.

Consciousness is to be the sole authority as to what are the objects of thought. The object of perception, for example, is that, and only that, which is perceived. But Hamilton *seems* to use *observation* instead. He says that the direct object of sight, for example, is the light and nerve in relation; but consciousness knows nothing of either; it rests on the luminous object. Such an obtrusion destroys psychology.

(b) The philosophy of a portion of the followers of Descartes, founding on the independent and contrasted existence of mind and matter, had held that there are two parallel series of phenomena, one in matter, the other in mind; any connection, or mutual intercourse between which is maintained by the "concourse of the Deity. Spinoza, taking up this system, welded the two series together by the simple statement, that they are phenomena of one substance viewed under different relations. "*Et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur,*" (*Eth.* II. 6,) and, applying the statement to man, "*quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit, quæ jam sub cogitationis, jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur.*" (*Eth.* III. 2.) The consequences of this

doctrine may be there seen, drawn out with a ratiocination as inexorable as that of Hamilton.

Now when Hamilton affirms that the mind is present to the whole body, (nervous organism,) and that our sensations are known in self-consciousness to be states of mind, and the same sensations known in perception to be states of body; especially when it is added that the sphere of our perceptions is limited by that of our bodily presence, and coincident in time and space with that of our sensations, he holds a doctrine which could not become common without making Spinozism common.*

Hamilton is indeed an emphatic dualist. He even holds that his doctrine is the only one on which dualism can stand, as strongly as Berkeley did that his doctrine was a vindication of the external world of common sense. He is emphatic in the assertion that the mind is unextended, the external world extended; and that they are known as independent of, out of, and in contrast to each other; their relation in sensation is the mystery of mysteries. But we feel sure that to most persons who should receive his views as we have set them forth, it will appear an easy solution of the mystery to say that consciousness is the interior experience of the same substance of which perception gives the exterior appearance.

(e) One of the best services of Reid is his adopting, and bringing into use, entirely different sets of terms for our knowledge of mind and our knowledge of matter—consciousness, &c. on the one hand, opposed to perception, &c. on the other; stamping with his approval what the common sense of mankind had indefinitely asserted in language, that consciousness is limited to mental states, and does not embrace external objects. This use has not arisen, as Hamilton says, from the prevalence of the ideal system, but because our knowledge of self is different in kind and in certainty from that of matter. We all feel our liability to mistake an object of perception. We have been mistaken a thousand times; but we are sure that

* Hamilton's doctrine that consciousness gives only a relative knowledge of self, coupled with that of latent modifications of mind, also strongly favours the monistic conception of the conscious Ego as an observer who sees some portion only of the phenomena of a great power or substance (mind, God,) of which it is thus only a mode.

we *think* we perceive. Consciousness is not, in the English speech, a general name for all our states of mind and their objects. It is a light in which our mental states go on,* varying in intensity with different degrees of attention, and, perhaps, in quality with the character of the Ego. Unless we believe with Hamilton that the sphere of knowledge is confined to that of our personal presence in space, we must admit, on his principles, that objects of knowledge may be outside the sphere of consciousness. He does not claim that the objects of representative knowledge are within it. The strength of the popular hold on a doctrine varies almost exactly as the extent to which language conforms to it. Materialism will never gain so much ground among the people, as long as the English idiom will not let us say that we are conscious of matter. We cannot bear to be taught to say that we are conscious of inkstands. (*Lect.* 158.)

11th. Reid and Stewart take pleasure in referring the succession and adjustment of the facts of perception to the arrangement of the all-wise and good Framer of man. Hamilton thinks this *mystical* and *hyperphysical*. (*Lect.* 355.) He wishes to postulate statements which shall logically involve the facts. This leads him to make immediate knowledge a different thing from instinctive knowledge. The lower animals, for example, have an instinctive perception of distant objects by sight (*R.* 182;) but this could not be true perception in man, for that can only exist where the mind is present to the object. He must assert of phenomena instinctively connected that they are one and the same phenomenon, or connected only by inference. It leads him also to decline the argument from the veracity of God (*R.* 130, &c.,) as distinguished from the veracity of consciousness. But when the sceptic throws doubt on the existence of matter by an appeal to the power of God to produce our present states of mind though there were no matter in existence, it is certainly not only a legitimate, but *the* legitimate argument to appeal to the veracity of God, which is as sure as his power.

This feature seems to us objectionable. The constitution

* Hamilton holds that states of mind may go on without consciousness. (*Lect.* xviii.)

of man will be best understood by him who looks at it as the workmanship of infinite wisdom, and who delights to refer what he cannot, as well as what he can understand, to the power and wisdom of God—*Deus in machina*.

Finally. We remark, as an argumentum ad hominem, that a doubt is thrown on the whole theory as the only possible statement of real perception, by the alleged facts of animal magnetism, which Hamilton affirms to be in themselves “certain and even manifest” (*Dis.* 600;) since these would seem to show that perception may take place in other ways—since, in Hamilton’s own language, it is proved that “*perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary channels of the senses.*” (*R.* 246.)

Hamilton’s theory, on the whole, seems retrograde from Reid’s. His fundamental principles—every phenomenon (e. g. knowledge) involves two causes—knowledge of opposites (e. g. mind and matter) is one—give no sure footing here. In moving the sphere of perception from the external world to our own bodies, he has moved from the clear to the obscure; from the field of science to that of use; from the most definite of knowledge to the most indefinite, where consciousness least protests against confounding mind and matter. Reid, perhaps, did not guard every point against the idealist; Hamilton must “distinguish and divide,” and *affirm* strenuously, to keep us from believing that in perception and consciousness we are looking at the outside and the inside of the same substance. Monism is a more fascinating doctrine than idealism. Spinoza and Hegel have a more comprehensive and inexorable grasp than Berkeley.

The relations between mind and matter are little known. Hamilton’s theory may be the true explanation of some of our perceptions—of those in which we are most certain of the existence of a *non Ego*; while in other unlike perceptions we learn most of the properties, qualities, and motions of this *non Ego*. The final judgment may even be that he has succeeded in touching the very heart of truth in this matter; but the authority of his great name ought not so radically to change the old views without a thorough discussion. In another article we purpose to examine the Philosophy of the Conditioned.

ART. IV.—*Man, Moral and Physical: or the Influence of Health and Disease on Religious Experience.* By the REV. JOSEPH H. JONES, D.D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

THE history of this book may interest most of our readers. We have understood that the manuscript of the first edition, which was published in 1846, was shown to the late Rev. Dr. Archibald Alexander, who was supposed to be preparing a work on the subject which would supersede the necessity of this. The writer was informed that this was not the case, and was advised to publish, and immediately prepare for a second edition of his volume. This, however, was delayed until, at the earnest solicitation of friends, and especially of the late Rev. Dr. James W. Alexander, the author resumed his labours, which have resulted in the present enlarged edition. To confirm our statement it may not be amiss to quote the affectionate and grateful tribute which Dr. Jones has paid, in the preface, to these venerated friends, whose names and efforts have been for so many years connected with this *Review*.

“The last two letters that we ever received from our lamented friend and correspondent, Dr. James W. Alexander, related mainly to its reproduction and enlargement ‘on several points,’ which he thought ‘should be treated more fully.’ None of all our friends ever expressed a deeper interest in the subject of this book, nor helped us more by their counsel, than the late Doctors Alexander, both father and son. The removal of the former, *like a shock of corn in his season*, though causing wide spread sorrow, did not take us by surprise.

Multis ille bonis flebilis, occidit;
Nulli flebilior, quam mihi.

The death of the latter, *in his full strength*, and at the time of so great and increasing usefulness, was painfully abrupt, and seemed to be premature. He was taken from a large circle of admirers, whose memory lingers on their irreparable loss, with

the mournful reflection expressed in that 'exquisite inscription of Shenstone's,' whose aroma no translation can preserve,

Heu! quanto minus est cum reliquis versari, quam tui meminisse!

They almost forget the living in their reminiscences of the dead."

The changes made in the present work consist in the addition of many interesting facts, and in the amplification of some of the practical portions, such as the chapters on Temptation and Counsels. Large use has been made of the best medical authorities, both French and English, and particularly of works upon subjects nearly related to that of this volume, such as Pritchard, Pinel, Prout; Voison on the Moral and Physical Causes of Mental Maladies; Tissot on the Health of Men of Letters; Hitchcock's Lectures on Diet, Regimen, and Employment; Shepherd's Sincere Convert; Robe on Religious Melancholy; and the very scarce and remarkable "Discourse" of the Rev. Timothy Rogers on Trouble of Mind and the Disease of Melancholy. These, with many well known works on Christian Casuistry, ancient and modern, have supplied a range of facts from which the chief difficulty has been to make proper selections.

The author is evidently familiar with medical reading, which for many years has been steadily directed to this object; and this, with his long experience as a pastor, who has acted upon the principles embodied in the work before us, must recommend its intrinsic value. The need of such a manual for pastors, theological students, and many intelligent Christians, the peculiar difficulties of preparing it, and the fact that this, so far as we have learned, is the only work in the English language expressly devoted to this subject, entitle it to larger consideration in these pages than is usually given to practical works. We propose, therefore, to present some account of this peculiarly interesting book, satisfied that we can scarcely do a better service to many of our readers. The author has not written for professional men, as a class, yet the lucid, polished, terse, vigorous, classical style, the profuse illustration of principles by striking facts, and its literary and religious attractions, combine to make it interesting and instructive to any intelligent

mind; but its chief value must be to pastors, students, pious physicians, and those who either suffer or are brought into intimate contact with the victims of spiritual maladies.

The grand difficulty of such a work lies in the fact that its field is a border-land, where the boundaries of two realms of human experience meet. Where does the physical end, and the moral begin? How does the one affect the other? Where are the functions of the physician and of the minister of religion most demanded? The relations between the brain and the intellect, or between the nervous system and the spiritual powers—the physiological and the divine life—the passions and the graces—the physical effects of sympathy and of the imagination—the bounds of morbid and the natural experience—in fine, the whole subject of the health of the body and of the soul is complicated with the greatest difficulties. Then again, how shall we apply religious truth to the ever varying cases of spiritual trouble whose tap-root may be in a diseased stomach, liver, or spleen? The writer of this article has several times been obliged to say to parishioners, after most perplexing and fruitless interviews, “You need the physician more than the minister.” In another case of one who has late gone up higher, in Christian triumph, whose disposition was morbidly infected by a self-reproachful spirit, he was constrained to reply to a question about giving up her music, because she thought that it was wrong to indulge the passion—“No; re-open your piano, take up your old music, and get new pieces. Your taste and talent for it are God’s gifts; use them cheerfully and freely.” She looked astonished, but took the advice, and profited by it.

Ministration to the sick and dying must always be greatly modified by their physical state. Disease and medicines cloud many a devout soul which would otherwise exult like the sun in his strength. Medical jurisprudence, which treats of the application of the principles and practice of medicine to doubtful cases in courts of justice, has grown into the dignity of a noble science, whose decisions govern courts and juries, and determine questions of crime or innocence, of life and death. The church needs just such a branch of theological casuistry, in proportion as its interests are superior to those of mere law, and medicine, and common life. But no man is competent to

such a work “who is not furnished with a suitable education, theological and medical, profoundly and experimentally acquainted with the Scriptures, fond of research, and gifted with good powers of generalization and induction.” We must have good theology, large practical experience, discriminating views of character and truth, and other requisites of a safe counsellor in the most delicate mission of soul to souls. We want not a book of mere learning, but of principles well illustrated by authentic facts, and applicable, like the medicines of the physician, to the entire range of practice. The chief danger of such a work is that of running it into materialism, as in the case of phrenology and some of its kindred quackeries. A man may make too much or too little of it, and in both cases do great harm. But we think that the present work is a fine specimen of that “*via media tutissima*” which grants all that is necessary to the mutual influence of the body and the mind, without violating the principles of sound philosophy or orthodox theology. The author combats this tendency with vigour, both in the line of direct argument and in the pervading spirit of the book. We shall have full occasion to see that while there is a “*prima facie*” plausibility in the objection, the most sensitively pious reader need not afflict himself with the shadow of a shade of misgiving as to his orthodoxy to humanity or to religion. But more of this hereafter.

The first chapter contains a clear and somewhat elaborate detail of the testimonies of science and of Scripture respecting the connection between body and mind. The various organs of the body are passed in review—the brain, stomach, lungs and heart, liver and spleen, and their connection with thought, temperament, mental functions, the emotional nature, sympathy, and imagination. As an example of his method of treating this part of the subject, we quote what is said about the Liver and Spleen:

“**LIVER.** What are all the uses of this organ in the human economy, is still a subject of inquiry. The main service which it performs, so far as is generally understood, is merely the secretion daily of a few ounces of bile. But when we consider its dimensions—the largest gland of any kind in the human system—the number and size of its parts, and its peculiar

structure, we cannot resist the impression that this great constituent of the vital mechanism is used for a higher purpose than this. And hence the opinion has obtained, both among the ancients and moderns, that the liver has a powerful influence on the temperament, the mental functions, and the passions of the man, thus affecting his moral and religious feelings. We presume to offer no solution of the fact, nor even a conjecture, why a certain class of mental phenomena should be developed by the condition of this particular gland; why the liver should exhibit its affinities for that which is gloomy and sad, rather than the lungs or heart? But the fact is witnessed every day, that such is the power of many of the depressing passions when suddenly excited, that they cause a gush of bile into the system at large, which gives a yellow tinge to the eye, and overcasts the mind with the most rueful forebodings and ineffable despondency. Why it should cause this mental dejection, is just as inexplicable as is the hopeful, buoyant spirit of the hectic patient, whose more desperate malady is seated in his lungs. The contrast is remarkable, whatever may be the cause. While in the last stage of consumption the sufferer is cheerful and incredulous as to the issue which is so obvious to others, the man labouring under disease of the liver is often oppressed with a heaviness of heart which repels relief from any suggestion of reason or the consolations of religion. The classical reader will recollect the frightful story of the miserable Tityus, as told by both Homer and Virgil, who, for his nameless crime, was condemned to be eternally tormented by the preying of a vulture upon his liver, which was supernaturally reproduced as fast as consumed.

Rostroque immanis vultur obunco,
Immortale jecur tundens.

A huge vulture, with his hooky beak,
Pouncing his immortal liver.—*Davidson.*

“Whether our poets designed that fable should receive a physiological gloss, and were prompted, in part, by their own morbid experiences or not, it is certainly a most graphic allegory, descriptive at once of the seat, the intensity, and hopelessness of that unspeakable wretchedness which so often pro-

ceeds from a diseased condition of this organ. Such would seem to have been the opinion of Lucretius, who, in giving the moral of various heathen fables, furnishes the following interpretation of this, as translated by Dryden.

No Tityus torn by vultures lies in hell,
Nor could the lobes of his rank liver swell
To that prodigious mass for their eternal meal.
But he's the Tityus, who by love oppressed,
Or tyrant passions preying on his breast,
And ever anxious thoughts, is robbed of rest.

“Hippocrates, Galen, Aretæus, and other illustrious ancients, were accustomed to describe a great variety of mental disease under the general term ‘melancholy,’ because they believed a pensive and desponding state of the mind to arise from a superabundance of ‘black bile,’ the literal meaning of the compound word ‘melancholy.’ Others supposed the hidden cause of this mental depression to be the

“SPLEEN—and hence, ‘to be spleeny,’ as descriptive of the gloomy and disconsolate, has come down to us traditionally as a saying of antiquity. What is the use of this spongy viscus has never been determined. Dr. Good says various hypotheses have been offered by learned men; but they are hypotheses, and nothing more. Archdeacon Paley thinks it is employed as needful in the package of the animal mass. It is possible, he says, that the spleen may be ‘merely a stuffing, a soft cushion to fill up a vacancy or hollow, which, unless occupied, would leave the package loose and unsteady.’ The same opinion concerning the influence of the liver in producing emotions of sadness is conveyed in the word ‘hypochondriac,’ applied by the ancients to the melancholy, and which has been domesticated by the moderns. Every reader who can analyse the term, knows that it designates the position of this organ, *ὁπὸ χόνδρον*, under the cartilage. Thus the opinion obtained early, that by some mysterious generation, affections of this sombre cast were the offspring of the liver.

“The writer is indebted to a lady of genius, and various accomplishments of both mind and person, for a critical remark and suggestion in relation to the subject of hepatic influence, as furnished by her own experience. She is favourably known

to the literary and religious community by several instructive and interesting works, and has paid the common penalty of the studious in those physical ailments which are too often the price of their success. She had very soon discovered that the fluctuations in her animal spirits, religious enjoyment, and spiritual exercises generally; the changes in her temper, mental energy, and cheerfulness, to which she is painfully subject, were symptomatic of a corresponding change in the condition of this sensitive organ. But the exhibition of some simple remedy, by which its healthful functions are restored, brings back at once her elastic freedom of thought and cheerfulness." Pp. 39—44.

The influence of the passions upon the physical system is then exhibited at length. One of the most remarkable illustrations of the power of hope and fear upon great masses of men is drawn from the late Italian war. After stating that army surgeons have testified to the great contrast between the mortality of the wounded in conquering and defeated armies, and the fearful predominance of the worst diseases of the camp in the latter, the author quotes the opposite statements made by two correspondents of the *London Times*, who wrote respectively from the allied and Austrian armies, after the great battle on the Mincio, in 1859, which resulted in the defeat and pursuit of the Austrians.

"The difference in views and statements of the same place, scenes, and events, is remarkable. The former are said to be marching through a beautiful and luxuriant country during the day, and at night encamping where they are supplied with an abundance of the best provisions, and all sorts of rural dainties. There is nothing of war about the proceeding, except its stimulus and excitement. On the side of the poor Austrians it is just the reverse. In his letter of the same date, describing the same places, and a march over the same road, the writer can scarcely find words to set forth the sufferings, impatience, and disgust existing around him. What was pleasant to the former was intolerable to the latter. What made all this difference? asks the journalist. 'One condition only; the French are victorious, the Austrians have been defeated. The contrast

may convey a distinctive idea of the extent to which moral impressions affect the efficiency of the soldier.”

Cases are frequently mentioned of persons whose hair has turned partially gray, or entirely white, in a single night, from excessive fear. We well remember a gentleman, now deceased, whose head was made white as the driven snow by an attack of cholera. But the subjoined case is perhaps the only one on record in which this marvellous change has actually occurred in so short a space of time, and before witnesses who saw the process going on, as distinctly as any transformation of the chemist's laboratory.

“A correspondent of the *London Medical Times*, writing from India, February 19, 1858, says that a Sepoy of the Bengal army, having been made a prisoner, was brought before the authorities for examination. The man trembled violently; intense horror and despair were depicted on his face, and he seemed to be almost stupefied with fear. The writer, who was present, adds, that within the space of half an hour his hair became grey on every portion of his head. ‘When first seen by us, it was the glossy jet-black of the Bengalee; his age was twenty-four. The attention of the by-standers was first attracted by the Sergeant, whose prisoner he was, exclaiming, ‘he is turning gray!’ and I, with several other persons, watched its progress. Gradually, but decidedly, the change went on, and a uniform gray colour was completed within the period above named.” Pp. 52, 53.

In treating of the effects of the Imagination on the nervous system, Dr. Jones has given ample illustrations from the phenomena which attended the great Revival in Kentucky, of which Dr. Davidson has rendered a very interesting account in his *History of the Presbyterian Church in that State*. The re-appearance of somewhat similar “physical manifestations,” in connection with the present or late great awakening in Ireland has imparted a new interest to this subject, both among its opposers and its friends. An interesting account of these very singular manifestations is contained in a little volume recently published in this country, entitled, “*The Revival in Ireland—consisting of Letters from Ministers and Medical Men in Ulster, on the Revival of Religion in the*

North of Ireland, addressed to the Rev. Henry Grattan Guinness," the well known Evangelist, whose labours in Great Britain and in this country have been so greatly blessed by the Head of the Church. Having carefully examined a number of these cases in various places, Mr. Guinness publishes the statements of his clerical and medical friends, whose position and character he fully endorses, without committing himself to their opinions. He regards all the theories hitherto put forth on the subject as very unsatisfactory, and adds in a spirit, which is characteristic of the man, "As to their being the work of the Spirit of God, all things being considered, I think we should tremble either to assert or deny that they are so, lest we should grieve the Holy Spirit."

The general opinion of intelligent Christians in Protestant Ireland on the subject, is embodied in the ensuing extract from the letter of Dr. J. Macaldin of Coleraine, "a Christian physician who has laboured much during the revival, both for the welfare of the souls and bodies of men in the town of Coleraine." As the matter is of permanent importance, belonging to the universal church and the human race, and as it is from a competent witness to facts of recent occurrence, which are nearly related to the subject of the work now under review, we need not apologize for introducing to our readers this striking collateral testimony.

Under date of September 17, 1859, Dr. Macaldin first states the fact that these manifestations, physical and psychical, largely accompanied the earlier, and occasionally the later cases of conversion in *most* places where the work of God has appeared, (for in some places, as in Connor, during two years of revival, there have been no such phenomena,) and then he continues:

"The physical phenomena which appeared to be intimately associated with a real work of conversion in this neighbourhood, and of which I have witnessed throughout their whole course a vast number, I would rank under two classes: 1st, those with loss of muscular power, perfect consciousness remaining; and 2d, those in which both muscular power and consciousness are temporarily suspended. To these may be superadded various nervous symptoms in different degrees of exaltation or intensity,

according to the temperament, age, and sex of the individual. But these are mere accidents in the history of the case, and exceptional. As might be expected, where men have stood at a distance, and have not personally witnessed any of these cases of prostration or 'striking down,' from the first cry of anguish of the heavy-laden sinner, when he has just looked on Him whom his sins have pierced, until the final burst of joy, when, fixing his eye on that fountain opened for sin and uncleanness, he has suddenly apprehended Jesus as his Saviour, and felt the whole burthen of his guilt removed at the sight of the cross—these so-called medical authorities, writing of things they do not understand, have vouchsafed the most erroneous explanations, and have created in the minds of parties at a distance, really desirous of arriving at the truth, impressions unfavourable to the whole movement. One man calls the seizure catalepsy; another calls it hysteria; another, mesmeric ecstacy; another, a physical influence in the hand of the Spirit. This may be all very simple, and appears so very satisfactory, that even non-medical divines have caught up the phrases, and so familiar are they with all the symptoms of hysteria, &c., that they have become instructors in physiology and pathology of their less learned brethren.

"That there has been much of an unreal character about many of the cases of which I have heard in other places, and somewhat of hysteria even here, I am free to admit; but to any one who has had experience of the real work, and has studied it in all its phenomena, there is no difficulty in distinguishing the real from the false—what is merely the effect of excitement, fear, sympathy, or imitation, from the genuine working of a broken and a contrite heart. For example, a strong man, in robust health, who has never been to a meeting—a child of twelve years—a young girl, or middle-aged woman, as the case may be, have begun to realize that they have souls to be saved or lost—uneasiness is felt; a weight on the heart or spirits; a 'crushing' is complained of; they cannot look cheerful, or give the ordinary attention to their daily duties. This may go on for days, with many but a few hours; some do not know what is the matter; others discover the truth—it is the burthen of sin; they cannot get rid of it, divert their minds and

dissipate as they may. In either case a crisis comes; the Spirit of God seizes them in his strong grasp; a sight of their sins, in all their enormity, as regards Christ and his dying love, is suddenly given. In others, the terrors of a coming judgment are presented to the mind. They fall prostrate and powerless, as in a swoon, or writhe in agony, with loud cries and supplications to Jesus, for his Holy Spirit to remove the load by the application of his blood. The prayer is heard; the blood is applied. Jesus is revealed as their Saviour; the burthen is gone; and now succeeds a paroxysm of joy, in which the hitherto prostrate, powerless man, starts to his feet; the full vigour of a new life is given; and in the ecstasy of his new-born happiness he embraces all around; his heart, formerly narrow and selfish, now large enough to take in the whole world.

“Now, what is this?—hysteria? Hysteria rarely attacks an able-bodied man; does not give man or woman a sight of their sins, and lead them to surrender their hearts to Christ. Catalepsy? Catalepsy, so rare that I never saw but one case in my life, leaves the sinner where it found him, dead in trespasses and in sins. A ‘physical influence?’ Electricity, magnetism, light, heat, are physical ‘agents,’ and have an influence on the bodies, but not on the souls of men. No, no; these cannot explain it; it is incomprehensible and inexplicable by natural laws. I do not pretend to understand it; I accept the fact, and am thankful that God has in his wisdom and his love seen fit to smite down, if it so please him, the stubborn and rebellious heart, whether of man or child; to throw it into the furnace of contrition for a season; to keep it there, until, like the gold in the refiner’s crucible, purified from the dross, it reflects his image; and then to bring it out washed and justified, a vessel meet for the Master’s service.

“As for the visions, supposed revelations, prophesyings, deafness, dumbness, &c., to which weakly, nervous, and highly excitable individuals attach so much importance, I do not deny that the Spirit of God *may* make use of these, seriously to impress a hitherto dead, carnal mind with a sense of spiritual things, but I look on them as mere accidents in the history of the work, and they may occur either in connection with, or

independent of, any work of grace in the heart. It is much to be regretted that any prominence should have been given to them, as they are apt, not only to withdraw the mind from the real ground of a sinner's hope, and to lead him to look within, instead of without, by the eye of faith to the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, but to lead to positively sinful results, damaging to the cause of God. To this description of cases unfortunately friends of the 'counterwork,' rather than of the 'work,' refer as examples of the 'so-called revival' in the North of Ireland.

"I cannot close without referring to those cases in which the individual has been stricken several times. I believe the subjects of these distressing occurrences to be weakly, nervous persons, who have really been seeking Christ, and have had deep conviction of sin, but have never had their peace firmly established on that foundation which cannot be moved. They have a very tender conscience, are imperfectly instructed in the word of God, and think they never can sin again. Their first love begins to wane; temptation assails them; they look for evidence of their safety to their own hearts, instead of to Christ and the written word. What wonder that they should again be surrounded in darkness, and be agitated by fears? The issue of such cases, when properly treated, I am happy to believe, is in the end most satisfactory."

We cannot regard the view given in the above extract as at all satisfactory. There is great danger in ascribing to the Holy Spirit mere physical effects, thus leading men to regard as evidence of his presence and work what is purely natural and incidental. The fact, familiar to all readers of medical history, is, that bodily agitations, various forms of hysteria, catalepsy, and epilepsy, are at times epidemic, manifesting themselves commonly in persons of a peculiar temperament, and induced by any strong emotion of any kind. They have been quite as frequent at the tombs of Popish saints and within the walls of French nunneries as in Irish or American revivals. Such phenomena, therefore, may attend a genuine work of grace, but they are no evidence of its genuineness. They are the physical concomitants, under certain conditions, of strong feeling, but do not determine its character. Tears, sighing, trembling,

may attend the operations of the Spirit of God in the heart, but no one pretends that they are discriminating characteristics of his work. The bodily agitations in question being mere nervous effects of excited feeling are not in themselves to be desired or cherished. On the contrary, they are to be dreaded and counteracted, just as much as any other form of disease, or abnormal action of the physical system. Excitement gives many men a headache or congestion of the lungs; endeavouring to prevent or cure these corporeal states involves no condemnation of the moral character of the feeling which produces them, and does not tend to counteract its legitimate effects. We may, therefore, lament the prevalence of the bodily agitations attending the Irish revivals, and disapprove of the encouragement given to them, without at all doubting the genuineness of the revival itself. That is to be judged of by its spiritual, and not by its corporeal effects. When the writer of the letter above quoted asks, Whether hysteria can lead men to surrender their hearts to Christ? or catalepsy convert the soul? the answer is plain enough; but the question betrays great confusion of mind. Suppose it should be asked, whether a bad headache could lead a man to Christ, or oppression at the chest convert the soul, because these effects so often attend the agitation and weeping caused by religious feelings. The Holy Ghost may be the author of the feeling, and the feeling the incidental cause of these bodily effects, ordinary or extraordinary; but reverencing or fostering these abnormal or diseased corporeal concomitants is not only unreasonable but highly dangerous. These bodily affections are dependent on the nervous state, and that is greatly influenced by the imagination and the judgment. If they are approved and cherished, they increase; if disapproved of and counteracted, they disappear. In the great American revival of the last century it was found that bodily agitations prevailed almost exclusively in the congregations of those ministers who regarded them as signs of the Spirit's presence. Edwards discountenanced them, and consequently his church was exempted from the visitation; while his neighbours who favoured, or would not resist their manifestation, had them in abundance. In France, the only way in which their progress could be arrested was by fear.

Death was threatened to the first man who went into convulsions, and the epidemic soon ran out. It gives the world a great handle against religion, when bodily agitations are made evidences of a work of grace.

Returning to the work of Dr. Jones, we remark the happy way in which he brings the physical part of his subject into the domain of Christian experience. Nothing strikes like a fact. Metaphysical reasonings, and abstract theological discussions can do little, in the most favourable circumstances, to pierce the thick darkness of religious melancholy, and to bind up a broken heart. The surgeons of the French hospitals, after the battle of Solferino, might as well have passed among the couches of mutilated and dying men explaining the anatomy of their bodies, or the theory of gun-shot wounds, instead of applying their skill to the immediate relief of the wretched sufferers. The author wisely deals with principles and facts. The cases of Baxter, Payson, Dean Milner, Cowper and others, are cited with a discriminating sympathy and judicious application, which will appeal to every appreciative reader.

Never does the minister of Christ require more of the Master's Spirit than when engaged in this class of pastoral duties. He needs the gentleness of the "nurse cherishing her children," the skill of the physician in the diagnosis and treatment of the most delicate patient, the grace of the apostle manifested in "becoming all things to all men," and yet making Christ "all and in all." The best pastor will be a Christian philosopher, a true Baconian, attentive to the smallest minutiae of surrounding circumstances, reasoning from particulars to generals, overlooking nothing that governs the mutual relations of the physical and moral. He will not forget that neither body nor mind is proof against a north-east wind, a sultry August noon, a February frost, or an equinoctial gale. He will not be above considering the effects of a foul atmosphere, or the badly-lighted back-room, in which poverty wrings its hands and its hearts together. He will not expect the sick mother, with her helpless babes around her, and with no servant or helper near, and a husband at his daily toil or in a drunken bout, to manifest the same freedom from spiritual despondency as the next suffering parishioner he visits in a fine house, with com-

forts, and books, and friends, and everything that love and money can procure, even down to the frail flowers which overshadow the medicines on the stand.

Constitutional difficulties, hereditary maladies, troubles which have resulted from bad habits, or from sensual indulgences, though long repented of; the legacies left by the sins of youth, or by fierce diseases in the partially recovered frame; family traits, defective bodily organization—these and kindred circumstances must inevitably modify mental action and spiritual life. The converting grace of God does not cure dyspepsia, rectify a wry neck, straiten a broken back, or change the mental constitution. A very striking case known to the writer is that of a gentleman, whose piety none can for a moment doubt, but whose whole experience is affected by a peculiar sensitiveness, which is often expressed in unbidden torrents of irrepressible tears, especially in view of the soul-moving truth of Redemption; and which almost entirely prevents his active participation in the social worship of the sanctuary. He traces this tendency directly to the period before his birth, when his mother was similarly affected; thus illustrating the remark quoted from Coleridge by our author, and fortified by sadly stirring facts, “that the history of a man for the months that precede his birth, would probably be far more interesting, and contain events of greater moment than all that follow it.” Surely such a man is not to be treated in the same way as one whose temperament is of an opposite or a more equable nature. Again, take the case of the paralytic. Even though the mind may be at first unaffected, it suffers with the shattered body. But soon the spiritual man, too, has a withered hand and a stammering tongue, and a dragging foot. Darkness comes over the bright sky and the divine life of the once gigantic preacher fluctuates with every change of bodily sensibility or want of feeling, until the sad end comes. Thus the soul is like the victim of shipwreck, reeling in a broken vessel, until at last with one fatal plunge she carries all down into the deep sea. Cases like these are not rare, and their fearfulness compels attention; but they are only extreme types of innumerable others, where more subtle diseases often elude the keenest detection, until at the last, some almost volcanic upheaval star-

tles us with its dread solution of the real causes, just as death reveals the secret disease which, for months, mysteriously preyed upon the noble frame, which housed a still more noble soul. How keenly do we then feel the mistakes we may have made in treatment, or the rebukes which offended charity rolls in upon our too censorious judgments; and we sit, like a physician, at the bedside of the dying patient, to whose real malady his eyes were shut, until the last agony proclaimed his fatal want of care and skill, when they might have been of use.

These thoughts are well developed in the second chapter, which treats at large of the uses of knowledge on this subject. We commend this portion of the book especially to those who have not thoroughly examined the matter, convinced as we are that they will find it profitable for doctrine, for charity, for reproof, for correction, and for consolation. Under the head of "Reproof and Correction," we find an important discussion of the supposed relations of insanity to religion. By a careful induction from well attested facts, and by the cumulative evidence of competent witnesses, the author completely explodes the popular error which charges upon religion the blame of certain mental disorders and epidemical delusions. These are its parasites, but never its products. We give a few quotations:

"This one thing I must testify," (Dr. Archibald Alexander says,) "that I never knew the most pungent convictions of sin to terminate in insanity, and as to the affections of love to God and the lively hope of everlasting life producing insanity, it is too absurd for any one to believe it." Fanaticism, excitement, and overwrought enthusiasm lead out legions of physical, mental, and spiritual evils. A very large proportion of the insane in France, previous to the Revolution, were Romish monks. Moral and religious epidemics are governed by laws of human nature, which faithful philosophical analysis shows to run in parallel lines with those fearful scourges which periodically sweep with the power of death over the bodies of men. Whatever may be their procuring cause, it is not Christianity. The most reliable medical authorities concur with the statement of Dr. Burrowes in his standard work on insanity, "that there is not a tittle of evidence to substantiate that Christianity

abstractedly, ever made a person insane. Such an accusation is only one of the abortions of infidelity, or of those who lack knowledge." P. 117.

"In Dr. Cheyne's interesting work on partial derangement of mind in supposed connection with religion, he says: "I never saw a case of mental derangement, even where it was traceable to a moral cause, in which there was not reason to believe that bodily disease could have been detected before the earliest aberration, had an opportunity of examination been offered. Not only does every deranged state of the intellectual faculties and the natural affections depend upon bodily disease, but derangements of the religious and moral sentiments also."

The author confirms his views by stating at length the theory of Dr. James Johnson, justly called "the ablest and most effective writer of the age, on every subject to which his attention was directed." That theory is to this effect, that mind is merely an invisible agent, manifesting itself solely through the bodily organs; that when these are deranged, the mental manifestations must also be deranged, but the mind itself being immaterial is not liable to disease or death; that even insanity is not a disease of the mind but of the brain, which imparts its morbid action to the mind, and this because if the mind itself can be diseased, it may just as easily die. But as the mind is immortal, it "remains unchanged, unassailable, imperishable," and we can speak of its being diseased "only by a figure of rhetoric." Insanity is, therefore, really a corporeal malady, which affects mental action, and to this source, not to religion, are we to trace the origin of so-called religious melancholy or mania.

The best medical authorities, and the statistics of insanity prove the assertion, "that the hallucinations of those persons whose mental disorder is imputed to religion, 'are the result of pre-existing disease, and only take their form from the accidental habits and feelings of the patients.' This has been so fully demonstrated that scarcely any modern writer of eminence advocates the opposite opinion." Pp. 114. 119.

Our space allows only one more quotation from this interesting section, in which the memorable case of the amiable Cow-

per is used to vindicate our faith against the malicious assumption of certain writers that Calvinism was the procuring cause of his fearful malady.

“Thus, a writer in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* at that time, with great confidence ascribed his mental malady to the theory of justification which he had adopted, his natural disposition fitting him to receive all the horrors, without the consolations of his faith. Macaulay also favours the same opinion, by pronouncing the religious teachers of the poet ‘worthy of incineration.’ Nor is there anything, we are constrained to say, in the over cautious, imperfect, and disingenuous, however interesting *Memoirs* by Haley, that forbids this inference. And yet, it could not but have been known by the author, or rather compiler of that work, that the period of his life, during which he enjoyed, together with the unclouded sunshine of reason, the peace and joy of religion, was the interval from 1764 to 1773, when he believed and openly professed every article of his faith, the effect of which was represented as afterwards being so calamitous. It was then that his character was exhibited in all its attractiveness, unveiled by any of the mists that had come over it before, and which gathered again toward the close of his life. He was more cheerful and affectionate in his intercourse, partaking with lively interest in the common concerns of society, and happy in the enjoyment of his religion; and when he became subsequently the victim of his afflictive hallucination, he could not avoid acknowledging that his gloomy persuasion was at variance with every article of his creed, and he was driven to regard himself as an inexplicable exception to his own principles. We have shown already that religious truth of any kind had nothing to do as a procuring cause of Cowper’s malady. It was as clearly a case of hypochondriasis as are those instances in which the patient has fancied himself a tea-pot or a sack of wool; or as was that of the baker of Ferrara, mentioned by an Italian Count, who thought himself a lump of butter, and durst not sit in the sun, nor come near the fire, for fear of being melted, and his thinking substance destroyed.”

The consolatory part of this chapter is richly suggestive. Principles, cases, experiences, scriptures, are interwoven with

rare skill. One paragraph is devoted to a subject which certainly claims more attention than it has received, viz. the great lack of sound judgment and of competent knowledge of mental disorders and morbid spiritual experiences in the writers of Christian biography. It seems to be taken for granted by many, that a memoir must be a mirror of a man's inmost thoughts, feelings, passions, motives, and deeds, as complete as the Confessions of Augustine or of Rousseau. The consequence is that our biographical collections are, to a great degree, like museums of morbid anatomy, in which malformations, cancers, tumours, deformities of all kinds, diseases in their most hideous shapes, are carefully preserved, and the healthy system has scarcely a representative. We would by no means have biographies that ignore the peculiar defects of their subjects. Christianity leaves it to profane novelists to pourtray their monsters of perfection. But the grace of God does not require its heralds to unbare to a gossiping curiosity all the wretchedness which it has covered with its mantle. To understand the system of sewerage in a great city, we need not explore its foul labyrinths upon our hands and knees. We cannot think that the author has overstated the true doctrine on this point. "Indeed, we are by no means convinced that there is not virtually a breach of trust in exposing the records of Christian experience, perhaps meant to be secret, to the inspection of the public. Such relations, moreover, while they have not benefitted the pious, have been subjects of merriment to the profane." The remark is justly added, that even the memoir of Payson would have been more valuable by the omission of some portions which many regard as indications rather of the state of his health than of the condition of his soul; and that the journal kept by Cowper, during the whole period of his melancholy, was published despite the earnest expostulations of friends, who regarded it "as a heartless violation of the secrets of the sepulchre—a throwing open of the closet of the anatomist, and a yielding to the prying of a prurient curiosity under a pretence of correcting certain false notions of religion."

Perhaps this part of the work may be adduced as a most successful reply to the objection which we noticed above, of its begetting materialistic views. No candid reader can enter-

tain such an opinion who will remember that the author has strictly confined himself to the limits of his subject. Practical works abound, and are filled with an almost endless diversity of spiritual advices; but they generally ignore the physical influences to which this volume is devoted. Excellent in their place, they seem to have been written more for people "out of the body" than "in the body." A wise regard to facts would never permit us to forget that religion is for the whole man—body, intellect, heart, will, conscience—for man as he is in this world, compassed about with the earthy and the spiritual—creature of circumstances, victim of the whole tempting world, whose ungodliness is "earthly, sensual, devilish," and whose godliness is "profitable for all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." The glory of the Bible is, that it treats man just as he is. But the tendency of some of our best practical works has been to etherialize religious experience to such a degree, that one is tempted to feel that our guides forget, at times, that we are not angels or glorified spirits, and that we are only sinners housed in flesh and blood, and tempted in all points by a cunning devil, who knows how to use "the flesh against the spirit," and to haunt our earthly house with demoniac spite. While physical education, so long neglected, is imperiously pressing its way into our families and educational institutions; while the natural, social, and political sciences, so long wrested by unbelief to its godless purposes, are compelling the studies and strengthening the armories of the defenders of the faith; while even the great questions of peace and war are linked with the majestic religious movements of the world; and while thus all departments of the Creator's dominions unite their testimonies to his wisdom, goodness, and love, is it too much to ask that our practical religion shall be taught rightly to regard the true relationships of the outward and the inner man, and to obey the physical as well as the spiritual laws of our being? Because some "fool, who hath said in his heart, No God," declares "that his brain secretes thought, as his liver secretes bile; that believing and disbelieving are acts of the soul, as is tasting of the body, and one is as destitute of any moral character as the other, and therefore that it is as absurd to

suppose a man blamable for being an atheist, as for being afflicted with an attack of the gout"—and because some thoughtless or hyper-cautious person thinks it a heresy to send a certain troubled soul to a good physician to be treated for "black bile" or dyspepsia, instead of putting him down to the study of Edwards on the Affections, can these reasons justify the positive disregard of the manifest laws of health and disease, and the reciprocal action of body and mind? It is our firm belief that a better physical education, in multitudes of cases, is quite as necessary to a healthy religion as to a robust literature. On the other hand, there are instances not a few in which the body suffers because the soul is in trouble; and here the remedy must be just the opposite of the former. The patient needs not narcotics, nor astringents, nor alteratives—but pardon, peace, and "comfort in the Holy Ghost." In both cases it may be difficult to convince the sufferers that the proposed remedy is the right one. But in neither should the mere fear of the charge of naturalizing our faith deter us from a careful examination of the true state of things, and from corresponding action. We should as soon think that Natural Theology is at variance with its revealed sister, or that the millennium will be the reign of materialism, because "in that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses HOLINESS UNTO THE LORD."

Yet, let us not be misunderstood. Our religion cannot be too spiritual; but to be truly so, it must adapt itself to humanity in all its varieties of constitution and circumstance. Hence the need of great discrimination in the application of the principles of this subject, which, like sharp tools, or poisonous medicines in unskilful hands, may do more harm than good. That our author has guarded himself with great care, may be seen from the ensuing remarks, selected from a whole section on the same topic.

"As may be well presumed, this doctrine of physical influences is easily capable of being perverted. Some may mistake the buoyancy of animal spirits for the influence of the Comforter, and others may ascribe the *motions of sins which are by the law*, to the power of bodily disease. But it is not intended by this admission of the effect of physical causes upon

the soul, to offer an apology for sin, to furnish a convenient excuse for indolence, sullenness, a cynical temper, or any other culpable dispositions to which a man may be constitutionally prone. All these may be natural, but very criminal nevertheless. The difference is wide between a neglect of prayer and watchfulness occasioned by great fatigue in the performance of other duties, as in the case of the disciples in the garden, and an omission caused by giving way to an inbred laziness. As a question in morals, the point is material whether a man's hastiness of spirit be a symptom of hepatic disease, or the habitual prompting of a depraved and neglected heart. We are not accountable to God for the difference in our complexion, or in the length of our limbs, but he justly makes us responsible for the envy and jealousy and malice of our dispositions. Nor is it enough to refer such perplexing cases to the tribunal of conscience, in view of the well-known influence of various moral, as well as physical causes, in misguiding its decision." Pp. 131, 132.

The chapter entitled "TEMPTATION," opens an interesting and important part of Christian casuistry, in which is shown how much of mental distress, how many fears, self-reproaches, and dejections, and how much of despair, which is ascribed by the pious to Satan, or to an unsanctified heart, are often the direct results of bodily disease, or of imagination as affected by a bad physical condition. Among the common temptations of the morbid, is that fearful one of having committed "the sin against the Holy Ghost." This leads to extended remarks on the nature of this sin. The opinions of Austin of the fourth century, of the Mediæval Schoolmen, of Calvin, Arminius, Chalmers, and others, are quoted, together with striking cases, which illustrate the position quoted from Kemper, "that in ninety-nine instances out of a hundred it is a symptom of bodily disease, 'of which state Satan takes advantage to annoy and distress them. This appears,' he adds, 'for two reasons—first, that so many recover, become comfortable, and cease to charge themselves with the commission of that most frightful of all sins; the second is, that others know their characters to be better than they say they are, and from the unreasonable

charges which they bring against themselves, which others, in their sober senses, can see were impossible.'"

Another temptation, familiar to many pastors, is that of adopting false standards of duty and tests of the new life, such as the sudden occurrence of texts of Scripture of cheering or alarming import, and dreams or visions. Under the former impression, a story is told of a certain Mr. Lackington, who, in a moment of religious excitement and of Satanic delusion, opened his Bible at the passage, "He shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their hand they shall bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone." Without a moment's hesitation, he ran up two pair of stairs to his own room, and leaped out of his window to the ground. Subsequent experience of pains and bruises taught him a lesson on the interpretation of Scripture that he never forgot.

The influence of dreams and visions upon religious life is illustrated by physiological facts, showing that these "visions of the night" are most frequently traceable to the physical condition, and "the multitude of business." A dyspeptic, a glutton, or a drunkard, will be far more likely to dream of hell than of heaven. Baron Trenck said that when almost famishing in a dungeon, he dreamed every night of the groaning tables of Berlin. Lieutenant Swain, in the story of his terrible expedition across the Isthmus, relates that when subsisting upon scanty roots, or bitter nuts, or a foul buzzard, and when for days together deprived of all food, his sleep was sometimes charmed by visions of the richest banquets. Coleridge states that after reading Khan Kubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that situation composed an entire poem of not less than two hundred lines, some of which he afterwards committed to writing. President Edwards used to observe his dreams, to find out what were his ruling tendencies; "so firmly did he believe that they were shaped by the events, thoughts, and feelings of the day." The author also mentions the case of an old lady, not remarkable for piety, whose only ground of hope in God was a dream. Other instances are stated, showing that while implicit or general credence is not to be given to these modes of spiritual influence, yet it is not denied that many things occur in religious experience which are inexplicable on

natural principles. We are nowhere told that God has debarred himself the privilege or power of making supernatural communications to human souls for the purposes of his good providence and grace. William Tennent's memorable trance is a case in point. The writer of this article once enjoyed the fellowship and help of a devotedly pious elder, a man of calm, earnest spirit, whose only account of his conversion was in substance as follows: One day, while engaged entirely alone at his work in an open field, he heard a voice crying out to him, "Prepare to meet thy God!" At that time he was an utterly irreligious and profane man, skeptical in his views, and full of enmity to the cross of Christ. Alarmed, he looked around him, but finding no person near, he resumed his labour, when suddenly the same voice again arrested him. Persuaded that some one must be trying to frighten him, or at least to play upon his credulity, again he sought but could not find the supposed human caller. A third time the dreadful sound rang in his ears, "Prepare to meet thy God!" The cold sweat burst from every pore, and staggering homewards through utter weakness, he entered his house; and soon after retired almost unconsciously to his chamber, where he fell upon his knees to pray. In that posture he fell asleep, and dreamed that he was just poised upon the brink of a fearful precipice, and about falling, when a strong hand grasped him, and above him shone a face of such unearthly beauty that he thought it could only have been that of Christ. He awoke exhausted, a convicted sinner, and remained in deepest wretchedness of soul until a short time afterwards—a few days, as we remember—when he found peace in believing in that glorious Jesus whom he has long served as an humble and useful Christian. Perhaps he could not have been reached by any of the ordinary means of grace. In this instance the dream was but an arresting process, followed by those undoubted exercises which characterize the new birth. The case is worthy of record, both for its unusual circumstances, its conformity to the great laws of the kingdom of God, and for its happy results. But while occasionally such instances of the supernatural occur, as if on purpose to remind us of the infinite methods by which God can change enemies into friends, our grand resource is in the ordi-

nary modes of gracious interposition. Many a supposed divinely-given dream has little better origin than that which our author happily quotes from Shakspeare's description of "Queen Mab," sallying forth by night in her hazle-nut chariot on her dream-inspiring missions:

"When in this state, she gallops night by night
Through lovers' brains, and then they dream of love;
On courtiers' knees, that dream on court'sies straight;
O'er lawyers' fingers, who straight dream on fees:
O'er ladies' lips, who straight on kisses dream:
Sometimes she gallops o'er a courtier's nose,
And then dreams he of smelling out a suit;
And sometimes comes she with a tithe-pig's tail,
Tickling a parson's nose as 'a lies asleep,
Then dreams he of another benefice:
Sometimes she driveth o'er a soldier's neck,
And then he dreams of cutting foreign throats,
Of breaches, ambuscadoes, Spanish blades,
Of healths five fathoms deep; and then anon
Drums in his ear; at which he starts, and wakes;
And, being thus frightened, swears a prayer or two,
And sleeps again."

The remainder of this chapter treats with discrimination those temptations which arise from a disposition to make too much of religious frames of feeling; the habit of melancholy introspection; the tendency to "make an idol of comfort," and those fierce Satanic temptations to despair which form the climax of a morbid spiritual state, and which in most cases are traceable to some lurking or open forms of bodily disease.

Passing over these valuable topics, we come to the last chapter, (not the least useful part of the work,) containing "COUNSELS TO THE TROUBLED AND DESPONDING." These are arranged under eight heads, some of which are copiously treated, and all are abundantly attested by facts. A simple enumeration of the chief topics will best show the importance of these counsels. For instance, the desponding should ascertain, if possible, the cause of their spiritual disquietude. They should seek judicious medical advice whenever there is probable evidence of a physical cause. They should seek suitable society; should be temperate, "keeping the body under;" should be habitually occupied; should watch and promote bodily health.

The author has evidently bestowed great care upon this latter point, which it appears was suggested and urged upon his attention by the late Rev. Dr. J. W. Alexander, whose experience was greatly affected by "the precarious state of his own health;" and "whose sympathy, tenderness, and heart-reaching power, in discourses, conversation, and intercourse," were largely increased by the stern discipline of bodily infirmities and of "some of the most poignant and overwhelming distresses that can oppress the human soul."

The writer makes many suggestions which evince much familiarity with the subject of dietetic economy—embracing food and drink, rest, the injurious effects of narcotics, exercise in the pure open air. On the subject of narcotics, he has presented an argument against the use of tobacco, which we can hardly hope will be very acceptable to the clerical or lay devotees of that stygian test of orthodoxy, but which, nevertheless, contains a series of facts whose cumulative argument cannot be set aside, however it may be overridden. We quote two or three impressive testimonies.

One of the most celebrated of the living professors of medicine, "Dr. Dunglison (of Philadelphia) told the writer, that of the many cases of functional affections of the heart that he had seen, particularly among young men, a large proportion appeared to be owing to an immoderate use of tobacco." P. 240.

Again—"Contemplate its havoc of life. According to the estimate of discerning physicians, not less than twenty thousand die in the United States every year from the use of tobacco. In Germany, where this pernicious habit is far more common, it is said that of all the deaths between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, one-half originate in the waste of constitution by smoking. But in unnumbered cases where it does not destroy life, it exhausts and deranges the nervous powers, and produces some of the most distressing and unmanageable ailments. M. Bouisson, a French writer, has lately published some startling facts upon the danger of smoking. He states that cancer in the mouth has grown so frequent from the use of tobacco, that it now forms one of the most dreaded diseases in the hospitals. From 1845 to 1859 he has himself performed sixty-eight operations for cancers in the lips in the Hospital

St. Eloi. The use of tobacco rarely produces lip cancer in youth. Almost all Bouisson's patients had passed the age of forty. The disease is also more frequent with individuals of the humbler class, who smoke short pipes, and tobacco of inferior quality, while with the orientals, who are careful to preserve the coolness of the mouth-piece by the transmission of the smoke through water, it is unknown; showing that it is generated more by the constant application of heat to the lips, than by the inhaling of nicotine. It is a common cause of disease in the stomach, and especially those forms that go under the name of dyspepsia, with all their kindred train of evils. It also exerts a disastrous influence upon the mind, and frequently produces an enfeebling of the memory, a confusion of ideas, irritability of temper, want of energy, an unsteadiness of purpose, melancholy, and sometimes insanity. These are the ultimate effects of the use of tobacco; and though one may not perceive them in his own case, we are assured that the tendency of the drug is always toward disease." Pp. 244, 245.

Verily, if King James were living yet, we should have a new counterblast against the weed that produces results like these. Prejudice apart, this section commends itself to the calm consideration of those who resort to it or other drugs, opiates, or beverages, for solace and stimulus, or from mere habits which have grown into tyranny over their entire moral, intellectual, and physical system. The despondent will find in their reaction a deeper gloom, the unhealthy their need of new remedies and antidotes, and the healthy—might remember the old proverb—"Let well enough alone."

The extract from Dr. N. L. Rice, on "Ministerial Depression," with the concurrent excerpts from Dr. Archibald Alexander, occupies a well-deserved place in this chapter. Every minister may here find timely suggestions from wise counsellors.

The concluding counsel directs the desponding to "LOOK TO CHRIST." A simple, child-like faith in Him is the great remedy, and sometimes the only one, that can take away the sadness of heart which the book discusses. We have not space to quote from this admirable portion of the book. It is rich with the records of varied Christian experiences like that of the Rev. Timothy Rogers, whose work on Melancholy is fre-

quently referred to, and whose good counsels to the desponding were the teachings of his own protracted sorrows, and subsequent deliverance, as recorded in his interesting narrative. Like a good shepherd, the author leads his troubled readers gently, directly, lovingly to "the Chief Shepherd and Bishop of their souls," and beside His cross he points them upward to the "rest that remaineth for the people of God."

We have thus endeavoured to give our readers an idea of the only work in our language which traverses this delicate ground. It is due to the respected author to say that he has so thoroughly accomplished his purpose as to leave us little more to do than present an outline, and quotations from his careful pages. That his work will be a standard with those who can appreciate its value, we have no doubt, and we shall be amply repaid, if the readers of this article may thereby be led to profit by a volume which has given us clearer views of pastoral duty, and has brought us into closer sympathy with the afflicted, and with Him who "knoweth our frame, who remembereth that we are dust," and who was "tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin."

ART. V.—*The First and Second Adam. The Elohim revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1860. Pp. 688.

THE opinion which we expressed of this work in our last number was founded, as there stated, on a very casual inspection. That opinion has been somewhat modified by a more extended examination. Although we still think that it is an able, laborious, and valuable work, its faults are greater than we then apprehended. There is throughout an overweening and unfounded confidence, a great display of half-knowledge, a lack of discrimination and power of analysis, and the advocacy of principles more entirely subversive of the system of doctrine

taught in our standards, than we were at first aware of. The writer seems, of set purpose, rather than from any logical relation of the subjects, to have introduced every specially mysterious and difficult doctrine in the whole range of theology. The Trinity, the inscrutable relations of the several persons of the Godhead, the councils of eternity, the relation of God's efficiency with second causes, the nature of sin, the origin of evil, the origin of the soul, the propagation of sin, the freedom of the will, God's agency in human actions, the person of Christ, the mystical union, are all discussed and searched out to their utmost limits. Here, therefore, if anywhere, diffidence, caution, and discrimination are preëminently needed. But these are the attributes in which Dr. Baird's book is specially deficient. He speaks as though "the deep things of God" had been all revealed to him. Nothing is obscure and nothing doubtful. He marches through rivulet and river, puddle and ocean, with equal ease, finding bottom everywhere. He is equally confident on all subjects. Everything is "incontestable," and everything is represented as all but essential. To deny that universals are objective realities, or that souls are propagated, or that the substance of our souls is numerically the same as that which sinned in Adam, is to deny original sin altogether, or to endanger the whole system of scriptural doctrine. That man's nature was designed to reveal the relations of the persons of the Trinity, that Adam's "generative nature" was an important element in his likeness to God, is declared to be incontestable; and that he breathed is "demonstrated" to be a designed outshadowing of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other persons of the Godhead. Arguments which have not the weight of a feather are declared to be irresistible, and objections to which every other mind succumbs are pronounced futile. The language of Edwards "in the very statement of his doctrine," is said to be "a contradiction in terms," because he speaks of "a privative cause," whereas "a cause is a force of some kind, by the positive action of which the contemplated effect is produced." If Dr. Baird were sinking in the water, and a spectator should refuse to stretch out a hand to save him, he might learn that there are other kinds of causes than positive forces. The tendency of Edwards's philosophy is said to

be to Pelagianism and also to Pantheism; that is, it has diametrically opposite and incompatible tendencies. A doctrine of divine efficiency held by every Augustinian theologian, Romish, Lutheran, and Reformed, until within a recent period, is constantly spoken of as "Edwards's doctrine." With the same propriety he might speak of Edwards's doctrine of immutability, or of the deity of Christ. The doctrine of simultaneous and predetermining concurrences is no peculiar doctrine of Edwards. He says the venerable President makes motives "as external forces" the efficient causes of volition. The distinction "which Edwards draws between the freedom of the soul and the freedom of the will," is declared to be "altogether inconclusive and impertinent." We could fill half our number with quotations exhibiting the same want of discrimination, and the same absence of modesty. Such overweening confidence is not to be referred exclusively to the will; it arises in no small measure from the character of the intellect. The less clear-sighted a man is, the less can he see differences. A man may have very considerable ability in dealing with things in the concrete, in investigating and arranging facts; he may be an effective writer; he may be able to construct a luminous argument founded on such facts, and yet be a very indifferent metaphysician. And a book may have very great merits as a record and classification of facts and opinions, and yet be sadly disfigured by serious blemishes arising from the mistaken assumption on the part of the author that he has a special gift for philosophical discrimination and analysis. We should be very sorry to speak as we have done of the faults of the work before us, if we did not conscientiously believe that it is likely to do the cause of truth serious harm, should its readers allow themselves to be deceived by the tone of confidence and mastery with which its erroneous principles are announced, and the doctrines of the Reformed Church are misrepresented. It is no want of respect for Cicero to think he was a bad poet; and it is no disrespect for Dr. Baird to think or to say that his forte does not lie in metaphysics. His book goes over so much ground, so many important subjects are brought to view, the opinions of so many theologians of different schools are adduced, that the volume will prove eminently suggestive, and will take a high

rank in the theological literature of our country, although the writer may be regarded as neither sound nor discriminating.

The Lutheran and Reformed churches, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and to Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man; the covenant with Adam; the nature of the union between him and his posterity; the effect of his sin on his descendants; and they consequently are of one mind as to imputation, depravity, and inability; and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. Not only in the symbols of these churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned. They all acknowledge that our union with Adam and our union with Christ, the relation of the sin of the one and of the righteousness of the other to our condemnation on the one hand and our justification on the other, the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam, and of a holy nature from Christ, are included in the analogy between the first and second Adam, as that analogy is presented in the Bible. It would, however, have been little short of a miracle had a whole system of theology been evolved perfectly from the beginning, had there been no confusion or inconsistency, no undue prominence given to one principle over others no less true. This would be contrary to all the ordinary methods of God's dealings with the church. The truth is usually elicited by conflict; agreement is the result of comparison and adjustment of divergencies. We accordingly find in the history of Protestant theology much more of inconsistency and confusion during the sixteenth than during the seventeenth century. It was not until after one principle had been allowed to modify another, that the scheme of doctrine came to adjust itself into the consistent and moderate form in which it is presented in the writings of Turretin and Gerhard. Nothing human, however, is either perfect or permanent. While the Protestant theology retains its power over the minds of the vast body of the purer churches of the Reformation, there has been not only open defection from it as

a whole, but also the revival of the one-sided views which, in many instances, were presented during its forming period. These views have been either advocated singly, or wrought up into entirely new philosophical systems.

All Protestants at the Reformation, and afterwards, agreed in teaching, 1. That Adam was the natural head or progenitor of the whole human race. He was admitted to be the father of all men. 2. That he was the covenant head or representative of all mankind. 3. That all men are born in a state of condemnation, destitute of original righteousness, and morally corrupt; needing redemption by the blood of Christ, and sanctification by his Spirit from the commencement of their existence. 4. That this ruin of our race, or the fact that men are born in this estate of sin and misery, is due to their connection with Adam. All men were in such a sense, in him, that they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. All these points are affirmed in the symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed churches; and no one of them is denied in the writings of any standard theologian of the period of the Reformation. There is, however, no little diversity as to the relative importance ascribed to these several points. In accounting for the fact that the sin of Adam involved the race in ruin, the principal stress was sometimes laid on the covenant relation between him and his posterity; at others, on the natural relation. The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others to the corruption of nature derived from him. What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz. that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity. It was

this that determined the theology of the Lutheran and Reformed churches as to all this class of doctrines. Those churches, therefore, came to teach with extraordinary unanimity, 1. That Adam, as the common father of all men, was by divine appointment constituted not only the natural, but the federal head or representative of his posterity. The race stood its probation in him. His sin was the sin of the race, because the sin of its divinely and righteously constituted representative. We therefore sinned in Adam in the same sense that we died in Christ. 2. The penalty of death threatened against Adam in the event of his transgression was not merely the dissolution of the body, but spiritual death, the loss of the divine favour and of original righteousness; and the consequent corruption of his whole nature. 3. This penalty came upon his race. His sin was the judicial ground on which the favour and fellowship of God were withdrawn or withheld from the apostate family of man. 4. Since the fall, therefore, men are by nature, or as they are born, the children of wrath. They are not only under condemnation, but destitute of original righteousness, and corrupted in their whole nature. According to this view of the subject, the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such sense that it would not have been imputed had he not been constituted their representative. It is imputed to them not because it was antecedently to that imputation, and irrespective of the covenant on which the imputation is founded, already theirs; but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him. Moreover, the corruption of nature derived from Adam is not, as Dr. Baird, with strange confusion of thought persists in regarding it, a physiological fact, but a fact in the moral government of God. Our author treats it as a question of physics, belonging to the general category of propagation, to be accounted for on the ground of what he calls "the mysteries of generation;" ignoring the distinction between physical laws and the principles of God's dealings with rational creatures.

In strict analogy with the relation, as above stated, between Adam and his posterity, the Lutheran and Reformed theology teaches, 1. That Christ, in the covenant of redemption, is con-

stituted the head and representative of his people; and that, in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf. They died in him. They rose in him; not literally, so that his acts were their acts, but representatively.

2. That the reward promised to Christ in the covenant of redemption, was the justification, sanctification, and eternal salvation of his people. 3. That the judicial ground, therefore, of the justification of the believer is not their own personal righteousness, nor the holy nature which they derive from Christ, but his obedience and sufferings, performed and endured in their name, and which became theirs in virtue of the covenant and by the gracious imputation of God. 4. That the believer is not only justified by the righteousness of Christ, but sanctified by his Spirit. These two things are not to be confounded, because they differ not only in their nature, but in their source. Justification is a forensic or judicial act, by which the sinner is pronounced just on the ground of a righteousness which is not subjectively his, and which therefore does not constitute his character. Sanctification is an efficient or executive work, in which God by the power of his Spirit renovates the corrupted nature of man, and restores him to his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant church, and as exhibited by the apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of our race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation.

It has already been remarked, that in the early writings of the period of the Reformation, the imputation of Adam's sin and

the corruption of nature as derived from him, are often confounded, and, without intending to deny the former, more stress is in many cases laid upon the latter. This is the more easily accounted for, inasmuch as just the opposite tendency was at that time prevalent in the church of Rome. Many of the Popish theologians made the sin of Adam the only ground of the condemnation of his race, and seemed inclined to hold, (although contrary to the decisions of their own church,) that inherent corruption was not properly of the nature of sin, or in itself a ground of condemnation. Calvin, therefore, was accustomed to say, that men are condemned not *per solam imputationem*, not on account of the imputation of Adam's sin alone, but also on account of their own inherent corruption. This was not a denial of imputation, but the assertion of another and equally important ground of the condemnation of the race. By *death* was understood eternal death, and the Reformers were anxious to show that they did not teach that those personally innocent and pure were condemned to eternal perdition. They therefore made original sin, in its wide sense, to include two sins; original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*. The latter they regarded as the penal consequence of the former. On the ground of the personal sin of Adam, as the representative of the race, God withdrew from men his favour and Spirit; they thereby lost his image, and became inwardly depraved. This depravity being truly and properly of the nature of sin, subjects those infected with it to the penalty of sin. God in his infinite mercy, through the merits of Christ, saves from that penalty all who die in infancy, that is, all who have no other sins to answer for than sin imputed and sin inherent. This we may, and do believe, without denying the fact that we fell in Adam, and without questioning the righteousness of that divine constitution.

These two things, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent corruption, thus often confounded or combined in the writings of the Reformers, came afterwards to be so separated that the former was entirely denied or left out of view. Placæus, in the French church, taught that the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, was the only ground of the condemnation of men, apart from their own personal transgressions. This theory

received the name of *Mediate Imputation*—not because it involved the idea, properly speaking, of the imputation of Adam's sin, but simply because Placæus was content to use the words, provided they were understood in accordance with his theory. Men are first depraved, and because of this inherent depravity, it may be said the sin of Adam is imputed to them, inasmuch as it is derived from him. *Hoc posito*, inquit Placæus, *distinguenda est Imputatio in immediatam seu antecedentem, et mediatam seu consequentem. Illa fit immediatè, hoc est, non-mediante corruptione; hæc mediatè, hoc est, mediante corruptione: illa ordine naturæ corruptionem antecedit, hæc sequitur: illa corruptionis causa censetur esse, hæc effectum: illam D. Placæus rejicit, hanc admittit.* This was said in answer to the decision of the National Synod of France, condemning his denial of the imputation of Adam's sin. The meaning of Placæus was not that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but that on account of the inherent corruption derived from him, we are regarded as being as deserving of death as he was. Imputation, therefore, is not the judicial ground of corruption, but corruption is the ground of imputation of guilt. 1. The obvious objections to this theory are, that it denies any probation to the race. They come into the world under the burden of spiritual death, infected with a deadly spiritual malady, by a sovereign or arbitrary infliction. To put a man to death in consequence of a righteous judicial sentence, is one thing; to put him to death without any offence or sentence, is another thing. According to Placæus, men being born in sin, and having no probation in Adam, are condemned without trial or offence. 2. It refers the propagation of sin to a mere physical law. Like begets like. All lions inherit the nature of the first lion; and so all men inherit the corrupt nature of fallen Adam. God deals with moral and immortal beings as he does with brutes. There is no distinction admitted between physical laws and the principles on which a holy God deals with responsible creatures. 3. The principle on which this doctrine is founded subverts the whole evangelical system. That principle is, that it is not only inconsistent with the justice of God, but irreconcilable with his very nature as an omniscient and truthful being, that his judgments of rational creatures should be founded on anything else

than their inward, subjective character. He cannot regard and treat those personally innocent as guilty. Then by parity of reason, he cannot regard the personally unrighteous as righteous, he cannot justify the ungodly. Then what is to become of us sinners? The objections against the imputation of sin bear with all their force against the imputation of righteousness. Those, therefore, who reject the one, have, as a general and necessary consequence, rejected the other. This is a fact familiar to every one acquainted with the history of theology in our own, and other countries. 4. A fourth objection to his doctrine is, it destroys the analogy between Adam and Christ, or it necessitates the adoption of the doctrine of subjective justification. We must either deny that the sin of Adam (as *alienum peccatum*) stands in a relation to our condemnation analogous to that in which the righteousness of Christ, as distinguished from our own, stands to our justification; or we must admit the analogy to be, that as we derive a corrupt nature from Adam and are on that account condemned, so we derive a holy nature from Christ, and are on the ground of that nature justified. But this, as every one knows, is to give up the great point in dispute between Romanists and Protestants; it is to renounce Luther's famous doctrine, *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*. 5. This doctrine is in direct conflict with the declarations of Scripture. The design of the apostle in Romans v. 12—21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life; but it is to illustrate *the mode* or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification. From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offence of one. To deny this, and to

assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another. This doctrine, which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed churches, and even of the church catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placæus belonged. It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, "Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere iis qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀμέσως imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatae et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæreditariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt."

It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion. It was, therefore, no exaggeration when the theologians of Holland declared the doctrine of mediate imputation to be "contrary to the consent of almost all Christians." Dr. Baird does not adopt that doctrine. He pronounces medi-

ate imputation a figment. He devotes a whole section to prove that his view is not identical with that of Placæus. This was the more necessary, as he adopts all the principles on which that doctrine is founded, and urges all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placæus, or by Pelagians, Socinians, or Remonstrants. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other. It is neither the old intelligible doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin as not our own act, but the act of our divinely constituted head and representative; nor is it the equally intelligible, although, as we think, erroneous and dangerous doctrine, that the thing imputed to us, and the primary and only ground (apart from our personal actual transgressions) of condemnation, is the corrupt nature derived from Adam. This, we say, is intelligible. We know what a man means when he refers everything to the law of propagation, and explains the derivation of a corrupted nature from Adam on the same principle that the asps of to-day get their poison from the asps before the deluge. This is in one sense intelligible; but we defy any man to put any intelligible meaning on what Dr. Baird says. Wherein he differs, or supposes he differs from this doctrine, he deceives himself with words. He does not see that what he says means nothing. He makes distinctions where there is no difference; and supposes himself to be saying something when he is saying nothing. On the justice of this judgment our readers will decide. In our opinion Dr. Baird's theory, when stripped of its words without meaning, is nothing more than the familiar doctrine adopted by the more orthodox of our New England brethren, who repudiate the idea of imputation, and yet maintain the propagation of a morally depraved nature from Adam to his posterity.

The following extracts may suffice to give an adequate idea of his views. "In the angelic hosts each several individual is possessed of a several nature, original in and peculiar to him. The history of the person and of the nature is contemporaneous and the same. But in man it is different. The nature of the entire race was created originally in Adam, and is propagated from him by generation, and so descends to all his seed. Hence arise two distinct forms of responsibility; the nature being

placed under a creative obligation of conformity to the holiness of God's nature, and each several person being, in a similar manner, held under obligation of personal conformity of affections, thoughts, words, and actions, to the holy requirements of God's law. The apostasy of this nature was the immediate efficient cause of the act of disobedience, the plucking of the forbidden fruit. Thus there attached to him the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience. The guilt thus incurred attached not only to Adam's person, but to the nature which, in his person, caused the act of transgression. Thus, as the nature flows to all the posterity of Adam, it comes bearing the burden of that initial crime, and characterized by the depravity which was embraced therein. In both respects the nature is in variance with the law. In both respects it is guilty of sin, (the sin of nature.) In addition to this, Adam's posterity find the depravity thus embraced and indwelling, an unfailing and active cause of other sins. The apostate nature works iniquity. Thus originate the personal sins which fill the world. Such is the ground upon which the apostasy of man's nature from holiness and its embrace of depravity, is called sin, and, as such, charged upon the race of man." P. 256.

According to this statement, the nature of man being a unit, and that one nature being concentrated in Adam, the sin of his nature was the sin of the entire race to which that nature was propagated. We, that is, our nature, sinned in Adam as truly, properly, and strictly, as he himself did. On p. 311, it is said, "We are *not* held accountable for Adam's breach of the covenant, in consequence of the transaction respecting the tree; but because of the inscription of the covenant in Adam's nature, and our in-being in him in whose nature it was inscribed." Again, it is said, "the offence of Adam is ours immediately;" "when Adam sinned, all his seed were in him, and so sinned in him in the same act with him." P. 422. The cause of actual sin is depravity, "the cause of which was the wicked apostasy of our nature from God, in the person of Adam, an apostasy in which we are as truly criminal as Adam was, because the nature by which it was committed is as really in us as in him." P. 502. The doctrine of this book, therefore, is that we sinned in Adam actually and in the proper sense of the

term. His sin is imputed to us because it is "intrinsically" ours. It is ours, not in a forensic and legal sense, but literally, because of the identity of nature between him and us. The ground, therefore, of the imputation is this community of nature, and not the covenant by which he was constituted our head and representative. It would have been ours had no such covenant been established. The only effect of the covenant was to limit the period of man's probation. "To object, therefore, to the positive transaction between God and Adam," says our author, "is to complain that God did not give us a myriad chances of falling instead of one; since the only effect of that transaction was, to secure confirmation and eternal life to man, upon condition of Adam's temporary obedience; instead of the race being held to a perpetual probation in Adam and in themselves. To complain of being held responsible for Adam's sin, is to object to being held to obedience at all; since, in any case, Adam's sin was our sin; the forces which are in us, the nature which we inherit from him, is the very nature which in him rebelled; the same, not in kind merely, but as flowing continuously from him to us." P. 302. "Had Adam, made as he was, been placed in probation without limit as to time, and had he remained upright, whilst one of his posterity became apostate, the crime and corruption thus introduced would have flowed to the family of the apostate precisely as that of Adam does to us his seed." P. 509. This is a great truth, our author intimates, which few have sense enough to see.

Such is the doctrine which is here set forth as the faith of the Reformed churches, and specially as the doctrine of the Westminster Confession. It rests on the following principles:

1. The identity of the race with Adam; or, the assumption that humanity is a generic life, a substance, a nature, a "sum of forces" numerically the same in Adam and all his descendants.
2. That a nature can act impersonally; or, the apostasy and rebellion of human nature is to be distinguished from the personal act of Adam.
3. That souls are propagated.
4. That community, in a propagated nature, involves all those to whom that nature is communicated in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it originated.
5. The real germinating principle from which the whole theory

spring is, that God cannot regard and treat a rational creature otherwise than he is in himself; if he is not subjectively a sinner, he cannot be treated as such, and if he is not subjectively righteous, he cannot be treated as righteous.

The first remark which we think must occur to every intelligent reader in reference to such a system is, that it is simply a physiological theory. It is a peculiar view of anthropology, of the nature of man as an animal, and the laws of his propagation. Had there been no God, or had God nothing to do in the government of the world, or did he take no cognizance of the character and conduct of men, all that this system supposes would be just as it is. When God created the first oak, he gave it a certain nature; and impressed upon it a certain law of propagation. All subsequent oaks are the development of the identical life-principle embodied in the first oak. So when the first lion, tiger, or elephant was created, a generic leonine, feline, or elephantine nature was called into being, and that identical original substance is communicated, with all its peculiar characteristics, from one generation to another. So too when man was created, the same thing happened. There was no covenant with the first lion that all other lions should inherit his nature; and the propagation of Adam's nature to his posterity, with its guilt and pollution, is altogether independent of any covenant—it is simply a physiological fact. A second remark no less obvious is, that we need no divine revelation on which to rest our faith in this fact. Physiologists teach us what is the law of propagation in the animal world; to that world man belongs; he falls under the general category. Human character is transmitted by the same law which regulates the transmission of the nature of other animals. What need then have we for any special divine revelation on the subject? It is very evident that the theory does not rest on the testimony of the Bible. It has a purely inductive basis. A man may hold it and not believe in the Bible; he may reject it, and his faith in the Scriptures be undisturbed. A third remark is, that even as a physiological theory it has no substantial foundation. From the nature of the case, it is merely a hypothesis to account for certain phenomena; it cannot be anything more. The fact is, that like begets like. Genera and species are,

within certain limits, permanent and indestructible. An oak never becomes an apple-tree, a lion never becomes an ox, a man never becomes a monkey, nor a monkey a man. Even distinct varieties of the same species of plants and animals become permanent. There are therefore fixed types in nature, either original or acquired. Men, as men, have a common nature—that is, they have the same anatomical structure, the same φύσις, the same rational and moral faculties, the same social dispositions and constitutional principles. These are permanent and universal, and belong to men as men, and therefore to all mankind. But within the limits of this specific identity we see all the varieties of the Caucasian, Malayan, and African races; the national, and even family peculiarities transmitted from generation to generation. These are admitted facts. How are they to be accounted for? How are we to explain this immense diversity and this permanency in the different forms of life? One hypothesis is, and that the most simple and sublime, the most captivating to the imagination, the most specious to the natural understanding, the oldest and most persistent of all the forms of human thought, underlying the philosophy and religions of ages and nations, viz., that all these diversified forms of life are manifestations of one all-pervading principle—God, in the various forms and states of self-development. This is a hypothesis, which is to the theory which Dr. Baird adopts, what the ocean is to a gutter. Another hypothesis, less ambitious than this pantheistic system, is that this world is a living organism, imbued with one life, of which all that lives are different forms, and man the apex of the pyramid. Another, that humanity is a generic life, a substance having objective reality which reveals itself, or comes to personality in connection with individual material organisms. As light is a subtle fluid diffused through space, and becomes luminous only on certain conditions, so this diffused principle of humanity comes to existence or self-manifestations only in combination with appropriate corporeal forms, which it fashions for itself under specific conditions. Still another is, that each genus or species of plants and animals is something, it is hard to say what—a force, a law, a life, a substance, a something having objective reality, and which

propagates itself, each according to its kind, the individuals being only the extension of the original force, principle, or substance. This is the hypothesis which constitutes Dr. Baird's book, without which it is nothing. This is the foundation on which rests his theology. If this fails, his theology disappears. On page 25 he says, Nominalism, as opposed to Realism, gave a great impulse to Pelagianism. "According to the philosophy," he says, "which prevailed before the rise of that sect, such universal conceptions, as those of genera, species, and nature, have as their ground some kind of objective realities. They are not the mere result of thought, but have in some proper sense, a real existence, and lie as essences at the base of the existence of all individuals and particulars." According to the Platonic doctrine, as we all know, these universals existed from eternity in the divine mind. They are the ideas of which individuals are the manifestations. The universal is alone real; the individual is simply apparent. This was the original form of Realism as taught by Scotus and Anselm. According to another statement of the doctrine, it was held, "*Eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse individuis; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas.*" To the word *homo*, man, there answers, therefore, one substance or essence, which is distinguished in individuals only by accidental diversities. Dr. Baird says that according to one theory, "general conceptions are the mere product of the imaginative faculty—results of logical deduction from the observation of many like individuals. A second theory represents universals as being realities which have actual objective subsistence of their own, distinct from and independent of that of the particulars and individuals. A third holds that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own, separate from the individuals through which they are manifested." "The third," he says, "is the scriptural doctrine, according to which the substances were at the beginning endowed with forces, which are distinctive and abiding; and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order, to the successive generations of the creatures. Of these forces the word *nature* is the expression.

In its proper use it conveys the distinct idea of permanent indwelling force. It expresses the sum of the essential qualities or efficient principles of a given thing, viewed in their relation to its substance, as that in which they reside, and from whence they operate. Such is the sense in which the word is constantly employed in the Scriptures." P. 149. "Thus the human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces, which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not express the fact merely, that we and Adam are alike; but that we are alike, because the forces which are in us, and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and his likeness." P. 150.

According to this view, humanity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propagation communicated to all his descendants, so that the substance, with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is numerically the same as that which was in him, and made him what he was. The principle here involved is asserted to be true in its application to all the genera and species of plants and animals. The lion of to-day is the same numerical substance with the lion first created; the oak of to-day is the same numerically as the original oak in Eden. What is meant by this? We take up an acorn in the forest—in what sense is it identical with the first created oak? Not in the matter of which it is composed, for that is derived from the earth and atmosphere; not in its chemical properties, for they inhere in the matter, or result from its combinations. These properties are doubtless the same in kind with those belonging to the first acorn, but they are not numerically the same. No one assumes the existence of any chemical substance, in which those properties inhere, as transmitted by the laws of propagation. Wherein then does this assumed numerical identity exist? Is it in the principle of life? But can any one tell what that is? Is it a substance? Has human skill ever yet discovered what life is, whether in plant or animal? And must a whole system of theology be founded on a conjecture as to its nature? Is a confidence on this point, which can only spring from ignorance, to be allowed to control the faith of the church?

There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency, but what necessity is there for assuming that principle to be a substance, numerically the same with the first of each kind? If the chemical properties belonging to an acorn, or to the germ of a nascent animal, may be the same in kind, from generation to generation, without assuming the transmission of a chemical substance, why may not the principle of life remain permanent, without any such transmission of substance? The realistic hypothesis of the objective reality of genera and species is not only purely gratuitous, but it overlooks the continued presence and agency of God in nature. The development of a plant, and the growth of an animal body, are not to be referred to blind forces, inherent in matter, nor in any substance, material or immaterial, but to the omnipresent Spirit of God. The intelligence manifested in organic structures is clear evidence of the presence of mind guiding the operation of natural forces. It might as well be assumed that a book was written, and the letters arranged by such forces, with no present mind to control their operation. If a plant or human body can be fashioned by a transmitted substance, then a world can be so constructed. The principle on which the argument from design in favour of the being of God is founded is, that the adaptation of means to an end is evidence of a present, active intelligence. As all organic nature teems with manifestations of such adaptations, it teems in like measure with evidence of the omnipresent, active intelligence of God. We are not about to enter on the mediæval controversy about universals. All we are concerned about is, that the assumption of a generic human nature, as an objective reality, constituting all men numerically one in substance with Adam, is a pure figment, unentitled to any weight or authority in determining Christian doctrine.

The second principle on which our author's theory rests, is that natural acts are to be distinguished from personal acts; or, that a nature may act independently of the person to which that nature belongs. We are not responsible for Adam's personal act, but we are held to have performed the act of his nature, because that nature is numerically the same in him and in us. The rebellion and apostasy of his nature,

which preceded and caused his personal transgression, were our rebellion and apostasy. On this subject, the author says in a passage already quoted, "There attached to him (Adam) the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience." P. 256. "It is certain that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature, and if this must be admitted, there appears no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt." "The nature which was the cause of my person was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows *inevitably*(?) that everything in me, upon which resistance to apostasy might be imagined, was actually there and took part in the rebellion." P. 257. "Throughout the entire argument Paul carefully distinguishes two features which are essentially united in Adam's apostasy. The one is the violation of the positive precept, which he designates as the offence, the disobedience, and the transgression. The other is the violation of the law written in Adam's heart, and so in the nature of the race, and by the offence transgressed in both. Its violation was the embrace of that which the apostle calls sin." P. 419. "There are two classes of actions—which should be carefully distinguished. Of these, one is such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, &c." To this belong, he says, all the sins of our immediate ancestors, for which we are not responsible. "The other consists of such agency, as springing from within constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referrible to this class is that of apostasy, the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but with itself the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it and thus conveyed." P. 509. "The sin was the apostasy of man's nature from God; apostasy by the force of which Adam was impelled into the act of transgression as an inevitable

consequence of the state of heart constituted by the apostasy. Now let it be carefully observed that apostasy is an act, not a habit; and, on the other hand, depravity and corruption is a habitual state, and not an act." P. 497. The obligation of the law, he says, extends "to the *substance* of the soul." "It is to the *very substance* of the soul that the law is addressed; and upon it the penal sanctions of that law are enforced. The soul is that, which, in its substance and powers intrinsically, as much as in their exercises, was created and ordained to be the image and glory of God. Conformity of this substance to this its exalted office is holiness; the reverse is sin." P. 258.

If there is any meaning in all this, we confess ourselves to be too blind to see it. We have no idea what is meant by the law being addressed "to the very substance of the soul," or by saying "conformity of substance to the image of God is holiness, and the reverse, sin." It is as unintelligible to us as speaking of the moral character of a tree, or the correct deportment of a house. It has often happened to us in reading German metaphysics, not to comprehend at all the meaning of the author; but we have always had the conviction that he had a meaning. We do not feel thus on the present occasion. The distinction which the author attempts to draw between *sinful* acts of nature and personal sins is a distinction which means nothing, and on this nothing his whole theory is founded. There are, of course, actions of very different kinds in a creature composed of soul and body; some of these may properly enough be called natural, and others, personal. But this does not apply to moral acts, whether good or evil. The mere natural functions of the body, as the process of respiration, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are acts of nature in the sense of not being acts of personal self-determination. There is also a distinction between outward acts and acts of the soul. And this is what our author seems sometimes to have in his mind, as when he tells us we must distinguish between the act of Adam in plucking and eating the forbidden fruit, and the act of his heart. The former, he tells us, was personal, and peculiar to himself; but the latter was natural, and belongs equally to us. But at the same time he admits there is no moral character in an external act in itself considered, and

this distinction between outward and inward acts is nothing peculiar to Adam's first sin. It is no less true of every sin of word or deed he or any one else ever committed, and every such sin is a personal sin. There can, indeed, from the very idea of sin, be no *actual* sin which is not personal, because that which acts rationally and by self-determination, two elements essential to actual sin, is a person. *Actual* sin can no more be predicated of a nature as distinguished from a person than of a house. There is also, beside the different kinds of actions already mentioned, another equally obvious distinction, viz. between those which, being consentaneous with nature, do not change it, and such as from their peculiar character produce a permanent change in the nature itself. Thus of the physical acts of Adam, his eating and drinking were perfectly normal acts, belonging to his nature as originally constituted, and producing no change in its character. It is conceivable, however, that he might have performed some act which should change his physical constitution. For example, he might have done something which changed his skin from white to black. Such change might have been permanent, and all his descendants been black. Or, he might have so poisoned himself as to have made his body perishable instead of immortal, and his descendants inherited his disease. So, also, as has already been admitted, it is conceivable that as by his apostasy from God, his moral nature became depraved, that corrupt nature, by the general law of propagation, might be transmitted to his posterity. This is the view presented by many Augustinians, before and after the Reformation, and also at times by the Lutheran and Reformed during the forming period of their theology. This also is the doctrine of a large class of our New England and New-school brethren, of Dr. Dwight and of Dr. Richards, and the class whom they represent. This is Mr. Barnes's doctrine, as presented in many of his writings. This, too, is what Dr. Baird has in his mind about one-half the time. But this is very different from the doctrine that *we*, as persons, committed Adam's sin, because our nature committed it. This supposes that actual sin can be committed by persons before they are persons. That *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was

framed. The doctrine of preëxistence, as held by Origen, revived in our day by Dr. Müller and others in Germany, and by Dr. Edward Beecher in this country, is, compared to that proposition, clear sunshine. Apostasy, we are requested carefully to consider, "is an act," it is "a voluntary act," it is an act of "*self*-depravation," and it is affirmed to be our act. That is, we performed a personal act—that is, a voluntary act, an act of self-determination, before that *self* had any existence. There is no definition of a personal act more precise and generally adopted than an "act of voluntary self-determination." Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that act, then we were in him—not by community of nature merely, but personally. For we are said to have done what nature, as nature, cannot do; what of necessity implies personality. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says. Dr. Baird, however, asserts that he did thus act in Adam, and that he feels sorry for it. He teaches that we are bound to feel remorse and self-reproach for this act of *self*-determination performed so many centuries before self existed. This is represented as a genuine form of religious experience, an experience due to the teachings and influence of God's Holy Spirit. This is a very serious matter. To attribute to the Spirit of God the mistakes and figments of our own minds—to represent as a genuine form and manifestation of the divine life what is a mere delusion of our own imagination, or offspring of our pride of intellect, is a very grave offence, and a very great evil. It is very true that when the father of a family commits a disgraceful crime, the whole family is disgraced; or if a son or daughter is led astray from the paths of virtue, the whole household hide their faces, and weep in secret places. It is also true that when our country is honoured or degraded, we feel that it is our honour or our shame. We share in the common life of the community. The same is true of the whole human race. The sins of men are a disgrace to humanity. We may well blush for our common

nature when we read of the vileness and enormities by which our fellow-men have in all ages been guilty. But this is a very different thing from saying that we performed their acts. When a father commits murder, or a son forgery, the whole family, although humbled and distressed, although they feel a participation in the shame which does not pertain to strangers, yet do not pretend that they were guilty of the crime, and were partners in the act. Such confusion of ideas is not found in the common life. It is peculiar to those who are not content to take things as they are, who are not satisfied with phenomena, but must search into being.

The *πρῶτον φεῦδος* of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated; hence some assume that we existed in a former state, where, by an act of self-determination, we depraved our own nature. Others assume that humanity is a person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature as a generic life, and that individuals are the forms in which its comprehensive personality is revealed; a conception as incongruous as the hundred-headed idol of the Hindoos. Others again, as Dr. Baird, distancing all competitors, insist that *we* performed the act of self-depravation thousands of years before we existed. All these are not only gratuitous but impossible assumptions, to account for the admitted fact that innate corruption is truly sin, which they say it cannot be unless it have an origin in an act of our own. Things are, however, what they are, no matter how they originated. If a man is black, he is black, whether he was born so, or made himself so. If he is good, he is good; if bad, he is bad, whether he is the one or the other by birth or self-determination. If Satan had the power to create, and should create fiends, they would not be innocent angels. Adam was created righteous. Original righteousness in him had a moral character. It was truly of the nature of holiness. It constituted Adam's moral character in the sight of God, although not self-originated. It is a first principle of Pelagianism, that moral character can attach only to acts of self-determination and their consequences. All Pelagians, there-

fore, deny that Adam was created holy. He could not be holy, they say, unless he originated his own character. So all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated. If we are born corrupt, that corruption must have sprung from our own act, either in a former state of existence, or in the person of Adam. When God, by the almighty power of his Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness. It is not essential to its moral character that it should be our own work. The graces of the Spirit, although due to the divine energy, constitute the moral and religious character of the believer. In like manner the depraved nature which we inherit from Adam constitutes our moral character, although it did not originate in any act of our own. It is clearly revealed in Scripture that we are born in sin, that we are by nature the children of wrath. This divine declaration is authenticated by our own convictions and experience, and by the history of the world. To account for this fact, to reconcile it with the justice and goodness of God, may be as difficult as to account for the origin of evil. But it is to darken counsel by words without knowledge, and even without meaning, to assert that *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed. The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this. Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam's sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ's righteousness, and not something self-originated and self-deserved.

A third general principle on which Dr. Baird's theory is founded is, the propagation of souls. On this point he is just as dogmatic and confident as on all others. On page 19, the immediate creation of the soul, as opposed to the theory of propagation, is declared to be "the fundamental doctrine of the Pelagian system." On page 364, he complains of orthodox theologians as uniting "with Pelagians in explaining away the teachings of the scriptures on the origin of the soul, in obedience to the dicta of an intuitive philosophy." The doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation, he says, "introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct ele-

ments of soul and body. In the unity of these elements, there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character." On the same page it is said, "There is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative (in Genesis) seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect, inseparable identification with it." P. 365. This is as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of "dualism" in man's nature; and the assertion of "a perfect and inseparable identification" of soul and body. Then the soul and body are one and the same thing, or, at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence. This is the doctrine, on the one hand, of such materialists as Priestley, and, on the other, of the mystical school of modern Germany, as shown in our last number. Dr. Baird, however, is so characteristically incorrect and indiscriminating in his language, that it is by no means certain that he intended, even when he wrote what has just been quoted, to assert that the body and soul are identical, or even that they are inseparable.

On page 377, our author says, that "on the admission that the soul is created, the doctrine of original sin becomes altogether inexplicable." "It is in fact irreconcilable with that doctrine." It is irreconcilable with Dr. Baird's gross, materialistic theory of original sin, but not with the scriptural and church doctrine on the subject, as has been shown a hundred times by the most eminent theologians of the Reformed churches. Our author quotes Van Mastricht as saying that the first error of those who insist on the propagation of the soul, is "that they suppose corruption (in us) numerically the same with Adam's to be propagated; whereas it is only the same in species." To this Dr. Baird replies, "If not numerically the same, it comes not to us from him. Its origin is not, then, in him. He was only the first sinner in the order of time. The alternative is that each soul successively apostatizes, or that they are created corrupt. Such are the inconsistencies to which the most orthodox writers are led, when they attempt to vindicate the creation theory in consistency with the testimony of scripture respecting the nature of man."

He pronounces the theory of creation to be "Manichean-Pelagianism," that is, a mixture of Manicheism and Pelagianism. The opposite doctrine of propagation of souls, he says, is "inevitable," "unavoidable," &c., &c., from the plain teaching of the Scriptures.

On this subject we would remark, 1. That it is from its nature inscrutable. It lies beyond the sphere of observation or experiment. It lies no less beyond, or aside from the purpose and design of the teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures are designed to teach us facts, and not metaphysics, psychology, or ontology. They teach us that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, but they are silent as to the mode of propagation. They teach us that we are regenerated by the power of the Spirit of God, but directly assert that the mode of that new birth no man can know. All positive dogmatism on this subject, therefore, is unseemly and injurious. 2. It is a point on which the church has always differed, and as to which the most profound have been the least confident. In the early church Jerome was decidedly for creation, Tertulian for propagation; Augustine for creation, but with admissions of difficulties on both sides which he could not solve. The Augustinians of the middle ages were for creation; the Lutherans in the general for propagation, the Reformed or Calvinists almost in a body for creation. Such being the historical facts in the case, we think it would require a very ordinary degree of modesty to prevent any man from pronouncing the doctrine of propagation, renounced as it ever has been by the great body of the Reformed churches, a matter perfectly plain, clearly taught in Scripture, inevitable and unavoidable. Still less should we expect any one to denounce the opposite doctrine as Manichean-Pelagian, as irreconcilable with original sin, &c., &c. All this is rather unseemly, somewhat hard to bear with becoming equanimity. 3. The origin of the soul has no necessary connection with Pelagianism one way or the other. A man may hold the theory either of creation or of propagation and be a Pelagian, and he may hold either and be a thorough and consistent opponent of Pelagianism. If he holds that responsibility is limited by ability; that we are responsible only for our acts, and only

for that class of acts which are under our own control, then he must deny original righteousness and original sin. Moral character can be predicated only of voluntary action, and consequently nothing concreated, innate, or hereditary, can be of the nature either of holiness or of sin. It is clear that a man may hold all these principles, and yet believe that the soul is the product of generation; and he may deny them and yet believe the soul to be immediately created. The two things have no logical connection whatever. And hence the most thorough Pelagians are the advocates of propagation of the soul, as Priestley and men of his school. On the other hand, the most thoroughly anti-Pelagian body in the whole history of the church, has been the most strenuous advocates for the theory of immediate creation. It is, therefore, a manifestation of no small degree of courage, for any man to assert that theory to be the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, and totally irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin. He might as well assert that it is the fundamental principle of conic sections. The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is, that original sin is propagated *NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM*. It is not a material infection of the blood; it is not a substance either corporeal or spiritual, to be transmitted by physical laws, but it is a punitive infliction. It is the consequence of the withdrawal of the fellowship and favour of God from the descendants of Adam, as the judicial consequence of his apostasy. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is a thousand times better than the doctrine of "the identification of soul and body," which Dr. Baird would have us believe is essential to orthodoxy.

A fourth characteristic principle of this book is one which is announced with great formality, and often repeated, and which is made of the last importance. That principle is thus stated. "Community in a propagated nature constitutes such a union or oneness, as immediately involves the possessor in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it springs." P. 317. This does not mean, and is not intended to mean simply, that a progenitor transmits

his own nature to his posterity; that as genera and species are permanent and transmissible in the animal world, so moral character is transmissible in the human race. This is the Placæan and New School doctrine. More than that is intended by the principle above stated. Community in a propagated nature involves community not only in moral character, but in guilt. We are said, on account of this community of nature, not only to inherit a depraved nature from Adam, but to have sinned his sin, and to bear the criminality of his apostasy. His act of self-determination in turning from God was our act, and imposes the same responsibility on us as it did on him. "We share in the moral responsibility of his apostasy as though we had wrought it for ourselves." We are "morally chargeable with that sin." "No man is held to answer for the first sin as it is Adam's; and if it is not his own, as it is sin or crime, justice will not account it his, as it is a ground of condemnation." The principle is that what a nature does in the progenitor of a race, all who receive that nature coöperated in doing. Being an act of nature it is common to all who possess that nature, and involves all in the same criminality.

This is a principle which is of wide application. It cannot be taken up and laid aside at pleasure. If true at all, it is true universally. If community of nature involves community in guilt and pollution for acts of nature, then it must be for all the acts of that nature. It is purely arbitrary and contradictory to confine it to one of those acts, to the exclusion of all others. If, in virtue of community of nature, we are agents in Adam's first sin of nature, and morally chargeable with its criminality, then we are morally chargeable with all his moral acts. If the ground of imputation of his guilt is the covenant, then it is limited to his first sin; but if that ground be community of nature, it must extend to all his sins. Dr. Baird (unconsciously perhaps) admits this. "Any exertion of Adam's will or powers," he says, "the effect of which had been to strengthen holy principles within him, affecting as it would his nature, would have been imputed to those who in him were partakers of his native holiness. Any act of his will, or exertion of the powers of his being, the tendency of which had been to weaken those principles in his nature, would have been in like

manner imputed. On the contrary, actions which bore no relation to such effects as these, were personal to the actor, and not imputed to others. To the former class belong acts of obedience to God, such as tilling the ground, observing the Sabbath, and worshipping God—acts which, by the force of habit, gave increasing strength to the holy nature in which he was created; or any want of watchfulness, in view of the dangers which were at hand, or failure to seek divine strength to uphold him in integrity. To the latter class of actions pertained such as partaking of food, and indulging in nightly slumbers—acts which had no special moral character, and exerted no plastic influence on his nature.” P. 306. This is a fair carrying out the principle. Community of nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of our progenitor. But what is to limit the application of the principle to our original progenitor? What is the specific difference between our natural relation to Adam and our natural relation to Noah? Human nature, as common to the extant race of men, was as truly and completely in the latter as in the former. We are as truly the descendants of the one as of the other. If community in a propagated nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of a common parent, why are we not responsible for the moral acts of Noah? Again, what difference, as to community of nature, is there between our relation to Adam, and the relation of the Hebrews to Abraham? If we, on the ground of that community, are responsible for all Adam’s moral acts, why are not the Hebrews responsible for all the acts of Abraham? Nay, why are we not responsible for the acts of our immediate progenitors, and of all our progenitors back to Adam? What is to hinder our being morally chargeable with every act ever committed by all our ancestors? Can Dr. Baird answer that question? He does indeed answer it, and just as might be expected, by denying his principle, and upsetting his theory. He says this objection confounds two classes of actions—“of these, one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring therein; but constitute mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known.” “To

this class," he adds, "belong the sins of our immediate ancestors;" which, therefore, are not imputable. "The other class," we are told, "consists of such agency as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed." P. 509. But, in the first place, this is not the principle. The principle is, that community of nature involves us in *all* the moral and legal responsibilities of our progenitor, and not in a single class of his responsibilities only. And, in the second place, it is not the author's own exposition and application of his principle. He distinctly states that we share the responsibility of all Adam's moral acts; everything which tended to strengthen or to weaken his nature is imputable, and nothing, according to our author, can be imputed, which is not morally chargeable. It is not therefore merely acts which change nature, but acts which strengthen or weaken it, that is, all moral acts, the guilt and pollution, or merit and holiness, of which are transmitted. If this principle is true at all, it must involve us in moral responsibility for all the moral acts of the nature which we have inherited. Besides all this, the author tells us that it is acts or agencies which change nature, in which the recipients of that nature are involved; and, therefore, that if all men had remained holy, save one individual, and he should apostatize, his descendants would be involved in his crime and depravity. Then, if a man's nature is changed by the power of the Holy Ghost, why is not that holy nature transmitted? The fact that it is not, is proof that this whole theory is a chimera. It is not by physical transmission of substance that sin or holiness is propagated.

A more serious consequence of this theory arises from its application to Christ. It is admitted by our author that Christ partook of a human nature derived from Adam. The Scriptures, he says "lay much stress on the derivation of his human nature and person from the common fountain of the race."* P. 582. He was the Son of man, the Son of David, the Seed of Abraham. His genealogy is carefully traced up to Adam. He was a partaker, therefore, of the nature which apostatized from God in the progenitor of the race. He was

* Dr. Baird speaks of the derivation of Christ's *human person* from Adam, as though he were two persons. This of course is an inadvertency.

consubstantial with those whom he came to redeem. If, however, he was truly the Son of David according to his human nature; if he was, in the strict and proper sense of the words, the seed of Abraham; and if community of nature involves community in the guilt and pollution belonging to that nature, how are we to avoid the inevitable, although shocking, conclusion, that Christ was guilty and polluted? If we, because we are descendants of Adam, are partakers in his apostasy, why is not Christ, who also was a descendant of Adam, also a partaker in that crime? If it is morally chargeable on us, *on the ground of community of nature*, why is it not in like manner chargeable on him? Dr. Baird's answer to this difficulty is again a denial of his theory. He refers to the mystery of the miraculous conception. But this does not avail him. It is indeed supposable (even on the theory of propagation) that the *pollution* of our nature was removed by "the power of the Highest," before its assumption into personal union with the Son of God. But *guilt* cannot be removed by power. If a man commits a crime he is guilty, and even Omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true that we apostatized in Adam, Omnipotence cannot make it untrue. And if it is true that all who partake of Adam's nature shared in his apostasy, and are morally chargeable with its guilt, then it must be true of Christ. That his human nature sinned in Adam is a simple fact of the past, according to the theory of this book, and all the power in the universe cannot make it no fact. Contradictions and absurdities are not the objects of power. They have no relation to it, and do not fall within its sphere. It is, therefore, only by a denial of the principle which the author admits underlies his whole book, that he can escape a conclusion which no Christian can admit. The principle, therefore, must be false—the whole fabric which it sustains falls to the ground. It may indeed be said that all sin is personal, and that as the human nature of Christ is not a person it cannot be chargeable with sin. But, in the first place, this is not Dr. Baird's doctrine. He holds to the distinction between personal sins and sins of nature. He teaches that the nature sinned in Adam, and that the guilt and depravity resulting from that sin attaches to all the persons to

whom that nature belongs. In the second place, although the human nature in Christ is impersonal, yet it was assumed into personal union with the divine nature, so that all that belongs essentially to that nature belongs to the one person Christ. He could say, *I thirst, I am exceeding sorrowful*. If, therefore, the nature assumed by Christ had sinned in Adam, he assumed it with the moral criminality of that act. It was his sin morally as being the sin of his nature.

The answer given by the Protestant theologians to this difficulty, shows that they held a very different doctrine from that contained in this book. They say that although Christ was in Adam naturally, he was not in him federally. He was not embraced in the covenant made with Adam as the natural head of the human family; and, therefore, he had no part in the guilt of his sin. This of course supposes that the federal, and not the natural union is the essential ground of the imputation; that the sense in which Adam's sin is ours, is a legal and not a moral sense; and that the sense in which we sinned in him is that in which we act in a representative and not a literal sense. And as to the pollution inherent in human nature, as has already been remarked, the Protestant theologians teach that it did not flow to Christ, because it is propagated "neither through the body nor through the soul, but through guilt." If there were not community of guilt, if Adam did not represent Christ in the covenant of works, then spiritual death, the punitive infliction for that offence, would not affect him. Thus Hornbeck, in his *Confutation of Socinianism*, after saying that men are in Adam, first, as their natural head; and, secondly, as their federal head, adds: "*Illâ ratione etiam ex Adamo naturæ suæ humanæ originem trahit Christus. Sed non posteriori ratione consitus in Adamo fuit, ut in capite morali et foederali, qui non pro Christo legem aut tenuit aut prævaricatus fuit;—quique proinde nec cum peccato originali (cujus in Adamo non fuit particeps, haud censitus in ejus federe) concipiendus erat.*" And Ursinus in his *Explication of the Heidelberg Catechism*, says: "*Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas, dum creat, simul privat originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hæc lege contulerat,*

ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent. Neque Deus hoc faciens fit injustus vel causa peccati. Nam hæc privatio respectu Dei eam infligentis ob culpam parentum, non peccatum, sed justissima poena est; etsi respectu parentum sibi et soboli suæ eam attrahentium, peccatum sit." See *De Moor's Comm. Perpetuus*, Caput xv., § xxxii. How Dr. Baird can quote these and other authors of the same class in support of his views, we cannot understand. They distinctly contradict every point in his peculiar theory, and affirm the contrary. They deny the propagation of the soul, and assert its immediate creation. They deny that the communication of original sin is through community of nature, and assert that it is through the federal relation. They deny that the loss of original righteousness is due to our own sin, and assert that it is (ob culpam parentum) on account of the fault of our first parents. In short they hold one system of doctrine, and he another.

The only other principle involved in the theology of this book, to which our limits permit us to advert, is the denial that anything can be imputed to a person which does not personally belong to him; any act which is not his own act; any sin that is not morally chargeable upon him as his own; any righteousness which is not subjectively his. No one can be punished who is not personally a sinner, and no one can be justified who is not inherently righteous. It need not be remarked how thoroughly this overthrows the whole system of evangelical doctrine and of evangelical religion.

1. The general principle is laid down, that nothing can be imputed to a man which is not really his own; his own, that is, not on the ground of a legal relation, but his own morally, as constituting his personal character. "If there is any one principle which shines forth," says the author, "on the pages of the Scriptures, with a light as of the noon-day sun, it is that thus attested. It is, that at the bar of God every man shall be judged and rewarded in precise accordance with his deserts; which certainly have respect to the attitude of the soul and its affections, as well as the actions of the life. When the Scriptures speak of the justice of God, the meaning is not obscure or doubtful. We are plainly and abundantly taught that the

rule of all his judgments is his law, which is the only criterion of merit or crime; that there are but two classes of cases recognized at his bar, namely, those who are conformed to the law, or righteous, or those who are not conformed, and are therefore criminal or sinners; and that God's justice consists in the fact, that to these severally he will render a reward appropriate and precisely proportionate to their desert." P. 489. On another page, Dr. Baird says: "He who supposes that God's dealings with his creatures are, in any case or manner, controlled by relations, or imagined relations, not in accordance with the intrinsic state of the case, as it is in every respect, not only denies that the judgments of God are in accordance with truth, but involves himself in the further conclusion that the Almighty is without a moral nature at all. For, to imagine that he can look upon one as guilty, in a matter in which he is not guilty, or liable to be punished as a sinner, when in fact he is not a sinner, is to assume that holiness is no more in harmony with God's nature than sin, truth no more pleasing to him than a lie." P. 330.

2. In the second place, he applies the general principle, that the only ground of God's judgment is subjective character and personal merit or demerit, to the case specially of sin. Sin he defines to be that which includes criminality and pollution. He therefore insists that sin can be imputed only to one who is criminal and polluted, and on the ground of such criminality. Thus, as we have seen, he constantly teaches that Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, unless we are morally chargeable with it. He devotes a whole section to prove that men cannot be regarded and treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, unless it is theirs in such a sense as to constitute their moral character. "It is only because truly and immediately ours, that a God of infinite goodness and mercy charges it upon us." P. 422. We are partakers "of the moral enormity of his deed." "We were so in Adam, that we share the moral responsibility of his apostasy, as really as though we had wrought it for ourselves personally and severally; and that in consequence we are guilty, and condemned under the curse at the bar of infinite justice." P. 475. The word *guilt*, he says, means "criminal liability to punishment." It includes, we are

told, two ideas: "The one is violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated, depends the moral enormity which the word implies. . . . The second element in the meaning of the word is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. Hence no one can be guilty except he has violated the law which condemns him." P. 462. By parity of reason, no one can be righteous who does not fulfil the law which justifies him.

3. In accordance with the above principle, our author teaches that none but sinners can be punished; and by sinners, he means those chargeable with moral criminality and pollution. On page 488, he says, the idea of criminality can never be separated from the word sin; "the primary conception always contained in the word is, crime—moral turpitude." The language of the Bible, he says, "knows not even how to threaten punishment, without uttering the charge of sin." "The only way in which," he adds, "we can conceive the attempt to be made to evade the force of this argument is by the assumption that, although there must be sin in order to the infliction of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that they coexist in the same party. If a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned; but it does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! To this subterfuge, two insuperable objections may be sufficient. The first is, that the entire argument of the apostle is predicated upon directly the opposite doctrine, to wit, that wherever there is punishment, it is conclusive proof of sin, (i. e. 'of moral turpitude.'). . . . The second is, that it sweeps utterly away the whole doctrine of the Scriptures respecting God's justice. The doctrine involved in the justice of God, and proclaimed in his word, is, that every intelligent creature shall be dealt with in precise accordance with his works," [and yet the author expects to be saved!] "under the provisions of the law, and the covenant therein incorporated. That provides that the sinner," [he who is chargeable with crime and moral turpitude,] "and the sinner only, shall be punished, and that in precise proportion to the enormity of his sins."

If then sin cannot be imputed where there are not crime and pollution in the person or persons to whom the imputation is made, then it follows that our sins were not imputed to Christ.

And if sinners only are punished, if punishment implies crime and moral turpitude in the person punished, then Christ's sufferings were not of the nature of punishment; and the doctrine of atonement, as that doctrine has ever been held in the church, and as it is the foundation of the believer's hope, must be given up. It would be difficult to find in the writings of Socinians or Pelagians more sweeping, emphatic, and bitter denials of the principles on which the great doctrines of satisfaction and justification rest, than are to be found in this book. How does Dr. Baird avoid these conclusions from his principles? He attempts it in two perfectly inconsistent and contradictory ways. First, by denying the principles themselves in their application to Christ, making him an exception; and secondly, by asserting that after all they do apply to him. This latter course is taken in a confused and faltering manner; it is, however, attempted. First, he denies the application of his principles to Christ: "It may be said that the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded and treated as a sinner. To this proposition we must emphatically except. He is regarded and treated no otherwise than as being precisely what he was, God's spotless Son, the spotless substitute, the vicarious sacrifice for sinners. But, that he was regarded and treated as a sinner, NEVER!" P. 440. The only exception to the principle that rational creatures shall be treated according "to their deserts," he says, "is the Lord Jesus Christ, in his atoning work. And unless we are disposed to deny the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ, and the wonderful wisdom, as well as grace, displayed in the plan of redemption, we must admit that this very exception confirms and establishes the rule. In God's own Son, and in him alone, shall innocence ever be visited with the inflictions appropriate to crime; and in his people, and in them alone, shall sin ever fail of the curse of God." P. 490. On the same page, "The doctrine which we oppose, involves the confounding of all moral distinctions—the infliction on the sinless, of the punishment of crime—the endurance by innocence, of the curse of the just and holy One. If this be so, then we are forced to conclude that there is no essential difference between holiness and sin; or else, that whatever the distinction, the Lawgiver and Judge of all is indifferent to it." This is certainly most extraordinary writing. The

punishment of the innocent, on the ground of the sin of others, is declared to be a violation of justice, inconsistent with the very nature of God, involving the assumption that he is indifferent to the distinction between holiness and sin; and yet it is admitted that Christ, although perfectly innocent, was punished! That is, God did, in the case of Christ, what his very nature forbids to be done, and what it is atheistical to say a holy God can do! On page 492, our author says, "Had Christ's sufferings been involuntary, they would have been a violation of justice, instead of being a signal display of it." But how does this help the matter? If a thing is essentially wicked, our consenting to its being done, cannot make it right. "If the infliction on the sinless, the punishment of crime," is a moral enormity, it is an awful thing to say that God has done it. How can what is impossible be done? If sinfulness in the victim is the necessary condition of punishment, then consent is no vindication of the justice of its infliction. A man may consent to suffer, but consent does not make him a sinner, and therefore, according to this doctrine, cannot render punishment just, or even possible.

The principle on which this whole book rests, renders a satisfaction to justice by vicarious punishment an absolute impossibility, because it makes sinfulness in the victim an essential condition of its infliction. All this difficulty and confusion arises out of the unwillingness or inability of the author to see that punishment has nothing to do either with the degree or nature of the suffering, or with the character of the sufferer. Everything depends on the design of the infliction. Suffering endured in satisfaction of justice is punishment, whatever be its nature or degree, and whatever be the character of the victim. If Christ suffered to satisfy divine justice for the sins of his people, his sufferings were penal.

Dr. Baird, when speaking of our relation to Adam, says it is subterfuge to say that the sin may be in one party and the punishment on another,—that Paul insists that wherever there is punishment it is conclusive proof there is sin in the sufferer. Although, as we have seen, in some places he makes Christ an exception to this principle, in others he seems disposed to carry the principle through. Community in a propagated nature

involves all who partake of that nature in the moral character and responsibilities of the progenitor whence the nature originated, is a principle which he expressly says applies to Christ. P. 317. "Unless Christ occupied such a relation to the sins of his people that they may, in some proper sense, be called his sins, they cannot be imputed to him, nor punished in him." P. 607. He had just before said that Christ's "position must be such that justice, in searching for the transgressors, shall find him in such a relation to them, to render him the party responsible to justice for their sins." All this, and much more to the same effect, may be interpreted in a perfectly good sense; but when it is interpreted in the light of the principle that community of nature involves community of character; that sin cannot be punished except in the person of the sinner; when it is remembered that our participation in Adam's sin, which is said to involve us in the charge of its moral criminality, is placed on the same ground, and declared to be analogous to the participation of Christ in our sins; then it must be admitted that the language above cited comes dreadfully near to charging the adorable Redeemer with crime and pollution. That this is in words denied is very true. But to say that sin cannot be imputed to the sinless; that it cannot exist in one person and be punished in another, is to say, either that it was not imputed to Christ and punished in him; or, that Christ was personally a sinner. A man cannot assert a thing in his premises, and deny it in his conclusion.

4. The fourth application of the principle that God's judgments are founded on subjective character, is to the doctrine of justification. Here again we are referred to our relation to Adam for illustration. The method of our justification, Dr. Baird says, "resembles the method of our condemnation in Adam." "The sentence of the law, whether condemnatory or justifying, must have some real ground; since the judgment of God is according to truth. The condemnation of sinners is for sin. The justification is of righteous ones, for righteousness." P. 425. But as the sin for which we are condemned is, and according to Dr. Baird must be, our sin, so the righteousness for which we are justified is subjectively our own. As we are chargeable with the moral criminality of Adam's apos-

tasy, so we are morally meritorious for Christ's righteousness. The one is ours in the same sense that the other is. And as the one is ours in such a sense as to constitute our moral character, and to expose us to the curse of God on the ground of that character; so the other is ours so as to constitute our character, and entitle us on the ground of our subjective state to justification before God. And as Adam's sin is a proper ground of remorse, so Christ's righteousness is a proper ground for self-complacency. P. 448. We are justified not by Christ's righteousness extriniscal to us and only nominally ours, but "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death." Bellarmine teaches the doctrine of subjective justification more consistently than Dr. Baird does, but we do not think that he teaches it more explicitly, or that it flows more necessarily from the principles of the former than it does from those of the latter.

The principle that God's judgments must be according to truth, that if he pronounces a man guilty, he must be guilty; and if he pronounces a man just he must be just, is indeed self-evidently true. It is, however, no less true, that the same man may be at the same time both guilty and not guilty, righteous and unrighteous. In other words, the terms guilty and righteous have each two distinct, recognized, and perfectly familiar meanings. They are used in a moral, and also in a forensic sense. A man, therefore, may be guilty in one sense, and righteous in another. God pronounces the ungodly righteous. This is the very language of the Holy Ghost. Should any one convicted of theft, or of any other crime, bear full penalty of his offence, his moral character and ill-desert remain the same, but in the eye of the law he is righteous. It would be unjust to inflict upon him any further punishment. Justice, so far as his offence is concerned, is satisfied. In justification God pronounces us righteous, legally, not morally. His declaration is according to truth, because in the sense intended, we are righteous. The demands of justice have been satisfied in our behalf. When Christ is said to be guilty, or to bear our guilt, the word is of course used not in its moral, but in its legal sense. He assumed the responsibility to satisfy justice for the sins of his people. And thus when we are said

to bear the guilt of Adam's first sin, it does not mean that his sin is crime and pollution in us, but that, in virtue of our relation to him, we are justly exposed to the penalty of his sin. That such is the plain doctrine of the Scripture is the faith of the church in all ages. It is the doctrine of all the Augustinians in the Latin church; it is the faith of the Lutherans and of the Reformed, and it is the foundation, more or less distinctly apprehended, of the hope of salvation in every true believer. In opposition to this system, Dr. Baird would have us believe, that God's judgments are founded exclusively on the moral character or subjective state of his creatures; that if he pronounces any creature guilty, that creature must be morally criminal and polluted; if he pronounces him righteous, he must be subjectively holy; that only sinners, in the moral sense of the word, can be punished, and only the righteous, in the moral sense of that term, can be justified. With whatever orthodoxy in phraseology, with whatever earnestness of protestations against heresy, these principles may be set forth, they are none the less subversive of the whole system of evangelical religion. If none but sinners can be punished, then Christ did not bear the penalty of the law; and if none but the subjectively righteous can be justified, then no human being can be saved.

It is one of the infelicities of a review, that it is commonly written *currente calamo*, and sent piecemeal to the press before the ink is thoroughly dried. It is, therefore, apt to bear the impress of the feelings which the book reviewed makes at the time on the writer's mind. If it could be laid aside, and allowed to cool, much might be softened or modified. It is very possible that when we come to see this review in print, we may wish that some things had been otherwise expressed. We would very gladly have written in a style of laudation all the way through. Our first short notice of this volume is evidence that we were even too ready to commend. If we have said anything in this more protracted review which offends in the other extreme, we shall be sincerely sorry. But an author who does not hesitate to pronounce principles held by nineteenth-century men, and we believe by ninety-nine hundredths of his brethren, to be Manichean, Pelagian, and atheistical; who

represents the advocates of those principles as Pharisees, who make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, can have no right to complain that those who hold these principles should speak their minds with all frankness. We at least feel bound to enter a solemn protest against doctrines which we firmly believe subvert our whole system of faith, and to be inconsistent with the preservation of evangelical religion.

SHORT NOTICES.

A Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Boston: Hickling, Swan & Brewer. 1860. Quarto; pp. 1854.

THIS great work, which the public have been long looking for with excited expectations, has at last made its appearance. So far as we are competent to judge, on a cursory examination of its principles and contents, we are disposed to regard it as the most reliable and useful book of the kind in our language. It contains about one hundred and four thousand words. Many of these of course are obsolete, provincial, local, or technical. They nevertheless deserve a place in a work which professes to be a complete glossary of the language for common use. Matters of orthography may be determined either by principle and analogy, or by usage. Dr. Worcester has wisely adopted the latter as his guide. Usage is law in matters of language. As regards pronunciation, the same rule has been adopted. In doubtful cases, different authorities are cited. In all disputed points relating to the English language, the English are surely entitled to be judges. It is not desirable to get up an American language. It is one of the great recommendations of this Dictionary, that the author is disposed to defer to the authority of the standard writers of the old country. Our language is so rapidly spreading over the earth, that the only plan by which anything like uniformity can be preserved, is to have some standard to which all shall conform; otherwise we shall soon have American, Australian, Indian, Polynesian English, in endless confusion. The most difficult department of a Dictionary is the definitions. They require not only knowledge, but power of discrimination and of expression. The true rule, so

far as a rule can be given, is, as we think, that which Dr. Worcester has adopted, viz. to give first the signification of the word as determined by its etymology, which commonly contains its generic idea, and then its various meanings, in logical order, as determined by usage, each supported by one or more citations from standard writers. The illustrations introduced into this volume are a valuable addition. The eye is more informing than the ear. The delineation of an Abacus gives a clearer idea of the thing than can be communicated by any verbal description. We must leave to abler hands the full discussion of the merits of this important work; and can only express our gratitude to the indefatigable author for the herculean labour which he has so patiently endured for the benefit of others.

Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians. By John Lillie, D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Kingston, N. Y. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 580.

Dr. Lillie is one of the most accomplished biblical scholars in our country. He is already extensively and favourably known as the author of several valuable contributions to the translation and interpretation of the sacred text. These lectures are printed as they were delivered from the pulpit, and furnish a fine illustration of the way in which the stores of learning, and the results of the most critical research, may be made available for popular instruction and edification.

The Organon of Scripture; or the Inductive Method of Biblical Interpretation. By J. S. Lamar. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1860. Pp. 324.

This "purports to be," as the author informs us, "radically and essentially, a new work, and not a remodelled edition of Ernesti, Michaëlis, Stuart, or Horne. True, it does not claim to have discovered a new method of investigating phenomena; it merely adopts and applies to the Scripture a method which has been satisfactorily tried in other departments of study, but which, it is believed, has never been presented and urged as *the* method of Biblical Interpretation." By method, as distinguished from rules, is meant "the way or manner of investigation;" rules are determined by the method adopted; they are the principles employed in carrying it out. The author discusses successively the Mystical, the Dogmatic, and the Inductive Methods of Interpretation. The last is the one which he adopts, and regards as something new in its application to exegesis. Protestants, he says, although they started right, soon abandoned their principles, and adopted the Dogmatic method, exalting creeds and confessions into the place formerly occupied

by tradition and decretals; changing masters, but remaining slaves.

Commentary on the Pentateuch. Translated from the German of Otto Von Gerlach, by Rev. Henry Downing, incumbent of St. Mary's, Kingswinford. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. Pp. 585.

Otto Von Gerlach was an eminently pious and lovely man. He was educated for an academical career, but finally determined to accept office as a pastor, and was ordained as minister of the Elizabeth Church in Berlin. He died at the early age of forty-eight. His principal work is his *Scripture Commentary*, designed for the people, of which this exposition of the Pentateuch is a part. It is not a learned work, but it is a sound, practical exposition, characterized by clear good sense, and an intelligent appreciation of the text.

Christianity in the First Century; or, The New Birth of the Social Life of Man through the Rising of Christianity. By Chr. Hoffman, Inspector of the Evangelical School in Salou, near Ludwigsburg. Translated from the German. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. Dublin: John Robertson. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860. Pp. 294.

"It would be difficult," says the translator, "to find the great central truth of Christianity, personal union of the believer with Christ, or the satisfaction and joy consequent on that union, portrayed in more vivid colours" than they are in this volume. "The great object of these dissertations," however, he adds, "is to set forth this principle as the powerful and only bond and cement of society." A volume replete with new and suggestive trains of thought, is well worthy of an extended circulation.

The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, stated anew, with special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times; in Eight Lectures delivered in the Oxford University Pulpit in the year 1859, on the Bampton Foundation; by George Rawlinson, M.A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Editor of the "*History of Herodotus*," &c. From the London edition, with the Notes translated, by Rev. A. N. Arnold. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 454.

This work is directed against the latest form of modern unbelief—that which attempts, by the process of historical criticism, to destroy the authority of the Scriptures. It is therefore an historical argument, designed to show that on the principles on which, by common consent, the facts of history are to be established, the Bible is to be received as a trust-

worthy record of actual events, and is not a mere collection of myths and legends. It belongs to the same series of lectures with those of Professor Mansel on the Limits of Religious Thought, but is adapted to a wider class of readers. The author, from his relationship with the celebrated traveller and antiquarian, Col. Rawlinson, has been led to pay special attention to the recent discoveries of historical monuments in the East, which serve to confirm the sacred narratives. This, however, is only a subordinate object of this work. It embraces a survey of all the historical testimonies to the veracity of Bible history. It is a timely and valuable contribution to apologetic literature.

The Stars and the Angels. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1860. Pp. 358.

This work consists of two parts. The first is a scientific discussion of the structure of the moon, sun, earth, planets, the nebular hypothesis, &c. The second part relates to Angels, who are represented as embodied spirits of the same species as man. This part includes the discussion of many questions, within and without the limits of human knowledge, as the Natural History of Devils—The Unfallen Sons of God in other Worlds—Death and Carnivorous Animals in the Stars—The Soul, or Psyche—Mesmerism, and Spirit Rapping, &c.

The Story of a Pocket Bible; a book for all classes of readers. Ten Illustrations. New York: published by Carlton & Porter. Sunday School Union, No. 200 Mulberry Street. Pp. 412.

In this volume a Pocket Bible, which passes through many hands, is made to relate its own history. The child, the youth, the man of business, &c., are its successive possessors, on all of whom the truth is represented as making a more or less salutary impression. It is handsomely printed, and the illustrations are in good taste.

The Life of Daniel Wilson, D. D., Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India: by Joseph Bateman, M. A., Rector of North Cray, Kent, his Son-in-Law and First Chaplain. With Portraits, Map, and Illustrations. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 744.

As Bishop Wilson in early life came under the influence of the Rev. John Newton, was the associate of Richard Cecil, and prominent among the evangelical clergy of the church of England during the early part of the present century, his biography becomes in a measure a history of the recent revival of evangelical religion in the Established Church. His appoint-

ment to the bishopric of Calcutta in 1832, and his indefatigable labours in India until his death, January 1858, bring to view the state and progress of Christianity in that important part of the British empire. Independently, therefore, of the interest which attaches to the personal history and character of this eminent servant of God, his biography has an important bearing on the history of religion during the last fifty years. This large and handsome volume has, therefore, a great and permanent value.

History of the Old Covenant. From the German of J. H. Kurtz, D. D., Professor of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. III. Translated by James Martin, B. A., Nottingham. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1859. Pp. 532.

An additional volume of a work which we have repeatedly noticed and recommended.

Inaugural Addresses at the Opening of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the North-West, Chicago, Ill. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street, below Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 93.

The North-Western Seminary, although it had its birth in the midst of conflict, has begun its career under unusually auspicious circumstances. It has a full Faculty, a competent endowment, and a favourable location. With all these elements of success, it can hardly fail to answer the wishes of its friends, and the expectations of the church. These addresses are worthy of their several authors, and will serve to strengthen the conviction of their fitness for the important and peculiarly responsible positions to which they have been called. The lithographic portraits of the Professors are gloomy caricatures, a disgrace both to art and taste.

The Resurrection of Christ and of His People. A Discourse preached, March 7, 1859, at the funeral of the Rev. James Carnahan, D. D., LL.D., Ninth President of the College of New Jersey: containing a Brief Sketch of his Life and Character. By James M. MacDonald, D. D., Minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Princeton. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1860. Pp. 39.

This is an affectionate tribute to the memory of an excellent man. Dr. Carnahan had the respect, the confidence, and love of all who knew him. He filled his high station with dignity and success. There was in him a slumbering power of intellect and will which was called into exercise only on rare occasions, but on which his friends knew they could rely when the emergency arose. Few men ever gave less cause of offence to others, and few were less disposed to take offence. Dr. MacDonald has skilfully performed the task of delineating his character, and estimating his worth as a man, as a minister, and as President of the College of New Jersey.

Annual of Scientific Discovery; or, Year Book in Facts of Science and Art, for the year 1860; exhibiting the most important discoveries and improvements in Mechanics, Useful Arts, &c., &c., &c. Edited by David A. Wells, A. M., author of "Principles of Natural Philosophy," &c., &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, No 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. London: Trübner & Co. 1860. Pp. 430.

The extended title-page of this Annual is a sufficient index of its design. Our readers, indeed, are already familiar with the former volumes of this valuable repository of facts, and record of the progress of science.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. By the Rev. James McCosh, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast: Author of "The Method of Divine Government, Physical and Moral," and joint author of "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 504.

Intending to present our readers with an extended review of this work, in the next number, as we hope, of this Journal, we content ourselves for the present with its simple announcement.

The Puritans; or, the Church, Court, and Parliament of England, during the Reigns of Edward VI. and Queen Elizabeth. By Samuel Hopkins. In Three Volumes. Vol. II. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 539.

This volume continues the history of the Puritans from 1575 to 1586. Another volume will complete a work which is certainly deserving of a very high place in historical literature, a department in which our countrymen have been remarkably successful.

A plain Commentary on the Four Holy Gospels: Intended chiefly for Devotional Reading. In two vols. Vols. I. and II. St. Matthew—St. Mark. Second American Edition, complete from the London Edition. Philadelphia: published by Herman Hooker, S. W. corner Chestnut & 8th streets. 1859. Pp. 938.

There is a very grateful savour of the antique about these comments, both as to expression and spirit. They are written under the inspiration of the Prayer-Book, and of the theological and religious life of the second century of the history of the English church, when the Catholic element had not come to leaven the Protestant mass. These volumes are rich in religious truth, in a reverential and devout spirit. They abound with pertinent scriptural references, and would, we think, prove a healthful condiment to Presbyterian and Puritan reading.

The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary upon the Epistle of St. James. By Rudolf Stier, Doctor of Theology, Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkeuditz. Translated from the German by the Rev. William B. Pope, Manchester. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859. Pp. 501. Also Vols. V. and VI. Pp. 513 and 518.

Dr. Stier's works have had such an extensive circulation in this country, that our readers need only be apprized that additional volumes have issued from the press.

Bishop Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Edited, with an Analysis, by J. T. Champlin, D. D., President of Waterville College. Boston: J. Jewett & Co. 1860. Pp. 278.

The design of this edition of Butler's Analogy is to present it in a convenient form for a text-book. For this purpose, the longer paragraphs are divided, and the subjects of each prefixed. Notes of explanation are occasionally added.

The Power of Jesus Christ to save unto the uttermost. By Rev. A. J. Campbell, Melrose. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 329.

This is an argument and an appeal meant specially for the people of the author's charge, when he was about to leave them for a distant land. The plan of the work is to present, in successive chapters, the grounds of faith in Christ's power to save. As may be inferred from its source and object, it is a book well adapted to guide men to the knowledge of salvation.

The Titles of our Lord adopted by Himself in the New Testament. By J. Montague Randall, Vicar of Langham, Norfolk. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 249.

This book was written in pencil, by a man nearly blind. It is not a compilation from books, but the outpourings of a pious and cultivated mind.

The Holy Bible, containing The Old and New Testaments; Translated out the Original Tongues, and with the former Translations diligently compared and revised. In which all the Proper Names are divided and accented as they should be pronounced, and a copious and original Selection of References and numerous Marginal Readings are given; together with Introductions to each Book, and numerous Tables and Maps. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

One prominent feature of this edition of the Scriptures—its indications of the pronunciation of proper names—will be highly prized by a large number of readers. The other peculiarities specified in the title-page also add to its value for ordinary use by individuals and families. But there is an additional feature not mentioned, so far as we have observed, in title-page

or preface, which we think, in justice to all readers and purchasers, should have been distinctly announced. We refer to the text and readings being according to the amended version of the American Bible Society, which, after being used a brief period by that institution, was, after most thorough discussion, deliberately discarded by it. We do not propose here to discuss the merits, the propriety, or the expediency of that revised version of the Scriptures. We have sufficiently expressed ourselves on these matters in a former article, published when the mind of the church was agitated on the subject. We do not complain of any publisher for adopting this version, if he sees fit. We only insist, that if he takes this course, he should announce it explicitly in the title-page, or in a manner equivalent thereto. This edition is in large octavo, in good clear type, and, with the qualification above noted, well adapted to general use.

Esther and her Times, a Series of Lectures on the Book of Esther. By John M. Lowrie, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

A series of instructive and interesting lectures on a portion of the word of God, which has received less attention from common Christians than it otherwise would, owing to the absence of helps like this, for the due understanding and application of its teachings.

Annie Leslie, or the Little Orphan. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

One of those safe and interesting books for children, for a copious supply of which, we are indebted to our Board of Publication.

Sketches of New England Divines. By the Rev. D. Sherman. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

The author gives in this volume sketches of twenty-one ministers, whose chief theatre of action was in New England. Beginning with John Cotton, he passes on to the Mathers, and Roger Williams, and introduces for the eighth portraiture, Jesse Lee, the pioneer of Methodism in New England. After reaching the Methodist era, his sketches number fourteen—five Congregationalists and nine Methodists! He condescends to notice Presidents Edwards, Stiles, and Dwight, Lemuel Haynes and Nathaniel Emmons. These exhaust his catalogue of Congregational luminaries after the sun of Methodism arose in overshadowing splendour. But besides the Methodist celebrities, Lee, Hedding, Fisk, Olin, who are known to fame, he unveils the hitherto hidden greatness of George Pickering, Joshua Crowell,

Jonathan D. Bridge, Timothy Merritt, and *Billy Hibbard*. Our readers can judge for themselves whether such a list answers the reasonable expectations raised by the title of the volume—"Sketches of New England Divines."

The *animus* of the author in this and other respects, as well as some of his other characteristics as a writer, will be further indicated by the following extracts from a passage in which he sets forth the religious and theological condition of New England, when Lee made his pioneer visit there in the interest of Methodism. He pronounces the Congregational clergy of that day "a sort of Puritanical Popes. They usually lived aside from the laity, on their farms, mingling little with them, save on the Sabbath, when they issued from their privacy to ascend the high pulpit, and dispense to the hungry multitude a wisp or two of ecclesiastical straw, in the shape of a dry disquisition on the fall, election, perseverance, or divine sovereignty. The people, in the meantime, looked reverently from their square pews up to the eminent position of their teacher; and what they received was masticated sufficiently to meet the demands of the most ultra vegetarian; thence becoming incorporated with their spiritual organism."

"Whatever the pulpit uttered was regarded as one of the eternal verities; unconditional election, reprobation, infant damnation, *et id omne genus*, went down with an appetite, because, forsooth, the minister had thrown them out as wholesome articles of spiritual diet. We laugh at the tatterdemalion regiment of the Pope, who nab at any old bone or mouldy relic his Holiness may deign to throw down to them; but their credulity in regard to the holy father is hardly more preposterous than was that of the Pilgrims in regard to their clergy. What the clergy said, they seized up, very much as the baboon is said to scrape his food into his mouth—good, bad, and indifferent—dust and vegetables altogether, leaving nature to make selections to her liking. . . . Any moral Columbus that might spring up, ought to be imprisoned or exiled for promulgating such novel and pernicious notions among the people. . . . The ecclesiastical blood-hounds would be found baying on their track. . . . The piety which then existed in the land was too sombre and gloomy, overcast as it was by the dark shadows of persecution, and depressed by the influence of a severe, pitiless theological system, which could consign men to perdition by a divine decree, and without any fault on their part." Pp. 119-23.

Such passages speak the character of this volume, and of the "moral Columbus" who wrote it, better than any description which we can give. The narrowness, ignorance, and utter

incompetency to master the subjects treated which are everywhere conspicuous, are aggravated by corresponding deformities of style. The pointless vulgarisms, the turgid puerilities, the sesquipedalian flourishes with which the work is replete, neither disguise nor atone for its contracted spirit, its erroneous statements, and its imbecile reasonings.

The Christian Lawyer; being a Portraiture of the Life and Character of William George Baker. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1859.

The subject of this memoir was a lawyer in Baltimore, who had achieved distinguished success at the bar, and in the Legislature of Maryland, long before his death, which occurred in the prime of his manhood. He was a zealous and exemplary Christian in the communion of the Methodist Church. While he was an efficient supporter of his own church, he took an active part in evangelical and charitable enterprises in which Christians of all communions coöperate. He was one of those large-hearted, symmetrical Christians, whose sympathies are rather catholic than sectarian.

We have taken an especial interest in the book, as showing the broad sphere of usefulness which opens itself to educated, able, and earnest laymen. We think a due proportion of this class is indispensable to the stability and prosperity of religion. There are educated men who can better serve God and the Church in the capacity of Aarons and Hurs, who uphold pastors in their work, than in the direct exercise of the pastoral office in their own persons.

The Life of the Rev. Adam Clarke, LL.D., F. A. S., M. R. I. A., &c. &c. By J. W. Etheridge, M. A., Doctor in Philosophy of the University of Heidelberg, and Member of the Asiatic Society of Paris. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1859.

The name of Adam Clarke is historical. Next to Wesley, and perhaps, through his Commentaries, even more than Wesley, he has exercised a powerful influence in moulding the mind and heart of the great Methodist communion in Britain and America. Of course, an accessible memoir of him is a want not only of his own denomination, but of all Christians who are interested in the great leaders and lights on whom God has put the honour of being representative men of any large portion of his people. The life of Dr. Clarke by his son, in three volumes, published in 1834, very imperfectly met this want, being too bulky and prolix to be available to the mass of readers. The present volume is an attempt to supply this desideratum by condensing the delineation of his life and character within the compass of one portable volume. It bears the impress of fidelity and accuracy in the author. We do not

discern the high artistic skill which imparts to this class of compositions their strongest fascination. The facts stated, however, speak their own importance, and kindle their own interest. Of course, the book advances many views which Presbyterian eyes see in another light. It will, nevertheless, be welcomed by the Christian public as a valuable addition to our biographical literature.

Autobiography of Dan Young, a New England Preacher of the Olden Time.
Edited by W. P. Strickland. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This narrative of his life and labours by a prominent Methodist preacher of New England, is, in a fair degree, readable and entertaining. It is, however, instinct with the sectarian and anti-Calvinistic mania which is so apt to deform this sort of books. Thus he says, "Calvinism, Universalism, and Deism had been the order of the day, but these crumbled and fell before the glorious testimony of the gospel, like Dagon before the ark." P. 34. "If, then, God had decreed all things, and the decree preceded his knowledge, there must necessarily have been a period, anterior to the decree, in which God knew nothing." P. 60. We are sorry that a book, not devoid of interest and instruction, should be marred by blemishes of this kind.

History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland: Condensed from the standard work of Messrs. Reid and Killen. By Rev. Samuel D. Alexander. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

As our own church is the child of the Presbyterian Church of Ireland, which furnished most of the people and ministers who first planted and organized Presbyterianism in this country, this volume by Mr. Alexander possesses a special interest for American Presbyterians. It will also be valued by all who desire to understand the history of this large and influential body of Christians in our land. The thanks of the public are due to Mr. Alexander for his very faithful and successful labour, in condensing the ponderous work of Reid and Killen within a compass which meets the exigencies of ordinary readers. The work was undertaken at the instance of the author's brother, the late lamented J. Addison Alexander, D. D., whose teeming mind was not more prolific of matchless works of his own, than of apt and felicitous suggestions to others of appropriate literary undertakings. Few came into free intercourse with him, who did not find themselves encouraged and stimulated to literary effort by his genial proposals. We are glad that the suggestion in this case resulted in this well-wrought volume, which the Christian public will not fail to appreciate.

Christ in History. By Robert Turnbull, D. D. New and Revised Edition. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

The work of Dr. Turnbull, of which this is a new and revised edition, had, by its first publication, won a high position among scholars and divines, thinkers, and cultivated Christians. "It takes the Incarnation as the central or 'turning point' in the history of mankind, and attempts to show how all the forces of society converge around it, how all preceding history prepares for it, and all succeeding history dates from it." Historical facts are so arrayed and expounded by the author, as to show that they find their highest significance in Christ. The rationalism and scepticism of Strauss *et id genus omne* are vigorously refuted. The relations of all events to Christ are shown, not in the pantheistic or transcendental meaning now so fashionable with certain writers, but in the scriptural and evangelical sense. The work indicates large reading and culture, and is animated by a fervent Christian spirit.

The Still Hour; or, Communion with God. By Austin Phelps, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

We hail the appearance at this time of little manuals like this, designed to stimulate and inform the devotional spirit of Christians. This little treatise, the author informs us, is a growth from a sermon delivered with manifest happy effects in the chapel of Andover Seminary and elsewhere. It is brief yet thorough. It is searching and faithful without being censorious or disheartening to contrite souls. It is discriminating and instructive without undue casuistical refinings. We rejoice to believe that many will find it profitable for correction, consolation, and edification.

ERRATUM.

Page 296, line 4 of note, *dele* the perception of.

THE
PRINCETON REVIEW.

JULY, 1860.

No. III.

ART. I.—*The Bible its own Witness and Interpreter.*

A NEW philosophy, which has been frequently exposed on the pages of this Review, has invaded the Christian Church both in Britain and America, within the last thirty or forty years. Foremost among its ushers is Coleridge, whose views on the fundamental subjects of Inspiration, the Fall, and the Atonement, were so distorted by his philosophy, that by no alchemy of charity can we make them part or parcel of the Christian scheme. His philosophy was confessedly derived from Schelling.

Since Coleridge wrote and talked, this phase of metaphysical thought has been gradually extending itself through the domain of the Church. It is impossible to define the limits of its influence. It has, more than all other forces combined, created the "Broad Church" party of the Establishment of England, numbering about thirty-five hundred of its clergy,* and adorned with the names of such men as Arnold, Hare, Conybeare, Maurice, Jowett, Baden Powell, &c. It has effected an entrance into the Free Scotch Church; and while it has called

* Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1853, article on Church Parties.

forth the emphatic and able rebuke of Dr. Cunningham in his late inaugural, that rebuke only the more clearly shows how strong is the hold this mystical theology has already secured in that noble body of Christ's disciples. It has made rapid progress in this country. It holds not a few of the high places of the church in the land, and the rising ministry of no inconsiderable portion of the American church are taught to regard Schelling and Hegel as the "highest expounders" of philosophy.

It is difficult to describe, in a short compass, the varying forms which this new principle adopts. In attempting the Church of Christ, it has, of course, met with a great diversity of opposing forces, which only the steadfast, persistent working of many years can overcome. The applications of this philosophy are modified and coloured by early habits and prejudices, by the social influence of christianized communities and organizations, by a strong, though perhaps not very intelligent faith in God's word; and often no little skill is required to detect its presence, when it has really gained not only a foothold in the mental constitution of the individual, but the mastery over it. Thoroughly *a priori* and subjective, it has little to do with the external and phenomenal. It undervalues the objective, and magnifies the secret life, essence, and causes of things. Some of its watchwords are, "Spiritual Faith," "Spiritual Insight," "the Spiritual Sense," "the Reason," "the Practical Reason," "the Moral Reason," "the Transcendent Sphere of the Reason," "Intuitional Capacity." It talks much of "dynamics" in mind and in nature; of "development" and "self-evolution." It teaches that by "the one supreme principle of faith as the organ of all primitive or fundamental truth," the mind perceives or intuits absolute truth irrespective of the evidence on which it rests, "evidence and reasoning being little congenial to the spirit of faith"—indeed, it furnishes the evidence for truths that are supersensuous, even "the evidence of a direct intuition." If they are not evident in its light, nothing can make them so. It is "itself the substance and ground of its truth." Hence it teaches that the genus is as much "a substance, an actual being," as is the

individual;* that the genus Homo was alike the subject of the fall and of redemption. When God created Adam, he did not create a man, but "the Adam," an "idea which is not appreciable by the understanding, but only in the transcendent region of the Reason;" and Christ did not assume simply "a true body and a reasonable soul," but, as we have heard it expressed, "the archetypal idea that was defecated in Adam;" or, as Dr. Schaff and others say, he became not "a man, but man." This philosophy ascribes to the Church the theanthropic life of Christ, a *tertium quid*, no one can define, however clearly certain of the more gifted may intuitively perceive it; and to the race a generic sinfulness, which, in the Hegelian nomenclature, "becomes" the sin of the individual. It transmutes the sovereign work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification into the operation of an inward spiritual law or force, and identifies the enlightenment of believers by the same Divine Agent with the activities of "the reason," or "spiritual faith." It teaches that Christianity is "primarily a life, not a doctrine." It turns the earlier Mosaic narrative into an allegory or a myth, and applies its transforming processes to the miracles of the Bible, affirming that they are "a burden" which Christianity carries, not the foundation on which it rests; and that the doctrines of the Bible must establish its miracles, rather than these prove and authenticate the doctrines. The advocates of this philosophy quite generally accept the Scriptures as divine. Indeed, it is greatly for their interest to do so; for here is the theatre on which almost all its applications are made, and without which its sphere would be extremely limited. Being transcendental and mystical in its nature, it rejoices in the really transcendent utterances of these Divine oracles, and urges its claims upon the Christian church by the fact of its superior intuitive discernment of the

* "If there is one dream of a godless philosophy to which, beyond all others, every moment of our consciousness gives the lie, it is that which subordinates the individual to the universal, the person to the species; which deifies kinds, and realizes classifications; which sees Being in generalization, and appearance in limitation; which regards the living and conscious man as a wave on the ocean of the unconscious Infinite; his life a momentary tossing to and fro on the shifting tide; his destiny to be swallowed up in the formless and boundless universe."—*Limits of Religious Thought*, pp. 105, 6. Am. ed.

mysteries of revelation. In keeping with this, however, the inspiration of the Bible is that of the *ideas*, not of the words; of the spirit, not of the letter; and hence the meaning of Scripture varies with the varying modes which the philosophy assumes; its more ineffable declarations being limited and apprehended by the intuitions of the Reason.

We do not affirm or suppose that any prominent individual church is described by these references to what we deem an essentially Infidel and Pantheistic Philosophy. Its poisonous taint has not yet so thoroughly diffused itself. Some good men, however, have been led captive by it, and adopted no small portion of the peculiarities of this scheme as now set forth. One cannot take fire into his bosom and not be burned. The adoption of this dynamic, realistic mode of thought in one application, speedily makes way for another; for no philosophy is more self-consistent and imperative in its claims. The logic is very simple that binds all Christianity in the same mystic chains, imparting a common character to the whole scheme, which gradually works death to every part. The love of the Bible as the pure and authoritative and self-interpreting word of God will not long abide in the same mind with this philosophy. Germany is a living witness to the truth of this remark, and instances are multiplying in this country which fully verify it. Christian men have tried and are trying to unite them. Though none more earnestly or more honestly than these repudiate the charge of rationalism, they are holden in its cords, notwithstanding their disclaimers, and it will lead them away more and more from the simplicity that is in Christ.

An alleged distinction between "the Understanding" and "the Reason," which Coleridge so elaborately attempts to establish, is the vicious root of no small part of the theological errors of our day. The Reason, with Coleridge and others, is the faculty of judging or discerning primary and necessary truths; the intuitive power of the mind which acts independently of the processes of the Understanding. That the human mind has such a power no one disputes; all reasoning and all faith presuppose and require it; but the Intuitional Philosophy assigns it a distinction and a sphere of its own arbitrary creation. The universal and necessary truths which are self-

evident and cognized as soon as stated, are vastly enlarged by this philosophy, and its "Reason," its "sense for the supernatural," claims to perceive immediately and intuitively, truths which in fact are at best knowable but in part, and this by inference or by testimony. Coleridge, and after him many others, identified that "Faith which is the gift of God," the "spiritual mind" in the regenerate, with their faculty of Reason; at the same time confounding the "natural" or "carnal" mind of the Scriptures with the "Understanding." Thus in his introductory sentence to his Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion, we read, "What the eldest Greek Philosophy entitled the Reason (*ΝΟΥΣ*) and ideas, the Philosophic Apostle names *the Spirit*, and *truths spiritually* discerned."* And again, on page 268, "Without or in contravention to the Reason—(that is, the *spiritual* mind of St. Paul, and, *the light that lighteth every man*, of St. John)—this Understanding (*φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς*, or carnal mind) becomes the sophistical principle, the wily tempter to evil by counterfeit good," &c. Perhaps, however, a better view of Coleridge's opinion may be taken from Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, page 564: "After showing that the idea of pure being is a real one, borne witness to by the clearest light of our inward nature, he (Coleridge) adds, 'By what name then canst thou call a truth so manifested? Is it not a Revelation? And the manifesting power, the source and the correlative of the idea thus manifested, is it not God?' How is it possible to show more clearly than this, the blending of our higher reason and intellectual sensibility in the one supreme principle of *faith*, as the organ of all primitive and fundamental truth?" And on the following page he says: "Reason, according to Coleridge, blends with the will: in other words, the faculty by which we gaze upon absolute truth, unites with that by which we are conscious of our own personality; and from hence originates a new insight into the secrets of man's destiny both in time and in eternity. 'Faith,' to use his own words, 'consists in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual will. By virtue of the latter, therefore, it must be an energy; and inasmuch as it relates to the whole man, it

* Prof. Shedd's edition of Coleridge's Works, vol. i. p. 199.

must be exerted in each and all of his constituents or incidents, faculties, and tendencies: it must be a total, not a partial—a continuous, not a desultory or occasional energy. And by virtue of the former (that is, Reason) faith must be a light—a form of knowing—a beholding of truth. In the incomparable words of the Evangelist, therefore, faith must be a light, originating in the Logos, or the substantive Reason, which is co-eternal and one with the holy will, and which light is at the same time the life of men.’”

The human mind thus endowed becomes truly a mighty power in Philosophy and Theology. According to the hitherto prevalent view, “the only principles which we are authorized to assume as intuitive, are universal and necessary truths; that is, truths which are universally admitted, and which necessitate belief as soon as presented. If we go beyond these narrow limits we enter on debatable and fallible ground, and others have as much right to deny as we have to affirm.” But now the deep mysteries proposed to our faith in the Bible are verities intuitively perceived, self-affirmed to this transcendent faculty of our nature. Surely if this is so, the entire Christian religion, as it has been held by the church, is undermined: the conclusion is very easily reached that an objective Revelation is not only incredible, but impossible. Miracles, and every other external proof by which we would authenticate the Bible truths must be judged by this intuitive faculty, and as they do not assert their own truth to it, must be discredited and disowned. Only such truths as are within the range of this supreme faculty can be known as truths to man, all others must be unrecognized as such. We are not therefore surprised when Dr. Hickok tells us, “that a Revelation from God can be addressed only to and received by this part of our being, and without it our Bibles were as well given to the brutes,” and accounts for the existence of certain paradoxes and contradictions, by ascribing it to what he alleges as a fact, that “the truths of the Infinite and of the Absolute have been kept from the Reason and degraded to the processes of the logical understanding.”* We need not indicate any further the tendencies of this vital element of the new Philosophy.

* Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1860, p. 89.

Now, does such a faculty as this belong to man? Have we, naturally or by cultivation, the power of spiritual insight into the supernatural and divine? Is there a "sense" for such objects, corresponding to that for objects in nature, by which the spiritual and divine revelations of the Bible are directly perceived to be true, they shining in their own light, and appealing with a self-evidencing power to the spiritual organ of vision in man? We speak not of that conviction, that unsailable persuasion of the truth of Bible revelations which arises upon "the witness" of the Holy Spirit, when, in sovereign wisdom, he imparts his enlightening grace to any of the elect; but of a normal power of spiritual vision which this philosophy asserts and signalizes as an endowment of our nature. Assuredly, human consciousness generally does not verify its existence; nor is there any evidence that the most cultured and gifted possess any such "autonomic" "divine" faculty. The present condition and the past history of mankind, so far from affirming, seem directly to deny its existence; for about nothing is there greater disagreement among men, than about these very truths that are claimed to be "*a priori*, and fundamental." The *ipse dixits* of certain philosophers do not prove either its actual presence in their own minds, or its latent presence in the rest of the race. Some have attempted to prove its existence by declaring that we cannot otherwise have any knowledge of divine and supernatural verities; that a revelation is possible only to this "supreme" faculty; that unless made to this, it might as well be made to the brutes; that "the things of the Infinite and of the Absolute," the mysteries of the spiritual world "are appreciable only in the transcendent sphere of the Reason;" that human language is inadequate to convey the ideas of these things; that they must be "seen" to be rightly or at all apprehended.* But these are

* Professor Shedd, in the introductory essay to his edition of Coleridge's works, remarking upon the prominence and supremacy assigned in Kant's system to the Moral or Practical Reason, says: "This is Reason in its highest and substantive form, and no decisions of any other faculty of the human soul have such absolute authority as those of this faculty. It stands over against the moral and spiritual world, precisely as the five senses stand over against the world of sense, and there is the same *immediateness* of knowledge in the one case as in the other. In the phrase of Jacobi, Reason, i. e.,

simply their own unproved assertions. If the only knowledge which we can have of things divine and supernatural is indeed that "clear and distinct" knowledge which the direct perception of the reason furnishes—knowledge which, however difficult it may be to express in language, is none the less, but rather the more, perfect on that account. We say, if this is the only knowledge we can have of such objects, and if *we really have it*, we should be indisposed to dispute the assertion of the existence of such a faculty. But the fact is, we neither have, nor is it possible for us to have, any such perfect knowledge of the things of God and the supernatural. Being finite and relative in our nature and existence, we cannot have other than finite and relative notions or conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute. There is knowledge that is too wonderful for us—so high that we cannot attain to it. Indeed, all our knowledge is imperfect, incomplete. Not only of things supernatural, but of the simplest objects of nature, must we say, "we know in part." *Omnia exeunt in mysterium.*

But things which in their nature are incomprehensible are nevertheless so far within the range of our faculties as to be the proper objects of our intellectual conviction. We may

the Moral Reason, is the *sense* for the supernatural, and therefore we have in fact the same kind of evidence for the reality of spiritual objects that we have for that of objects of sense—the evidence of a sense—the evidence of a direct intuition." Again, speaking of "self-motion" as a development or movement in the spiritual world, unlike that of a movement in nature, he says: "The distinction itself, never more important than at this time when naturalism is so rife, cannot after all be taught in words, so well as it can be thought out. It is a matter of direct perception, if perceived at all, as must be the case with all *a priori* and fundamental positions. The contradiction which clings to the idea of *self-motion*, when we attempt to express it through the imperfect medium of language is merely verbal, and will weigh nothing with the mind that has once *seen* the distinction." A most convenient philosophy this, indeed, which defies criticism, and repels assaults upon its verbal statements of what it may deem "*a priori* and fundamental positions" in the sphere of the supernatural, by boldly affirming that these cannot be "well taught in words," but must be "thought out;" that its verbal contradictions are apparent, not real; that the intuitive perception or "seeing" of these sublime verities is far more reliable and certain than is the exactest "verbal" statement of them. Indeed, it would seem that "the words which the Holy Ghost speaketh," are by no means as excellent a medium of "the things of the Spirit" as is this spiritual sense, this faculty of direct perception.

know somewhat of that which passes knowledge. It cannot be said that we are *totally* ignorant of the Deity. Being "made after his similitude," we are ourselves possessed of certain elements in common with him. The ideas of spirit, of goodness, justice, wisdom, power, etc., are some of them primitive and fundamental, others are easily derived. These qualities are therefore already known to us. We readily ascribe them to our fellow-men. If, now, we seek to divest them of all imperfection, if we attempt to conceive of them as unlimited in degree, absolutely without defect, we have a basis in our minds for the thought of God, as a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. A God fully known, "directly perceived," would be no God to us. Our ignorance of his infinite nature, with our knowledge that his attributes are unlimited, furnishes a far better ground for an idea of God than any intuitive vision of his absolute and infinite being. So, too, we have some notion, positive or negative, or both, of personality. Being ourselves personal, the idea is not foreign to us. And when we are told that God is tri-personal, while we are unable to understand all that is meant, we understand enough to warrant and obligate faith, when the statement is authenticated as true.

The new Philosophy appears to ignore, to a large extent, one source of knowledge which mankind have ever esteemed of great importance. We have constitutionally a faculty, a power to believe truths or facts on extrinsic evidence. The knowledge thus derived may be as satisfactory as that which we have either by intuition or by induction. Our conviction is absolute that two halves make a whole; yet not more so than that produced by the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and equal to either is the conviction we have of the existence of the city of Paris derived from testimony of others. The modes of acquiring knowledge may be different, but the knowledge acquired may be perfectly satisfactory in each instance. Bishop Pearson has concisely and most admirably set forth this latter mode of knowing. After defining "belief in general to be an assent unto that which is credible, as credible," and explaining the

terms of this definition, he states the matter thus: "When any thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connection with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken up upon any real arguments or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet, notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by a manifestation, but attestation of the truth, and so moveth us to assent, not of itself, but by virtue of the testimony given unto it, this is said properly to be *credible*; and an assent unto this, upon such *credibility*, is in the proper notion *faith* or belief."* "Human faith is an assent unto anything credible merely upon the testimony of man." Divine faith is an assent unto anything credible upon the testimony of God. And when divinely attested truths, which may have been "held in unrighteousness," are by the Divine Spirit made to appear holy and just and good, when the merely intellectual acceptance of them becomes that of the whole man, then these truths shine with a beauty and glory more convincing to the mind, than is that of the existence of the sun produced by its shining. They realize and evidence themselves to us with a vividness and power equal to the intuitive perception of any necessary and universal truths.

But it must be remembered that the Bible with its revelation of supernatural verities is addressed to man in the first instance, not as thus enlightened by the Spirit, but as a rational and moral being, fallen, and blinded by sin to the *excellency* of divine things. This particular quality cannot be realized to the mind by any amount of external evidence, however abundant and unanswerable. Another agency must intervene to secure this result, to which, however, a conviction of the reality of the things revealed is an essential prerequisite; the Holy Spirit using the word of truth as the instrument of his renewing, enlightening, and sanctifying operations in the mind. Things must, in the order of nature if not of time, be true to us before they are either beautiful or good.

* On the Creed, Art. I.

To convince men, therefore, of the truth of supernatural announcements, and so to create the obligation of faith and obedience, they must be verified by signs and tokens that appeal "to them that believe not." Those signs and tokens must be distinctive and demonstrative; for the Scriptures demand faith in their highest mysteries on sternest penalties.

A great variety of evidences more or less conclusive, exist for receiving the Scriptures as the word of God:* and as a matter of fact, multitudes yield their assent to their claims on grounds sometimes of questionable sufficiency, so that their faith is easily shaken; yet the ultimate basis, the surest guaranty of faith in supernatural and superrational revelations, must be supernatural attestations. And we may add, that these attestations must to a large extent be so palpable and convincing, that if they are not in and of themselves *self-evidencing*, they are so in effect. In proportion as the things declared are beyond the reach of our natural faculties, should the *evidence* for their truth be within their apprehension.

The attempt to remove miraculous attestations from the sphere of "the Understanding" into that of "the Reason," is not only in accordance with the spirit of infidelity, but is a logical result of the intuitional philosophy. The effect of this is, in *the end*, to discredit the miracles themselves; but the *first* step is to subordinate the miracles to the truths they are held to accredit. We find in the writings of philosophers and theologians of this school such teachings as these: "The doctrine must prove the miracle, and not the miracle the doctrine;" "we believe the miracle for Christ's sake, rather than Christ for the miracle's sake.† Of course, if the truth of a super-

* Confession of Faith, chap. i. sec. 5.

† Professor Baden Powell, of the University of Oxford, twenty years ago was a strong defender of the views contended for in this article; since his adoption of the new Philosophy he has become an equally earnest defender of an extreme rationalism in respect to Christianity. We need hardly remark that his present position is a logical sequence from his philosophy. In his recent work, "The Order of Nature, considered with reference to the Claims of Revelation," he gives forth such teaching as the following: "Spiritual faith transfers miracles to the region of spiritual contemplation and divine mystery;" "the acceptance of miracles is regarded purely as a matter of religious faith and spiritual apprehension." "Miracles are admitted as a part of the

natural doctrine is dependent upon the verdict of "the Reason," or "the spiritual insight," such external attestation as miracles afford is worthless; and, as Dr. Bushnell and others tell us, they are "burdens" which Christianity carries. The new philosophy is self-consistent in such assertions.

Miraculous manifestations occupy a large space in the Bible record. They are there for some distinct and important purpose; and that purpose, as we shall presently see, is avowedly that of attesting and authenticating the doctrines and duties inculcated by those that wrought them. No proof of their aptitude to this purpose is more striking or convincing than the fact, that throughout all ages, and in all parts of the world, they have been counterfeited with utmost care and study, both by devils and by wicked men, for the specific purpose of establishing claims to supernatural authority. On this account it is that the criteria, by which the true are distinguished from the counterfeit, are made a matter of so much importance in Christian evidences. We are abundantly forewarned that false prophets and false Christs should appear with their signs and lying wonders, so much resembling the manifestation of Divine power in supernatural works, that, if it were possible, they would deceive the very elect.

Among the tests by which "signs and wonders" are tried, is unquestionably *in many cases* that of the nature or tendency of the doctrine they enforce. Deut. xiii. 1—3, is decisive on this point. In the instance named it is very manifest that if a prophet or dreamer of dreams, produces apparently the most demonstrative evidence that it is the duty of men to deny the one only living and true God and become idolaters, the evidence is, *ipso facto*, worthless; the conduct prescribed proving that the sign or wonder was not from God. Any sign or wonder must be immediately discredited that goes to contravene the immutable principles of morality, or impugns any universal and necessary truths. God cannot contradict him-

gospel, not as the antecedent or preliminary proof of it." "The belief in miracles, whether in ancient or in modern times, has always been a point not of evidence addressed to the intellect, but of religious faith impressed on the spirit." A bold affirmation, indeed, to any one at all acquainted with the history of Christianity.

self in the nature he has given us. Even here however no little wisdom is requisite; for the number of self-evident truths is limited, and amidst the complications and relations of things we may be mistaken in regard to what is essential and necessary morality. God may require conduct that is *apparently* contradicted by the moral sense, but which is nevertheless both just and proper in the circumstances.

But granting that false miracles may be tested by the character of the doctrine they enforce, it by no means follows that true miracles are thus discriminated. We can in this way learn what is *not* from God, but not what *is*. When a doctrine or duty is announced which is strictly supernatural, it is manifest that such doctrine or duty stands wholly in the character of its authentication, whatever it may be, e. g. The Incarnation of the Second Person of the Godhead, or the resurrection of the dead, its verity is not deduced from its statement, but from something aside and independent of the statement. According to the Scriptures themselves, God's attestations of his truth, are such as no man can, without fearful guilt gainsay or resist. They ordinarily carry with them their own evidence and shine in their own light. They have all the power of first truths to the mind. Thus while the things declared are supernatural, the proofs of their verity are the most complete imaginable. The evidence is addressed to the senses, and in such circumstances as to preclude deception. Taking the Bible as a whole, the *number*, the *variety*, and the *manner of effecting its* miracles, are such as to carry irresistible force of evidence. But their principal characteristic is their self-demonstrativeness. While this varies in many cases, there are a large number in which the very highest form of this quality exists which put the Bible revelation as a whole beyond all rational question. The central miracle of our religion is, the Resurrection of Christ. It is explicitly affirmed that this fact was established by direct appeal to the senses of the Apostles and about five hundred others, and that the proof thus afforded was "infallible." The language of Luke is very distinct and instructive—"Apostles whom He had chosen; to whom also he showed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things per-

taining to the kingdom of God.”* Here was the well-defined and unimpeachable evidence of the senses of sight and hearing, and we may add of touch, during this long period. If this does not settle the fact of the Resurrection, the assertion of it as a cardinal doctrine will not do it. And the Apostle in 1 Cor. xv. assumes that unless it can be proved by incontestable extrinsic evidence that Christ rose from the dead, then all the faith and hope and preaching of Christians are vain, and they of all men are most miserable. In like manner the divine mission and authority of Moses was authenticated by self-demonstrative miracles. He stood upon the shore of the Red Sea and lifted up his rod and stretched out his hand and divided the sea; the whole nation of Israel passed through the parted waters. The Egyptians followed. Arrived at the other side, Moses stretched out his hand again, and the waters returned, and covered the chariots and the horsemen and all the host of Pharaoh that came into the sea after them; there remained not so much as one of them. And Israel saw the Egyptians upon the sea shore. Surely here was a divine demonstration to the senses of three millions of people. Conceding the correctness of the record, we do not see how it is in the power of the human mind to evade its force. The effect was natural and legitimate: “And Israel saw that great work which the Lord did upon the Egyptians; and the people feared the Lord, and believed the Lord and his servant Moses.”†

This then is the specific end or purpose of miracles, to attest and confirm supernatural verities. “They stand on their own evidence and prove many doctrines otherwise uncertain, and confirm all.” They are appointed for this, and most effectually fulfil their appointed design. This is their natural and appropriate use, and nothing can take their place.

We design in the remainder of this article to show that this is the place they hold in God’s own view; and while we are aware of the danger of magnifying too greatly any one part of the complex whole of the evidence with which the Bible is authenticated, we feel that there is great truth in the remark of Mansel: “The crying evil of the present day in religious con-

* Acts i. 3.

† Exodus xiv.

troversy is the neglect or contempt of the external evidences of Christianity: the first step towards the establishment of a sound religious philosophy must consist in the restoration of those evidences to their true place in the theological system.”*

We shall not urge the claims of any other scheme of philosophy in order to nullify this German importation, whose tendencies and results we have briefly outlined. We believe that Christianity stands on other than “philosophical pillars,” and is what it is to the mind and conscience of those that receive it, on simple and palpable principles. Philosophy has no claim to be more than the servant of the Scriptures, and it ought to be a very humble self-diffident one. These must authoritatively judge and limit or silence philosophy as their divine wisdom may dictate. They are not at all beholden to it for their existence, for their power, for their principle, or rule of interpretation.

As we have already remarked, one of the more prominent and wide reaching applications of this new Philosophy relates to the external evidences of Christianity. It is affirmed and held with persistent earnestness, that the peculiar verities of Christianity, if not discovered, are verified by the Practical or Moral Reason, the Intuitive faculty; and that the miracles of the Bible are both proved and interpreted by its doctrines and precepts, so that these latter are rather the tests of the miracles, than are the miracles the tests of the doctrines and precepts. Thus a wide and effectual door is opened for the entrance and prevalence of a system of interpretation covering the entire volume of inspiration which invests the finite, not to say the fallen, mind of man with a faculty of “Divine” discernment, and exalts this faculty to the seat of judgment upon the word of God.

Christianity is contained in a written document setting forth certain facts, doctrines, duties, etc. It is accompanied with a record of divine interpositions, which, as we shall show, are God’s authentications of these truths and duties. Now, aside from these miraculous interventions, we affirm that Christianity in nearly, if not quite all, its distinctive peculiarities, is not

* *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 207.

only not self-evident, but that it would be in the last degree presumptuous in us to receive and regard not a few of its distinguishing statements as true or rational: a special divine interposition is needed, we say not to require, but to justify our faith in them. Though they may be "*a priori* and fundamental positions," wholly in the sphere of the spiritual, still they are neither directly nor indirectly perceived to be true *a priori*, by the reason, or the moral sense, or the understanding, or any faculty of the mind. Apart from its testimonial miracles, the direct supernatural attestation of God himself, Christianity does not shine either in its own light or in that of the most gifted human spirit: unless we can see God's truth in God's light, we cannot see it all.

The evidence of the divine origin and authority of the Scriptures is of different kinds, each having its own peculiar power. There is, in the first place, the internal evidence, which is in itself manifold. The Bible bears the impress of divinity. As the material universe, in its grandeur, immensity, harmony, and beauty, reveals itself as the work of an omniscient and almighty intelligence, so does the Bible in the grandeur of its truths, in its holiness, in its adaptation to the nature and wants of man, in its consistency and the logical relation of its parts as a gradually developed system, and, above all, in the unapproachable divine excellence of the character of the Son of God. It has the same evidence to the understanding and the heart, that the moral law has for the conscience. This moral evidence, as it may be called, is the main ground of faith to the mass of professing Christians. In the second place, we have the evidence of prophecy and miracles, which being indisputable manifestations of divine knowledge and power, are irrefragable proofs that the Bible is the word of God. In the third place, there is the demonstration of the Spirit, without which all other sources of evidence are of no avail so far as saving or sanctifying faith is concerned. This is the special ground of faith on the part of all true believers. When the Spirit of God convinces the soul of sin, it is impossible that it should not regard the law of God as divine; when he reveals the glory of the Redeemer as God manifest in the flesh, it is impossible that we should fail to see and believe him to be our

Lord and our God; when he unfolds to us the plan of salvation it is as impossible for us not to receive it as just what we need, as it would be for a man dying of thirst not to drink of an overflowing fountain. It is undoubtedly true that the Spirit of God does attend the truth with this kind of evidence. This is the direct and immediate testimony of God to the soul itself. It is no less true that this testimony of the Spirit is of the nature of a demonstration and revelation. It enables the soul to perceive the things of God to be true, so that faith is not merely reliance on testimony which is objective and extraneous, but includes an apprehension of the truth. It is to be still further remarked, that although this witness of the Spirit is confined in its direct influence to those doctrines which enter into our religious experience, yet it indirectly, although effectually, includes the whole Bible. The man who is convinced of the divinity of the Son of God, cannot but be convinced of the divine origin of the book in which he is revealed, and which he sanctioned; which treats of him from beginning to end, and which he presents to us as his word. All this we cordially admit. Our object is twofold; first, to vindicate the importance of prophecy and miracles as trustworthy, if not absolutely indispensable testimonials of a divine revelation; and secondly, to show that the Scriptures are not addressed to the intuitional faculty of the natural mind; that it is not the immediate apprehension of the reason which constitutes faith, but that the word of God is an objective revelation of truth, divinely authenticated by supernatural evidence, which gives it supreme authority over the reason and the conscience.

We cannot avoid referring to a very memorable sentence in Butler's Analogy, Part II. chap. 7. "In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be," he says, "several things of great weight, not reducible to the head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs; and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always joined with them."

We do not doubt, but most gratefully acknowledge that multitudes, as we have already intimated, even of those who

are not renewed by the Holy Spirit, are intellectually convinced of the truth of Christianity, who have never studied the Christian evidences. The reasons for their faith may not be very distinctly present to their minds; but from whatever source their conviction is immediately derived, the objective authentication of the Bible as divine is at the basis. The light which is thus cast upon those revelations imparts to them a radiance of their own in which they shine.

Let us clearly understand what we mean by Christianity. Of course, it is Bible truth as discriminated from natural religion. It is exclusively and distinctively Bible doctrines and Bible precepts. We intend those peculiar verities which mark and distinguish the Bible, separating it from all other books, and constituting Christianity a religion radically and for ever distinct from every other system of religious faith and practice known in human history. Among them we name the fall and spiritual ruin of the entire race of men in Adam, through one offence committed by him at the commencement of human history; by which offence judgment came upon all men unto condemnation, so that ever since this apostasy men are conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity, and are by nature the children of wrath; the mode of the divine existence, three distinct, eternal persons, subsisting in the one only living and true God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the gift of the Son by the Father to be a sacrifice for the sins of men; the advent of Christ to the world; his assumption of our nature in a true body and reasonable soul; his atoning death on Calvary, expiating human guilt, making reconciliation between an offended God and us, and bringing in an everlasting righteousness and complete salvation; the burial, resurrection, ascension, mediatorial reign, and intercession of the Incarnate God; the mission of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, in the fulfilment of which, by his own peculiar and sovereign influence, he convinces men of sin, leads the sinner to Christ, enlightens the understanding, rectifies the conscience, purifies the heart, and sanctifies the whole man through the instrumentality of the word of God; salvation through faith in Christ, in which regeneration, justification, adoption into God's family, sanctification, and final perfection, are secured; the

second advent of Christ; the resurrection of the dead; the universal judgment, and eternal retributions.

The preceptive code of Christianity (as such) is as peculiar and distinctive as is the doctrinal. It requires an unreserved and everlasting personal consecration and supreme love to the Lord Jesus Christ. It constitutes his word a supreme law to his disciples. Supreme love to him and regard to his glory are their constraining motives of conduct. They are required to renounce all their own righteousness as worthless, to accept his obedience in the place of their own, to live by his Holy Spirit, to be baptized into the name of the triune God, to celebrate the death of Christ in the sacrament of the supper, to seek to save the souls of men from the second death, to pray to God only in the name of Christ, to possess the virtues of self-denial, forgiveness of enemies, brotherly love, and endurance of wrong for Christ's sake.

This is Christianity. Its sphere is supernatural and super-rational. These several doctrines, these peculiar duties, as they are based upon and spring out of the doctrines, can neither be defined nor defended outside of the written word. "Reason," "Intuition," "Spiritual Faith," are blind and dumb before this oracle. God's testimony is the necessary ground and reason of faith in them. The notion that philosophy states the problems, and that faith solves them, which is held by the friends of this new system, is utterly baseless in fact and truth. Philosophy never dreamt of them, and knows nothing about them, except as they are declared in the Bible. These are matters of mere revelation, of inspired record, and can be received and credited only as stated in the written word of God, and because authenticated by him as true. Such a statement, made and attested by the Deity, is receivable by any sane human mind: yea, it must be received by all to whom it comes, on the alternative of making God a liar; and received just as are other truths or facts in nature or in providence, on reliable testimony. If we have God's testimony for any declaration, however incredible the fact or idea declared may be, we want nothing more, for God is Truth and knows all things, and cannot lie: if we have not this, nothing in man, no gift, no grace, no mystical transcendental faculty or property of the

mind can remedy the defect. To receive a statement on the divine attestation of its truth requires no intuitive perception of the essential harmony of that statement with reason. It is credited on the same principles and in the same way as are ordinary statements of facts or opinions, on the ground of the evidence which is furnished for their verity.

We say that the doctrines and precepts of the Bible, which constitute Christianity, can be accepted only on a special divine attestation. Let us take a single illustration. We meet with a Bible for the first time. We open it. Our eyes fall upon this sentence, "He that believeth (the gospel) and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Now it is clear that the mere existence of this sentence on paper does not prove the truth of what it declares. It is not axiomatic; it does not shine in its own light. It is not a self-evident truth that man's everlasting weal or woe is poised on faith, or the want of faith, in the words of Jesus of Nazareth. No mere man, however keen his perceptive faculties, however marvellous his intuitional power, can affirm or deny this statement. Its truth or falsehood is wholly dependent on the question, Does God declare this? and its verification must be a distinct, infallible, divine authentication of it: unless we have this, it has, it can have, no authority over us. An uneducated son of a carpenter, of truest morality, of sternest integrity, says this; must we believe it because he says it? We want evidence that he was competent thus to speak. The language is divine, or entitled to no credit. It involves on its face the divine prerogative of determining and settling our everlasting destiny. If God himself does not authenticate this declaration, we should not feel ourselves bound by it, though an angel was its author. Jesus must manifest himself to be a teacher sent from God. He must make it plain that the word which he speaks is the word of the Father which sent him.

We just now remarked, that there were not a few of the distinguishing statements of the Bible which it would be presumptuous for us to receive without a special divine attestation. Let us verify this remark before we proceed with our argument: we shall thus more fully appreciate the *necessity* for divine attestations of divine revelations, and the utter impo-

tency of the "spiritual sense," the "intuitive reason," in the mysteries of God. We shall better understand that in order to a right reception of the divine word, not high philosophy nor spiritual acumen are requisite, but the faith of a little child. "The first and most indispensable condition of piety is submission, blind, absolute, entire submission of the intellect, the life, the conscience, to God. This is blind, but not irrational. It is the submission of a sightless child to an all-seeing Father; of a feeble, beclouded intelligence, to the Infinite intelligence. It is not only reasonable, but indispensable, both as a safeguard from scepticism, and for the rational exercise of piety."

The doctrines that the one only living and true God subsists in three distinct and eternal persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and that the second of these persons became man, and was offered a sacrifice to Divine justice for our sins, are plainly stated in the Bible, and are God's own attested revelations. Now to hold these doctrines on any other ground than the divine statements of them, to assume to know anything more or other than God has been pleased to tell us; to pretend to reason out, or guess, or intuit these ineffable mysteries by any faculties our finite natures may possess, on the very face of the matter evinces a boldness and hardihood of spirit, a presumptuous intrusiveness into the arcana of the Infinite, compared with which the conduct of the Bethshemites in "looking into the ark of the Lord" was innocence itself. Again: The statement that God can be just, and yet justify and sanctify and give eternal life to the ungodly who believe in the crucified Nazarene, is one of pure revelation. To affirm it without a divine attestation, on the strength of a gift of "spiritual insight," or any thing else, would be unpardonable arrogance. Again: We read in the Bible that the infinite and holy God adopts guilty and vile men who believe in Christ into his family, loving them with the same kind of love wherewith he loves his only begotten Son, and changing them into his image from glory to glory. Now suppose a philosopher of highest acumen should declare this of the Most High? Even faith itself is often staggered at the inconceivable condescension herein displayed.

Take one or two instances of a practical character. To name them is sufficient. For Abraham to offer Isaac in a

bloody sacrifice to God at the suggestion of his "spiritual sense," or at the dictation of his "moral reason," would have been both impious and inhuman. Again: For Saul to have attacked the Amalekites, when they were at peace with him, and utterly to destroy them, slaying both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass, at the dictation of his "practical reason," in the strength of an "immediate perception" of his duty, would have been wantonly cruel and murderous; though to do these same things at the behest of the Almighty Ruler, was simple and righteous obedience, for which none can blame him.* Similar examples might be almost indefinitely multiplied. These suffice. Now to return.

Let any man come to us claiming to deliver a message from God, the very fact that he is a man, not only gives us the right, but makes it our duty to require evidence that God has given him such a message. He must show his credentials, and those credentials must be supernatural, since the message which he declares is so. Accordingly, we demand evidence that his message is divine. He refers us to our "Practical Reason," telling us that a spiritual insight into the nature of his message will prove its truth; that the subject belongs to the domain of the spiritual, and can be known only by the "spiritual sense." It is a matter of "direct perception, if perceived at all." We reply, that we are not conscious of any such intuitive faculty; his message does not appear to us self-evidently true; we must have objective and external proof, demonstrative and infallible, because our best faculties are finite and fallible, utterly unreliable in things supernatural and super-rational. He still insists that we have such powers of spiritual insight, and if we will not exercise this divine faculty, we must remain in ignorance of the mind of God and of our duty. This method of ascertaining divine and spiritual truths, of testing and substantiating the doctrines of Christianity, is simply preposterous. In any really serious case, no human being would rely upon it. And yet the new philosophy does put forth pretensions akin to this. Not to speak of Schelling and Hegel, of Newman and Parker, who philoso-

* See Butler's *Analogy*, Book II. chap. iii. near the close.

phized distinctive Christianity into Pantheism or mysticism, utterly out of the reach of that class by whom the Christian religion is principally received,* it has, as we have seen, votaries among men whom we must regard as friends of evangelical religion—men who attribute a percipient faculty to the human mind, a power of “insight into the transcendent sphere of the Reason,” which, if it really exists, renders superfluous or of secondary value any distinct extraordinary attestations from God, other than that furnished by this marvellous power of spiritual intuition. No; we must have special divine evidence for all divine doctrines or precepts that command our faith and obedience. And the same principle that makes it our duty to require demonstrative evidence for the divinity of the word declared, makes it our duty to believe implicitly, and obey promptly that word when thus attested. In this case, not merely the nature of the doctrine, but the character of the evidence is to determine the truth of the statement announced. And when conclusive evidence is furnished, when the divine word is divinely authenticated, “it is to be received,” as Lord Bolingbroke, one of the most gifted and accomplished of English deists, says, “with the most profound reverence, with the most entire submission, with the most unfeigned thanksgiving. Reason has exercised her whole prerogative then, and delivers us over to faith. To believe before, or to doubt after this attestation, is alike unreasonable.”

Christianity, with its superhuman and superfinite revelations concerning God and Christ, and the way of salvation, and the future state, must have the unmistakable seal and witness of God for its truth. It can be properly believed only when and as thus authenticated. For the Book which contains Christianity was confessedly written by finite men, and their utterances on these high and mysterious themes, to be valid and authoritative, must be owned and proved to be from God himself.

The method of proof which God has chosen, and which is so perfect and commanding as to make the Bible its own evidence is, as has already been observed, that of miracle; the special

* 1 Corinthians i. 26—29.

and extraordinary interposition of the Deity in works of knowledge and of power. Let us briefly describe this method.

True prophecy, the perfect foresight and authentic announcement of future, distant, purely contingent events, necessarily involves omniscience, infinite intelligence. God only can thus foresee and foretell the secrets of futurity. This proposition is too plain to need proof or illustration. The Bible is replete with prophetic declarations of events near and remote, simple and complex, most unexpected, pertaining to persons not then in existence, to events which were to occur during the progress of years, even of ages; prophecies, which those who first attempted to oppose Christianity by argument, endeavoured to show, were written after the events; but they were even more staggered by the fact, that the Old Testament Scriptures must have been in being hundreds of years before Christ, from the indisputable existence of the Septuagint version, so that many of the most signal fulfilments of prophecy could not be explained on any such supposition.

Now the strength, the convincing power of the evidence of prophecy consists in this, that connected with these divine predictions, so blended and interwoven that they cannot be separated from them, are those very doctrines and precepts which constitute the pith and core of the Christian religion. Witness as an illustration the 53d chapter of Isaiah. We find there a declaration of the humiliation, rejection, substitution, atoning sacrifice, death, burial, and intercession of the Lord Jesus Christ: also the depravity of men and the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son. Omniscience uttered the prophecy. Omniscience revealed the doctrines. Both proceeded from the same divine oracle. If one is received the other must be also. They are too closely united ever to be put asunder. And so throughout the Scripture. The "Thus saith the Lord" cleaves alike to the word of doctrine and of duty, and to that of prophecy. To reject the prophecy is logically impossible. To reject the doctrine or the duty it enforces, is wilful disobedience to the Omniscient God. So that until any one can deliberately deny the wondrous prophecies of the Bible, he is shut up to the reception of the doctrines

and precepts, the warnings and threatenings, that are embodied in it.

And so in regard to miracles. A true miracle is the work of Omnipotence. The Bible is full of the records of the most positive, indubitable, miraculous events. These miracles were, or they were not, performed. If it can be proved that the book which is so full of divine revelations in connection with divine prophecies, is equally full of sham miracles; if it can be proved that Omniscience has joined with imposture and absurdity, with myths and fables of events that never occurred, and allowed that book in whole or in part to be the guide of His church for nearly four thousand years, then a fact will be established more wonderful than are all the miracles recorded in it. Admitting the prophecies of the book, even if there were no other evidence for the reality of the miracles, it would be most irrational, undevout, and hasty, to discredit those miracles. Once admit that the finger of an Omniscient God has traced its infallible lines throughout these pages, and that mind must be sadly perverted that is ready to deny the evidences which loom up all over those same pages, that an Omnipotent God is also seen in the mighty deeds, the super-human achievements there recorded. A real miracle is proof absolute of Divinity; and if miracle and teaching are blended and interwoven, even as are prophecy and teaching, if the power of God and the doctrine of God are manifested at the same time, as any reader of the Bible cannot fail to perceive they are, then the attempt to dis sever them must be a vain one. They stand or fall together. Both must be accepted, or both must be rejected. We cannot allow the miracle and deny the doctrine; we cannot allow the doctrine and deny the miracle. If we admit, e. g., that Christ had power to heal the paralytic by a word, we must also confess that he had power on earth to forgive sins.

Beyond question, the testimony of prophecy and miracle to the divine origin of Christianity is decisive. If the Bible rests upon Omniscience and Omnipotence thus manifested, then it is God's word beyond reasonable debate. God deals with us in this matter as rational beings. There is no truth of revelation to the acceptance or obedience of which he summons us,

except on sufficient and infallible evidence. For the existence of no object in nature, for the occurrence of no event in history, is the evidence more intrinsically clear and commanding than for the super-rational verities of the Christian religion. And though some men refuse to believe on the evidence God has furnished, it is not because of insufficiency in that evidence, but because, as Pascal has said, "of the supernatural hardness of their hearts." The evidence is demonstrative, and just what the human mind requires.

Instead, however, of arguing this from the nature of the case, or from analogy, we propose to show from the Bible itself that the human mind instinctively and rightfully demands just this sort of evidence for supernatural revelations, and that God has most freely recognized and met this demand. Our references and quotations, though by no means exhaustive, will be quite numerous, not more so, however, we think, than the importance of the subject at the present time requires. We wish to signalize the divine testimony on the necessity of a special supernatural authentication of revealed truth, and therefore freely tax the patience of our readers.

We find then, throughout the Bible, that when men claimed to speak from God, those to whom they spake had, or demanded, evidence of their authority thus to speak, and that ordinarily miracles constituted that evidence.

When God told Moses to go to the children of Israel and call them out of Egypt in his name, Moses answered and said, "But, behold, they will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice; for they will say, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee!" The force of this suggestion was admitted; and God in order to authenticate his word by Moses and silence this objection, said unto him, "What is that in thine hand? And he said, A rod. And he said, Cast it on the ground, and he cast it on the ground, and it became a serpent; and the Lord said unto Moses, Put forth thine hand and take it by the tail, and he put forth his hand and caught it, and it became a rod in his hand; that they may believe, that the Lord God of their fathers hath appeared unto thee." *Exod. iv. 1—5.* Upon which Bishop Pearson admirably remarks, "They who saw in his *hand* God's omnipotency, could not suspect in his

tongue God's veracity; insomuch that when Aaron became to Moses instead of a mouth, and Moses to Aaron instead of God, Aaron spake all the words which the Lord had spoken unto Moses, and did the signs in the sight of the people, and the people believed."*

When Moses and Aaron went in unto Pharaoh and said, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go—it was right and rational, a thing to be anticipated, that Pharaoh should say, "Show a miracle for you"†—i. e. give me your credentials; what proof can you furnish that the Almighty speaks as you avow? When God by the prophet Elijah had restored to life the dead son of the woman of Zarephath, that was a necessary conclusion she drew, "now by this I know that thou art a man of God, and that the word of the Lord in thy mouth is truth."‡ As was also that of the people of Israel upon the result of the trial of the prophets of Baal by the same prophet—"and when all the people saw it, they fell on their faces; and they said, The Lord, He is the God; the Lord, He is the God."|| God, wishing to produce conviction on the mind of Ahaz, said to him, "Ask thou a sign of the Lord thy God; ask it either in the depth, or in the height above." Ahaz only evinced his unbelief and sin when he replied, "I will not ask, neither will I tempt the Lord."§ When the prophet Isaiah promised to Hezekiah from God that his life should be prolonged fifteen years, his unattested word was insufficient, and he said, "This shall be a sign unto thee from the Lord, that the Lord will do this thing that he hath spoken, Behold, I will bring again the shadow of the degrees which is gone down in the sun-dial of Ahaz, ten degrees backwards. So the sun returned ten degrees, by which degrees it had gone down."¶

Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be the Son of God, and to speak with authority in God's name. And when the Jews demanded evidence of so high a claim, saying unto him, "What sign showest thou, that we may see and believe thee? What dost thou work?" so far from refusing to meet their demand, he habitually referred them to his miracles as verifica-

* Pearson on the Creed, Art. 1. † Exod. vii. 9. ‡ 1 Kings xvii. 24.

|| 1 Kings xviii. 39.

§ Isaiah vii. 11, 12.

¶ Isaiah xxxviii. 5—8.

tions of his words. Miracles throughout the evangelical record are made one great ground of conviction. These were the manifestations of his "glory" and of his "grace." That was a most rational conclusion of Nicodemus: "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him."* Equally wise was the word of the man who was born blind: "Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing."† So the prophetic power which Christ exhibited to the woman of Samaria attested the divinity of his mission: "Come and see a man which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ? For which reason many of the Samaritans believed on him."‡ And at the Passover in Jerusalem, "many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did."§ And he himself demanded faith in his word because of the miraculous character of his works. "If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true. There is another that beareth witness of me. . . . The *works* which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me."|| "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto thee, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the *works*"—*i. e.* which verify the truth of my words. "Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me, or else believe me for the very works' sake."¶ "If I do not the *works* of my Father, *believe me not*. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me and I in him."** "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, *they had not had sin*; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father."†† And the beloved disciple testifies: "Many other signs truly did Jesus in the presenee of his disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written, that ye might believe that

* John iii. 1.

† John ix. 32, 33.

‡ John iv. 29, 39.

§ John ii. 23.

|| John v. 31, 32 and 36, also, x. 25.

¶ John xiv. 10, 11.

** John x. 37, 38.

†† John xv. 24.

Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through his name.”* To verify and establish more abundantly his divine mission and authority, the Lord Jesus gave the power of working miracles in his name to his disciples; for, when he had said unto them, “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, he that believeth not, shall be damned . . . they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following.”† And so it was throughout the apostolic history. Divine *works* went with divine words, authenticating and establishing them. Thus it is said of Philip’s preaching at Samaria: “The people with one accord gave heed unto those things which Philip spake, hearing, *and seeing the miracles* that he did.”‡ Paul declares, “that Christ had wrought by him to make the Gentiles obedient by *word and deed*, through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Spirit of God.”§ “Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs and wonders and mighty deeds.”|| As also, speaking of salvation by Christ, he says: “which at first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness both with signs and wonders and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will.”¶ Wherefore Peter spake unanswerable truth when he said: “Ye men of Israel hear these words, Jesus of Nazareth, a man proved to be from God among you by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by him in the midst of you as ye yourselves also know.”** Truly was Jesus “declared to be the Son of God with power.”

This, then, is the position which the Bible itself holds in regard to the authentication of a divine revelation. It makes prophecy and miracles its seals. It refers to those manifestations of Omniscience and Omnipotence as the undeniable evidence that it is of God. It never appeals to the intuitive perceptions of the mind as the ground of our faith. It is only

* John xx. 30. 31.

† Mark xvi. 15, 16, and 20.

‡ Acts viii. 6.

§ Rom. xv. 18.

|| 2 Cor. xii. 12.

¶ Heb. ii. 3, 4.

** Acts ii. 22.

and always the testimony of God, that testimony which is given by outward works of divine power, and by the inward demonstrations of the Spirit. To confound this witnessing of the Spirit with and by the truth on the heart and conscience, with the intuitions of reason, is to obliterate the distinction between the natural and supernatural, between Rationalism and Christianity.

The spiritual experience of the Christian, his joy, and peace, and hope, and invincible persuasion of the truth of the promises, are all limited or enlarged by the authenticated word. The outward revelation attested by miracle, and the inward revelation by the Holy Spirit, having one and the same infallible author, are of course mutually consistent; but the test by which all spiritual feelings and frames and ideas are tried, the security against all deception, is the written word. The Bible comes to man as he is a moral, rational agent, and addresses him accordingly.* It creates responsibility, not by gracious communications, earnestness and assurances of the divine Spirit, but by its authoritative verbal utterances. These declarations by prophets and apostles are sent to men everywhere, and *as* and *when* they find men, create the duties of faith and obedience. The actual record of revelation authenticated by God is the *ultimate* ground and reason of all faith and godliness. To this we are indebted for whatever knowledge we may possess of "the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory." Intuition, spiritual faith, by whatsoever name we call the percipient faculty of the new philosophy, has no more ability to apprehend the nature of God, the mode of his existence, the incarnation of Christ, the work

* "This eternal life, which is offered to me in the gospel"—the gospel being not "a superfluous announcement of known moralities, but a revelation of truths quite unattainable by reason—is of universal aptitude in relation to human nature in its actual condition; and it must be so thought of, even although in fact it were but one in millions that should accept it. Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but a religion for man. I do not accept it because my temperament so disposes me, and because it meets my individual mood of mind, or my tastes. I accept it as it is suited to that moral condition in respect of which there is no difference of importance between me and the man I may next encounter on my path."—Isaac Taylor, *Restoration of Belief*, American edition, p. 313.

of the Holy Spirit, than has the common understanding of men.

Some writers of this school as before remarked, have sought to identify evangelical faith with their intuitive faculty. But in vain. The subjective principle of faith which is imparted by the Holy Spirit in regeneration, is in strictest accordance with the objective testimony God has given for the truths he requires us to believe. It has no such marvellous property as has been ascribed to it. Its distinction is, that it accepts as true, those things which God declares to be true, just as he declares them. If it does not of itself perceive them to be true and rational, it knows that they are both true and rational because they are from God, "by many infallible proofs." It receives with all the heart the record God has given concerning the spiritual and eternal states. Neither faith nor "reason" can prove the truth of the revelations from their nature or from their statement. This is established by an authenticated, "Thus saith the Lord," never by a "Thus saith faith," or a "Thus discerneth the reason."

The Bible utterly ignores, or rather summarily dismisses the claims of the new philosophy, declaring that God's word stands not in the wit or wisdom of men, but in the power of God, and the human revealers and expounders of the Christian scheme in the sacred Scriptures are abundantly proved to be men sent from God, by wonders and signs which God has wrought by them.

There are statements in the Bible that are self-evidently true. The mind instantly accredits them, just as it does any axiom in geometry, any first truth in morals. Many ethical maxims and practical precepts are of this character. Much in the Bible is identical with the teachings of natural religion. Besides these there are statements which may be known to be true by geographical or historical evidence, altogether independent of the Bible testimony. But in these instances there is nothing peculiar to Christianity; they are such as are common to Christianity and other systems.

Assuredly, the testimony of God is final, conclusive, all-sufficient on whatever subject he speaks. His well authenticated word is more reliable than the testimony of history,

geology, astronomy, geography, tradition—better than logic, or the moral sense or the intuitive reason of finite man. “If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater,” and having this, we ought to be satisfied. If we hold that God’s word is not enough, we put infinite dishonour on him. The witness of God is greater than the witness of all his creatures. We ought to believe God, though the voice of the entire human family were against him. “Let God be true, and every man a liar.”

The admirers and advocates of the new philosophy talk much of the “essential unity of Revelation and Reason.” They attempt “a philosophical statement and vindication of the distinctively spiritual and peculiar doctrines of the Christian system.” They tell us that “Christian faith is the perfection of human reason.” They contend for “the faith that is insight, and the insight that is faith,” and affirm “the internal coherency of the whole scheme of revelation within itself to the eye of Reason and the Spirit.” Some, more cautious than others, though not so self-consistent, teach that the province of the “Moral Reason” is negative; that it decides what is not to be believed, though it cannot always affirm what ought to be. Now, this entire strain of remark, rather the philosophy that suggests and sanctions it, is radically *rationalistic*. It tends either to exalt human reason to a sphere God has never assigned it, or else to degrade and weaken the authority of divine revelation. There is nothing in the Bible to warrant it. What Omniscience and Omnipotence attest, is true because they attest it. The verdict of man’s reason, affirmatively or negatively, approving or disapproving, is of little worth. God has declared it, and this ends the matter. Having accepted the Bible as his word, we are thenceforth believers, not reasoners. Our standards are explicit on this point. “The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon [the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God, (who is truth itself,) the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God.”* His

* Confession of Faith, Chap. i. Sec. 4.

testimony, not that of any percipient faculty we may possess, makes the belief of Bible doctrines and precepts *reasonable*. On this ground they are true and righteous to us altogether. The ultimate unity of pure reason, even God's reason, and that of revelation is established upon an infallible basis. No humble believer in the Bible ever imagined that it was difficult, as this philosophy affirms, "to reach the most absolute and unassailable conviction that divine revelation was likewise divine reason." Of course it is; and the mind need not go "down into deeper and deeper depths of its own being to find it out." A philosophical statement and vindication of the Christian mysteries may be very desirable to those who have nothing better, but to such as receive God's own statement and vindication of them, the taper-light of human reason goes out in the refulgence. Christian faith is indeed the perfection of human reason, but it is so only because nothing is more *reasonable* than to believe the word of Him who cannot lie. And is it not plain, that if we join "spiritual insight" with the divine testimony concerning any revealed truth, thus making a double basis for faith, it then becomes, not simple faith in God, but faith in something else *and* God. And just in so far as we place anything on the same level with the testimony of the Deity, be it history, reason, or logic, we impart to that thing an authority which belongs to the Omniscient God alone. We measurably set aside the testimony of the Infallible One as insufficient and unworthy in and of itself to command our implicit confidence, and make the intuitions of fallen and finite man like that word which God has magnified above all his name.

The true doctrine on this subject is, that faith begins where reason ends. Reason has its sphere, but this is below, decidedly, always, wholly below that of faith. A clear, distinct, impassable line of demarcation divides them. They are not companions that go hand in hand to the same goal; they are separate powers operating in different methods, in different departments of moral and spiritual realities. Not that faith is or can be irrational, but faith often is then most rational, when it is most unreasoning, when it receives what God says,

simply because he says it, without any other reason than that he says it.

Closely connected with the views now presented, of the fundamental evidence for the Christian religion, and directly growing out of them, is another subject, the statement of which is requisite to the complete divorcement of the Bible and the new philosophy. We refer to the interpretation of the Scriptures. We can only present a brief outline of argument, having already too long detained the reader. A false principle of interpretation is of course a principle of false interpretation; and any principle or method which subjects God's revealed will to man's critical sanction, or his intuitional insight, for its meaning, is a false principle. Unless the *meaning* of the word and the word itself are alike from God, unless inspiration and interpretation stand on the same basis, and are both the work of the Holy Spirit, we are destitute of any proper, legitimate revelation. The Bible in that case is little else than a book of dark sayings and riddles, the solution of which is dependent upon the understanding or reason of those to whom it is sent. God is his own interpreter. In this book he speaks directly to the mind of his own creature; the Father of spirits to the spirit of man. And no interposed expounder, no human interpreter is necessary in order to enable man to hear and understand the voice of his Maker. He has chosen the best words to express his own thoughts, which are as high above man's as the heavens are high above the earth. Not only are "the things of the Spirit," the ideas and thoughts of God, revealed, which would be all sufficient if every man was his own interpreter of the Bible; but the *words* which convey those divine ideas and thoughts. As the apostle affirms, "which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; joining spiritual things to spiritual words,"* or, explaining the things of the Spirit in the words of the Spirit. Men cannot make God's word any clearer than he himself has done by his own exposition of it. After all their explanations, the word of God shines only with its own inherent splendors. If God has not

* 1 Cor. ii. 13.

made his truth so plain, that in all important matters, the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err therein, man cannot help his Maker. "God's own word," it has been well said, "must be as intelligible as any human interpretation of it."

The Bible is the infallible rule of faith and practice, and it is the only authoritative rule; all that we are to believe concerning God, and all duty that God requires of man is in this book. It is a revelation. It is not an inquiry, nor an investigation, nor an analysis, nor an argument, nor a speculation. It is an authoritative declaration from God of his mind and will. It is the simple and unmixed product of infinite intelligence. Human thought as such, does not belong to it. It has one author, and only one. It is God's book more completely than Newton's "*Principia*" is his book. We are, therefore, utterly incompetent to sit in judgment upon its contents. The Bible judges all things, but itself is judged by nothing. It tests and gauges all human reasonings and opinions, but itself is gauged and tested by nothing outside of its own record. Having but one Author, it has but one meaning. Christianity in its peculiar doctrines and precepts is a simple, unique, isolated scheme of truth. It is fixed and immutable. It is not one thing for one age, and something different for another. It is unimpressible by, and unconformable to, what is called the spirit of the age. The Christianity which God gave to his people in the first century, is precisely the same as that which he gives to them in the nineteenth century; and woe to him who adds anything to it, or takes away anything from it. If, therefore, the Bible does not declare and determine with infallible certainty its own meaning, it is the merest guess work for any finite creature to attempt to do it. Neither individual men, philosophers or Christians, nor the church, are endowed with the power of authoritative interpretation. "*Private judgment*" is of little value unless it is *correct* judgment; and it is correct only when it harmonizes with, and embraces God's own judgment of his own word.

The Bible always assumes to interpret itself, and human teaching concerning divine and spiritual things must always be referred to the Scriptures. Like the Bereans, every man must go to God's own declarations to verify whatsoever may be

uttered by preacher or by philosopher. "To the law and to the testimony, if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." The higher reason, the spiritual insight, have no part nor lot in this matter, except, if they are willing to take it, that of humble obedient listeners to the divine oracles. Man must become a little child in the presence of this excellent glory, and like Samuel, say, "Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth." The Confession of Faith speaks with the utmost distinctness and emphasis on this subject; and we wonder that its noble words have not been more frequently cited in these days, when Rationalism has produced a "suspense of faith" in some quarters, and an eclipse of faith in others, and a wide-spread distrust of the absolute authority and self-interpretative character of the Bible. "The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture, (which is not manifold, but one,) it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly. The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture."* These statements are decisive. If accepted, they control every question pertaining to divine and spiritual subjects that arises. They send men directly to the Bible. This book settles its own meaning and tolerates no other. Its directions to preachers as the ambassadors of God, and its addresses to men, are all based on this assumption. Its utterances are authoritative and final. The word is not preached in order that men may subject it to the tests of the Practical Reason, and then approve or condemn as they please; but it is a word of immediate obligation. Men hesitate or doubt or reject it at their peril. And as they are bound here to accept it on its own authority and with its own interpretation, so this divine self-interpreting word will judge them at the last day: and any appeal which may be made in that day from this written state-

* Confession of Faith, chap. i. secs. 9 and 10.

ment of the mind of God, to the decisions of the intuitional reason or any other faculty of the soul, will be regarded as an aggravation of the sin which modified or rejected that word.

The principle of interpretation which we have now stated is that of the Reformed churches. It is the only principle recognized in the Scriptures themselves: and the only one which carries with it an authority from which there is no appeal. The words of the Bible are selected by God himself, and express the truths he has revealed more perfectly than any human language possibly could. All supernatural ideas that are not covered by and conveyed in "these words which the Holy Ghost teacheth," though supposed to be seen by a direct perception as plainly as the sun is seen by the human eye that looks upon it, are visionary and worthless. There are, if we look at the *sense* of the words, no verbal contradictions in the sacred oracles. The imperfect medium of language, in the mouth of God, becomes perfect, so perfect that we may not "think out" anything for truth which those words do not teach. We only know spiritual truths as they are expressed in the words of the Holy Spirit.

Of course, this doctrine of interpretation does not, in any manner, invalidate the importance of a just exegesis of Scripture, or affirm that no aid can be obtained from philology in understanding the meaning of the inspired word. Excellent as is our version of the Bible, we must bear in mind that it is a translation—a translation of, perchance, the hundredth copy of the original record. Most grateful, therefore, should mankind be to all those who render us any aid in discovering the exact words and their proper import, in which the Holy Spirit has revealed the Christian religion. And while in all essential matters there is no difficulty in apprehending the teachings of the Holy Spirit through our English translation, yet the view we have urged of the self-interpreting character of the Revelation God has made, only enhances the value of real scholarship and science in their applications to the sacred Scriptures. The human mind can be consecrated to no higher service than in removing whatever lets and hinderances may exist in the way of the direct intercourse of man with his Maker and Redeemer through the Bible. This book speaks

God's own mind; let us have it in as perfect a condition as is possible.

There are three maxims to be observed in the reading or study of this divine book: 1. That there is perfect unity in the Scriptures. Only one scheme or system of truth is to be found in them, and this is perfect, without any inconsistency or contradiction from the beginning to the end of the book. God's work is evermore perfect; and he has magnified his word above all his name. 2. That the substantive sense of Scripture, in all essential points, is self-evident. This appears to be an absolute necessity, upon the admission that the Bible is a divine revelation. And 3. That when there is obscurity, it is to be removed, if possible, by reference to the parts which are plain, and never understood as disagreeing with what is contained in these parts; so that the supreme authority of the Scriptures in interpretation is throughout maintained inviolate.

But we must bring this protracted discussion to a close. We have reverted to first principles, and searched among the foundations of the Christian religion. If these be destroyed, what shall the righteous do? Human philosophy cannot relieve the difficulties with which the Bible is encompassed and pervaded, in the apprehension of many minds. It cannot furnish the clew to the labyrinth. The difficulties and the obscurity are not in the Bible so much as in man himself. They are not so much intellectual, as moral. Light has come into the world, but men love darkness rather than light. The organ, not the object, of vision, is disordered; and this is remedied, not by the exercise of the intuitional faculty, or any other power belonging to the human mind, except as controlled and sanctified by the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. The pride of human "Reason," and the perversity of the human heart, will account for nearly all the absurdities and inconsistencies which men have supposed they discovered in the teachings of the Scriptures. A single eye and an humble heart will enable us to see the light of the glory of God throughout their revelation. Men are unwilling to let God speak for himself; to hear no voice but his, when he utters his will; to allow no wisdom of theirs to mingle with his infallible declarations. Unable to ignore or set aside

the Bible, and refusing unconditional submission to its declarations, they profess faith in its mysteries "as they understand them;" and kindling the fires of their "Reason" about it, they have thought in the light of these sparks to see divine truth. Thus this one immutable oracle is made to utter the most diverse, often contradictory and absurd voices. They have speculated upon the revelations of this sacred book as though they "contained" the "germs and seeds of truth," forgetting that not the germs and seeds of truth, but perfect truth itself, is both contained in the Bible, and is the Bible; that this book contains nothing else. *Rationalism*, whether issuing from the ranks of avowed infidels, or from the bosom of the visible church, is the enemy that is coming in upon us like a flood. The Bible, in its divine majesty and might, is the standard which the Spirit of the Lord will lift up against it. The Bible, attested by real prophecy and miracle, self-interpretative, and shining in its own light—this is the *citadel* of all true religion, against which nothing can prevail. Omniscience and Omnipotence guard it, and spread their sheltering wings over all its sacred domain.

ART. II.—*The Heathen inexcusable for their Idolatry.*

IT is no uncommon thing to meet with those who feel much difficulty in understanding the relation of the heathen to the law of God. They see that the condemnation of those under the gospel is different from those without it. They who disobey Christ shall find that this will be the heaviest charge brought against them in the day of judgment. But they who have never known of a Saviour cannot be guilty of the sin of rejecting him. What then is the ground of their condemnation? This question is an important one, for if the heathen are not under condemnation, what is the use of sending them the gospel? If the heathen, or the greater portion of them, are to get to heaven through their ignorance, where is the neces-

sity for any clearer light, which, reasoning from all past experience, the great majority will not receive? The question in fact lies still further back, as to the necessity of any gospel at all. If we, or any single individual man, could have been saved without the atonement, then righteousness would have been by that method, and Christ would not have died. The gospel however looks upon all as in a state of condemnation, and that none can hope for justification and eternal life except through the righteousness of Christ alone. This is Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans. All are by law guilty, condemned, and therefore they need a righteousness without the law—a righteousness which after explaining its nature, he shows must be proclaimed in all the earth; for faith, the only means by which man can be saved, comes by hearing. "How then shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?" The fundamental fact then upon which rest all our efforts, is that the heathen are under condemnation and their condition hopeless without the gospel. This point the apostle argues by laying down as a fundamental principle or axiom the truth that the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness. Whoever is guilty of ungodliness or unrighteousness is exposed to the wrath of God, that is, is guilty and under condemnation. Who then are those that are guilty? He first shows that the gentiles are. They had such a revelation of God and his character as rendered them without excuse. Though they had no written revelation, no law written on tables of stone, they had a law written upon their hearts, and enough of God revealed in the things that are made, to prove them guilty.

The two special grounds of their condemnation are, 1st. Ungodliness, or impiety; and, 2d. Immorality. The former stands as the foundation of all iniquity, from which, as from a corrupt fountain, proceeded every form of wickedness. It was because of their impiety, which manifested itself particularly in idolatry, that "God gave them up to vile affections, and as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, he gave them over to a reprobate mind." The root of their offence was forsaking God,

because that when they knew God, that is, possessed the means of knowing him by the things that are made, they glorified him not as God, but changed his glory into an image made like unto corruptible man, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. He then speaks of their immorality—a picture just as true now as then of all heathen countries. But the great cause of this wickedness was their unwillingness to retain God in their knowledge. They had not lived up to what they might have known of God. In other words, the heathen then and now are inexcusable for their idolatry.

In illustrating and confirming this statement of the inexcusableness of the heathen, there are three lines of proof on which we may rely. These, for the sake of brevity, may be indicated, 1st. As the argumentative; 2d. The historical; 3d. The scriptural. We propose in the following article to examine these briefly in order.

First, then, we argue that the heathen, though they have not the written word, have still an abundant opportunity for gaining a knowledge of the true God. In order to prove this it will not be necessary to go into a formal statement of the arguments to prove the existence of God. But we commence with this plain fact, that all men adopt some belief in superior and invisible beings. Taking this for granted, which all history as well as the present state of the world proves, then we go on to say that the most direct and rational step is towards Monotheism.

Evidences for the existence of a superior being or beings are so present to the mind of man, that we find no nation or tribe of any importance who have not some object of worship. The question is, Which is the most logical or rational—to believe in one God, or many? We affirm that Monotheism is the only consequent and rational system even to the heathen, and that other systems such as Polytheism, Pantheism, and Atheism, are only the substitutes and subterfuges of a depraved heart.

Let us first compare Monotheism with Polytheism, and see how much more simple and obvious it would have been to have believed in one God than in many. We do, in fact, generally stop when we have proved the existence of God, and take for granted the proof of his unity. The arguments which show

that he *is*, show that he is one alone, and that besides him there is none else. The supposition of many gods involves endless contradiction and absurdity. A god for one element and a god for another, and gods for the earth and gods for the sea, places the control of these in separate and independent hands. If thus distinct, there would necessarily exist, if not confusion, rivalry and opposition, at least separate and distinct control and influence. There would be no mutual dependence and coöperation. But the mutual dependence and relation of the different parts of creation is one of the plainest facts written on the things that are made. The unity and harmony which pervades the whole creation proves that He who made and governs one part must have made and governs the whole. The whole range of animal creation, from the insect to man, though various in form, have the same animal wants, necessities, and appetites. The same laws of life and death govern all. Their dependence on the outer world also shows that he who made the animal made the vegetable world, and that he who made that must also have made the sunshine and the rain. These mutual links and dependencies go on twining into each other so closely and inseparably, that it is manifest that no one part of the visible creation could have been made without distinct reference to all the rest.

Of course the wider a man's range of thought, the more conversant he becomes with the workings of general laws, and the mutual dependencies of the various parts of creation, the stronger the reason for believing in one God. But even to the most unenlightened the answer is no divided one. If the heathen has evidence that there are any gods, he has still stronger proof that there is but one. Say he comes to the belief in the existence of superior beings from the idea of dependence. Whether this be the origin of belief in the existence of God or not, it is certainly one of the main reasons for man's continuing to worship him. He feels his need, his dependence on a superior power, and he comes for aid and assistance. But upon whom is man dependent, on one God, or many? Here also, as in reference to the world at large, man is an individual, a unit, so necessarily one, that he that supports one part must the whole. He that made must nourish and feed. He that gave

life must have the control of it. If a man desires health, or to be cured of any disease, he certainly can best cure who first made. If he desires wealth, he can best give it who holds the control of other things, the ordinances of heaven and earth. The question here is this, Is the dependence which man feels best answered by consulting different gods for each want or desire, as if the gods were storekeepers, one with one set of commodities to suit one set of desires, and another with another set for other wants? This might answer if man were a bundle of desires tied up in the body, each coming from different sources and owing allegiance to different beings. But man with his different wants and capacities is one, from one hand, and owing allegiance to one Being. The different wants are but the different parts or wheels in the same machine, all made and upheld by the same almighty power.

Again: men have an idea of government, of order, and control. They have set before them the family, the state, the tribe, or the kingdom. Over any one of these there is a head, some one controlling power. Now the control over the kingdom of heaven and earth, over all things visible, is not a divided control. There is no evidence of separate chieftainship, or even delegated power. All the evidence goes to prove that there is one Supreme Head or Ruler. In fact, the necessity for some such unity has forced itself on heathen nations, and they have had their Zeus, their Jupiter, their Brahm, and their Shang-ti—some one being whom they have acknowledged as head, and whom they have considered as exercising control over the rest.

Thus we see that in whichever direction the evidence is consulted it is all in favour of Monotheism. The only confusion and want of harmony apparent, can readily be traced to the existence of evil. But the moral faculty, showing what is right and that right ought to be done, is too strong in man to allow him to suppose evil to be the governing principle. How then it may be asked are we to account for the fact that those without a revelation are so universally worshippers of false gods? This arises, we believe, not so much from want of evidence, as in the moral state of man. From what we know of the truthfulness of God, we know that the simple and straight-

forward testimony of his works must be in favour of his existence. Even without argument we are bound to assume this as a fact. God cannot deny himself, and his works must therefore express his unity as well as his existence. The reason then of man's choosing Polytheism instead of Monotheism lies not in want of evidence, for if he worship gods at all, the evidence is more in favour of one than many. We must look for some other reason for his choosing Polytheism than in lack of evidence. This we believe can be found in man's moral state. The root of unbelief in any truth, we find more often in not wishing to believe it, than in any want of proof. So in reference to the knowledge of God. Along with this knowledge comes the knowledge, or the consciousness of distance from him and opposition to him. If we reason about God, as we necessarily must from our own nature, and thus ascribe to him intellectual faculties, we must also a moral character. For though we do wrong, yet the impulse to do right and the approval of it, show that he who gave us our moral nature is on the side of right and truth and justice. Conscience then brings to light a moral Being, one who hates sin, and at the same time it convinces us of sin. It reveals a moral God, and us guilty of immorality—a God in opposition to us and us to him. From this opposition there are two methods of escape—one by reconciliation—but without a revelation men are ignorant of that; or, second, by forgetting him, by hiding from him. Adam in this respect was the type of all our race. The consciousness of sin brought him in opposition to God, and he sought to hide from him among the trees of the garden. This has ever been man's device. As the apostle says, he has not liked to retain God in his knowledge. He has rejected the proof he has had of his existence, and substituted in the place of the incorruptible God, images made like unto corruptible man, and four-footed beasts. Not able to suppress the idea of a superior Being, upon whom we are dependent, and who demands our homage and worship, he has sought to fill his place by images, mere semblances of deity, but without his power, and without his holiness. Polytheism, by multiplying the personality of its deities, divides the attributes, and needs

not necessarily ascribe holiness to any. The idea of accountability is also very much lost sight of by the impossibility of being accountable to so many masters. The less power and authority these gods have, the less will be thought of disobedience. Men wish gods from whom they can ask favours, but who will not punish. They are thus led to take up with the more indirect and illogical, because they wish gods whom they need not fear, to whom they will not feel accountable, and who will not punish their sins. The immediate absurdity into which men fall by rejecting the true God is so manifest and glaring that certainly no reason or evidence can be claimed for it, especially when they resort, as all Polytheists do, to the worship of images. Nothing can be more illogical and unreasonable than man's worshipping the work of his own hands. Justly do the sacred writers represent the maker as like unto the thing made, as devoid of sense and understanding. (Ps. cxxxv. 18.) How sharply does the prophet Isaiah reprove the stupidity and folly of idolaters. "None," he says, "considereth in his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, I have burned part of it in the fire; yea, I have also baked bread upon the coals thereof. I have roasted flesh and eaten it, and shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? shall I fall down to the stock of a tree? He feedeth on ashes: a *deceived heart* hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul, nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand? Isa. xlv. 19, 20.

When once the downward step is taken in forsaking God, the apostle gives another reason why they continue in the same path, and that is, that God gave such over to a reprobate mind. Him who forsakes God, God forsakes. He will not always bear with those who, rejecting the evidences of his existence, refuse to glorify him as God, and are not thankful for his mercies. Such are given up. They become vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart is darkened. They conceive of foolish and vain objects of worship, and while professing wisdom, boasting of their ability to understand divine things, they become fools—fools in exchanging the glory of the incorruptible God for images made like to corruptible man, and birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Left

without the restraints imposed by a personal and holy God, impiety is followed by immorality. The gratification of the basest lusts and passions adds to the degradation of the intellect, until, besotted and darkened, the only hope of the heathen being brought to acknowledge the existence of one God, is by again repeating the truth, and calling attention to the lesson written before every man in the things that are made.

Instead of Polytheism, some have adopted another more subtle subterfuge, and that is Pantheism. But while boasting wisdom, it is equally the fruit of folly and a deceived heart. This system commences with a fundamental truth, namely, the consciousness of dependent existence. But here a dilemma presents itself—man is conscious of personality—that is, that he is self-active, not a mere machine. At the same time he is conscious of being dependent on a superior Being, who, as he conditions and governs all other beings, is not a mere lifeless substratum, but the acting, living principle in all that is.* Here, on these two apparently inconsistent facts, turns an important question. Man is personal, self-active, independent. At the same time he is dependent, governed, controlled. Taking both these facts, neither of which can be denied without contradicting our deepest feelings and our very nature, and we arrive at the conclusion of one God, who has given us being, and to whom we are accountable. Taking the first without the second, namely, that man is independent, self-active, and subject to no control of a higher power, and we have Atheism. Taking the second without the first, namely, that man is without personality and self-action, and is simply the acting out of the higher original existence, and we have Pantheism. Both Atheism and Pantheism deny plain facts—facts of which every man is conscious. The former, Atheism, which denies our dependent existence, is so repugnant to the consciousness of man, that it has only been adopted in isolated instances. Pantheism, however, more specious in its appearance, and apparently more logical, and, what has contributed not a little to its success, more religious in its form, has been the belief more or less among the heathen in all ages, vying with Poly-

* See Princeton Essays, p. 556, art. Tholuck's Hist. of Theology.

theism in the number of its votaries. It has, however, co-existed with, and has not been felt to be inconsistent with, the grossest Polytheism. In its more refined and logical form it has been defended and supported among Christian nations. It is peculiarly dangerous on account of its religious speciousness. More than once in the history of the church it has been preached from the pulpit, and taught from the theological chair. It can even quote Scripture, perverting such truths as "in him we live, and move, and have our being."

But if we look at the system, we see that it is more illogical and unnatural than Monotheism, denying some of the plainest facts in man's existence, and that it can only be preferred by the sinful and depraved heart. Pantheism, it is true, professes to be the most logical of all systems of belief, but then, one of its first steps is to deny a most plain and prominent fact, and that is man's personality. What man feels and is conscious of, namely, his individuality and free agency, is represented as only apparent, not real; and the only agent in the universe is God. He is not only the all in all—but all is God. All the actings out of the individual are simply the actings of the original existence. Of course the legitimate conclusion is, that man is a mere machine (and as such it has been defended *L'homme machine*—by Lamettrie) that his evil actings as well as his good, are the workings of the original existence. God thus becomes the author of sin, or rather no action is regarded as sinful. Sin and the punishment of sin can no longer exist, for God would not punish himself. Man without individuality here, can of course have none hereafter, when he becomes swallowed up by, or a part of Deity. These are some of the absurdities into which this system forces its followers. Of course, no reason can be found for embracing it, except the fact that man does not like to retain God in his knowledge. He does not wish to be brought into contact with a personal God to whom he feels accountable, and who will punish sin. And so he hides away from God, or, which is the same thing, hides his God away from him. He obscures his being, and hides his personality by confounding him with his works.

Lest it should appear that the course of argument here adopted, is one which grows out of our enlightened knowledge

rather than any ability which the heathen have to understand the logical proof in favour of the existence of God, it may be well, in the second place, to bring forward some historical facts to show that the worship of false gods has arisen not from any want of ability to understand the truth. The systems of false religions in heathen lands have been wrought out with more labour and ingenuity, than would have sufficed to come directly at the truth. The very want of reason has imposed the necessity for false reasons, until these last increase and swell in amount, imposing by their number, if not by their truthfulness. Not only are these works voluminous, but some of them are very acute, defending error with a skill which shows they were not wanting in logical understanding. As a general rule, from which probably there are no exceptions, the further we trace back any false system of philosophy or religion, the purer we find it. There are statements of truth which we are surprised at, as we look upon later developments of error and superstition. Whatever may be the origin of these clearer and purer ideas of antiquity, whether tradition, as some suppose, or the plainness of the evidence in the things that are made, the law of deterioration is certain, and the reason of it is well expressed by the apostle, that when men know God, and yet glorify him not as God, they become vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart darkened. The tendency of all religious beliefs is to become assimilated to the object of worship, and the mournful tendency of heathenism to debase and degrade the intellect, as well as blunt the heart and conscience, is but too apparent in the history of the world. How true and certain, as well as philosophically correct is the curse pronounced in the second commandment, that the iniquity of the fathers in bowing down to and worshipping graven images, is visited upon the children of the third and fourth generations of those that hate him. In fact, this curse, or as expressed by the apostle, this giving up, must be taken into account in estimating the degradation of the heathen. Deterioration is no less the inevitable result of worshipping false gods, than elevation and progress is the result of worshipping the true. It is not to be expected, therefore, that those who have grown up under any system of heathenism will renew the intellectual

effort of their fathers. Still they often have in the books which have been left them, a witness against the prevailing forms of idolatry. Idolatry begins by slow and gradual departures from the truth, and in the most populous heathen countries on the globe, there is no difficulty in tracing it back to Monotheism. If we examine the early forms of religious belief in India and China, there is ample evidence to show that their ancient worship was not polytheistic or idolatrous.

Let us begin with India, and the first testimony that we shall bring forward is that of an old standard and authoritative philosophical work of Southern India, written more than a thousand years before the Christian era.* One of the principles adopted in this work is, that an effect shows a cause, just as smoke shows the presence of fire. As there can be no effect without a cause, so this treatise says the existence of the world proves the existence of a cause.

In the beginning of the work a disciple is supposed to ask such questions as these, "Is the world eternal, or had it a beginning? Is it self-existent, uncreated, or was it produced? If caused, was its cause merely an inherent power, or fate, or was it an intelligent cause?" These questions, which have always pressed upon the mind of man from the outer world, are answered in favour of an intelligent cause, as the Author of all things. True there is not the rising up to the high and sublime statement of Scripture, that God created all things out of nothing. Three terms are introduced, one of which is the material cause, and is as clay to the potter's vessel. Another is the instrumental cause and is as the moulding stick and wheel are to the potter. While the third is the efficient cause or Deity, who acts as the potter. The world or universe, like the earthen pot, is the effect it is said of these three combined causes.

In reference to God, he is said to pervade all the world as the flavour does all parts of the fruit. He is one with the world and yet separable from it. He is represented as perfectly filling every place. He is not divided so as to occupy indi-

* See Rev. Mr. Hoisington's Translations of Treatises on Hindu Philosophy, published under the auspices of the American Oriental Society.

vidual places as an individual. Just as the sun's light while it spreads everywhere is not confined or entangled by anything, so it is with God. It is asked by an objector, if God and the universe be thus, how do *Sathasivan*, who combines in himself the male and female energies of deity, and the other great gods, exist? It is replied, and here we see one of the sources of idolatry, *Sathasivan* and the other gods, and also the universe, are the servants of deity, and perform the work of servants in their respective places. A later work, written about two hundred years ago and intended to set forth in a clearer manner the philosophical tenets of the work already quoted from, holds the following language in reference to the nature of deity. This deity, called *Paran* or *Brahm*, and *Tat-Sivan*, is he says, neither purely spiritual nor embodied; is not possessed of any material organs; has neither qualities nor names; is ever free from impurity or evil; is *one* and *eternal*; is the source of understanding to innumerable souls; is fixed in position, illimitable in its nature; is the form of happiness; is difficult of access to unstable worshippers, but is easily approached by those who worship in the orderly course, and shines as the least of the little and the greatest of the great." These quotations show that the evidence for the existence of one God pressed upon these heathen writers, and that logically, they admitted the truth, and yet practically denied it, by admitting the worship of images and of inferior gods as servants of the Deity.

Similar testimony in regard to the views of the early Hindus is found in the Sacred Vedas, which are said by the Brahmans to be co-eval with creation, and in all probability date back to a period about thirteen centuries before the Christian era. Professor Wilson, professor of Sanscrit in Oxford University, who himself resided for a time in India, says: "There can be no doubt that the fundamental doctrine of the Vedas is Monotheism."* In repeated passages of the Vedas are found such expressions as the following: "There is, in truth, but one Deity, the Supreme Spirit." "He from whom the universal

* See two Lectures on the Religious Practices and Opinions of the Hindus, delivered at Oxford, February, 1840.

world proceeds, who is the Lord of the universe and whose work is the universe, is the Supreme Being." Injunctions also repeatedly occur, to worship him and him only. "Adore God alone, know God alone, give up all other discourse." And the Vedant says: "It is found in the Vedas that none but the Supreme Being is to be worshipped, nothing excepting him should be adored by a wise man." "It was upon such passages as these," says Professor Wilson, "that Rammohun Roy grounded his attempts to reform the religion of his countrymen, to put down idolatry, and abolish all idolatrous rites and festivals, and substitute the worship of one God by means of prayer and thanksgiving." Such being the doctrine of the Vedas, that there is one God, and that he alone is to be worshipped, it may be inquired what are the steps by which Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, with the thirty-three millions of other deities, came to be objects of worship. It would seem that the attributes of creation, preservation, and regeneration, were personified under the names of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. But it does not seem that they were early worshipped under visible types. "Ministration to idols in temples," says Professor Wilson, "is held by ancient authorities as infamous." "The worship of images," he says, "was defended by later authorities only upon the same plea which has been urged in other times and other countries, that the vulgar cannot raise their conceptions to abstract deity, and require some sensible object to which their senses may be addressed."

In China, no less than in India, the earliest form of religious belief and worship was monotheistic. In their earliest historical records there are constant references to a superintending, controlling power. This power is sometimes called *Shang-te*, or Supreme Ruler, and sometimes Heaven. The very name applied to this being shows that he is only *one*. A Supreme Ruler could only properly be one. As there was but one heaven, so God was one and alone. Afterwards earth was associated with heaven as the parents of all things. But at first there was a distinct reference to the intelligence, will, and personality of this Supreme Ruler. He was represented as disposing of the affairs of earth, as determining by his decree who was to be emperor, as punishing vice and rewarding vir-

tue. Thus it is said in the Shoo King, the earliest of the Chinese historical classics, "On those who do good he will send down a hundred blessings, and on those who do evil he will send down manifold calamities." Even later in Chinese history, when the great mass of the nation had sunk into Polytheism, we find occasional returns to the simpler and higher forms of antiquity. Thus one of the emperors in the sixteenth century of our era says, in his prayer or song, which he prepared for the worship of the Supreme Ruler: "When *Te*, the Lord, had so decreed, he called into existence heaven, earth, and man." "Thy sovereign goodness is infinite. As a potter hast thou made all living things. Great and small are sheltered by thee. As engraven on the heart of thy poor servant is the sense of thy goodness, so that my feeling cannot be fully displayed. With great kindness dost thou bear with us, and notwithstanding our demerits dost grant us life and posterity." And with an approach to, and apparent imitation of, the true and sublime teachings of revelation, he says: "For ever he setteth fast the high heavens and establisheth the solid earth. His government is everlasting."

The monotheistic character of the early worship of the Chinese is strongly insisted upon by the leader of the insurrection, who established himself at Nanking in 1853. He says that "from the earliest antiquity down to the time of the three dynasties, (which closed B. C. 220) both princes and people honoured and worshipped the great God." Considering this as an established historical fact, he calls upon his countrymen to return to the worship of their fathers, and no longer to practice the idolatrous and polytheistic worship by which they were surrounded.*

This testimony† from ancient religious systems shows not

* For further statements respecting the early worship of the Chinese, see article on Confucianism in the April number of this *Review* for 1858.

† Had the task not been an endless one, testimony might have been brought from other and less civilized nations, to show that Monotheism is the fundamental belief among many nations, even when mixed up with gross idolatry. It is not necessary, however, to enlarge upon this point, as our only object is to show that Monotheism is an accessible belief to the human mind, that it is not as most seem to take for granted, a truth so far remote that men must of necessity adopt some polytheistic or idolatrous mode of worship. Let the

only that Monotheism is the most natural and logical conclusion of the human mind, but the heathen have actually attained to it, and have only turned away from it through a disposition to hide from or neglect what they knew of God. God has also raised up other witnesses besides his voice in the things which are made, to reiterate the truth of his existence, and thus render the position of the heathen still more without excuse. Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians, have at different periods repeated the truth of the unity and existence of God to most of the inhabitants of earth. Not to speak of modern efforts, Christianity was made known as far east as China early in the fifth century. At one time the Mohammedans were the ruling power in Asia, and the only living truth of their system is that there is one God. Not only did they rule for a long time with great power and splendor in India, where their number and influence is still so great that they hoped to triumph over British rule, their mosques are also scattered through China, and the Malays in the peninsulas and islands south-east of Asia number themselves among the followers of the false prophet. We are also not to omit the testimony of the Jews. How wide they were scattered at the captivity of Samaria and Jerusalem, we have not the means of determining accurately. We know that as early as the first century a flourishing colony settled in *Khaefung-foo*, a city in Northern China. Other colonies may have lost their distinctive peculiarities earlier than this, which kept up the reading of the law and the prophets in the ancient Hebrew, until about fifty years since. Whatever may have been the origin of that remarkable people—the Karens—they have preserved from some source, and by verbal traditions, the knowledge of God. In ancient times they say God created the world;

following suffice in reference to the ability of man in smaller or more obscure tribes to arrive at the truth of one God. “In Yoruba,” a country in central Africa, says the Report of the English Episcopal Missions, “as in other countries of Soudan, one God is acknowledged, but the real worship is to the orishas or idols. It is interesting, however, to mark that these are always viewed as intermediate agents or intercessors. The African says he cannot approach God directly; he needs some one to come between him and God.” Here we have a belief in one God, combined as it often has been with idolatrous worship.

all things were minutely ordered by him. They have traditions respecting the fall and the dispersion of mankind. Respecting idolatry, they say, "O children and grandchildren do not worship idols or priests. If you worship them you obtain no advantage thereby, while you increase your sins exceedingly." Their fathers they believe once had God's book written on parchment, and they carelessly allowed it to be destroyed. Since then, as a punishment, they have been without a written language. If this tradition is correct, there is strong ground for the opinion that they are remnants of the ten lost tribes.*

Another fact which shows that the inclination to idolatry arises not from want of evidence, but from the evil and corrupt heart, is seen from this, that even when a revelation has been enjoyed, there is a constant tendency to leave the worship of God, and set up other objects and beings in his place. Take the case of the children of Israel. Notwithstanding God had appeared wonderfully for their deliverance in the land of Egypt, and had brought them out with a great and strong arm, and had in a special manner appeared unto them at Sinai, speaking unto them, yet in less than forty days from his divine and glorious appearance they had made unto themselves idols, saying, "These be thy gods that brought thee out of the land of Egypt." And throughout all their history until the Babylonish captivity, in spite of, and directly in opposition to, the plainest teachings of God's word, they were constantly falling into this sin. A wicked heart, disliking to retain the knowledge of God, was constantly leading them astray.

Equally strange is the fact that some of the strongest advocates of Atheism and Pantheism have lived under the light of the gospel. The worship of images also is defended by a church calling itself Christian, on precisely the same grounds which tolerated the introduction of idolatry thousands of years ago among the heathen. There is, in fact, an insidious tendency in our nature to idolatry. It is the tendency of the natural heart to worship and serve the creature more than the Creator. It is seen in hero-worship, in the way we exalt mere

* See "The Gospel in Burmah," by Mrs. McLeod Wylie. London, 1859.

men, magnifying their virtues and concealing their faults, until they stand out as something more than human. We may, for instance, in the laudation which we bestow on such men as Washington, pave the way for idolatrous regard, even if it do not terminate—which God forbid—in idolatrous worship. Confucius was a mere man, and is never styled anything else, yet he is considered in China as greater than any of their gods, and he is worshipped in the same way, with the same forms and ceremonies. There may be more reason than we allow ourselves to suspect for the admonition of the apostle, “Little children, keep yourselves from idols.” We are to avoid its beginnings, its tendencies—to take heed that when we know God, we neglect not to glorify him as God; to take heed lest we exalt the creature above or in the place of the Creator. Error arises not merely from the darkness without, from the want of evidence in the things that are made, but also from the darkness within, from the disposition of the natural heart to hide from God. Everywhere man is fighting against God; the truth pouring into his soul, and he rejecting it. Written or unwritten, be he Idolater, Pharisee, or Romanist, he seeks to make void the truth of God by his traditions. He does not like to retain God in his knowledge. The first Adam is still manifest in all his posterity seeking to hide from God. The voice of the Lord is heard, the sound of his steps echoes through all his works; but man is naked—has no robe of righteousness to cover himself—is afraid, and hides himself.

We have thus seen that the logical tendencies of the human mind would lead most directly to the worship of one God, instead of many. Again, we have seen that in actual experience in history, Monotheism has been the primary belief of the more prominent heathen nations, and that they have departed by slow but sure steps from this fundamental truth. We now wish to show that the testimony of revealed religion is in the same direction; that the Bible regards men, independently of its pages, as having sufficient opportunity for gaining a knowledge of the true God, and consequently as without excuse for their idolatry. This testimony may be considered as both direct and indirect.

If we take the indirect testimony, we are at once struck with

the fact that the existence of God is taken for granted. We are not told that in the beginning God was; but in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth. He is spoken of as already known, and the further fact of his being the Creator is asserted. In fact, it could not be otherwise. A revelation supposes a revealer. If the credibility of revelation rests upon the authority of God, we cannot turn round and make the evidence of his existence rest upon the authority of revelation.* Revelation can only be taken for proof of the existence of God in the same way that his other works can. The entire harmony of its different parts, its various excellencies, and nice adaptation to the wants of man, all show that as an effect it must have had a cause, and a cause adequate to produce these results. But if any question the existence of God, the statements of the Bible would form no proof of it, for if his existence be denied, revelation is of course denied, for there can be no revelation without a revealer. If the outer world, with all its glories and perfections, could have existed without a God, so might the Bible too. Man may write a book, though not such a book, but he cannot create a world. Some other foundation, some other prior proof, must exist for the belief in one God. Such foundation we have in man's religious nature, constraining him, as a dependent being, to worship some object or being; and such proof is there in the works of God, in the things that are made, that both reason and revelation unite in declaring him that rejects it to be without excuse.

Let us then, secondly, look at the direct proof which the Bible presents. In Acts xiv. 17, it is said that "God left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with joy and gladness." This was spoken by the apostles at Lystra, to a company of heathen, who, with the priest of Jupiter, were about to sacrifice to them in consequence of a miracle wrought upon an impotent man. God has not left himself without witness, a witness which is plain and legible to all men—to the heathen, for such was he addressing—for to all has he done good. The rain and fruitful seasons show a providential

* See Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, Appendix, note A.

government, attentive to, and able to supply the wants of all his creatures.

In the 17th chapter of the Acts, Paul reasoning with the Athenians, adduces from one of their poets a quotation that we are the offspring of God, and from it argues against their idolatry. They who were the offspring ought not to think the Godhead, their progenitor, like unto gold or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device. To have such views of Deity was to debase him of whom they claimed to be the offspring, not only below themselves, but to put him on a level with inanimate objects. Such ideas, such worship of images, they ought not to have entertained. They had an opportunity of knowing better. How could He who made all things, dwell in—that is, be confined to, a temple made by hands? How could He who gave life and breath, and all things, be served and supplied by men's hands, as though he needed anything? No! God had made all nations of one blood, and had appointed to each their habitation for this very object, that they should seek after the Lord; or, as we would say in our modern parlance, he had created and preserved man for the sake of leading him by these acts, and by his dependence on him, up to their Author. No hard and difficult task was this, for he is not far from every one of us. The existence of him in whom we live, and move, and have our being, lies too close to our own to be complained of as an out-of-the-way truth. How just and unavoidable then is the conclusion of the apostle that we ought not—that the heathen to whom it was addressed ought not, to think of the Godhead as like unto gold or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device!

Still more direct and conclusive is the passage in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which has been already referred to. The general course of the Apostle's argument having been pointed out, it is only necessary to add, in reference to the single statement in the 20th verse, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Here the Apostle expressly declares the heathen to be without excuse, from the fact that the invisible things of God are

clearly seen by the things that are made. God has not hid himself so that he cannot be known. Things made utter the truth of his existence in thousand forms, and there is no place where their voice is not heard. Man's not listening does not show there is no sound. His dwelling in and loving the darkness does not show that there is no light. If man could see, and yet does not, will ~~not~~ come to the light—justly is he condemned for his ignorance. Opportunity for knowing the truth is reckoned with, as well as actual sin. They might have known God, and yet they glorified him not; for this, and their consequent idolatry, God forsook them. Thus the decision of the Apostle is, that by the visible, God has so manifested his invisible power and Godhead as to leave the heathen without excuse.

In accordance with this view or statement of the Apostle, is the whole tenor of the teachings of the Scriptures in reference to the punishment coming upon the ungodly. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God." Ps. ix. 17. Idolatry in the Epistle to the Galatians (v. 20 and 21) is classed with other works of the flesh, and those who practise it are excluded from the kingdom of God. In Revelation, idolaters are classed with those who are without, who have no part in the New Jerusalem, and as having their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone. (xxi. 8.) From these passages it is plain that the heathen are considered as having abundant opportunity for knowing God, and as consequently inexcusable and exposed to righteous punishment on account of their ignorance of him.

It follows from the discussion of this subject that the evidence for the existence of God is so plain and legible that the heathen are without excuse for not seeing and acknowledging it. If this is so, we must discard the notion that the process by which we arrive at the truth of the being of one God is so abstract and requires such powers of generalization, that no man, unassisted by revelation, is able to arrive at this truth. Doubtless this truth cannot be reached any more than others, without thought given to the subject. But we are as much responsible for the right use of our reasoning faculties as of our moral. Truth, like duty, is placed where the reasons and

motives are clear, but still if man chooses to reject the light, he can, just as he can refuse to do that which his conscience urges upon him. That the evidence, however, is so plain that it need not be misunderstood without a revelation can be fully shown. It is indeed the only logical and natural conclusion from the works of God that he and he alone is their Author. And if, as the apostle says, the heathen are without excuse, the evidence must be sufficient. In fact, it is difficult to see how it could be more plain, or how man does at any time avoid the conclusion, forced upon him at every avenue, that there is a God. "The heavens declare his glory, and the firmament sheweth forth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard." There is not one of all the works of God which does not utter a voice in proof of his existence. Especially is it difficult to see how any one can look upon the more great and sublime works of God without being sensible of his existence. How can man look upon the heavens without inquiring whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened, or who laid the corner-stone thereof? Who can count the stars, or look upon the sun in his strength, and believe that they came forth from nothing, and are urged on by a blind chance? When the heavens gather blackness, and God sendeth forth his lightnings, and thundereth with his voice, when the sea roars as if to break its bars and doors, who can suppress the thought that God reigns? And does not God in all his works summon us into his presence, as he did Job, and say, "Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me:" and as query after query comes from all the wonderful works of creation, how can man reply other than in the words of the patriarch, "I know that thou canst do everything, and that no thought of thine can be hindered." At the crucifixion, when the centurion saw the earthquake, and the things that were done, he feared greatly, saying, "Truly this was the Son of God;" so when man sees exhibitions of power and greatness in the things that are made, he must confess that it is God alone. He may go away and forget the impression, he may cling to old associations, but still the inner man must answer truly to the voice of its Maker. Man's

religious nature can only be satisfied with the truth of God's existence, and at remarkable providences or dispensations, when God gets a listening ear, even the most debased heathen must feel the insufficiency of his idols. These can satisfy no inquiry, meet no demand of an earnest soul. Man, the highest of all beings on earth, is dependent, clings to, and longs after, something still higher, and can stock and stone help and comfort him. The refuge is so irrational that no satisfactory reason can be found for its adoption other than man's not liking to retain God in his knowledge. He loves darkness rather than light, because his deeds are evil.

The state of the heathen, then, is one of sin as well as misfortune. The condemnation that awaits them is not only grievous but just. It is not only for the whole catalogue of sin and crime that they are to be condemned, but for that which is the root and source of them all—ungodliness; because that when they knew God, that is, had the opportunity of knowing him by the things that are made, they glorified him not as God.

The heathen are under condemnation, and to them a dark and hopeless one; they know of no escape. While, therefore, their sin is far less than of those who know the remedy and reject it, still their condition is one which should excite our deepest pity and compassion. The wrath of God is abiding on them. From the second death and all its terrors, they know of no escape, but to us the only remedy for them and us has been made known. It is not our object to dwell upon the practical conclusion which the apostle draws from the fact that the heathen are under condemnation, but the more we recognize the fact, the more important must we feel to be the inference from it, namely, that the only hope for Jew and Gentile is in justification through faith in Christ, that his is the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved. "But how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach except they be sent?"

ART. III.—*Theories of the Eldership—The Constitutional view of the Presbyterian Church.*

IN a previous article we delineated the nature, and endeavoured to trace the progressive development of a recent theory of the Eldership, which, in various forms, has obtained considerable currency. Based upon the English or modern versions of the Scriptures, and the frequent use in them of such words as *elder* for the original word *presbyter*, and upon the now established use of the official title, *ruling elder*, it has all the advantage of apparently carrying with its premises its conclusion. That conclusion is, that ruling elders are “the presbyters” of Scripture, and “the presbyters who rule well” of the apostle; that ruling is therefore the fundamental office of the presbyter—its essence; that as the terms bishop, pastor, teacher, shepherd, watchman, overseer, leader, president, governor, steward, householder, ambassador, angel, are all used interchangeably with presbyter, whatever is set forth in the way of qualification and office concerning any one of these, is spoken primarily of ruling elders; that as preaching is also found to be characteristic of some of these variously described officers, there is a twofold order of elders, one class who only rule, and another who preach and rule—first rulers, and then preachers—rulers by the essence of their office, and preachers by a superadded charisma or gift; that “it is this distinction which gives us our name of ‘The Presbyterian Church’—the church that holds to government by elders, the essence of whose office is ruling, and not teaching.”*

Such is the theory for which is claimed the indubitable authority of Scripture, the practice and writings of primitive Christianity, the sanction of ancient and reformed churches, and the standards of the Presbyterian Church, and the abettors of which say that the rejection of it “by many Presbyterians and Presbyterian ministers” is “disreputable,” and proves that they are “very imperfectly acquainted with their own system.”

* Dr. Adger’s Inaugural Disc., Southern Presb. Review, 1859, pp. 165, 166.

“The ruling elder, even in the decisions of the General Assembly, occupies a very anomalous position.”

Now, the confusion we have found in every attempt to draw out this theory from Scripture, or state it in words, is its confutation. And when we remember that every prophet who expounds it has his own utterance different as well as distinct, and in some cases even contradictory and antagonistic, we use the language of Dr. Miller in reference to similar variations in the prelatic theory and among its defenders, when we affirm that “this very strife in their camp is a fatal testimony against their cause.”* “When they contradict, with so little ceremony, both the letter and spirit of their own public offices, drawn up by martyred fathers of their church, rendered venerable by the lapse of nearly three centuries, it would really seem as if to them victory or defeat must prove equally fatal. If they fail of establishing their argument, their cause, of course, is lost. If, on the contrary, they succeed in establishing it, they dishonour the venerated authors of their formularies.”

It will, at all events, be evident that the controversy, though about words, is not a mere logomachy, but involves all that is vital in the relations of the Eldership, the Ministry, and the Deaconship. This is the real question at issue. There is no manner of dispute whether the ruling elder is an officer, divinely appointed, deriving his authority from Christ the Lord; nor whether “he sits in Presbytery by divine right as a constituent element of the body;” nor even whether he may not be properly denominated, in a general use of the terms—ruling-elder—and especially as the original word, presbyter, and its cognate words, bishop, pastor, minister, &c., are in general usage, and in our standards, restricted to the office of the preacher. The status, in short, the dignity, the ecclesiastical and spiritual character of the ruling-elder as an office-bearer and ruler in the church of Christ, and as an essential element in Presbyterian polity;—these, none of them, are in question in this discussion. We claim, and it may be, shall establish, a greater honour for the ruling elder than this theory secures. We rejoice as much as any can rejoice, in every manifestation by our ruling elders of greater and growing interest in all that

* On the Christian Ministry, p. 60.

affects the prosperity of our church, and our heart's desire and prayer to God has been for thirty years, that he would send us ruling elders, able and willing to lead on and to sustain pastors in all pastoral visitation and instruction, and in the well-ordering and marshalling of the forces of the sacramental host.

What, then, is the Presbyterian view of the ruling eldership? It is very simple, and may be clearly, stated, both negatively and positively.

And first, negatively. The ruling eldership is not the ministry, nor of the same order or office as the ministry, which is the highest both for dignity and usefulness. And as the ministry combines both teaching and ruling, and ruling in order to teaching, IT is, on the last analysis, unquestionably the one fundamental order in the kingdom of Christ. On this point, we must omit a full exhibition of the decisive teaching of all Presbyterian standards. The remarkable harmony with which these all combine in exalting the ministry, in appropriating to the ministry the title of presbyter, and its collateral terms; in refusing so generally to give even the English term elder to our ruling elder, except under the explicit statement that it is in a "large" and comprehensive sense; the employment of *various* other terms for the official standard definition of ruling elders; the *rejection* of the title, ruling elders, and 1 Timothy v. 17, as proof, after long discussion, by the Westminster Assembly, whose form of government is that of the Church of Scotland, and of all affiliated churches, and the basis of, and for a time itself, our own form;—all this is completely subversive of the theory in question, which makes the ministry a class under the order of ruling elders or a function of the office of ruling elders.

The ministry, according to the Presbyterian system of doctrine and polity, is a distinct ORDER, and not a CLASS under an order. It is also the FIRST order in the church, both for dignity and usefulness, and not "a new function" of a more fundamental order. It is the order to which an analysis of the church of Christ, either as a doctrine or as a duty, or as a dispensation of God's gracious mercy, must ultimately lead—the instrumentality for making known authoritatively to lost and guilty men the glorious gospel of the blessed God. The

ministry is the radical and essential order in the church. It contains within itself, by necessity, both discipline and distribution, both ruling and relieving, watchful care for the interests both of the body and the soul.* The apostles accordingly are always named first, and all the other offices grow out of theirs, like branches from a common stock. The apostles were at the same time prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, and at first had charge even of the business of the deacons. This universal official character belonged in the highest sense to Christ. He is expressly called apostle, prophet, evangelist, (Eph. ii. 17); calls himself the Good Shepherd; and condescends to take even the title of deacon or servant; and all the various branches of the spiritual office are the organs through which Christ himself, in the Holy Ghost, continues to exercise on earth the offices of prophet, priest, and king. According to this fundamental idea of the Presbyterian church, therefore, the pastor includes in his official potentiality, the elder and deacon, as the elder does that of deacon, and thus as a missionary or evangelist, the pastor can call together and organize, and conduct churches, until God provides elders and deacons, whom he can then ordain.

Having thus shown what the system of the Presbyterian church in relation to the eldership is *negatively*, and that most assuredly it is not what this theory makes it, that is, the fundamental order of which the ministry is a class, or "a new function," we proceed to state what it is *positively*. On this point there ought to be no disputation, as our standards are unmistakably clear. They deliver no uncertain sound. They separate the eldership by a definite order from the pastorship, and from the deaconship by a distinct consideration of each in separate chapters. In our Form of Government (ch. v.) there has been even peculiar clearness of analysis, and we have both a lucid definition and a plain and popular *description* of ruling elders. In the definition we have first the *genus* or *class* to which ruling elders belong, viz. "the ordinary and perpetual officers in the church," (ch. iii.) of which there are *three kinds or orders*—(evangelists being properly considered as missionaries, and differing from ministers generally only in the

* Gillespie argues this against Stillingfleet, and quotes older writers.

nature and field of their work and not in office or order. The *species* or *order* to which ruling elders belong, and the particular mark—or relation—by which this office is distinguished from each of the others, is their being “the representatives of the people (ch. iii.);” or, as it is more fully given in chapter v., “Ruling elders are *properly* the representatives of the people, chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline, in conjunction with pastors or ministers.” Such is the *definition*. The *description*, as given in ch. iii. is, that they are those officers who are “*usually* (not *universally*) *styled* (not *are so by divine calling*, and hence not by divine right,) ruling elders.” In ch. v. it is: “This office has been *understood* by a great part of the Protestant Reformed Churches to be designated in the Holy Scriptures by the title of governments and (*described in their works as*) those who rule well, but do not labour in word and doctrine.”

We have here, therefore, a formal definition and a full description of ruling elders, and a candid admission that in regard to the name, and the application to that name of 1 Tim. v. 17, there has only been a “*common understanding*” (or *opinion*) by “a *great part*” of the churches. In the definition you will notice, that they are not called ruling elders, and that they are not—*here*, or anywhere else—called *presbyters*, which title is given exclusively to the bishop or pastor. And whereas “the elders that rule well,” in 1 Tim. v. 17, is quoted in proof, it is to be noted, that it is only in support of the “commonly” used title, “*ruling elders*,” for it lends no countenance whatever to the definition of “representatives of the people;” and also, that the suggestion of the name of *ruling elders* is founded upon the English rendering of “*rule well*” for οἱ καλῶς προσεστῶτες, (literally those who preside well or in an acceptable manner.)

Secondly, you will notice that they are “*properly* called representatives of the people,” which bishops are neither said to be, nor can be. The *people* can neither give nor take away their office, their call, their commission, their authority, their power of loosing and binding, their gifts and graces, their status as *representatives*, heralds and ambassadors of *Christ*, as lights of the world, salt of the earth, stars in Christ’s right

hand, angels, rulers, stewards, husbandmen, fathers, shepherds, builders, watchmen, the chariots and horsemen of Israel.”* Logically and efficiently, and in the order of the divine instrumentality, preachers precede believing people, and preaching is in order to discipleship, the shepherd to his flock, and the pastor to his people. There are, for instance, presbyteries in India, China, and elsewhere, where no suitable materials for elders or deacons exist, and where, therefore, ministers are in no proper sense representatives of the people. And as surely as there is a catholic visible church, there are ministers whose primary relations are to that church. As *ministers* they represent Christ and his kingdom, and as *pastors*, in the present strict sense of that term, by virtue of their relation to, and covenant with a particular church, they represent it. This principle constitutes the vital distinction between Presbyterianism and Independency, as Dr. Owen admits. Ruling Elders are common and proper to both, so that neither elders nor deacons constitute the distinctive characteristic of Presbyterianism.

And hence ruling elders are defined to be “*properly* representatives of the *people*,” because, as Dr. Adger well expounds, “*they are nothing more.*” They are, he adds, “specifically representatives of the people for the reason also, that not every elder in any district may be a member of Presbytery,” but “each session shall send one elder *only* to represent that session, and so to represent that church or people.”† Dr. Adger, however, is entirely mistaken in adding “with the minister,” as if the people sent the minister to Presbytery. Every ordained *minister* is, *ex officio*, a member of Presbytery which consists of all ministers, “and ONE ruling elder from every congregation within a certain district.” (Form of Gov. chap. x. § 2, See § 3—5.) “The pastor of the congregation also *shall always* be the moderator of the session, except when for some good reason some other *minister* be invited to preside.”

The fundamental relation of the ruling elder is, therefore, to the people. For while it is true that the apostles go before the church, not the church before the apostles; nevertheless, as

* Divine Right of the Ministry.

† Inaugural Discourse, *Southern Presbyterian Review*. 1859, p. 175.

soon as a Christian community was called, nothing was done without its coöperation. As all authority and power inhere in Christ, the autocratic King and Head, so does it pertain ministerially to his theocratic kingdom, or house, or family, or body, as it is severally called. The supreme government is upon his shoulders, who is head over all, and King of kings to his church. All power in the church, by whomsoever *exercised*, is made binding or loosing only by the authority of Christ, as constitutionally declared in his word. This power is not imparted primarily to officers, but to the church, considered as a kingdom, for whose edification officers are given. "Whatever authority and dignity the Holy Spirit confers on priests, or prophets, or apostles, or successors of apostles, is wholly given *not to men themselves*, but to the ministry to which they are appointed, or to speak more plainly, to the word, to the ministry of which they are appointed."*

The Presbyterian system is distinguished from Popery, Prelacy, and Independency, by its belief in one holy catholic, visible church, UNTO WHICH Christ hath given the ministry, oracles and ordinances of God. (Conf. of Faith, chap. xxv.) Officers therefore are given to the church, and not the church to officers. Jesus Christ hath erected in this world a kingdom which is his church. (Form of Gov. ch. ii.) Our blessed Lord at first collected his church out of different nations, and formed it into one body by the mission of men.

This is a fundamental doctrine of the Presbyterian system. "The ministry, oracles and ordinances of Christ, are given† by" Jesus Christ to the general church visible. All church power is, therefore, resident ultimately in the body of the people, to whom was given the commission to evangelize the world. And as Christ greatly honours his people, calling them a royal generation, a holy priesthood, and the commonwealth of Israel, they have a right to a substantive part in the government of the church, through officers appointed by them, and by whom it is to be administered, according to the laws of the kingdom. This power extends to everything, whether pertain-

* Calvin's Instit. B. iv., Chap. viii. § 2.

† Form of Government, by the Westminster Assembly.

ing to doctrine, discipline, or distribution, and to ministers also, and is only limited and restrained by the revealed will of the King of Zion. The church therefore in its visible form, is neither a democracy, nor an aristocracy, nor an autocracy, but a spiritual republic. It is a representative commonwealth, in which ministers represent God to the people and the people to God, and are in many ways subject to the direct and indirect control of the people, and in all cases are approved, elected, sustained, and supported by the people; in which ruling elders are properly representatives of the people; and in which deacons are representatives of both pastor and people to each other, and to the wants of a perishing world. In order however to avoid the use of any civil terms, our reformers have adhered to the original terms, kirk, pastors, elders, ancients or governors, and deacons. In Scotland, the first name adopted for this commonwealth was "The Congregation."*

According to this system, therefore, ALL the officers of the church are alike of divine appointment and authority, and their difference in importance, in dignity, and in usefulness, arises out of their relations to Christ and his people, and to the work assigned them. The office, and the gifts fitting for it, are in all cases, exclusively from Christ, and in the case of the minister the personal call is also from Christ, and when recognized and ratified by his existing ministers and elders in solemn convention, he is by them recommended to the people.

But it is very different with ruling elders. These are instituted for the special purpose of representing the people. By them the people exercise a popular and controlling influence in all the courts of the church, and in all spiritual government, discipline, and order, just as a similar control over all the temporalities, and charities, and funds of each church is wielded by the deacons, who also represent and act for the people in all this department of fiduciary power. This is the *essential* character of the ruling elder and deacon. They represent the inherent rights and prerogatives of the people as the free and loyal subjects of the King of Zion—the *elders* in their relation

* See Hetherington, History.

to the *whole church* as one body, of which all are members, and the *deacons* in their relation to a *particular church*.

According, therefore, to our Standards, ruling elders "act in the name of THE WHOLE CHURCH." (Form of Government, ch. i. § 3.) The election, and the mode of their election, is left to each church. (Ibid. § 7, and ch. xiii. § 2.) When they become unacceptable to a majority of the congregation *to which they belong*, they may cease to be acting elders or deacons." (Ibid. § 6.) They cease also to be officers when they remove to a different congregation, and require a new election and installation in order to be elders and deacons in it. Neither can an elder by virtue of office sit in any court of the church higher than his own church session, unless he is personally and regularly delegated by his session to represent their church in said body, and when said court adjourns, said commission and representation cease.

The ruling elder and deacon can do, officially, nothing which, if supposed to be acting directly, the church as a body could not rightly do; and can do nothing officially and regularly which is by the word made the peculiar and solemn duty of the minister.

Neither elders, nor deacons, nor people, nor all combined, can in the ordinary organized condition of the church call or ordain to the *office* of the ministry. They may call a man to become *their* minister, and to labour as *their pastor among them*. But he may be, and often is, already a minister—in the *office*—and if he is *not*, then other ministers must ordain him and install him with imposition of *their* hands. Though ruling elders are required to coöperate, as representatives of the people, in all the acts by which Presbytery examines and judges of the qualifications of a candidate for the ministry, and to approve or disapprove, yet such a thing as elders uniting in the imposition of hands in the ordination of a minister *has never been heard of under the constitutional laws of any Presbyterian church in the world, so far as we can find*.

The ruling elder, according to our Standards, is neither ordained by imposition of hands, (see Form of Government, ch. xiii. § 4,) nor allowed to unite in imposing hands in the ordination of ministers, (ibid. ch. xv. § 14,) and the adequate rea-

son is given by Dr. Miller.* “It seems,” says this venerated father of our church, “to be a fundamental principle in every department both of the natural and moral world, that every thing must be considered as capable of begetting its like,” and in meeting the Episcopal objection against presbyterial ordination, “when it is well known that our Presbyteries are made up of clerical and *lay elders*, and that we do not permit the latter to impose hands at all in the ordination of ministers,” he replies: “There is no inconsistency here. We deny the right of an *inferior* officer to lay on hands in the ordination of a superior, and uniformly act accordingly. The Presbytery lays on hands when all its teaching elders do, although those who are only rulers do not.”† This is the law in the Church of Scotland—our mother church‡—in which ordination of elders is to be by the minister of the congregation, or by one of the Presbytery. “Then the elders chosen, still standing up, the minister is next by solemn prayer, to set them *apart in verbis de præsenti*.”§ And in the same chapter on ruling elders, it is added, “The execution of some decrees of the church; *such as the imposition of hands*, the pronouncing the sentences of excommunication and absolution, &c. doth belong to pastors only.”|| In the ordination of ministers accordingly, the several parties “are to sit together with the intrant, (or *pastor elect*) so that all the ministers may conveniently give him the imposition of hands, and the others (elders, heritors) may *take him by the hand when thereunto called*.”¶ In 1698 the Assembly passed the following remarkable act, which will explain itself: “The Assembly unanimously declare that as they allow no powers in the *people*, but only in the pastors of the church, to appoint or ordain church officers, so they disclaim the error of the press in Acts vi. 3, . . . bearing ‘whom *ye* may appoint over this business,’ instead of ‘whom *we* may appoint’ . . . to prove the people’s power in ordaining their ministers, which error the Presbyterians are wrongously charged with.”**

In the very first Book of Discipline which was one drawn up

* Ruling Elders, p. 293.

† On the Ministry, p. 74.

‡ Laws of the Church of Scotland, vol. i. p. 222. Pardovan, Book I. Title vii. § 1. § Ibid. § 5. || Ibid. § 9. ¶ Ibid. Title i. § 34, p. 196.

** Compendium of Laws of Church of Scotland, vol. ii. p. 202.

by Bullinger in 1536, and translated by Wishart in 1540, the ministers are called presidents, heads, and teachers, and ruling elders, *officers chosen by the minister or magistrate*, and only ministers imposed hands.* “It (the election of ministers,) is well and justly approved by the voice of the church, and the imposition of the hands of the priests,” i. e. presbyters. By the Second Book of Discipline, which continued in force in Scotland until the adoption of the Westminster Standards, the office of elders is made permanent, but the incumbents of it may rotate in the actual discharge of its functions, and it was not required that there should be an *eldership* in every church, but only in towns and famous places. This view of the eldership as held by the Reformers, is given by Dr. Miller, as the reason why, “although they with one accord retained this rite, (the laying on of hands,) in the ordination of Teaching Elders, they seem *quite as unanimously*, to have discarded it in the ordination of Ruling Elders.”† Calderwood in his *Altare Damascenum*, says, “the administrators of this rite are pastors—presbyters—only. Still the others will not thereby be excluded from Presbytery, because the laying on of hands does not belong to them. For the imposition of hands may be called the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery, though each and every one of the presbyters have not the power of imposing hands. It is enough that the leading part of the Presbytery have that power, as the tribe of Levi is said to offer incense, when it was the prerogative of the priests only.”‡

Alexander Henderson, in his treatise on Church Government, written two years before the Westminster Assembly, confirms this opinion. Rutherford, also, who was commissioned to that Assembly, not only affirms this to be the doctrine of the church, but confirms it by scriptural arguments.§ James Guthrie, of Sterling, in his treatise on Elders and Deacons, says this rite, and other prerogatives, “do belong to ministers alone.”

* Art. xviii. See in Miscellany of the Wodrow Society, Vol. 1, Art. 1. Edinb. 1844.

† On the Ruling Elder, p. 285—288.

‡ Cap. xii. De administr. laicis, p. 689.

§ Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbytery, p. 57.

The Westminster Form of Government was solemnly adopted by the Church of Scotland in 1645, and has ever since formed a part of their constitutional standards, and of all the branches of the Presbyterian Church affiliated with it throughout the world. Now, on the doctrine and order of ordination by imposition of hands, it is both explicitly and emphatically strong, having no less than six distinct sections on "The Ordination of Ministers," "Touching the doctrine of Ordination," "Touching the power of Ordination," "Concerning the doctrinal part of the Ordination of Ministers," "The Directory for the Ordination of Ministers," and "The Rules for and Form of their Ordination;" and repeating over and over again, that "every minister of the word is to be ordained by imposition of hands, by those preaching presbyters to whom it doth belong." "Preaching presbyters, orderly associated, are those to whom imposition of hands doth appertain."*

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland, in addition to the Westminster standards, have their own Constitution and Discipline. The form for ordination of ruling elders and ministers is very similar to that of the Church of Scotland. The elder is "set apart to his *office* by prayer only." (Ch. iii. § 2.) The minister is "ordained by prayer on the part of the minister appointed to ordain, the candidate reverently kneeling . . . in some part of the prayer the officiating minister shall lay his hands upon the head of the candidate, and be joined by the rest of the ministers present." (Ch. iv. § 14, p. 39.)

At a later period, the Church of Scotland, in allusion to the act of 1698, quoted above, reaffirmed that law. "Our church doth condemn any doctrine that *tends* to support the *people's* power of ordaining their ministers."†

We are thus full in our presentation of the Presbyterian system in the Church of Scotland on the question of ordination *of* and *by* ruling elders, because it not only determines her view of ruling elders to be, that they are *not* ministers, nor of

* See in every Scotch Confession of Faith, and all published elsewhere, except under our own Form of Government.

† Compendium of Laws, vol. i. p. 194. Pardovan, B. I. tit. 1, § 21.

the same order; but also because it determines the proper interpretation of their nature and powers.

But we can carry this authoritative constitutional interpretation of the nature and powers of ruling elders up to the very first standards of Presbyterianism—to the Institutes of Calvin, and to the standards and practice of the Waldensian, and other primitive churches of God.

Calvin did not originate the Presbyterian system, combining as it does the order of the ministers—the fundamental rulers and teachers of the church of God—with the orders of ruling elders and deacons.

All Calvin had to do was to complete the system by adding the bench of ruling elders, and even this he did not invent, but confessedly borrowed from that branch of the Waldenses called the “Bohemian Brethren.”* This Zwingli had also done. Let us then hear on this subject the ancient discipline of the Waldenses: “God has given to his *people* to choose from themselves guides of the people, (*that is, pastors,*) and *ancients* in their carriages according to the diversity of the work in the unity of Christ;” and as it regards ordination, it is expressly provided (Article 93,) that “*the body of the pastors of the church shall give the imposition of hands.*”† The Bohemian Brethren carried these ancient confessions and forms of discipline from Picardy, some two hundred years before the time of Huss.

The precise relation between the doctrine of our own standards, and these original ones on the subject of ruling elders, will be clearly perceived by quoting the original form of the language in which they were expressed by the Church of Scotland, which is as follows, “and it is also agreeable to, and warranted by, the word of God, that *some others* (not *ruling elders nor even elders,*) besides those who labour in the word and doctrine, be (*not ruling elders,* but) church governors to *join with* ministers of the word (*already presupposed and prescribed as rulers*) in the government of the

* Dr. Miller as above, p. 21.

† See given in Blair's History, in Appendix, in full; and also in Muston's recent able History in two vols. 8vo.

church and discipline, which office-bearers Reformed churches do commonly call ruling elders.”*

Here also, it will be noted, we find, as in our book, a *definition*—“church governors to join with the ministers of the word in the government of the church,” or as they are termed in section 4, “the representatives of that congregation;” and also a *description*, “which office-bearers Reformed churches do commonly call ruling elders.”

‘We have now established, beyond dispute, the constitutional doctrine of the Presbyterian system concerning ruling elders on these points—that they are not ministers, nor of the same order of officers as ministers, that they are defined to be *properly*—that is, in their very nature or essential character—representatives of the people; that they are not officially, nor by divine assignation, the presbyters of Scripture who are ministers; that it is only “commonly,” and in the common or “large” sense of the term, they are styled elders; that they represent, and cannot transcend the power ultimately inherent in, the people, to whom and for whose benefit they are instituted; that their power is strictly representative, and capable of exercise beyond their particular “people” only by special, personal, and temporary delegation, and may cease to be exercised even over that people in case they become unacceptable; that they are not as ministers are, *ex-officio*, necessary, and constant members of any superior court; and that they never have been ordained by imposition of hands, nor considered as officially capable of uniting in imposition of hands, in the ordination of ministers, by the constitution of any Presbyterian church in any part of the world.†

But further, the antagonism of the theory in question to the Presbyterian system will be made more manifest by proving *distinctly*—what is implied in the positions already established—the lay, or popular, and non-clerical character of ruling elders. Ruling elders are laymen—that is, as the word literally and in universal usage means—they are not clergymen, but are distinct from the clergy; individuals of the people who

* Compend. of Laws, vol. 1, p. 187. Pardovan, Title 1, Sec. 1.

† “It was the practice of the Church for three hundred years to ordain bishops or presbyters with imposition of hands of neighbouring bishops or presbyters.” (Jus. Div. Regim. Eccl. p. 60.) Elders not sixty, ordained. (See Pref.)

are not in orders. The term *laity* is altogether relative, be it observed, to *office* and *order*, and not to *dignity*, or *worth*, or *rank*. The layman may in all these respects be exalted, and the minister be humble and poor. The term only distinguishes that relation which the clergy sustain to God and to his sacred services which the laity do not. In any invidious sense ruling elders are not laity; but neither are deacons, nor believers generally, for all are kings and priests unto God. But in every proper sense ruling elders are laymen, just as certainly as deacons are, since they are both called, elected, and ordained by the same formula. (*See Form of Government.*) It is idle work, therefore, to controvert this distinction, since it would only necessitate some other. The truth in the case was evidently this. In a high and holy sense all Christian people are *κληρικοι*, *cleroi*, or clergy, but ministers are in a peculiar and distinguishing sense, clergy. There is, therefore, an order of Christian laity as well as of Christian ministers or clergy, and it is in accordance with Christ's appointment that both orders should be represented in the government of the church, by a double class of officers, combining in the one, permanency and conservative wisdom as a Senate; and in the other, popular representation, prudence, activity, and authority, as a House of Representatives; united as one; acting as checks and balances to each other; coöperating as one court in everything common; and discharging, by each, everything peculiar to the character and office of each; and thus combining the greatest liberty with the highest security, and avoiding the extremes of a simple democracy and a spiritual hierarchy.

The defined nature of ruling elders, as properly the representatives of the people, implies and requires that they be laymen. A representative is one who bears the character, is clothed with the power, and performs the functions of others; who is one of them, united with them in interest, in power, and privilege, and chosen by them, from among themselves, to support their interests, and act in their name. Now if by becoming an elder, a man ceases to be a layman and becomes a clergyman, then he is no longer properly a representative of the people, and the Presbyterian government ceases to be representative, and a free commonwealth, and

becomes a clerical aristocracy, or in other words, a hierarchy. In their original form, as found in all modern and reformed churches, as among the Waldenses, in Switzerland at Geneva, in France, in Scotland, elders were unquestionably laymen, chosen from the civil state and not from the ecclesiastical, *and by the civil authorities* in many cases, as by the Confession of the churches of Switzerland, and the first adopted in Scotland. Blair,* "one of the most profound writers on the Waldenses," as Dr. Miller justly styles him, (on Presbyterianism, p. 18, 19,) "points out the difference between the lay elders of the Waldenses and of the Church of Scotland, by stating that the former were chosen by the Waldensian *congregations*, meeting annually and appointing the elder." "Calvin," says Principal Hill, "in 1542, admitted *lay* elders into his church.† The admission of *lay* elders into church courts having the sanction of these early authorities, Calvin thought it expedient to revive the primitive practice as an effectual method of preventing the return of inordinate power *in a superior order of clergy*. With some variation of name and privilege, the office of *lay* elders is found in all the Presbyterian churches on the Continent. Ever since the Reformation it has formed an essential part of the constitution of the church of Scotland." (*View*, pp. 24, 25.) "The Kirk session is composed of the minister of the parish, who is *officially* moderator, and of *lay* elders." P. 48. "The Presbytery is composed of the ministers of all the parishes within its bounds, and of *lay representatives* from the consistories." P. 26. Speaking of these lay elders as assisting the minister in everything which concerns discipline, Principal Hill adds, "They are called *laymen* in this respect, that they have no right to teach or to dispense the sacraments, and on this account they form *an office* in the Presbyterian church, *inferior in rank and power to that of pastors*." Ibid. p. 23.

The very learned Vitringa, in his elaborate treatise on the Ancient Synagogue, in discussing the question of ruling elders as maintained by Calvin, and as commonly adopted in his own church, uniformly styles them *presbyteros laicos*. (See p. 484.)

* In vol. ii. p. 540, he calls them *lay*, five times.

† View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, by George Hill, D. D. Principal of St. Andrews College, Third edition, p. 23.

That ruling elders have always been considered as laymen in every branch of the Presbyterian church, will be clearly seen further, from the variety of names by which they have been called. In the Syrian churches of Malabar, the Romish inquisitor addressed them as “representatives and procurators of the people.”* In the laws of Geneva they are called “inspectors, seniors, and commissioners for the Seniory.”† Among the Waldenses they received the names of rulers, ancients, and elders; among the Bohemians, of guides, elders, and censors; by Comenius they are called “seniors, judges of the congregation, or censors of the people.” Œcolampadius styles them elders of another kind, that is, “senators, leaders, and counsellors.” In the Helvetic Confession, “The elders are the agents, as it were the senators and fathers of the church, governing it by holy counsel.”‡ In the Books of Discipline, no one term is employed, but several, such as seniors, other governors, elders. In the Westminster Standards, and in the notes preserved by Gillespie, they are spoken of as—ruling officers—other church governors, *ruling* elder or others, church governor, others to join in government.” We have not found the full term “ruling elder,” until about the time of the Westminster Assembly, when it is introduced and reprobated in speeches preserved by Neal,§ and is used in the commission given by the Church of Scotland to its delegates to that Assembly. After ten days of elaborate discussion in the Westminster Assembly, both names, *elder* and *ruling elder*—were abandoned, and “other church governors,” and as in ch. on Presbytery, “other public officers,” were adopted. In the early churches in the United States, many had no elders.|| They were frequently called “assistants, representatives of the people, and sometimes the minister’s assistants, representatives of congregations.”¶

The lay character of ruling elders is not trivial nor unimportant. It is fundamental to the Presbyterian system and to

* See the Confession imposed on them in Hough’s Christianity in India, vol. iv. Append. p. 515.

† See Name, Nat. and Functions, of Elders, p. 11.

‡ See *ibid.* and auth. pp. 78, 79, 80, 84, 86, and Harmony of Confessions.

§ See Hist. of Puritans, vol. i. and Appendix.

|| Hodge, Constit. Hist., i. p. 96, 97.

¶ Do. 95, see example.

the true character and importance of the ruling eldership. It is their lay character which brings the lay element into our form of government and imparts voice and power to the people; indeed gives into their hands the *controlling* power in particular churches and sessions, and *equal* power in every other court and in every department. These lay representatives constitute the house of representatives united with the senate in one body in all the courts of our church.

“Our divines,” says Mr. George Gillespie in his Assertion of the government of the Church of Scotland, Part I. chap. 4, “prove against papists that some of these, whom they call laics, ought to have a place in the assemblies of the church, by this argument among the rest; because otherwise the whole church could not be thereby represented. And it is plain enough, that the church cannot be represented, except the hearers of the word, which are the far greater part of the church, be represented. By the ministers of the word they cannot be represented more than the burghs can be represented in parliament by the noblemen, or by the commissioners of shires; therefore by some of their own kind must they be represented, that is, by such as are hearers, and not preachers. Now some hearers cannot represent all the rest except they have a calling and commission thereto; and who can these be but ruling elders? And again, when the Council of Trent was first spoken of in the Diet at Wurtemberg, Anno 1522, all the estates of Germany desired of Pope Adrian VI. that admittance might be granted, as well to *laymen* as to clergymen, and that not only as witnesses and spectators, but to be judges there. This they could not obtain, therefore they would not come to the council, and published a book, where they allege this for one cause of their not coming to Trent, because none had voice there but cardinals, bishops, abbots, generals, or superiors of orders, whereas *laics* also ought to have a decisive voice in councils. If none but the ministers of the word should sit and have a voice in a synod, then it could not be a church representative, because the most part of the church (who are the hearers and not the teachers of the word) are not represented in it. A common cause ought to be concluded by common voices. But that which is treated of in councils, is a com-

mon cause pertaining to many particular churches. Our divines, when they prove against papists, that the election of ministers, and the excommunication of obstinate sinners, ought to be done by the suffrages of the whole church, make use of this same argument; that which concerneth all, ought to be treated of and judged by all."

So argued one of Scotland's noblest sons, and a representative in the Westminster Assembly of Divines. And such, also, are the general views of the early fathers of the Presbyterian church. (See Jamieson's Cyprianus Isotimus, pp. 554—556, 540—544.)

One of the ablest and most effective works written in favour of the Presbyterian system, in 1641, two years before the Westminster Assembly, and by some who were members of that body, was what—by the union of the initial letters of the names of its combined authors—was called Smectymnuus. "By all these testimonies," they say, (at the close of their argument for governing elders, whom they call *lay presbyters* and *lay elders*) "it is apparent, first, that in the ancient church there were some called *seniors*. Secondly, that these seniors *were not clergymen*. Thirdly, that they had a stroke in governing the church and managing the affairs thereof. Fourthly, that the seniors were distinguished from the rest of the people." P. 74.

We need not do more than refer to the biennial election of elders in the Dutch Church, and to the character of the eldership in the French and Swiss Churches.*

It is very remarkable that the proofs given by Dr. Killen for his theory from the Synagogue, prove also that if similar to the Parnasim, elders must be laymen. "In every synagogue," as he quotes from Lightfoot, "there was a *civil* triumvirate, that is, three *magistrates*, who judged of all matters in contest, advising within that synagogue." "The same writer," adds Dr. Killen, "declares that in every synagogue there were elders that ruled in *civil affairs* and elders that laboured in word and doctrine."† Dr. Miller admits all that we desire. 1. That

* See Lorimer on Eldership, p. 165.

† Lightfoot's Works, xi. 179, Killen, pp. 233, 234.

the earliest fathers distinguished ministers by the title of *clergy*, and the people by that of *laity*. 2. That in the time of Cyprian this use was general. 3. That the name of clergy was given to presbyters and deacons, and to any others who in the growing multiplication of orders were *ordained by imposition of hands*. 4. That this distinction is found even in Scripture. (Acts iv. 13.) 5. That in any *invidious* sense, ruling elders are not laymen, nor ministers, prelates or popes. 6. But that "so far as it is intended to designate those who are clothed with office and authorized to discharge important spiritual functions which the body of church members are not authorized to perform, and to mark the distinction between these two classes, the language may be defended, and that either that (*i. e.* laity) or some other of equivalent import, *ought to be*, and *must be used*, if we would be faithful to the New Testament view of ecclesiastical office as an ordinance of Christ." "Let all necessary distinction be made by saying, ministers or pastors, ruling elders, deacons, and the laity or body of the people." (Ruling Elders, pp. 211, 212.) Amen. So let it be.*

We are not left to put any sense possible or plausible upon our Book of Government. "Our whole arrangement of judicatories, and *our whole ecclesiastical nomenclature*, are, with few exceptions, borrowed from Scotland," and although "Presbyterianism in Scotland, Holland, France, Geneva, and Germany, are in substance the same . . . yet as those who commenced the Presbyterian church in America were chiefly emigrants from North Britain and Ireland, so the Church of Scotland was more than any other their model." Thus speaks Dr. Miller, who must be considered as being himself one of the most venerated fathers and upbuilders of our church.†

This constitutional interpretational authority of the Westminster standards is confirmed by the fact that, as Dr. Archibald Alexander remarks, "the *immediate* mother of our American

* Several names are employed in Scripture to denote the body of the Christian people, such as *brethren*—one heritage—disciple, as opposed to Master—taught, as opposed to teachers—soldiers and leaders—*ὁ λαός*, the people—*ποιμνιον*, the flock, the church—private persons, *ιδιωται*—and later, *βιωτικοι*, laymen, or men devoted to secular pursuits.

* See "Presbyterianism the truly Prim. and Apostolic Church," pp. 21, 22.

Presbyterian Church was the Synod of Ulster, from one of whose Presbyteries, the Lagan, the Rev. Francis Mackemie, its founder, was formally commissioned and ordained to labour in this country. Now, in a minute of the Synod of New York in 1751, it is said: "We do hereby declare and testify our constitution, order, and discipline to be in harmony with the established Church of Scotland. The Westminster Confession, Catechisms, Directory for Public Worship, and *Church Government*, adopted by them, are *in like manner* received and adopted by us. We declare ourselves united with that church in the same faith, order, and *discipline*.*

In conclusion, on this point, we remark, that either ruling elders are laymen, or deacons are not; and that if deacons are laymen, then ruling elders must be also, since both are elected and ordained by the same formula, word for word—(see *Form of Government*)—and therefore since deacons are universally recognized as lay officers in the church, so also are ruling elders. They are both laymen, and so understood and felt to be by themselves, by the church, and by the world—chosen from the people and by the people, to represent the people; and separated from them by no form of ordination peculiar to the sacred order of the ministry.

But we proceed to remark, that ruling elders and deacons, though laymen, are not incumbents of a *lay office*, nor *lay officers*, in the sense of being originated or authorized by man. They occupy a divinely instituted office, and are clothed by divine right with all the dignity and honour of ecclesiastical officers. In other words, they are authorized by Scripture and by sound reasoning from established scriptural truths, and are agreeable to, and approved by, scriptural examples, and by its general teaching.†

It is also to be remarked that this view of the office of the elder is the only one which gives a proper explanation of the nature and functions of ruling elders. Whatever can promote

* See in Hodge's Constitutional History, vol. i. p. 18, and his multiplied proofs of the fact.

† A divine right is supported by any one of these arguments. See Dr. McLeod's Eccl. Catech., p. 12, Q. 39, and note. Also, Jus. Div. Regiminis Eccl., ch. i.

the spiritual interests of the people, preserve their rights, and secure their prosperity, peace and purity, and the godly up-bringing of the children of the church—all this pertains to the eldership, and is expected from them, according to their several ability and opportunity.

This view gives to the eldership the power of the church in a very large measure, and to the church itself its popular representative character. This view gives to the church also its spiritual character. As elders are, the church will be; and as elders are, the ministry itself will, in all ordinary cases be; and either be as greatly hindered in what they would be, or helped in all they would accomplish. Elders can vitalize and popularize the church. There are no limits to their usefulness. They are the palladiums of the church's liberty and rights, and the preservers of its purity, both of doctrine and of life.

Such then is the Presbyterian theory of the eldership, as found in its standards, and in the history and practice of every Presbyterian church. The question, therefore, between this and the new theory is not, what *ought* to be, but what is *constitutional*—not what might be constitutionally altered, if a better is pointed out; nor even what is most scriptural, and most authoritatively maintained; but simply what is the Presbyterian system as it regards ruling elders? and are Presbyterian ministers and officers under solemn and covenant engagement bound to maintain and preserve it?

Is this then, we ask, the theory of the Presbyterian church in these United States on the subject of the eldership? The answer can be definitely given. That our church does not hold the theory propounded by Dr. Breckinridge, Dr. Thornwell, Dr. Adger and others, is admitted. "The ruling elder," says Dr. Thornwell,* "even in the decisions of the General Assembly occupies a very anomalous position, and it is still disputed† whether he belongs to the *same order with the minister*, or whether the minister alone is the presbyter of Scripture, and the ruling elder a subordinate assistant. It is still disputed whether he sits in Presbytery as the deputy of

* *Southern Presbyterian Review*, October 1859, p. 615.

† What is not at all disputed by the church, is here omitted.

the brotherhood, or whether he sits there by divine right as a constituent element of the body; whether as a member of presbytery, he can participate in ALL presbyterial acts (*i. e. ordinations, &c.*) or is debarred from some by the low nature of his office."

Now, passing by the invidious imputation of a design to lower the eldership by magnifying, as the apostles do, the high calling of the ministry, we have in this statement a full admission of the fact, that the theory of Dr. Breckinridge, which he adopts, is in antagonism to the Presbyterian system as interpreted by our General Assembly.

For three successive years (1842—1844,) our General Assembly was agitated by overtures to allow ruling elders to unite in the imposition of hands in the ordination of bishops. "The denial of this right," it was alleged by those who protested, "involved the denial that they are scriptural presbyters, which denial seems to us to undermine the foundations of Presbyterian order."* In accordance with the *unanimous* report of the Committee, the General Assembly resolved, "that in its judgment, neither the constitution nor the practice of our church authorizes ruling elders to impose hands in the ordination of ministers," (yeas 138, nays 9); and in a long and able reply to a long and able protest, the Assembly in 1844,† says: "These views are contrary to Scripture, and to the constitution of our church, and to the practice of our own and all other Presbyterian churches, and tend to subvert the office of ruling elder, by confounding it with that of the minister of the word. It was the doctrine of the Independents, and not of Presbyterians, that ruling elders had the right to impose hands in the ordination of ministers, as could be abundantly shown from authorities not to be questioned. In favour of the decision of the Assembly, or rather of the last three Assemblies, it can be shown, 1. That the decision accords with the word of God; 2. With the very words of our constitution; 3. With the uniform practice of those who framed the constitution; 4. With the uniform practice of all other Presbyterian churches; and we cannot but express the hope that a matter

* Protest, Baird's Digest, p. 77.

† By a vote of 154 to 25.

which has been decided, after a full and careful examination, by our whole church, and by such large majorities, may be considered as settled, and that it will not be made a subject of further agitation."

The question, therefore, which theory of the eldership is the Presbyterian system, according to the deliberate and almost unanimous judgment of our church, against the ablest opposition, and during three successive years of agitation, is no longer an open question, nor one of doubtful disputation. The positions here affirmed have to this day never been assailed. If the new theory of the protestors is the Presbyterian system, let the *proof* be given.

In another and closing article we will examine the grounds assumed as the basis of the new theory, and after proving that it has no foundation in Scripture, exhibit its tendency to destroy Presbyterianism, the ministry, the eldership, and the deaconship.

ART. IV.—*Reid's Collected Writings*. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, &c. &c. Third edition. Edinburgh, 1852. (Referred to in the following article by *R.* and the page.)

Discussions on Philosophy, &c. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1853. (Referred to by *Dis.* and the page.)

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart., &c. &c. Vol. I., Metaphysics. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1859. (Referred to by *Lect.* and the page.)

HAMILTON'S doctrine of the Conditioned is a modification of Kant's Critique of the Reason. Kant's Critique is a development of the doctrine of Hume. To explain Hume, we wish to say a few words of Locke.

In the epistle to the reader which Locke prefixed to his Essay on the Understanding, he says, "five or six friends

meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with." Accordingly he announces that it was a purpose to "take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted," which gave rise to the *Essay concerning the Understanding*. He concludes that we have two fountains of experience—external sensible objects and ourselves. Besides the power of observing objects (ideas) simply, we also observe them as modes (qualities), and as having certain relations—cause and effect, identity and diversity, time, place, power, proportion, social relations, moral relations, and an infinity of others. Ideas in these relations constituting complex ideas, or the relations themselves as abstractions, having been experienced, may afterwards themselves become objects of thought, or ideas; but no ideas are innate. Relations may be perceived intuitively, demonstratively, or by sensation. The distinction now familiar under the names Subjective and Objective was not much in Locke's mind: his opinions of ideas in this respect are vague and vacillating, but it seems certain that he did not distinctly and fixedly perceive that the action of the mind is in any case such as to presuppose an implicit possession of any truth prior to experience; the pure capacity of perceiving a relation was a sufficient account of the subjective part of the process;—it never involved a prior conception of the relation. The practical result was, as he intended, that his followers looked to experience as the only source of knowledge, and considered the mind not as a closed book, but as blank paper. The following are his opinions on those subjects which are specially treated in the doctrine of the Conditioned. He thinks the ideas of space and eternity are an indefinite repetition of ideas of perceived extension and time: we have "ever growing ideas" of quantity, but not an idea of an infinitely grown quantity. Our idea of infinity

is from the endless "addibility" of number: an infinite quantity can have only a negative idea. "The great and *inextricable difficulties* which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow faculties;" and he instances at great length the same puzzles which Hamilton brings forward. God is incomprehensibly infinite. (*Essay* ii., xvi., xvii.) We have no clear idea of substance. Power and cause are known both by sensation and reflection. (ii., xxiii.) The existence of things is to be known only by experience. (iv., iii., 31.)

Hume held similar views in general to these of Locke, but started the opinion that some of the supposed relations of objects are only relations of ideas. Definitely holding that our ideas are states of mind, he says, "there is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the power and forces by which the former is governed be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature." (*Essays*, 2, 64.) The relation of cause and effect especially engaged his attention, as that on which all reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded, that by which alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. He examines in detail the information from the outward senses, and that from the operation of our own minds, and, Hamilton says, has decided the opinion of philosophers that the idea of power or necessary connection is not derived from either of these sources. Whence is it then? Hume says that when we have several times had ideas in succession where there is a change in the object, the one idea draws the other after it by an instinct or "mechanical tendency," so that when we see the first, we feel that the other is coming, and this instinctive subjective connection of the ideas is the original from which we conceive the causal connection between the objects which the ideas represent. All inferences from effect to cause, or cause to effect, must proceed from experience of connection between their ideas. As we never have had experience of the making of worlds, for example, we

cannot infer their cause. The inference must be doubtful in every case, and scepticism is the legitimate philosophy.

Reid, believing that we know external objects as they are, affirms that we have original instinctive beliefs which assure us indubitably of general necessary objective truths, causation being one.

Kant, on the contrary, held by the doctrine that we know only our own states of mind directly; it was therefore consistent for him to hold that relations are also primarily subjective. Started in this track by the study of Hume, he generalized and developed Hume's doctrine of causation into the principle that whatever appears as necessary to us, must be given *a priori* by the mind itself,—and must be a form of mind,—a law of thought and not a law of things. Applying this principle to all our thinking, he found that space and time are forms of sensuous thinking and not external realities; all we know by intuition contains nothing more than phenomena—relations. Substance and cause are categories of the understanding, or forms in which the understanding produces conceptions. The laws of nature are only the laws of our perception, and have no objective validity. The ideas of absolute substance (the free ego), of an absolute totality of phenomena (the universe), of a Supreme Being which is the one all-sufficient cause, cannot be proved to have objective reality; they are to be used solely in systematizing our judgments, and when we apply them directly to experience, or assert their objective existence, series of judgments are produced which terminate in contradictory results.* These contradictions, which Kant calls antinomies of the pure reason, prove that reason is here out of her sphere.

Kant's negations are thus more thoroughgoing than Hume's. But he stands on the ground of critique instead of scepticism. He has examined all the powers of the mind, and having ascertained their limits and their illusions, is now in no danger

* 1. The world has a beginning in time and limits in space. . . . It has not.

2. Every thing is simple or composed of simple parts. . . . Nothing simple exists.

3. A free causality is necessary to account for the phenomena of the world. . . . There is no freedom.

4. There exists an absolutely necessary being. . . . There does not, &c. These are briefly the four antinomies of Kant.

of error, or doubt. As one who understands the laws of optics, and how the natural illusions of sight result from them, is no longer embarrassed by these illusions, so Kant knowing when and how we must have the illusions,—ideas of God, and freedom, and the world, uses his faculties, notwithstanding, with perfect confidence within their proper domain of the phenomenal, and knows the illusions as illusions. He is in no danger of throwing his inkstand at the Devil.

It is plain that no philosopher could advance from the ground of Kant without offering a new solution of his antinomies. Three have been offered, for it has been generally thought that for reason to positively affirm contradictions on the most vital subjects of human thought, is going beyond the limits of an allowable liberty in illusion, and entirely destroys her character for truth.

The first we mention is Hegel's. His doctrine is that the law of contradiction is not a law of being. Time is the key to this enigma. Contradictories may be true; one now, the other afterwards. Finite existences move on in time, oscillating from one pole to its contradictory, and making progress in their development only by perpetual tacking. Their nature therefore must involve contradictions. And absolute being combines in itself all possibilities of all time.

A second solution, which is the obvious one, is, that reason does not affirm any contradictions, that Kant's show of making it do so, arises from the peculiarities of his system, and is a proof that his system is false.

The third is the solution of Hamilton, who, standing in general on the ground of Kant, admits that the laws of thought necessarily lead to contradictions, and affirms that non-contradiction is a law both of thought and being; but who will not stand upon the ground of critique, yet thinks to clear reason of falsehood by showing that the laws of thought involved (e. g. causation) are consequences of the imbecility of the mind, and not positive affirmations of intelligence; so that the mind is weak but not false; and who claims that he is thus enabled without self-contradiction to advance beyond the limits of positive thought, and affirm that one, and one only of the inconceivable contradictories must be true in fact. Before entering on the discussion of Hamilton's peculiar doctrines, a few remarks

must be made on what seems to be a kind of axiom with him, as with Kant,—that all our knowledge is relative. What he means by relative has been a matter of discussion, because his general statements about our knowledge by perception are naturally taken to mean that we know the primary qualities of matter as they are in themselves, and it has therefore been said that by *relative* he must mean *partial*. In our last number we showed the true relations of his doctrine of perception. Moreover he distinctly says, “I have frequently asserted, that in perception we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. . . . To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a thing in a representation or mediately. . . . Our knowledge is only of the relative.” (*R.* 866.) Again he says: “Absolute is used in two senses: 1°. as opposed to the partial; and 2°. as opposed to the relative. Our knowledge is not of the absolute, and therefore only of the partial and relative,” (*Lect.* 99.) He means by relative then something different from *partial*. He means (1) that the only objects of our knowledge are phenomena, and that these are always a relation between two substances, and never expressive of the simple existence or unmixed quality of one substance (*Lect.* 97.) We do not know substance, either matter or mind, at all. He means (2) that every phenomenon known to us is known only under the special conditions of our faculties; it must be of a peculiar kind, so as to come within their scope; and (3) it cannot be known in its native purity without addition, but only under various modifications determined by the faculties themselves, (*Lect.* 104.) The only doubt that can fairly arise is, whether he will admit that we can in any case separate the subjective from the objective element, so as to come at pure objective fact even in regard to relations. Without undertaking to decide whether he had any consistent opinion on this point, we make the following remarks on the general subject.

1°. Our knowledge of external objects in the concrete is always mixed, but easily analyzed. Perception of extension is not a phenomenon expressing the result of interaction between mind and matter; but an intuition which mirrors

purely the state of the object. So Reid says that "there appears no reason for asserting that, in perception, either the object acts upon the mind or the mind upon the object;" "to be perceived, implies neither action nor quality in the object perceived;" "every body knows that to think of an object, and to act upon it are very different things." (*R.* 301.) This draws two notes from Hamilton, who appears to differ, though as is too often the case, his remarks, while making a show of confuting Reid, are really addressed to the precision of his language.

2°. It does not seem to be an accurate statement that we perceive only phenomena and not substance. In using the senses, the object on which thought fastens is the substance. I see a tree. I feel a pen. I see or feel the thing as having certain qualities, and not the qualities as residing in the unknown. Is perception confined to the thinking an unknown external correlative of a sensation, as a quality, leaving out altogether the intuitions which give us extension, motion, force, substance? These intuitions are the true perceptions, and their objects stand in consciousness as the ground-work to be dressed up in phenomena by sensation. Hamilton illustrates at great length the statement, that however many additional senses we might have, we should still learn nothing of matter in itself. That is true enough. We do not want senses for that purpose, but sense, intuition. What is meant by knowing a thing as it is in itself? Do we not know a geometrical circle as it is in itself? We know its innermost nature, and that in such a form that we can deduce all its properties and relations from it. Such a knowledge of matter as that would seem to be knowing it in itself. But such a knowledge is readily conceived. We now have theories of atomic constitution and organization, which explain many of the phenomena; and it is by no means an impossible advance in science, that a theory be found which shall explain with mathematical precision everything that we know about matter, and enable us to predict the future, just as we do now the movements under the law of attraction: and it is easy to conceive that, just as now on the suggestion of sensations, we have intuitive perceptions of extension and force: we might have an intuitive perception of the innermost nature of the

atoms, distinguish the point of origin of force, the polarity, the arrangement; so that like some arithmetical prodigy, who intuitively knows the nature of numbers, and understands their results in the most complicated combinations, we might tell with mathematical precision the precise nature (as intelligent or unintelligent), the organization, action and interaction of all the forces in a given mass of matter. Sensations give us the relation of matter to us, but the intuitive perceptions give us knowledge of matter as it is in itself, permanent, extension-occupying substance; exactly as it would be if we did not perceive it—exactly as it is when we do not perceive it. This knowledge is partial indeed, but pure.

3°. As to our knowledge of mind. It does not appear that the distinction of subject and object in consciousness of self is at all like the phenomenal relations of two masses of matter. On the contrary, consciousness assures us that the same indivisible unit is both subject and object; that we know this unit as it is in itself—a person; that we know our mental states exactly as they are; and that we have power over them; and that they have a positive quality as right and wrong. Consciousness is not a distorting lens, it is clear light; conscience is not a liar, nor a prejudiced witness, it is “the voice of God.” In regard to all these points we have knowledge, partial indeed, but pure.

4°. Size does not prevent knowledge from being pure, or continued existence. The purity of our knowledge of extension, for example, is not affected by the fact that we have not examined all extension, nor by the fact that we did not know it a century ago. What we do know we may know purely, though there is much more to know, and though it may change in an instant. Any inability to follow through and complete a knowledge of the infinite does not render less pure the knowledge which we do attain. The infinite God acts in finite relations; the knowledge of him which we have from these acts is not less pure, because we do not know all.

The fundamental principle of Hamilton's own doctrine of the conditioned may be stated as follows in his own words. All that is conceivable in thought lies in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, viz. the absolute and the infinite; each of which is altogether incon-

ceivable, but of which, according to the law of excluded middle, one must be true, though, according to the law of non-contradiction, both cannot, (*Lect.* 526, 527, 530. *Dis.* 22. 581.) The most important doctrines supposed to be involved in this law, so far as appears, are these. (1) We can know only phenomena, and phenomena of the finite. We can have only a relative knowledge of ourselves, or of any thing else, (*Dis.* 60. 574.) (2) It demonstrates that there is existence which is inconceivable. (*Dis.* 22. 586; *Lect.* 528.) (3) It demonstrates that space and time are forms of mind, "laws of thought and not laws of things." (*Dis.* 572.) (4) Several of the fundamental laws of thought, e. g. that of cause and effect, and that of substance and phenomenon, are not positive affirmations of intelligence, but only results of our inability to think the unconditioned. (*Dis.* 575; *Lect.* 532.) Free-agency is an inconceivable fact; a created free-agent, it seems, impossible. (*Dis.* 586+; *Lect.* 556+.) Creation adds nothing to existence. (*Dis.* 583; *Lect.* 553.) (5) God is nothing; an infinite God, nihil cogitabile; an infinite and absolute God, it seems, nihil purum, impossible. (*Dis.* 21, 22, 567.) A principle enforced by the great name of Hamilton, which is supposed to involve such truths, or errors, may well be marked, as it is in the margin of his lectures—"grand law of thought," and demands a thorough study. Our first effort should be to find out exactly what it means. "Conceivable in thought," "conditioned and unconditioned," "interval between," "contradictory extremes or poles," "absolute" and "infinite," all need close scrutiny. But the only method which we have found practicable in the absence of satisfactory definitions and illustrations, is to examine his applications of the law, and his reasonings upon them. We premise, however, a few words on contradictories. Hamilton introduces the subject to his class thus. "The highest of all logical laws, in other words, the supreme law of thought, is what is called the principle of contradiction, or more correctly the principle of non-contradiction. It is this: a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Alpha est, Alpha non est, are propositions which cannot both be true at once. A second fundamental law of thought, or rather the principle of contradiction viewed in a certain aspect, is called the principle of Excluded Middle, or, more fully the principle of Excluded Middle between two

Contradictories. A thing either is or it is not,—aut est Alpha aut non est; there is no medium, one must be true, both cannot.” (*Lect.* 526.) Then follows the grand law. But in order that it may be seen how “absolute” and “infinite” are the contradictories in the law, we will state the sense of the term in another way. Two predicates are contradictories when to affirm the one and to deny the other are the same thing; *green* and *not-green* are such. It is the same thing to deny that any thing is *green* and to affirm that it is *not-green*. True contradictory predicates may be predicated of any thing nameable, and in every case one must be true and the other false; they divide the nameable—including all things real, impossible, thinkable, unthinkable, whatever a word can stand for—into two mutually exclusive classes, one of which is marked by a positive quality, the other includes all the rest of the nameable. Virtue is *green* or *not-green*. A round-square is *green* or *not-green*. The first of each of these contradictories is false, the second is true: but the second affirms nothing, except that the subject (virtue: round-square) belongs somewhere else among *nameables* than among green objects. It affirms nothing as to its existence, or qualities.

A second sense of contradictories, or opposites, is two mutually exclusive predicates which together embrace the whole of a genus, and nothing more. If such are predicated of any subject belonging to the genus, one must be true and the other false; but if they are predicated of any thing out of that genus, they will both be false. We may divide visible objects into coloured and black, and say that grass as visible must be coloured or black; but virtue is neither coloured nor black. If infinite and absolute do not include every thing nameable, but are only subdivisions of the unconditioned, then they cannot be predicated as contradictories of any thing that is conditioned.

If *infinite* and *absolute* are true contradictories, to *lie between them* must mean, to be the Excluded Middle between them, that is, to be impossible. The grand law will then enounce that all which is conceivable is impossible, and all which is possible is inconceivable. From this stand point it would be easy to grasp the sense of Hamilton’s maxim, “the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy.” Hamilton certainly dallied with this thought; he

pronounces motion to involve a contradiction (*Lect.* 530), time to involve a contradiction, (*Dis.* 571), a free act to be inconceivable, yet known. (*Dis.* 587.)

If *infinite* and *absolute* are only contradictory subdivisions of the unconditioned, as Hamilton seems to say, (*Dis.* 21.) to *lie between them* means that all we can know under any relation (space, time, degree) is not enough to assure us whether there exists under that relation an absolute whole or an infinite extent. However far we may carry our knowledge, the object of knowledge still lies indefinite between a whole and infinity, we do not know which it is. That the law in this sense amounts to nothing will appear as we proceed.

We are now ready to examine the first statement; namely, that the grand law demonstrates that there is existence which is inconceivable. The demonstration is as follows. We cannot positively conceive an absolute whole; that is, a whole so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of some greater whole; on the other hand, we cannot positively conceive an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would require an infinite time for its accomplishment. But an absolute whole and an infinite whole are contradictories, and as such, on the principles of contradiction and Excluded Middle, which are laws of objective existence, one of them must be true, must exist. There must therefore be existence which is inconceivable. (*Dis.* 20—22.) In answer to this,

1°. Infinite and absolute are not true contradictories. It is not the same thing to affirm that 20 is an infinite number, and to deny that 20 is so great that we cannot conceive it as a part of a greater whole. They do not include all the nameable. Indeed, Hamilton describes them as species of which the Unconditioned is the genus. (*Dis.* 21.) If predicated of anything out of the genus they are both false.

2°. Supposing absolute and infinite to be mutually exclusive species including the whole genus Unconditioned, so that we can say of any Unconditioned object that it must be either absolute or infinite, does that prove that any unconditioned object exists? Let *round-square* be a genus, of which *green* and *not-green* are species; does the fact that the specific names are contradictories prove that round-squares exist? Contra-

dictory predicates can be affirmed of nothing just as easily as of something. No skill in logic can deduce the existence of Alpha from "Alpha est aut non est," or the existence of the Unconditioned from "the Unconditioned must be absolute or not." Let Hamiltonians explain by what new process any one can imagine that it can be done.

But 3°. Absolute and infinite in Hamilton's sense do not include all the unconditioned. He says in a note added to the original article, "*Absolutum* means *finished, perfected, completed*; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total; in this acceptance I exclusively use it." It is thus distinguished from what is "aloof from relation, condition," &c. (*Dis.* 21.) Here the Unconditioned is conditioned to be made up of a progressive quantitative series; it is not complete, but *completed*. We quote further, "We tire ourselves either in adding to or taking from. Some, more reasonably, call the thing unfinished—*infinite*; others, less rationally, call it finished—*absolute*. (*Dis.* 28.) Absolute and infinite are species then only of such unconditioned objects as are made up of parts or progressive series; here is quietly begged by suffixing a *d* to *complete*, the portentous assumption that all our thinking, and it seems all existence thinkable and unthinkable, is of objects made up by a quantitative addition. This is still further illustrated by an appendix to the lectures, headed "Contradictions proving the psychological theory of the Conditioned," which consists of a collection of those puzzles with which teachers of mathematics try to clear up the ideas of beginners upon the infinite series. We quote the following: "An infinite number of quantities must make up either an infinite or a finite whole. I. The former.—But an inch a minute, a degree contain each an infinite number of quantities; therefore, an inch, a minute, a degree are each infinite wholes; which is absurd. II. The latter.—An infinite number of quantities would thus make up a finite quantity; which is equally absurd." Again: "A quantity, say a foot, has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quantity, say an inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger than another. Therefore, an inch is equal to a foot." (*Lect.* 682, 683).

There are two very different meanings of *infinite*, which

we shall have to refer to often as we proceed; (1) that which is so great that nothing can be added to it or supposed to be added; (2) a quantity which is supposed to be increased beyond any determinate limits. It is by confounding these two meanings, and taking for granted that what is true of an infinite in the second sense must also be true of an infinite in the first sense; that any appearance of contradiction can be drawn from the doctrine of mathematical infinities. That it should seem absurd to any one that an infinite number of infinitely small quantities equal a finite quantity, indicates a sad lack of mathematical training. But what is the drift of bringing forward these puzzles as contradictions? It cannot be to illustrate Hegel's position that contradictions to thought are truths in fact. Is it that we cannot know the infinities of mathematicians, and that any attempt to deal with the infinite series involves us in contradictions? That the calculus is not to be trusted, and Berkeley was right in holding it up to contempt as grasping altogether beyond the reach of man's wit? Such would seem the purpose which would accord best with the other applications of this grand law of the Conditioned. This is plain, that Hamilton will admit no other infinite than one made up of parts, and this shows us how he was led into the supposition that the existence of the inconceivable could be demonstrated; he assumes the existence of the unconditioned, in the known existence of conditioned parts. This will be plainer as we pursue our examination. There can be no pretence then that the law demonstrates the existence of anything not made up of parts. On the contrary, if its claims were admitted, it would prove that all the unconditioned must be so made up, a position which gives little satisfaction in regard to an infinite God. But we have shown that its claims are baseless. We pass on to the next doctrine.

Secondly; space is a form of mind, a law of thought and not a law of things. (*Dis.* 572.) Hamilton's course of thought is this. Space is an *a priori* form of imagination; this implies that we make a mental picture of it, not as a copy of anything, but prior to any perception of extension. We do this by "thinking out from a centre," and "carrying the circumference of the sphere" onward and onward indefinitely. Space in conception is necessarily spherical. It is also black. If we

try to carry it to infinity, no one effort will do it; and as we cannot do it at once by one infinite act, it would require an eternity of successive finite efforts—an endless series of imaginings beyond imaginings. The very attempt is contradictory. Infinite space is inconceivable. (*Lect.* 386, 387, 402.) We cannot however, in this process, ever complete a whole beyond which we can imagine no further space. “It contradicts the supposition of space as a necessary notion; for if we could imagine space as a terminated sphere, and that sphere not itself enclosed in a surrounding space, we should not be obliged to think everything in space; and, on the contrary, if we did imagine this terminated sphere as itself in space, in that case we should not have actually conceived all space as a bounded whole.” Absolute space is inconceivable. (*Lect.* 527.) But, applying the grand law, one of these two inconceivable contradictories must be true. Space must be either absolute, or infinite. Real space, therefore, is inconceivable. Space as conceived being an excluded middle, is impossible. There cannot be any space such as we conceive; it is only a form of mind, a law of thought and not a law of things. On this we remark:

1°. The statement of facts does not agree with consciousness. We stated in our last number briefly the common-sense doctrine of perception and conception, and their relations to space.* Space is perceived, or known as an external object, and is the field wherein we both perceive and conceive all other extended objects. That we know space as an external object in perception, extending indefinitely beyond all material objects perceived, we think plain. Conception or imagination is not so simple. The language used about it generally implies that in imagination our phantasms of extended objects are mental states, unextended themselves, and involving the existence of no extension; of course that the accompanying space is also a mental picture, and unextended. In opposition to this view, we believe that in every true phantasm of a material object there is a perception of space; and that the process of conception or phantasy consists in distinguishing some points of

* For conception, see p. 295, note, where after “1st” should be inserted “perception of space, 2d.”

this true extension by imaginary qualities—copies of perceived qualities of objects. Certain it is that the process just described exists. To drop the reviewer's *we* for a moment, and ramble in personal experience, I look up from my paper and describe a triangle on the walls of my room in phantasy. It is pretty nearly equilateral, and the sides are about a foot long. I see each line and angle in perceived space, and it as truly involves real extension, as a painted figure of the same size. So far as I can judge, all my phantasms are similar. I can think, of course, by words and associations without this phantasy-work. With the eyes open, the field of phantasy is co-extensive with that of perception, if I choose; but with them closed it is very small. The early sun wakes me these charming spring mornings. I open my eyes on the casement. When I close them, I see a glimmering square. By comparing its size with that of the window from which it is copied, I easily tell how far it is from the eyes. I can vary its distance, by varying the direction of the optical axes, probably; but it is never far, and yet I am sure that it is a little beyond my usual field of view. The whole stage on which I play my puppets is within the compass of a few inches. I demonstrate propositions, I muse on my friends in vivid dreams, I gaze in imagination beyond the farthest star, but diagrams, friends, stars are all pictures, and the pictures are close by me. When I view the stars, I imagine a bright point, and say to myself, This is Jupiter; another point, and say, This is Sirius; another, and as with a great effort, I say, This is the farthest star, but all the points are near me. It is as easy to visit stars as to view them. Space is all alike, and I have only to say to myself, This space shall represent the neighbourhood of the star, and I am there. I find that by my best effort I cannot, with closed eyes, extend the canvass of my pictures much beyond the reach of my fingers. In that small sphere astral systems move in phantasy. This is the same sphere in which Cheselden's patient saw objects with his newly-couched eyes. I doubt not he had long been in the habit of watching vague lights there.

If I read my consciousness aright, Hamilton deceives himself in supposing that he can swell out a spherical phantasm of space in his imagination. I can draw a circle in space, but not into any place where I do not perceive space before. I

can run out an arc with a pretty long radius, but not an arc that has all the space within it which I perceive. He mistakes describing figures in space, for producing space itself.

When he says we must imagine space a spherical figure, I fear he draws on his logic for his psychology. I find I cannot at all make myself the centre of a great sphere. I can run out a pretty good arc of a circle horizon-fashion, but the top of the sphere will flatten down. He says there can no reason be given for varying from the spherical form. No logical reason, perhaps, but the perpetual habit of seeing this flattened concave of blue sky has got the better of any logical necessity I ever was under of imagining myself in a perfect black sphere. I often amuse myself in the twilight by travelling in perception from a bright star to a fainter, then still farther to a still fainter, and so on, trying to make real each receding distance, till I feel as though penetrating the depths of space, when suddenly my eye rests on the landscape before my window, the far receding vista, hill behind plain, fading far away into indistinguishable mountain and cloud, where the river threads its way; and I am at once made aware that all my efforts have left the faintest stars near me, when compared with those far off mountains. The star, as a point, gives no data to the judgment for accurately adjusting its size and distance. The sky still stoops to us. Unaided conception cannot equal perception in the extent of space it occupies with its figures.

We do not then imagine or make space by adding part to part; we perceive it already existing and stretching beyond all other extended objects.

2°. Space as absolute. That space is a necessary notion does not account for the fact that we cannot conceive or believe any extension which we think as occupied in perception or conception to be the whole of space. We might have a necessary notion of the finite as well as the infinite. It might have been a law of thought that when we reach a given limit in pure extension, thought should definitely end; every thing possible to thought might be embraced therein, and any suggestion of going farther be impossible to the human mind—that is to say, we might have the subjective assurance that there extension ends.

Hamilton's argument, that if we could imagine space bounded, and nothing beyond, we should not be obliged to think every thing in space, is a transparent fallacy; as though thinking all objects in space implied thinking space itself to be in a second space, and that in a third, and so on *in infinitum*.

The reason that we cannot conceive any finite extension to be the whole of space is, that to the perception of space as indefinite is attached an intuitive knowledge or belief that space is infinite. The only reason that we cannot conceive it contained in any sphere that we make is because we know that is not so contained. We can conceive bounds, and perceive bounds; it is not an incapacity to that which affects us. If space were bounded within bounds possible to our perception or conception, we could conceive it easily enough; if we did not know that it is not bounded, we could easily conceive some bounded phantasm as a representative of it. We perceive it extending indefinitely beyond any bounds which we can make either in perception or conception. We intuitively know that it is not bounded, and therefore we know that no figure can represent it.

3°. Space as infinite. We have already pointed out the two senses of the word infinite, which Hamilton confounds. Space is infinite in the higher sense; it is given in an indefinite perception not as made up by increase, but as an existence to which nothing can be added or supposed to be added; but Hamilton describes its infiniteness as of the lower kind, made up of endlessly added parts, and argues that we can never complete the series because it would take an eternity to do it.

We remark therefore in regard to the statement that infinite space and absolute space in Hamilton's sense are two inconceivable extremes, that they are inconceivable,—i. e. not to be pictured in phantasy, for very different reasons. Space cannot be pictured as absolutely finite, (Hamilton's absolute,) because we know it is not so; it is implied as the canvass, for every picture, and seen to exceed the picture;* while it cannot be wholly pictured in a phantasm made up of an endless number of finite parts, (Hamilton's infinite,) because it is truly infinite.

* This may be the fact in the structure of our minds, by which the intuitive knowledge of the infinity of space is conditioned.

The one inconceivability is an inability to conceive the contradictory of a fact of which we have necessary intuition, the other an inability to limit infinite extension. Hamilton is wrong then in making them co-ordinate weaknesses. The inconceivability of the absolute here depends on the positive intuitive necessary belief of a true infinite.

4°. Absolute and infinite in the sense in which they are applicable to space are not contradictories. Space is known to us intuitively as a whole which is no part, in the higher sense as absolute. It is also known to us intuitively as so great that nothing of its own kind can be added to it, or supposed to be added—in the higher sense as infinite. These are not contradictories. On the contrary, it is because space is not finite, that we know it is not a part of anything.

In the sense in which Hamilton uses *absolute* and *infinite*, namely, a finished or unfinishable progression of finite parts, neither of the terms are applicable to space. So far from its being necessary that space should be either a finished series of finite parts, or an unfinished series, as Hamilton affirms, the fact is that it is neither one nor the other.

5°. The conclusion that space is a form of mind does not follow, even if the premises were true. That space cannot exist as we conceive it, would seem to show rather that it cannot be a form of conception. That which is perceived to exceed conception should be objective rather. (b) The element of necessity which belongs to space is taken as proof that it is a form of thought and not of things; necessity belongs to the intellect not to the senses. But an intuition of necessity can attach as well to a perception as a conception; and it seems to contradict the testimony of consciousness, when what we know as a necessity in external objects, is declared to be the consequence of a necessity of thinking.

6°. The result is sceptical. That space as conceived cannot exist, and space as it exists cannot be conceived, is a good foundation to build scepticism or nihilism. We have already in our discussion of perception (p. 295,) remarked the connection of the statement that space is a form of mind, with idealism.

Thirdly. Hamilton concludes that time present is wholly inconceivable as anything positive, a *nihil cogitabile*. He seems

to say also that he can prove that it is impossible, *nihil purum*. (*Dis.* 571;) for he says a demonstration of it may be made as insoluble as Zeno's of the impossibility of motion, and he elsewhere pronounces that satisfactory. (*Lect.* 530.) Time past and time future he speaks of, as he does of space. We remark that while our intuition assures us that all of space is a reality now existing, it assures us that time present is the only existing time. We are always conscious of present duration. We know the past and future to be non-existent; objects* perceived or conceived, may be conceived as they were in the past, or will be in the future, and the present flow of duration answers representatively for the duration then passing or hereafter to pass. So that in regard to time, Hamilton's nihil is the only reality. Time implies, we think, something to endure. Eternity presupposes necessary Being.

Fourthly. This doctrine claims to show that several of the fundamental laws of thought are only results of our inability to think the unconditioned. Hamilton mentions the law of substance and phenomenon, but he has made the application of the doctrine only to the law of cause and effect. Of all the words that have entangled thought, *cause* is the worst. Material, efficient, formal, and final causes are too unlike to be confounded under the same name; mechanical, chemical, crystalline, vegetable, animal, moral causes, if called causes at all, ought to be clearly distinguished. If Hamilton had discriminated the different senses of the word by clear definitions, and stamped each with some brave, long Greek name, which would have taken our ears and filled the lines of our Quarterlies, and established itself in use, he would have done us noble service. As it is, he has introduced a new ambiguity, and made the confusion worse confounded.

The idea of cause or necessary antecedent is given indefinitely when reflection commences. All the antecedents of a fact, and everything involved in them and in it, whether (loosely) phenomena, substances, powers, relations, occasions, motions, or changes,—and all the consequents under the notion of final causes or the like, are objects of interest and examination,

* We know the here in the now, the there in the then. The remote takes time for perception. We see it as it was.

when one would thoroughly investigate a fact, and they have all at one time or another been confounded under the name *cause*.

It seems that the relation of substance and quality should be definitely distinguished from that of cause and effect. (1.) The material world is made up of substances having permanent qualities, which do not change either in reality or appearance, unless some change of relation is produced among them by a force external to them. These qualities are adjusted to space, so that a change of position with regard to the substance gives a new appearance. A spark explodes gunpowder only when they are brought together. A large element of the chemical and mechanical powers should be counted as quality, not cause. (2.) It seems that beside these material particles, there are units of existence which are conceived as permanent subjects of the properties of crystallization,—that there is an order of existences which show themselves in arranging particles of matter in definite geometrical forms, and in the other facts in which crystals differ from uncrystallized matter. These existences are endowed with permanent affections as substantial created existences, and should be classified as substances rather than modes. (3.) It seems that there is an order of existences which have power to display themselves to us by taking up and arranging matter in the form of plants, and by exhibiting the peculiar phenomena of vegetable life; these too, it seems, should be classified as substances, and their permanent capacities be referred to them as qualities rather than as effects to causes. (4.) It seems that there is also an order of existences which have power to organize matter into animal forms, and display themselves in it, and in the peculiar phenomena of animal life, and that here too we have substances and qualities. (5.) Consciousness assures us of the existence of the human soul, having various permanent capacities analogous to states or qualities in other substances; but which also has the control of power, and can originate motion and change on a simple prevision of a mere ideal future, or in obedience to a moral law.

Now, whatever is found on examination to be referred to these or other like substances as a permanent quality, may with propriety and advantage be dismissed in so far from the

relation of causation. A world of substances with their permanent qualities, if it were possible to conceive it unadjusted and unmoved, would exhibit no change and call forth no judgment of causation. The projecting matter in space with such a distribution that the qualities shall produce by their proper action and reaction the successive phenomena of an astral system, implies a power over and above matter. The facts of motion are those which are most obtrusive in their demand for a cause. Changes in quality—brightness, colour, savour, smell, resistance, are results of motion producing changes in the relations of bodies in space. It is to this succession of changes by motion considered not merely as the expression of a permanent quality of a created substance, but as the effect and expression ultimately of a force external to the material world and to all substances incapable of free-act, that the suggestion of causation seems legitimately to point. Every change must be preceded by another change of which it is a necessary consequence. Change is a mark of force which is not quality—that is to say, a mark ultimately of free-force.

The creation of substances is therefore a different thing from the arrangement and ordering of a cosmos; the timely and orderly introduction of successive vital substances, or living beings, is a different exhibition of infinite power from that which is displayed in their creation: the providential ordering of the human race, that progress of the work of redemption which renders a philosophy of history possible, implies forces which cannot be refunded into the constitution of man, and displays the Creator as Governor of his creatures. It seems then that the suggestion of causation legitimately leads to the tracing of free-force among created substances. It seems to us that the necessity that simple substances in space and time should be thought created existences is a consequence involved in the master necessity of God as a Governor, and in the special intuition of ends (final causes) in their natures, rather than a consequence of causation proper. In common use the word cause is not so confined, but certainly includes the permanent qualities or properties of substances considered as communicating motion or change to other substances. We have premised thus much to distinctly point out that there is free force in the

world in addition to its created substances, and to open the way to a discussion of Hamilton, who seems to ignore both free force and final causes. It would be a great service could all the known qualities or properties of all created substances be distinctly given them even in generals, that the atheistic supposition which makes them everything, might not be able to lurk longer in the chaotic confusion of causes, substances, qualities, properties, and powers; and that the power which moves all in wisdom from use to use, but belongs to none, might be clearly seen ever active, the quick witness of God.

His course of thought is this:—we put certain comments of our own in parenthesis. (1) We are aware of a new appearance, (2) and cannot but think an object existent in time (the substance of the phenomenon); (3) we cannot but think this object existed before (this substance, not this phenomenon), (4) and existed as plural objects; (5) because we cannot annihilate anything in thought (any substance, it should seem) or because—in equivalent statements (6) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement of time. = (7) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement in time of existence (i. e. all existence). = (8) we cannot conceive an absolute commencement in time of any individual object. = (9) we cannot conceive the sum of existence (existence in time, it should seem) to be increased or diminished; but (10) to be obliged to think the same existence which now shows a new appearance, was in being before under other appearances, is the law of causation, i. e. Every change must have a cause, which is thus shown to be (11) only an inability to think an absolute commencement in time.

On this we remark 1°. It seems that we can perceive and conceive phenomena to commence in time. It is such a perception that in fact calls forth the judgment of causation, and therefore, if it is impossible to conceive a beginning of substance, this impossibility must be a consequence of something in the nature of substance, and not of anything in the nature of thinking in time. But this negatives the theory.

2°. According to Hamilton, substance itself is nothing; our negatively thinking it, even as an inconceivable correlative of quality or phenomenon, is only a necessity of imbecility, like causation. (*Lect.* 532. *Dis.* 570.) How can it be then, if we

can annihilate all we can conceive—namely, the phenomena, that we must think the unthinkable negation to remain? Is it because we cannot get hold of it at all in thought, and if therefore we smuggle it into the mind by any logical trick, we cannot get it out again?

3°. How is the necessity of thinking plural objects accounted for? The inability to annihilate one object in thought is certainly not equivalent to the necessity of thinking two.

4°. The different forms used in stating the alleged inability confound in the one numbered 5, all thinkable objects with substance; in 6 and 7, time and objects thought in time; in 7 and 8, the sum of all existence with the separate existence of an individual thing; in 9, the sum of existence in time (created existence) with the total of God and the universe, and so existence in fact with the existence *in posse* involved in the divine omnipotence. We do not see how these confusions to common sense can be made consistent with any philosophy of existence except Monism, i. e. a philosophy which holds that the existence of individuals is not distinguishable in thought, one from the other, or the whole from God; that power and effect are one only; that existence is one unvarying total, of which the thinkable is phenomenal—but of this farther on.

5°. The inability to conceive that the same existence which now shows a new appearance, was not in being before, is not equivalent to the law of causation. (a) Change is required as the starting point to call forth the judgment of causation. Change implies a substance in two states or places, (for creation see further on). Now the necessity of conceiving continued existence would only operate to render the first of the perceived states of the change permanent; but the affirmation of causation really is, that change, i. e. all the perceived states must have been preceded by some other change or cause—that the antecedent state of the change must have been preceded by some different state antecedent to the change. The true affirmation of causation is that change has preceded change back to the first creation of things. The enunciation of Hamilton's principle is that so far as it can tell, everything must have for ever before been permanent in the state in which we first have knowledge of it. The inability to conceive an absolute begin-

ning of time may, by a (slight!) confusion with regard to *of* time and *in* time, be said to prevent our conceiving a beginning of substance; but by no possibility can it be made to necessitate the conception of beginning after beginning of phenomena in endless succession. Motion is the most common appearance which excites the causal judgment. My friend before me raises his hand. There must have been a cause of the motion. Does that mean that I cannot conceive that his hand was not in existence before? Surely not. The question relates not to change of existence or form, but to change of place. Is it the motion which cannot be conceived to begin? That confounds, in the doctrine, cause and substance, effect and quality—and the motion does begin. Is it said we must conceive it to have virtually existed in the will? If that is a continuation of the same existence, we have all facts and possibilities resolved into one existence.

(b) The law of causation at the lowest involves necessary connection. Hamilton's principle only asserts that we must think the substance in its present form was preceded by the substance in some other form. The necessity of an antecedent is confounded with a necessary antecedent. He is in exactly the position he charges upon Brown; he gives us an antecedent, but has eviscerated the necessity. The proposition "this substance must have existed in some former state," is confounded with "this substance must have existed in some former state of which this state is a necessary consequence."

(c) We think it also a clear affirmation of common sense that the necessity of thinking a relation is a very different thing from perceiving a necessary relation. Hume, as we have before said, started the notion in respect to causation that ideas of objects become associated by the laws of the mind, so that one idea draws the other after it, and that we, feeling that the idea draws the idea, conceive that the object is attached to the object. That would do for a sceptic. Kant developed this notion into the far-reaching principle that all necessity is only a necessity of thought, and this will do for an idealist; if we know nothing but ideas, the laws of connection among ideas would seem to be all that we can know of necessary connection. But common sense and Hamilton declare that we immediately

know an external world, and with this seems to be inseparably connected the statement that we perceive or know as objective fact real relations among real objects; that we must think such relations does not go to the point. The instant we think ourselves as possessing created powers of thought, adjusted to our uses by design, we have a stand-point from which our necessity of thinking gives only a contingency. In fact, Kant holds that our necessary thinking may not correspond to objective fact. Common sense, if it claim certainty, must hold fast to the statement that we believe objective facts and relations to exist, because we perceive and know them to exist, and not that we know, inasmuch as we cannot help believing. Pantheism and Monism alone, which see our faculties as a necessity, and subject and object as one, can logically claim that they can give objective necessity in their *a priori* subjective announcements. We hold then that if Hamilton had claimed with Kant that the law of causation is a positive subjective necessity, that would not be enough; there must be a subjective necessity to perceive or know an objective necessity, and neither necessity explains or involves the other.

(*d*) Necessity cannot be founded at the last on simple inability to conceive; that we cannot conceive a thing to-day does not prove that we may not be able to conceive it to-morrow. Inability as a mere fact of experience can no more give necessity than can any other fact. The inability must be seen as a necessary consequence of some positive affirmation of intelligence, or it must be accompanied by an intuitive positive affirmation of its own necessity; otherwise it is only experience: and how often has Hamilton repeated after Leibnitz and Kant, that experience cannot give necessity? We put this dilemma then. Either Hamilton's exposition of the principle is as weak as that of the weakest sensationalist whom he laughs to scorn, or he must admit a positive intuitive affirmation of necessary inability, and annihilate his whole theory.

Hamilton further illustrates the excellencies of this theory of causation, by applying it to creation and free-agency. We will follow him up.

Creation. The course of thought should be as follows. In a place where there was nothing material existing, we suddenly

see matter appear. We are unable to conceive a commencement of matter, we therefore believe this existing matter to have before existed under some other form, and God being by hypothesis the only former existence, it is as a part (or as the whole) of Him, that it existed before. Creation then is only a transfer of the same substance from existence in eternity to existence in time. With this compare Hamilton's statements. "When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself." (*Lect.* 533.) "We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world, but not as the springing of nothing into something,—only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality by the fiat of the Deity. We cannot conceive that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe and its Author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted in the Deity alone; there cannot be an atom added to or taken away from existence in general. All that is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the Creator." (*Dis.* 583.) These statements are the least repulsive form in which this doctrine that cause and effect are different forms of an identical substantial existence, can be applied to creation. There are two lights in which they may be viewed. One is that they verbally confound existence in time with that which has a place only in the eternal counsels of God,—existence in fact with existence as a possibility to Omnipotence,—the material universe with the being and power of God,—cause and effect,—the many and the one. The other is that they are intended scientifically to identify the whole. If this latter is the truth, they constitute as rigorous a system of Monism as Spinoza's. We incline to think that it is. It has been an insoluble puzzle to many not acquainted with Kant, where Hamilton slips in the idea of cause,—how he comes to think that his law has anything to do with causation at all. It seems that he thinks that a new appearance implies *present* force; and so begs an efficient at the start; this force he in some way merges in substance and thinks does not involve necessary connection; it is not given by, and does not give the law of causation. It is only in view of thinking in time, which

makes it impossible to conceive a beginning of this substance (with the force) that we get the idea of a necessary connection of the present substance (and force) with some antecedent substance (and force.) Of this we have to say, first, that force and necessary antecedence in time are truly indissolubly connected in thought, but the connection grows out of the nature of force, and not of the nature of thinking in time. These views of the connection of causation and the inconceivableness of a beginning, are fully brought out in Kant—indeed are obvious enough; only the necessity of causation produces the inconceivableness of a beginning without a cause, and not the inconceivableness, the causation. Hamilton merely gives us Kant under the form of a metaphysical hysteron-proteron. Again, it seems that all force is refunded to the substances whose phenomena are observed: the doctrine wholly ignores that free-force, as we termed it, which moves and arranges substances, and so produces the interaction of their qualities, and the exhibition of harmonious and orderly phenomena. Hamilton's favourite illustration of causation is a neutral salt. This he expounds as an effect of which an acid and an alkali are the causes. Everything that is in the salt was in the acid and alkali; but when he happens to mention this example where he is not thinking of his theory, he mentions a third cause, namely, "the translating force (perhaps the human hand) which made their affinities available, by bringing the two bodies within the sphere of mutual attraction." (*Lect.* 42.) What needs be said of a doctrine that either coordinates the human hand with an acid and alkali as three substances with which a neutral salt is to be identified, or omits the translating force wholly from its account of causation? It seems to us that this theory does omit the translating, and designing force in nature; and does therefore in representing cause and effect as one, represent all that is thinkable as the successive phenomena of one identical existence, which passes from state to state without order or design, unless such may exist in its own nature; and that this account of creation carries back the same identical existence to form a part or element of the eternal being of God.

Free agency. The essence of this, Hamilton declares to be

an absolute commencement in time. (*Dis.* 585.) It is therefore wholly inconceivable according to the grand law, but its contradictory, an infinite retrogressive succession of existence, is also inconceivable: and since as contradictories one or the other must be true, the true one may 'as well be freedom, which is vouched for by conscience.

We remark (1) this is not an accurate application of the law. The law is, "there cannot be conceived an absolute beginning of existence," i. e. substance, not phenomenon, not act. There is no difficulty in having a phenomenon begin, an act begin; such a 'beginning is the very starting point of the causal judgment. Is volition a substance? Does every act of free-will add to the amount of existence in the universe? A correct application of the law seems to be as follows; we are conscious of the *Ego* putting forth a volition; we are unable to conceive that the same existence, *Ego*, should not have been in existence before; we therefore are compelled to think the mind as existing in some antecedent state; or to use the other form of statement, we cannot conceive that the volition did not exist *in posse* before, i. e. we must believe that there was before existent some power to put forth the volition. All of which is true but impertinent. Necessary continuity of substantial existence does not interfere with freedom of the will. It is the necessary connection between the successive acts which troubles us, and this necessity Hamilton has eviscerated. This is one illustration of the total inapplicability of this theory of causation to any facts. (2) But if we inject the idea of necessary connection into the law, more serious consequences follow. Freedom is then inconceivable, but created freedom impossible. Freedom being an absolute beginning of existence, and creation a change in an identical existence, created freedom is a contradiction in terms. A peculiarity of Hamilton's metaphysics, it will be remembered, is that he has a demonstration that one of the two contradictory poles between which thinking is conditioned, is true, that the other is false, and that a combination of both in being is absolutely impossible—*nihil purum*. We are not allowed to take refuge in our ignorance and believe that both are true. His ignorance is a learned ignorance, which penetrates into the deepest mysteries of being, and there author-

atively enounces that we must take our choice between beliefs which to other philosophers have seemed to stand together. He indeed brings forward only the necessity that one must be true, and in this discussion for example, seems to be proving freedom. Nor does he put the foreknowledge and predestination of God as contradictories of free-will, but holds them both to be true though incomprehensible. (*Dis.* 588.) But we have not been surprised to see some of his admirers counting free agency and the omnipotence of God among the great contradictions which illustrate the profundity of his metaphysics. That one of these "anti-current truths" must be true, is good; but that the other must be false! a law to prove that, would be no triumph for philosophy.

Fourthly. God is nothing; as infinite he is *nihil cogitabile*; as absolute and infinite, *nihil purum*, impossible. We remark, 1°. A philosophic nomenclature is objectionable, which establishes this as the proper way to speak of God. What odium have the Hegelians met for this feature of their system! Even Hamilton uses it against them. "Jacobi (or Neeb?) might well say," writes Hamilton, "that in reading this last consummation of German speculation, he did not know whether he were standing on his head or his feet," (*Dis.* 28.) With which compare, "Both (the philosophy of the absolute and the philosophy of the conditioned) agree that the knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy." (*Dis.* 574.)

2°. That we are in measureless ignorance with regard to God; that there are many realities neither revealed nor within our comprehension, is a truth universally admitted so far as we know. Even Spinoza defines God to be "*substantiam constantem infinitis attributis*," of which attributes infinite in number, we know but two, extension and thought, (*Eth. def.* 6), Hamilton's system undertakes to prove that we know, and can know nothing of Him truthfully. This is its statement. Existence (God) must be either infinite or absolute. We cannot conceive it (Him) as either, therefore our conceptions are untruthful. Infinite and absolute are contradictories and cannot both be true, i. e. an infinite and absolute God is a contradiction, a *nihil purum*, an impossibility. Now, in complete opposition to this statement the truth is, that in any sense in

which infinite and absolute are either of them true of God, both are true; and each true in that the other is. God is truly without bounds—infinite, and truly a whole and no part—absolute, and truly absolute in that he is infinite.

We will speak briefly of our knowledge of God, its nature and conditions, first more objectively, and then more subjectively.

Objectively.—The material universe is made up of parts; it is in a progress of change; its adjustments to space and time, as shown in gravity and decay, for example, indicate it to be finite both in space and time. It appears to be absolute in Hamilton's sense, and not infinite, and there is no difficulty in so conceiving it—in conceiving it to begin and to end both in space and time. Hamilton admits this. If we could think of matter only, construct only extension in thought, we could not think an infinite God. But we have higher powers. We know another kind of existence which is not thought under any such conditions; we know mind, a person, a free person, in knowing ourselves. We are not made up of parts; indeed so totally removed are we from any such condition, that we know not what relations we sustain to extended substances. We are removed from them by the whole diameter of being. In ourselves we know substance and power. Our actions are not like the movements of matter conditioned to quantitative degree, but have the absolute qualities of right and wrong, benevolent and malevolent. God also is a free person, just, benevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent. We know this, conceive it, can reason from it. We do not understand his relations to extension more than we do our own. We can only repeat the mystical dogma of the schoolmen, that He is all in the whole, and all in every part; or the still older and more mystical figure, that His presence is a sphere whose centre is everywhere, its circumference nowhere. He is totally unconditioned by any laws of progressive series of quantity.

More subjectively.—Our bodily organs are such that we cannot perceive an object unless it is of a certain size, or perceive it as a whole, if it is too large; nor can we perceive a state unless it lasts a certain time; or a motion unless it is of a certain slowness, and quickness. A sound may be too high or too low to be heard; a light too faint or too bright to be seen. The power of conception or phantasy, which limns

phantasms in space, follows perception and is confined within similar limits. The same nerves are used in both. What is too small to affect a fibril is also smaller than the fibril can limn. A microscopic point or form can be represented in phantasy, but only by a magnified picture of it. That our bodies are adjusted to our animal wants, and bring us into definite relations with a very limited part of things and facts is plain. But the ability to invent and make instruments by which we improve the organs which nature gives us, and perceive objects, and measure motions and forces a thousand times removed from the utmost reach of unassisted ken; the fact that reason can see the invisible and weigh the intangible by its mathematics just as well as the visible and the tangible; the ability to know the remote starry heavens, and find delight in their beautiful order; the ability to perceive necessary truth, and to reason out in detail how things must be wherever the same substances and same laws exist, which we know here,—all bespeak a being who is not to accept as final these adjustments of the senses; while the moral sense speaks out loud and clear, and bids us know the infinite worker as a moral Governor, and know moral acts as right and wrong in the eternal necessity of His nature. How far can we know the infinite God? Can a finite mind have an idea of an infinite? Hamilton seems to think it a contradiction; but an idea of the infinite is a different thing from an infinite idea, as an idea of extension is a different thing from an extended idea; the total want of necessary resemblance, or proportion, between knowledge as a state of mind and the thing known, is such, that it seems impossible to say from a consideration of the nature of any object, that it cannot be known. The reference must be to consciousness. Do we know it? If so, under what conditions? And what are the elements subjective and objective that enter into the act of knowledge? By way of introduction, we remark that the fact seems to be that the indications of spirit are not quantitative. How do we know the existence of our fellow-men? How do we know an intellect or will of mighty power? a soul absolutely devoted to right? a loving heart? Not by quantity of act, but by quality. It seems to be of the nature of the soul that it may concentrate its total greatness

and express it in a single act or thought; its whole power may be put forth, its wisdom shown, in a single act. There is a certain indubitable mark which a single act may have, there is a meaning in a single tone or glance, which renders it as impossible to doubt the heroism or devotion of a man or woman, as to doubt the proven equality of two geometrical figures. And in like manner, it seems to us, the infinite wisdom, justice, mercy and love of God are revealed to us in Christ, and by his grace we may see them in such infinite fulness that no repetition could augment our knowledge.

Reid counts it one of the first principles, or fundamental truths, "that there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men, with whom we converse" (*R.* 448,) and another, "that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind." (*R.* 449.) We believe Reid was right in enumerating these as instinctive perceptions. It has been too often taken for granted, that whenever it can be seen how the exercise of mature reason might have given knowledge, no further discussion of that knowledge is required. The facts of childhood seem to us to show that we are kindly fitted out with peculiar powers of perceiving certain things as if by instinct, which we could have ultimately learned, after a fashion, by the conscious exercise of our faculties. Such perceptions are worthy of a careful enumeration as having, like other first principles, a peculiar sanction.

We believe the existence of the infinite God to be known by such a perception. We could arrive at it by the conscious exercise of reason; but it seems we instinctively perceive it in the marks of design in nature, and in providence. Sir Isaac Newton used to say, that there was a peculiar style in all the works of nature. These works are the works of the infinite God acting in a finite relation. We can certainly know them to be works of a being of peculiar power, and wisdom, and goodness. Can we know them as works of the infinite God? Hamilton says we cannot (*Lect.* 687.) Those who have assented to our prefatory remarks, will not hesitate to say we can. Just as to our perception of a particular example of cause is added a more remarkable power of perceiving its necessity; just as to

the perception of space as indefinite is added the more wonderful power of perceiving it to be incapable of increase, so we think to the perception of the peculiar acts of God in design and providence, is annexed the more remarkable power of perceiving these acts to be the acts of an infinite Being, of perceiving this wisdom to be His wisdom, this goodness to be His goodness, this moral law to be His moral law. It seems further, that in the very frame-work of our own minds is felt the same power, carrying with it the same knowledge of God, even without the cognizance of reflective consciousness, since the general laws of mind, as they are called, are obviously the same energy running through and through the Ego, consciously distinct from acts of the Ego, and shaping our consciousness to the designs of infinite wisdom. In a similar manner it seems that to the perception of a particular right or wrong act, is annexed the perception that this right or wrong is also an announcement of the nature of the infinite God, and that the imperative accompanying it is the command of the absolute Governor of the world. Such appears to us the testimony of consciousness as to our ability to know the infinite God. He acts in finite relations. As having power to perceive wisdom, goodness, and justice, we recognize them in these acts; as having power to know the acts of the infinite and absolute God, as distinguished from the acts of a finite being, we recognize these acts as His. "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." With the first two statements Hamilton agrees; with the last he disagrees. The element of it which implies a recognition of an infinite and absolute Being, in a manner corresponding to that which he calls an *a priori* conception, he declares to be impossible. We began by showing that the nature of the object does not render it impossible; we close by appealing to consciousness for the affirmation that it is a fact.

3°. Hamilton's "learned ignorance" is a very different thing from simple silence on a subject too deep for thought. It boasts itself to have sounded the depths of being, and enounces what is possible and what impossible to the divine existence, on points which are usually passed in silence—its absoluteness and

infinity; and it claims to know that our conceptions of justice and goodness are merely relative, and cannot be true for Him. We see no good ground for saying that Hamilton was merely humbling those who pretend to grasp the whole infinite nature of God, by showing that there can exist no such infinite or absolute as we can conceive—that both, as involving contradictions, are predicates of nothing—have nothing to do with real being. On the contrary, in the first place, he rests a proof of the existence of God, and a proof of the reality of free-agency, on the alleged necessity that one of these predicates must be true. It is in fact his great claim for the doctrine, that it proves the actual and necessary existence of one of these inconceivable facts. In the second place, it is not necessary to affirm any positive knowledge of the infinite or absolute, to bring one within the grasp of the “grand law.” Hamilton’s statement is, that the infinite and absolute are only negations, (*Dis.* 28.) According to him, then, it makes no difference what we think infinite to mean, provided only it is not finite; or what we think absolute to mean, if it is not a part. If the demonstration is anything, it is that in the whole compass of being, thought, language, there is nothing not finite that infinite can mean, and nothing not a part which absolute can mean, which it is possible in the nature of things should both be true of God. To a modest Christian who should say, I know I am totally ignorant of the real nature of God in this respect, but I certainly think that God is not finite, and I certainly think that he is not a part of anything—the grand law is made to say, “Make your thinking definite on this subject, and you will find that you have been thinking a contradiction; that He must be one or the other, and cannot be both of the negations which you say you think He is.”

4°. The truth is, that this whole application of the law of contradictories is totally baseless. The absolute and infinite defined by Hamilton, i. e. the completed and uncompleted, (*Dis.* 21,) are not contradictories; they do not include all being; do not include all unconditioned being; neither of them is a character of uncreated being; neither of them a character of spirit; neither has anything to do with God. The first lie from which all the rest here spring is, that we can know

or think of nothing except as a quantity to be completed—to be made up by addition of parts, either extensive, protensive, or intensive; that all thoughts and all things exist in degrees as an indefinite more and less. But we have already pointed out that a person is a unit to whom more and less do not apply; right and wrong are absolute, and not produced by addition; necessity has no degrees; intuition has no degrees; demonstration has no degrees; knowledge is not a sum of probabilities; God is not made up of a sum of parts. He is a spirit, a person, an uncaused cause, an infinite and perfect one, a righteous governor. He who stands on this ground has only to say that Hamilton's progressive infinities and absolutes are altogether impertinent, and his grand law is words, *vox, et præterea nihil*.

We have now been over and through the philosophy of the Conditioned, and have seemed to find that it is utterly baseless, and that if its claims were granted, it would destroy all knowledge on the most vital subjects of human thought. We must now qualify the latter conclusion. Hamilton is one of the most difficult writers to fully understand; partly because he deals with such excessive generalizations that they cannot be trusted; as in perception, the *ego* and *non-ego*; in the Conditioned, *existence, thing, the thinkable, the unconditioned, &c.*; partly because his views are not thought out, but are really critical shifts from particular views of some preceding philosopher; but chiefly, we think, because these critical shifts formed mostly on the meaning of words, while he gives the discussions the form of a critique on thought; thus in treating perception he narrows its meaning as we have before explained; so in the discussion of causation, he treats other philosophers as though he and they were treating the same facts, yet he has really shifted the meaning of the law. So in regard to knowledge, he has perhaps only narrowed the meaning of the word, and made a merely verbal transfer of whole classes of topics into the domain which he calls faith, or belief. If so, this domain becomes the most important province of philosophy, and his critique of our faculties of knowledge is of no practical worth in limiting speculation, as long as the faculties of belief are uncriticised, and the region of faith open to all excursions, with as good promise of certainty and satisfaction, as

that of knowledge. But in regard to almost all the topics here treated, it would seem there can be no such resort, because the deductions are drawn from supposed general laws of consciousness, and would negative belief, just as much as knowledge. An absolute and infinite God being an impossibility—an absolute nothing, He could not be an object of belief, any more than of knowledge: a created free-agency is in the same condition; nor is it easy to see how belief can be brought to bear at all on that which general laws of consciousness render nothing to us—*nihil cogitabile*.

Hamilton informs us that his confidence in this system rests in part upon finding in it “a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions.” (*Dis.* 588.) Yes; from this centre we see how Hume was right in declaring that we do not know any substantial external world; that we do not know ourselves as substances capable of thought; power is to us nothing; cause and effect a trustless subjective suggestion; God unknowable; the phenomena only which bubble up in our consciousness—the fleeting succession of relations of the unknown is all our knowledge. In all this Hume was right; he was only wrong in letting these speculations land him in scepticism. A “learned ignorance,” which dogmatically and undoubtingly knows that its ignorance is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, is the true philosophy. And yet this passage is found in Hamilton, “Doubt is the beginning and the end of all our efforts to know; for as it is true—‘*Altè dubitat qui altiùs credit*,’ so it is likewise true, ‘*Quo magis quærimus magis dubitamus*.’ ” (*Dis.* 591.)

From this centre we see also that Reid was right in maintaining that we have an immediate knowledge of the material world; though he did not see that we only know it, as being ourselves part and parcel of the same subject with it—that sensations are states of mind and matter at once, and in knowing sensations, we know mind and matter equally; that is to say, we know neither, but a relation of both.

From this centre, also, we see that Kant was right in holding that all our speculative thinking is confined to the relative, and that the laws of belief are laws of thought alone, and mislead if used as laws of being. He is only wrong in giving a

special place to the ideas of reason which direct our thinking towards that absolute it can never attain, and in trusting in a practical reason as giving us absolute knowledge of right and wrong, and of an infinite and absolute moral governor.

From this centre also, we understand the position of Schelling, in his first philosophy. He was right in confining our conceptions to the relative, and his intellectual intuition of the absolute was a blind grasping after the grand law of the conditioned, according to which, "by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." (*Dis.* 22.)

Here also is the identity system in all its vague immensity. Here, subject and object, substance and attribute, power and effect, whole and part, God and the world, intermingling and interchanging, float and flow phenomenally on the currents of the unknown, the ocean stream of identical existence; power is nothing; substance nothing; God is nothing. Hegel only missed it, that when he had everything shut up in this dark closet of annihilation, he had no grand law of the conditioned to turn the lock and hold all fast for ever.

Here also we are at one with the last philosophy, the Eclecticism of France: only in place of the principle that all the positive thoughts of all systems are to be taken and the negative left, we here learn that all the negative are to be taken and the positive left. "The knowledge of nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy." (*Dis.* 574.) We have no confidence in this idea of comprehension by universal conciliation; it implies that there is error in all thinking, and that truth is to be *sought* (not found) in a compromise of all opinions. We want thinkers in these times who will brace themselves stoutly on the old stable truths, and draw men to them, not meet them half-way. And we may here mention Hamilton's doctrine of education, that the pursuit of truth is better than the possession and loving contemplation of it. (*Lect.* 61.) It is of a piece with his whole philosophy;—but we have no room here to expose it. We can only protest against it.

It is, however, in the interest of religion that most is claimed for this philosophy, as “abolishing a world of false, pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning in theology.” (*Dis.* 588.) The writer of this article will not follow the disciples of Hamilton into this field of thought. They have given up, most of them, the peculiar position of Hamilton, and fallen back on the old negatives of the positive school and the sceptics, in regard to natural religion. As to anything added by Hamilton himself to the familiar teachings of our divines in regard to the incomprehensibility of God, we believe we have shown that his claims are totally baseless; that they are either a tangle of verbal confusions, or spring from a metaphysical system which grounds in Monism or Nihilism. It has been represented as a merit of this philosophy by one of its ablest defenders, that it teaches in regard to the greatest truths of religion, that in themselves they are incomprehensible, and that it is only in their relation to each other, and in their mutual relation to our understanding, that we can comprehend them. We believe that the converse and opposite of this statement expresses a more important view of these truths—that is to say, we know, in some degree, the great truths of religion as they are in themselves, but we are largely ignorant of their relations to each other, and to the intuitions which give them to us, or enable us to receive them intelligently from nature or revelation. We have what we have called *pure* knowledge of the infinite as a reality, and also of the finite as a reality; but we do not know their relations to each other—we cannot deduce one from the other. We have pure knowledge of free agency as a fact, and of foreordination as a fact; but we do not know their relations to each other; we cannot co-ordinate them; but not because our knowledge has a hidden subjective element which renders it impure, so that we ought to modify our statements to express these truths,—the admission of such an element would fling the doors wide open to all “pestilent reasonings;” we know the truths, but not all their relations. So we have a pure knowledge of the unity and of the three-fold personality of God; and however much learning and eloquence may be exhausted to show that the three-foldness is only the result of a relation to us—an appearance which the infinite

must show to the finite, we must still stand on the firm ground that these are veritable objective truths. We know that they are true, but do not understand their mutual relations. A Christian introduced by the Spirit into the glorious temple of truth, may well be blinded by excess of light, but he can still clasp in his arms the great pillars of the faith.

That right and wrong are relations to us, and are not of the nature of God; that natural religion, if logical, must be a tissue of contradictions, would seem to annihilate all possibility of religion;—certainly all possibility of convincing unbelievers. If pantheism and nihilism are the only propædæutics to Christianity which reason can legitimately use, she will lead very few to Christ. Locke says—"He that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to perceive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope." Hume closes one of his most destructive essays—that of miracles—by saying, "I am the better pleased with this method of reasoning, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason." That it is founded on faith is true, but only a half-truth. It is a faith which does not destroy or demand the destruction of reason, but elevates and perfects it.

If we have, in the foregoing criticisms, injuriously misconstrued Hamilton, none will more sincerely than ourselves rejoice to have such misconception shown. At all events, we think it has been demonstrated that he is not that infallible oracle in philosophy which many flattered themselves had appeared in these last times. Much yet remains to be done before we have a truly Christian philosophy, or a perfect conciliation of philosophy with Christianity. With all the precious truth which Hamilton has so ably vindicated, are mixed some formidable and monstrous errors, against which all need to be put on their guard. While we yield to none in legitimate admiration of this wonderful man, we are clear and earnest against any indiscriminate acceptance or endorsement of his opinions.

ART. V.—*The General Assembly.*

THE General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America convened in the city of Rochester, New York, May 17, 1860. The Assembly was called to order by the Rev. Dr. Magill, the Permanent Clerk, who stated that the Rev. William L. Breckinridge, D. D., the Moderator of the last General Assembly, was providentially absent. Whereupon the Rev. William A. Scott, D. D., of San Francisco, the last Moderator present, was requested to preach the sermon, and preside until a new Moderator should be chosen. Dr. Scott accordingly ascended the pulpit, and delivered a discourse on 1 Cor. ii. 2.

After sermon, the Assembly was constituted, and the Rev. Dr. J. W. Yeomans of the Synod of Philadelphia, Dr. Adger of the Synod of South Carolina, and Dr. William M. Scott of the Synod of Chicago, were severally nominated for the Moderator's Chair. Dr. Yeomans received 150 votes, Dr. Adger 91, and Dr. Scott 56; whereupon Dr. Yeomans was declared duly elected. In the absence of Dr. Leyburn, the Stated Clerk, Dr. Willis Lord was appointed to officiate in his place, and the Rev. A. G. Vermilye was elected Temporary Clerk.

Reorganization of the Boards.

The first subject of importance which occupied the attention of the Assembly, was the reorganization of the Boards of the Church. On this and its collateral subjects, the last General Assembly had appointed two Committees, and directed them to report to the present Assembly. Of one of these Committees, the Rev. Dr. B. M. Smith, of Virginia, was the Chairman, and of the other, the Rev. Dr. Humphrey, of Kentucky. On the first day of the sessions, Dr. Smith offered the following resolution, which was adopted, viz.

Resolved, That a Committee of fifteen be appointed, to whom shall be referred the overture of the last Assembly on the subject of Reorganizing the Boards of the Church, and the Church Extension Committee.

To this Committee was referred the report of the Committee appointed last year, without reading it to the House, and other papers connected with the subject. Towards the close of the sessions this Committee of fifteen reported the following resolutions:

Resolved, 1. That at each meeting of the Assembly the Boards shall present their Records with their Annual Report.

Resolved, 2. That the Boards and Church Extension Committee shall elect to office their Secretaries for not less than four years; and the Assembly shall have power always to remove a Secretary for neglect of duty, or other sufficient ground.

Resolved, 3. That the Boards and Church Extension Committee be hereafter composed of twenty members each, to be elected in four classes, as formerly; besides, the Secretary or Secretaries to be members *ex officio*.

Resolved, 4. That these Boards shall henceforth conduct the business without the employment of Executive Committees.

Resolved, 5. That five members shall be a quorum, except for the election of officers, when fifteen shall be a quorum.

Resolved, 6. That this Assembly now proceed to elect members of the Boards.

Resolved, 7. That all acts inconsistent with this action be repealed.

On motion of Rev. Dr. Armstrong, these resolutions were laid on the table without debate, with the view of taking up another series presented by Dr. Krebs.

The Committee of the last Assembly, of which Dr. Humphrey was chairman, was, in his absence, represented by Dr. Boardman, who read the report and offered a series of resolutions. The first of these was, that it is inexpedient to make any organic change in the constitution of the Board of Domestic Missions. The second resolution, which recommended that there should be no Executive Committee but the one in Philadelphia, was referred to the next Assembly. The third resolution, so far as it recommended the appointment of an Advisory Committee at San Francisco, was adopted. The fourth, which proposed that the Board should appoint one Corresponding and one Travelling Secretary, was laid upon the table.

The first of these resolutions, as it brought up the whole subject, was discussed with great earnestness, and at great length. The debate was continued from day to day, until the close of the eighth day of the sessions, when the resolution was adopted. The yeas and nays were called, and the result was, yeas 234, nays 56. These numbers were slightly increased by absentees being permitted to record their votes, making the yeas 240, and the nays about 60. On the ninth day, Dr. Thornwell presented a protest against the above decision, which was referred to a committee, of which Dr. William Brown of Virginia, was made chairman, to be answered. When, however, the resolutions above referred to, introduced by Dr. Krebs, were adopted, Dr. Thornwell withdrew his protest, with the leave of the house.

The resolutions presented by Dr. Krebs are as follows:

Resolved, 1. By this General Assembly, that the Secretaries of the Boards of the Church be instructed to notify the members thereof of their appointment, and of all the meetings of the Boards, whether stated or special; and when such meetings are for special purposes, the subject for discussion shall be mentioned in the notice.

Resolved, 2. That it shall be the duty of the above-named Boards to send up to the Assembly, with their Annual Reports, their books of minutes of the respective Executive Committees, for examination; and it shall be the duty of said Committees to bring to the attention of the Assembly any matters which, in their judgment, call for the notice of the Assembly.

Resolved, 3. That it is not lawful for either of the above-named Boards to issue certificates of life-membership to any person, or any testimonial, by virtue of which any person is permitted to sit, deliberate, and vote with the Boards; but the Boards may devise and grant certificates or testimonials of special donations to the class of persons hitherto known as honorary members—it being understood and provided that such persons can in no sense be allowed, by purchase or gift, to exercise any sort of right or position to deliberate and vote with the members appointed by the General Assembly.

Thus was this exciting subject finally settled, as by common consent; and it is to be hoped that it will not again be agitated,

but the Church be allowed to go on unimpeded and united in her great work of missionary labour.

It would be in vain to attempt to present any adequate report of this protracted debate. To reprint the speeches as furnished in the papers, would fill up our pages with matter already in the hands of our readers. We shall attempt nothing more than the merest synopsis of the arguments urged on either side.

1. It was argued by Dr. B. M. Smith, that there were two kinds of government in the church—the one founded on principle, the other on expediency. Voluntary societies were the product of the latter. They had proved among Congregationalists very efficient. It was natural that men coming into our church from New England, should bring with them some of the leaven of the system to which they had been accustomed. As a counter-weight to these voluntary societies, our Boards were created. They were the fruit of expediency. They were intended to do for us what voluntary societies had done for New England—to enlist the influence of leading men in all parts of the church, by making them members of these boards; which were a fungus growth, mere excrescences on our system.
2. He urged that the Boards did nothing. The whole work was done by the Executive Committees. The Boards were therefore an unnecessary incumbrance.
3. The mode of their election was ridiculous, and showed that the whole thing was a farce. Nobody took any interest in the choice, because everybody saw that those elected were not expected to do anything. Sometimes the wrong men had been elected.
4. He thought there was danger that these large Boards might pack the Assembly, and control its action. A small body could be more easily managed, and kept in due subordination to the Assembly. He admitted the right of the Assembly to act by an organization outside of itself; but insisted that this organization should be a small body, and immediately dependent on the Assembly, without the intervention of any unnecessary corporation.

Dr. Adger's argument was founded principally on the inefficiency of the present system. He said that \$118,000 a year was a very poor contribution for a church which could and should raise a million dollars annually for this great work. Your report says that the average salaries of your missionaries

is \$536, when \$1000 would not be too much. Only 1705 churches contribute to this fund, while 1783 churches are non-contributing. They do not contribute, he said, because they do not like the system. 2. He insisted that the system was wrong. God has given us a divine system of government—sessions, Presbyteries, and Synods. The Synod should not do the work of a Presbytery, nor a Presbytery of a session; much less should a Board be allowed to do the work of the Presbyteries. Every Presbytery should attend to the work of missions within its own bounds; the proper field for the Board was outside and beyond our ecclesiastical territories. It is its business to follow the emigrants to New Mexico, Utah, Dacotah, &c., with the missionary and the means of grace. Each Presbytery having performed what was necessary within its own borders, should send its surplus funds to a Central Committee, by which they should be used for missionary operations beyond the borders of the church, and to aid the feebler Presbyteries who need help to do the work within their own limits. 3. The Board system is not only wrong in principle, and inefficient in operation, but it fails to unite the church, and call forth its energies. We want, he said, to co-operate with you, but we must work apart if you insist on your present system. We want to operate through our Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assembly. Boards have no life in them. The Presbyteries do not feel any interest in the work of missions. They say the great Board in Philadelphia will attend to it. 4. It was strenuously urged on this side of the question, that the Boards were an incumbrance; that they did nothing; that they stood in the way between the Assembly and the Executive Committees, shielding the latter from direct responsibility to the church, and yet exercising no real inspection or control over them.

Dr. Thornwell took higher ground. He argued the question as one of principle, as involving radically different views, on the one side, and on the other, of the nature and powers of the church. His speeches on this subject were very long and very ardent. They are of course imperfectly reported, and we can only give the heads of his argument as presented in the public papers. 1. He insisted that God had laid down in the Scrip-

ture a form of church government, from which we are not at liberty to depart. We can neither add to it nor detract from it. We can no more create a new office, or a new organ for the church, than we can create a new article of faith, or a new precept for the moral law. It is not enough that a thing is not forbidden in the word of God, it must be expressly enjoined or implied by necessary inference. We must be able to plead a "Thus saith the Lord" for every organization or agency which we employ in carrying on the work of the church. We have "no discretionary power to create a new church court, or judicatory, or anything to stand in the place of, or to perform the duty which belongs to the church of God's creation and ordination." As Christ gave his church with its officers, courts, and laws, with a specific mission to accomplish in this apostate world, we cannot appoint another co-ordinate body to do the work which he appointed us to do. The General Assembly is the Board of Missions, the body which must be appealed to to do the work; Christ never authorized us to put it into other hands. 2. The powers which Christ has given his church cannot be transferred. She cannot impose her responsibilities on any other body. A Christian cannot pray or live a holy life by proxy. Congress cannot delegate its right of legislation to any organization of its own creation. It must itself make the laws. In like manner this General Assembly cannot transfer the power or the obligation to conduct the work of missions. It must be done by the Assembly itself. 3. It follows from these principles that the Boards are unscriptural. No one pretends that they are expressly enjoined in the Bible. It is not enough that they are not forbidden. Neither are they absolutely necessary to the exercise of the functions of the church. And if neither expressly commanded nor necessarily implied in the powers explicitly granted, they are absolutely unlawful. 4. That the Boards are thus uncommanded and unauthorized creations was argued because they are distinct organizations. They are bodies complete in themselves, with members, heads, and hands. They have their presidents, executive committees and other officers. They are therefore as complete self-acting organizations as our Presbyteries or Synods. The General Assembly, indeed, can either

review its action or dissolve them at its pleasure; but the same may be said of Presbyteries and Synods. 5. The existence of these Boards, therefore, is derogatory to the church, as implying that her divine constitution is not sufficient. They are an indignity to the great Head of the Church, as implying that he has not furnished her with an organization adequate to the work which he has given her to perform. 6. This discretionary power of the church, the principle that what was not forbidden is permitted, was the point of difference between the Puritans and the Church of England. Herber's idea was that the only limitation of the power of the church was the non-contradiction of the Bible; it does not forbid the liturgy, the sign of the cross, and kneeling at the Eucharist, therefore these things are right; while the Puritans contended they are not enjoined in the Bible, and an absence of a grant is a negation of the power. Our covenant fathers in Scotland fought for the same principle. 7. This is with us a *res adjudicata*. The General Assembly at Nashville refused to constitute a *Board* of Church Extension, but did constitute a *Committee* for that purpose, which had operated successfully. 8. Special objection was made to honorary or life members of these Boards. Although not allowed to vote, such members were entitled to meet with the Boards, and deliberate on all questions which come before them. Thus for money, any man can secure for himself or for another this position in the church, or in its organisms, for the conduct of the work of missions. This was represented as a great enormity. These, as far as we can gather from the report, were the principal heads of Dr. Thornwell's argument. The points made by the other speakers on the same side, were of course, with more or less prominence, made by him.

Dr. Spring and the Hon. Mr. Galloway made short and effective speeches, the one in reply to Dr. Smith, and the other in answer to Dr. Adger, and the debate was continued principally by Drs. Krebs, Boardman and Hodge. 1. It was shown that the assertion, that our Boards had a New England origin and were founded on expediency as distinguished from principle, is contrary to historical facts. The men who originated our Boards were not men of New England origin or imbued with New England ideas, but precisely the reverse. Our church from the be-

ginning had acted on the principle that the church itself was bound to preach the gospel to every creature; that this commission involved the duty and the authority to train men for the ministry, to send them forth, to sustain them in the field, and to furnish them with all the appliances requisite for the successful prosecution of their great object. This work the church cannot perform by its scattered members, nor by its regular judicatories meeting at long intervals and for short periods, and therefore there was a necessity for the appointment of distinct organizations for the accomplishment of the object. Hence the original Committee of Missions. But as the church enlarged, there was a call for a division of labour, and for more efficient arrangements. This gave rise to the formation of the Boards of Domestic Missions, Foreign Missions, Education, Publication, and Committee of Church Extension. These were the legitimate outgrowths of our own principles, and not foreign organisms engrafted into our system. 2. As to the principle that everything must be prescribed in the word of God as to the government and modes of operation of the church, or be unlawful, it was urged that no church ever existed that was organized on that principle. Every church that pleaded a *jus divinum* for its form of government, was content to claim divine authority for the essential elements of their system, while they claimed a discretionary power as to matters of detail and modes of operation; that it was absurd to do more than this with regard to our own system. The great principles of Presbyterianism are in the Bible; but it is preposterous to assert that our whole Book of Discipline is there. This would be to carry the theory of divine right beyond the limits even of the Old Testament economy, and make the gospel dispensation, designed for the whole world, more restricted and slavish than the Jewish, although it was designed for only one nation, and for a limited period. It was further urged, that this theory was utterly unscriptural, as the New Testament was far from exalting matters of government and external organization to the same level with matters of doctrine and morals. It was shown also to be an utterly impracticable and suicidal theory. If this doctrine were true, we could have no church-schools, nor academies, colleges, nor theological seminaries. No one pre-

tended to claim for these an explicit "Thus saith the Lord." The work of missions on this theory would be impracticable, for it would be impossible to carry it out among heathen converts. The church must have freedom to adapt herself to the varying circumstances in which she is called to act. The great objection, however, to this new and extreme doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with our Christian liberty, our liberty of conscience. It inevitably leads to the imposition of human ordinances as the commandments of God. The inferences which one draws from Scripture bind him, but they have no authority for others. It is not only revolting, but ridiculous, to say that the Bible forbids a Board and commands a Committee; that to organize the one is rebellion, while to constitute the other is obedience. And finally, as to this point, it was shown that every objection urged on this high *jus divinum* theory against the Boards, bears with equal force against Committees. The one is no more enjoined than the other. The one can be just as well inferred as the other. We have a work to do, and it is admitted that we are to adopt the best means for doing it. If we think a Board better, we may take that; if we think a Committee better, we may take that. There is as much a transfer of authority in the one case as in the other. A Committee is just as much an organization, acting of itself after the appointing body ceases to exist, as a Board. The only difference between the Committee of Church Extension and the Board of Missions is, that the one consists of some eighty or ninety members, the other of thirty or forty. To make this difference a matter of vital principle, a question of divine right, the dividing line between rebellion and obedience, is utterly unreasonable. But if it should be admitted that there is some minute difference in principle between such a Committee as that of Church Extension and a Board, what was to be said of the Boards of our Theological Seminaries? No objection is made to them, and yet they stand in the same relation to the Assembly as the Board of Missions. If the one is an organization outside the church, so are the others. If the one has delegated powers, so have the others. If the one is forbidden, so must the others be. It is plain that this principle of divine prescription for every detail, cannot be, and is not carried out. 3. Dr.

Boardman, with marked ability and effect, referred to our standards, and to the modest and moderate language therein employed, as utterly inconsistent with this extreme high-church doctrine. Our fathers were content with claiming that our system is "agrecable with Scripture," and never assume an explicit divine prescription for all its details.

4. If the matter is viewed in the light of expediency, the argument is not less decisive against any radical change. Such change without any imperative necessity would itself be a great evil. It would be an inconsistency. After having for years contended not only for the lawfulness, but the necessity of Boards, for us now to cast them aside would be a dishonour to those who have gone before us, and utterly inconsistent with proper respect for the dignity of the church. The Boards have been signally owned and blessed by the great Head of the church, and made the means of incalculable good. The objection that certain Presbyteries do not coöperate with our present organizations, is met by the fact that those who dissent on the ground of principle are a very small minority, such as must be expected to exist in any free church under any system of operation; and as to efficiency it is enough that the Presbyteries which coöperate most liberally with the Board of Missions are precisely those which do most to promote the work of missions within their own borders. To throw our weak Presbyteries, covering immense districts of thinly populated parts of the country, on their own efforts, and to confine the central committee to the region beyond our ecclesiastical limits, would be virtually to give up the work altogether, and to abandon the growing parts of the country to irreligion or to the labours of other denominations. The objection that the Boards are a mere incumbrance, a useless intervention between the executive committees, and the General Assembly, is met by saying: 1. That these Boards, consisting of members widely scattered, serve to increase interest and responsibility in the work. 2. They can be called together on emergency for consultation and direction when the Assembly is not in session. They can meet and spend days in the examination of records and sifting out evils or errors which an Assembly of three hundred members could not possibly do. Occasions have

occurred and must be expected to occur more or less frequently when, in absence of such Boards, the Assembly would be obliged to create them *pro re nata*. The large size of these bodies instead of being an objection is a decided and great advantage. It is not necessary that all the members should attend every meeting. It is enough that they can be called together on emergencies. It is very inexpedient that every thing should be in the hands of a few men in Philadelphia, New York, or Louisville. If unwise measures are adopted, if personal likes and dislikes, or sectional feeling, should be found to influence the action of the members living in or near the seat of operations, a general summons of the Board can correct the evil. This has happened already. It is illustrated in other cases. Had the Bible Society been in the hands of a few men in New York, the Society would have been ruined. It was by appealing to a wider constituency that that great Institution was saved. The same is true with regard to the Tract Society, and may prove true with regard to the Sunday-School Union. It is not safe to entrust such interests to a few hands; and although we have a safeguard in the supervision of the Assembly, yet as that body meets only once a year, first in one place, and then in another; as it is cumbered with so much other business, and sits for so short a time, it is eminently wise not to have the supervision of all the five great benevolent operations of the church centralized and monopolized by that body. We might as well abolish all the Boards of Directors of our Theological Seminaries and impose the work of supervision and direction on the Assembly. It is enough that the supreme power over these Boards is invested in our highest court; the power of appointment, supervision, and control. The stockholders of no railroad or bank in the country undertake the direct supervision of the executive officers at their annual meeting. They all find it necessary to confide that supervision to a board of directors. And when such institution is a state or national concern, those directors are never chosen from any one place or neighbourhood. These are the common-sense and scriptural principles on which the Boards have been constituted, and which have secured for them the general confidence of the church.

The overwhelming vote by which the Assembly declared any organic change in these institutions inexpedient, and the withdrawing of Dr. Thornwell's protest against that vote, on the adoption of the slight modifications suggested by Dr. Krebs, give ground to hope that the policy of the church in this matter will not be again called into question.

Dr. McGill.

Dr. Krebs moved that Dr. McGill be requested to address the Assembly with regard to the remark made by Dr. Thornwell, a day or two ago, about the disagreement between Drs. McGill and Hodge on the subject of Church Government.

Dr. McGill said—It is true that Dr. Thornwell had authority to say that I agree with his doctrines of Presbyterianism. They are substantially my theory of Presbyterianism. But I have no sympathy with this agitation with regard to Boards. On the other hand, I do not discard the theories of Dr. Hodge; on the contrary, I endorse them entirely, and circulate them among my pupils. With regard to the "Divine right" of Presbyterianism, I probably go farther than Dr. Hodge, but not so far as Dr. Thornwell. But an article has appeared in the *Princeton Review*, on the Eldership, to which I am opposed. If Dr. Hodge endorses it, we differ, and that is the first point of divergence. But what of that? Do you expect men to agree on all points? When I first went to Princeton, six years ago, Dr. Hodge took me by the hand, and he has given me his aid and counsel ever since. There is perfect harmony among the Professors at Princeton. There always has been, and I believe there always will be, as long as the present Professors remain together. What!—I at enmity with Dr. Hodge!—I had rather go to Africa, and die there, than live in a state of alienation from my beloved brother, Dr. Hodge.

Board of Domestic Missions.

The following is an abstract of the Annual Report of the Board, from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860.

Missions.—The number of missionaries in commission March 1, 1859, was 408, to which have been added to March 1, 1860,

283, making the whole number 691, and more by 91 than the year previous. The number of churches and missionary stations wholly or in part supplied, (as far as reported by our missionaries,) is 1179. The number of newly organized churches is 53. The number of admissions on examination is 2665, and on certificate, 2113; making a total of admissions of 4778. The number in communion with churches connected with the Board is 28,107. The number of Sabbath-schools is 429; of teachers, 3460; and of scholars, 22,035. The number of baptisms is 3197.

Appropriations.—The appropriations made to our missionaries from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, have been, at the office in Philadelphia, \$75,011.57; at the office in Louisville, \$48,580.58, and on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, at New Orleans, \$2212.50; making a total of \$125,804.65. The appropriations made to our missionaries from March 1, 1858, to March 1, 1859, were, at the office in Philadelphia, \$58,360.17, and at the office in Louisville, \$36,116.66; making a total of \$94,476.83. From this statement it appears that the appropriations made at the office in Philadelphia were greater than those made the year before, by \$16,651.40, and at the office in Louisville they were more by \$12,463.92; thus making the total appropriations this year, including those made on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, greater than the year preceding by \$31,327.82. For the purpose of further comparison, we may state that the *average* appropriations made during the preceding seven years, from 1852 to 1859, were, at the office in Philadelphia, \$51,062.17, and at the office in Louisville, \$31,896.88; making a total average of \$82,959.05. From this statement it appears that the appropriations made from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, at the office in Philadelphia, exceeded the average of the seven previous years, by \$23,949.40, and at the office in Louisville, \$16,683.70; thus making a total excess of appropriations this year, including those made on behalf of the South-western Advisory Committee, above the average appropriations of the seven preceding years, \$42,845.60.

Receipts.—The total amount of receipts from all sources from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, is 118,904.21, to which

add balances on hand in the different treasuries March 1, 1859, \$28,422.19; making the available resources of the Board during the year \$147,326.40. The amount paid out at the office in Philadelphia, including the Presbyterian treasuries, was \$100,318.74; at the office in Louisville, \$13,554.12; and at the office in New Orleans, \$3542.25; making the total amount of payments during the year, \$117,415.11; leaving in all the treasuries, on the 1st of March, 1860, \$29,911.29, which is a greater sum by \$1489.10, than that reported on the 1st of March, 1859. The amount due the missionaries at the same date was \$15,514.87; leaving a balance to meet appropriations already made, and accruing next year, of \$14,396.42. Even of this comparatively small balance a considerable portion cannot be appropriated by the Board to the general field, as it is held by the South-western Advisory Committee, for disbursement within the field assigned to them. The aggregate receipts from March 1, 1859, to March 1, 1860, have been greater, as compared with the receipts from March 1, 1858, to March 1, 1859, \$19,231.18. The increase has been, in individual or special donations and legacies, \$13,052.24, and in contributions of the churches, \$6178.94. The receipts at the office in Philadelphia, including the Presbyterian treasuries, were greater by \$10,861.43, and were less at the office in Louisville by \$4708.66.

New Missions.—During the year, the Board have established new missions in various sections of our country. They have also, to the extent of their ability, reinforced missionaries in the newer States and Territories. One missionary has been added to the number in California, one to Connecticut, two to Florida, four to Georgia, seventeen to Illinois, six to Indiana, one to Iowa, five to Kansas, four to Kentucky, two to Maryland, seventeen to Missouri, two to Nebraska, four to New Jersey, six to New York, three to North Carolina, three to Ohio, two to Oregon, eight to Pennsylvania, three to Texas, four to Virginia, two to Washington Territory, and four to Wisconsin. The Board have also commissioned one missionary in Massachusetts, and one in Dakotah Territory. The number of missionaries in Alabama has been reduced two, in Arkansas one, in Louisiana one, in Mississippi two, and in South Caro-

lina four; and the two missionaries who were last year reported in Rhode Island have left the State. Thus we have a total increase of *ninety-one* missionaries.

Clothing.—Clothing valued at \$17,295.86 has been received during the year, and distributed among the missionaries who needed it. Of this amount, \$13,289.72 was received at the office in Philadelphia; \$2331.48 at the office in Louisville; and \$1514.66 at the depot in Pittsburgh, and \$160 at the office in New Orleans.

Board of Foreign Missions.

The Hon. Walter Lowrie, one of the Secretaries, gave a general review of the missionary work.

1. The great field of *India*.—The country yet feels the effects of the mutiny. There is, however, an increased attention to religious subjects on the part of the natives. Instances are not uncommon of the conversion of Brahmins and Moham-medans; and there are instances of the conversion of distinguished native chiefs. As to the losses of our Board in India, it will take time to make them up. It will be a gradual work; labour is high, and material scarce. The British government will do something toward repairing our loss, but nothing of consequence. Eighteen thousand dollars have been given for this special purpose.

2. *China*.—There are eighteen provinces or states in China. An immense population; and among such a population we can do but little. Our missions occupy three provinces, namely: Canton, in Canton province; Shanghai, in Keongsoo; Ningpo, on the Keong. The first-mentioned has a population of nineteen millions; the second thirty-seven millions; and the third twenty-six millions—making a population of eighty-two millions of souls. Printing-presses are wanting for the purpose of printing editions of the Bible and Testament in the language of the natives; and there is no danger of the destruction of these books by the people, as they universally respect sacred writings, and lay them up in their temples. The Bible is, therefore, safe among them. Some friends in New York have given twenty-five thousand dollars for the purpose of purchasing presses for printing the Bible. We need one hundred thousand New Testa-

ments, requiring three years and a half to produce them; and fifty thousand Bibles, which it will require four years to print. The difficulties between the Chinese and English have interrupted the facilities for missionary labour. He here referred to a most interesting work of grace, as the result of the labours of our missionaries at Ningpo. For a full account of this work, he would refer the brethren to that part of the Annual Report.

3. *California*.—This mission is connected with the China mission. There is but one missionary of the Board in California, (Mr. Loomis,) who has been lately sent out. He finds as much as he can do, and with many discouragements, is well received by the Chinese in that State. The Board is very much indebted to Drs. Scott and Anderson for the aid and countenance which they have given to the mission; but especially to a ruling elder of the Calvary Church, San Francisco, now present in the Assembly; and he had great pleasure in having this opportunity to present to Mr. Roberts the warmest thanks of the Board.

4. *Japan* gives every indication of being a difficult and discouraging field, requiring much faith and patience from the church and missionaries. He then referred to the embassy from Japan now in this country, and the invincible prejudices of the people against strangers, which this embassy might have a tendency to remove.

5. *Siam*.—The Annual Report states this field to be, first, wide open for missionary enterprise; but hard and difficult, and requiring great labour, great patience, and great faith. Secondly, as the seat and the head-quarters, the stronghold of Buddhism. But he referred the Assembly to Mr. Mattoon, a missionary returned to this country, and present in the Assembly, who would address them upon the subject.

After speaking in detail of all the missionary stations, he concluded with a statement and brief illustration of some general principles.

1. There is but one agency in the church for Foreign Missions, but many blessed agencies at home. The Board of Foreign Missions ought, therefore, to receive a greater support. Not that he wanted to take anything from the other Boards,

but for the salvation of those there are many agencies at work—Domestic Missions, Educational Societies, the Boards of Publication, and Church Extension, Theological Seminaries, Male and Female Schools, Bible and Tract Societies, Sunday-school Union—but only one agency used by the church to send the gospel to the heathen. We are giving twenty-five dollars at home for every dollar we give for the foreign cause. This calculation is made on the ground that the population is the same, whereas the population of the foreign field vastly exceeds the home population.

2. The cause of Foreign Missions cannot stand still. If you do not go forward, you must go backward. It is such a work as must be carried on in all its parts. The Mission work is: 1. To preach; 2. To translate and print the Scriptures; 3. To raise up a native agency. It requires much study to translate, and if you do not print, this labour is lost. You have learned missionaries who are engaged in translating the Bible; and, this being done, then it is to be printed. But we have no money to print with; and when we ask it from the churches, they reply—"The missionaries are doing very well, and we cannot give money for this purpose." How comes it that this large church does so little? One-half of the churches do nothing. He was aware that many of these were struggling for their own existence. But cannot they do something to connect themselves with this great cause? Is there no way to reach these brethren? Tens of thousands of heathen are perishing every year. In view of the passing away and perishing of the nations of heathendom, Mr. Lowrie stated the fact, that the Chinese have a remarkable respect for their parents. A converted Chinese, when told of the perishing state of the heathen without the gospel, immediately inquired of the missionary, with great distress—"What has become of our parents?"

3. The Missionary work is a work of faith. This proposition the speaker illustrated by stating that our foreign missionaries were obtained from all parts of the church, and must have confidence in one another—the church have confidence in the missionaries, and the missionaries confidence in the church. The missionaries send a calculation to the Board of what their probable wants will be for the year; and then the Board makes

a calculation of the amount which the church will probably put at their disposal, and sends the missionaries promises accordingly. It is faith all around. We have sent them word this year that we will expend \$240,000. We *must* have it, and do it. In this connection he made an affecting allusion to our martyred missionaries, first in the China seas, which terrible calamity had inflicted a wound which had not yet ceased to bleed; and then in India, a providence which required great faith in God. A mother of one of the martyred missionaries said, "I have another son to send to India;" and a brother then pursuing his study in one of our Theological Seminaries, said, "I am ready to go and take the place of the murdered." Reference was made to the native Christians in India, who chose death rather than deny the Lord Jesus. We were afraid of the native ministers, but they proved faithful. The missionary brethren have since that time gone on with more faith.

Board of Education.

Dr. Boardman, chairman of the Committee, presented the report.

The number of *new* Candidates received during the year is 181; making in all from the beginning (in 1819) 2952; the whole number on the roll during the past year is 492; increase during the previous year (1859) 141; excess in favour of the present year (1860) 40; excess of the aggregate of this year over that of last year 101.

It should, however, be stated in this connection that the present year overruns the last by ten days; and that during this period the number of new students has been increased by ten or twelve.

State of the Treasury.—Total receipts of the year from all sources \$71,132.39; total receipts of the Candidates' Fund \$64,637.19; increase of this fund over last year \$12,559.27; balance in this fund \$12,105.38; total receipts from all sources in School and College Fund \$7537.84; balance in this Fund \$239.62.

After the adoption of the usual resolution, the Rev. Mr. Watts who, since the illness of Dr. Van Rensselaer, has discharged the duties of the office with great acceptance, addressed

the Assembly at length. Subsequently, Dr. Boardman read the following letter written in the name of the Assembly, to the Rev. Dr. Van Rensselaer, now lying dangerously ill. The letter was heard in the midst of tearful silence, and adopted by all the members rising from their seats.

TO THE REV. CORTLANDT VAN RENSSELAER, D. D.

Beloved Brother in Christ Jesus:—The General Assembly has learned, with deep solicitude, of the afflictive dispensation which detains you from its present sessions. It has pleased Him whose “way is in the sea, and his path in the great waters,” to visit you with a painful illness. We cannot permit you to suppose that the church which you have loved and served so well is unmindful of you in this season of trial. And we should do injustice to ourselves, not to assure you of our united and cordial sympathy.

We are well aware, that one who feels himself drawing near to eternity, and around whose couch of suffering the light of that “better country” is shedding its heavenly radiance, can stand in no need of earthly consolations. Nor would we offend your Christian humility by enlarging upon the services you have rendered to the cause of Christ. But we may, nay, we must, magnify the grace of God in you, which has wrought so effectually to the furtherance of the gospel amongst us, through your instrumentality. We cannot accept your resignation of the important office you have just relinquished, without bearing our formal and grateful testimony to the manner in which its duties have been performed. With devout thankfulness to God, and under him, beloved brother, to you, we record our sense of the eminent wisdom, fidelity and efficiency, and the noble, disinterested liberality with which you have for fourteen years conducted the affairs of our “BOARD OF EDUCATION.” Under your administration it has risen from a condition of comparative feebleness to strength and power. Its plans have been matured and systematized. Its sphere has been greatly enlarged. It has assumed new and most beneficent functions. Your luminous pen has vindicated the principles which lie at the basis of true Christian education. And by your numerous publications, your sermons and addresses, your extended cor-

respondence, and your self-denying activity in visiting every part of the church, you have, by God's blessing, accomplished a great work in elevating this sacred cause to its just position, and gathering around it the sympathies of our whole communion. Nor may we forbear to add, that in prosecuting these manifold official labours, you have greatly endeared yourself personally to the ministry and membership of the church.

Rejoicing as we do in the auspicious results of these unwearied exertions, we mourn this day the sacrifice they have cost us. While the church is reaping the harvest—a harvest which we fully believe she will go on gathering until the Master comes to present her unto himself, a glorious church—the workman, who has done so much to prepare the ground and sow the seed, falls exhausted in the furrows. There, dear brother, we doubt not you would choose to fall—upon that field, to the culture of which you had dedicated your life.

On behalf of the church we represent, we once more thank you sincerely and gratefully, for all your labours and sacrifices. We lift up our hearts in humble and fervent supplication to our common GOD and FATHER, that his presence may be with you in this hour of trial. We hear with joy that he does not forget you; that he is giving you strength according to your day; and that your peace flows like a river. We plead with him that if it be possible, this blow may still be averted, and your health restored. But we desire to commit you into his hands. That Saviour in whom you trust, will not forsake you. The Divine Comforter will comfort you and *yours*. Your covenant God will be the God of your children.

To Him, the TRIUNE JEHOVAH, we affectionately commend you—praying that his rod and his staff may comfort you, and that whenever the summons shall come, an entrance may be ministered unto you abundantly, into the everlasting kingdom of our LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST.

On behalf of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church, in session at Rochester, N. Y., May 23, 1860.

JOHN W. YEOMANS, *Moderator*.

WILLIS LORD, *Stated Clerk*.

ALEXANDER T. MCGILL, *Permanent Clerk*.

A. G. VERMILYE, *Temporary Clerk*.

[Signed also by the whole Assembly.]

While the members were still standing, Dr. Spring, at the request of the Moderator, led the Assembly in prayer. Few members of the house ever witnessed a more solemn scene. It is the greatest honour ever rendered by our church to one of her servants. It was rendered with the full assent and consent of every heart. It was a tribute spontaneously granted to goodness, disinterestedness, humility, and fidelity. A well-deserved tribute, as grateful to those who were permitted to offer it as to the honoured servant of God to whom it was rendered. The whole church seemed to stand weeping around his bed, and saying, "Well done good and faithful servant, enter now into the joy of thy Lord."

Board of Publication.

Rev. Dr. Krebs presented the Report of the Committee to whom the Annual Report of the Board of Publication was referred.

The progress of the Board during the past year has been most cheering. In every branch of its operations it has been largely in advance of the preceding year, and nearly every item of its statistics shows larger results than in any former year of its existence. The temporary effect which the commercial embarrassments of the country during the years 1857-59 had upon the receipts and sales of the Board in common with nearly every Publishing House in the country, has passed away, leaving its affairs in a more prosperous and hopeful state than ever.

Total number of copies of books and tracts published by the Board since its organization, 8,790,188.

This exhibits the largest number of *new* books and tracts ever issued in one year, as well as the largest *aggregate* of publications by 141,000 copies.

The total of distribution is as follows:

Sales of volumes at the depository,	-	-	-	241,050
Sales of volumes by colporteurs,	-	-	-	124,638
Given by colporteurs,	-	-	-	14,920
Granted by the Executive Committee,	-	-	-	6,101

Total of volumes distributed, 386,709

which is an increase of 54,712 volumes on the distribution of the previous year.

The distribution of pages of tracts has been as follows:

Sales at the depository,	-	.	-	-	-	869,405
Distributed by colporteurs,	-	-	-	-	-	2,162,594
Granted by the Executive Committee,	-	-	-	-	-	413,222

Total pages of tracts distributed, 3,445,221

being an increase of 389,770 pages in the distribution over the year before.

The Treasurer's account shows an aggregate of receipts of \$125,394.45, an increase of \$15,854.74 over last year. The expenditures have amounted to \$126,033.04, an increase of \$18,472.02. Cash received from sales of books, tracts and periodicals, \$93,851.72, an increase of \$11,620.27 over last year, and the largest amount the Board has ever received from these sources in any one year.

Rev. Dr. Schenck, Secretary of the Board, followed with a lucid and impressive exhibition of the progress of the work; showing the efficiency, economy, and usefulness of its operations, explaining the system on which its business is conducted, showing that the publications of this Board are as cheap and well made as those of any other concern. He took up some books published by the Board and similar books by private publishers and publishing societies, showing that *this* Board's books are generally 25 per cent. cheaper than others.

Church Extension.

The Rev. Dr. S. J. Baird read the report of the Committee on Church Extension, recommending the work to the increased support of the church; changing the name from "Committee" to "Board," without any organic change in the body, and continuing its present immediate responsibility to the General Assembly. It was suggested that the change of the name would give the cause a higher place in the public estimation: and also prevent confusion arising from the fact that the New School Assembly has a "Committee" with the same objects in view.

The following is an abstract of the Report:

The present year's report names 617 contributing churches, against 565 specified last year, and records an increase in

receipts of \$6197.62. While an unusually large proportion of the receipts were special donations, showing rather what the church is doing in this department, than the amount at the disposal of the Committee, still, after these are deducted, the sum received for general purposes is somewhat larger than that received in any former year. The number of appropriations reported is 85, against 76 reported last year; and the amount appropriated is \$10,603.72 greater than during the previous twelve months. The amount paid 90 churches this year is \$11,106.43 greater than the amount paid 76 churches last year.

The year closed with one hundred applications on file and undisposed of, calling for \$43,000. None of these were in a condition to be acted upon by the Committee immediately, but a large number of them will, probably, soon furnish the necessary information.

During the year five applications, calling for \$6000, were declined, chiefly for want of means to respond to them.

The appropriated balance in the Treasury of the Church Extension Committee, April 1, 1859, was \$14,795.34.

The receipts from all sources from April 1, 1859, to April 1, 1860, were \$35,440.01. Of this sum \$26,505.63 was from churches, and \$2223.33 from legacies. The available means of the year were therefore \$50,335.35.

The expenditures of the year as shown by the Treasurer's statement appended to this report, were \$34,749.64, leaving in the Treasury April 2, 1860, an appropriated balance of \$15,585.71. There were, however, unpaid at that date, appropriations to fifty-three churches amounting to \$17,825.61. The liabilities of the Committee, therefore, exceed their means on hand at the close of the fifth fiscal year.

The Rev. Mr. Coe, Secretary of the Committee, made a strong statement and appeal in behalf of this work, showing that *one-third* of the organized churches of the Assembly actually need help to build or improve, and this is saying nothing of unoccupied fields to which aid ought to be extended forthwith.

Father Chiniquy's Mission.

Rev. W. M. Scott, D. D., presented and read a memorial from the Presbytery of Chicago, on the wonderful work of grace in the colony of French Canadians in Kankakee county, Illinois. This memorial was referred to a Special Committee, of which Dr. Atwater was Chairman, who subsequently presented an interesting report, which was adopted, and ordered to be printed in the Appendix to the Minutes. One evening was set apart to the consideration of this subject, on which occasion Father Chiniquy addressed the Assembly, and gave a most affecting account of the history and progress of this extraordinary work of God. Several thousands of Canadians have removed to the State of Illinois. These colonies have been visited by Dr. Willis Lord and Dr. Scott, commissioners from the Presbytery of Chicago, who bear the fullest testimony to the reality and power of this religious movement. Owing to successive failures of the crops in all that region of country, the colonists have been reduced to the greatest extremities, and are still in great straits. Three thousand dollars were raised or pledged by members of the Assembly, in answer to Father Chiniquy's appeal; and the Assembly earnestly recommended to the churches under its care to make contributions for the relief of these suffering converts from Romanism.

Revised Book of Discipline.

Dr. Thornwell presented the Book of Discipline, as revised and corrected by the Committee appointed for that purpose. His report was accepted and printed, and copies of the Book were distributed among the members. The discussion of the subject did not come on until towards the end of the session. It was soon found that the diversity of opinion as to some important features of the new Book was so great, that time could not be secured for its satisfactory consideration. Before any vote was taken on any proposed amendments, it was resolved to recommit the Book to the same Committee, with additions, and direct them to report to the next Assembly. This delay seemed unavoidable, and is perhaps not to be regretted. The prejudice excited against the Book, on account of some of its features, is passing away; and it is to be hoped

that its merits will, in the course of another year, be so generally recognized as to secure for it the cordial adoption of the next General Assembly.

Theological Seminaries.

Rev. Dr. Spring, Chairman of the Committee on Theological Seminaries, reported that the several institutions under the care of the Assembly were in a prosperous condition. The report recommended, that agreeably to the request of the Board of Directors, a Professor should be elected to the chair vacated by the death of the Rev. J. Addison Alexander, in the Theological Seminary at Princeton; and also that a fifth Professor be chosen to take part of the duties now resting on Dr. McGill in that institution. There was no real objection made to granting this request for a fifth Professor. Some of the brethren said that it was well to consider the matter before it was decided, because if the corps of teachers was increased in one Seminary, it must ultimately be done in all the others, and thus an increasing demand on the ministers and resources of the church would be made. Dr. Hodge spoke in favour of the measure, and said:

Mr. Moderator, there is no indelicacy in my addressing the Assembly on this subject. We are seeking no personal object. We have full confidence in the members of this house. As this is a court of Jesus Christ, it must be assumed to be governed by his Spirit. Its members, I doubt not, will act not from personal or sectional motives, but from considerations which they can present before the eyes of their Divine Master.

Princeton claims no superiority. We cheerfully admit that all our Seminaries stand on the same level, and should be treated on precisely the same principles. And, therefore, whenever any Seminary appears here by its authorized representatives, and says that it cannot discharge its duties to the church without additional aid, not a friend of Princeton will hesitate to vote that it should be granted.

There are two things, indeed, which give Princeton a special hold on the feelings of the church. The one is that she is Alma Mater of some two thousand five hundred preachers of the gospel. That is her crown. As it is impossible that a

son should fail to look with tenderness and respect on the face of his mother, so it is impossible that the Alumni of Princeton should not regard that Institution with peculiar affection. A matron surrounded by her children grown to maturity, and filling stations of usefulness, must be the object of feelings which a blooming maiden cannot excite. The maiden may be more attractive and more promising, but she is not the mother of children. The other thing is, that Princeton is on the frontier of our church. Our other seminaries are safe in the interior. We stand on the borders in near proximity to the great institutions, Andover and Union Seminary in New York. Unless Princeton is able to stand erect by the side of those Seminaries, and present equal facilities for a thorough theological training, we shall lose our young men; our most promising students will be educated outside of our church. This would be a calamity not to Princeton only, but to the church at large.

But, Mr. Moderator, this is not the main ground on which we rest her application for a fifth Professor. We are unable without additional assistance properly to cultivate the field assigned to us. Princeton has been prostrated in the dust. We come to you to beg you to raise us up. In the death of Joseph Addison Alexander we have lost our great glory and defence.

Permit me, Mr. Moderator, to express my own individual convictions. I regard Dr. Joseph Addison Alexander as incomparably the greatest man I ever knew—as incomparably the greatest man our church has ever produced. His intellect was majestic not only in its greatness, but in its harmonious proportions. No faculty was in excess, and none was in defect. His understanding, imagination, and memory, were alike wonderful. Everything was equally easy to him. Nothing he ever did seemed to reveal half his power. His attainments in classical, oriental, and modern languages and literature were almost unexampled. His stores of biblical, historical, and antiquarian knowledge seemed inexhaustible. To all these talents and attainments were added great force of character, power over the minds of men, and a peculiar facility in imparting knowledge. His thorough orthodoxy, his fervent

piety, humility, faithfulness in the discharge of his duties, and reverence for the word of God, consecrated all his other gifts. His complete mastery of every form of modern infidelity enabled him to vindicate the Scriptures as with authority. He glorified the word of God in the sight of his pupils beyond what any other man I ever knew had the power of doing. Princeton is not what it was, and can never expect to be what it has been. You cannot fill his place. The only compensation for such a loss is the presence of the Spirit of God.

The department of New Testament Literature and Biblical Greek, to which this extraordinary man consecrated his life, and which he felt called for all his time and efforts, is vacant. You must put some one into it, to do what he can.

But when you have done that, Dr. McGill remains burdened with the duties of two complete departments—the Pastoral and Historical. This is more than the most robust man can bear. Justice to him and to the Institution therefore requires that a fifth Professor should be appointed to share his duties. Full provision has been made for the support of the new Professor. The church will be asked for no contributions, and the finances of the Institution will not be burdened. I am sure, Mr. Moderator, under these circumstances, the request of the Board of Directors will be cheerfully granted.

The Rev. Dr. Adger said he could not conceive on what ground the Assembly should hesitate to grant the request of the Directors of Princeton Seminary. Grant that it will place Princeton at a vantage over the other Seminaries; if it will advance the cause, why should it not be so? He had no objection to it. If theological education is costly, let it be; everything good is costly, and he had no idea of keeping Princeton, or any other Seminary that was favoured with the means, from being placed in the very highest position favourable to success. He could not see on what ground the Assembly could refuse. The funds were forthcoming; no demand to be made upon the people or the churches, and he trusted the request would be promptly and cordially voted.

The request of the Board for a fifth Professor was granted *nemine contradicente*. With the same unanimity a fifth Professor was granted to the Western Theological Seminary at

Allegheny, at the request of the Directors of that Institution. In accordance with these resolutions, the Rev. Dr. Palmer was elected to the chair of Pastoral Theology and Sacred Rhetoric, and the Rev. Caspar Wistar Hodge to that of New Testament Literature and Biblical Greek in the Seminary at Princeton. The Rev. William M. Paxton was elected as Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in the Western Theological Seminary. The Rev. Joseph T. Smith, D. D., was elected Professor of Pastoral Theology and Church Government in the Seminary at Danville. All these elections were unanimous. With the same unanimity the Assembly confirmed the election of the Rev. Dr. Peck as Professor in the Union Seminary in Virginia.

The following resolutions in relation to the death of Dr. Addison Alexander, presented by Rev. William M. Paxton, were unanimously adopted:

1. *Resolved*, That we record our devout gratitude to the great King and Head of the church for his great favour in raising up and continuing to us for so many years, one so eminently gifted and qualified by such a rich variety of powers and acquirements for the work of training a ministry for the church.

2. *Resolved*, That whilst we bow in humble submission to the sovereign hand of God, we cannot forbear to express our deep sorrow under the inscrutable dispensation which has deprived the Seminary of a sound, faithful, experienced and eminently learned Professor, the church of an eloquent herald of the gospel, an able defender of the faith, a wise and skilful expounder of the truth as it is in Jesus, and the world of a noble mind, a potent pen, a praying voice, a great heart to feel for its sorrows, and a ready will to relieve its woes.

3. *Resolved*, That whilst we express our high estimate of the distinguished ability and rare erudition with which he enriched his professional instructions, and our deep appreciation of the industry and self-sacrifice with which he devoted himself to the great end of the church's mission in the world, we feel cheered by the tokens of the Divine favour which attended his life and crowned his death. And we hereby record our thankfulness for the grace which made his dying moments a testimony to the efficacy of the Christian's hope, and his memory an incen-

tive to follow after, if "that we also may apprehend that for which we are apprehended of Christ Jesus."

4. *Resolved*, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to the family of the deceased.

Cumberland Presbyterian Church.

Overture No. 33, proposing to appoint a delegate, and to open correspondence with the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church.

The overture stated that they have received overtures from the Cumberland Presbyterian church, through individuals, expressing a wish to have correspondence with this Assembly. The Committee recommend that a delegate be appointed to the General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church.

Rev. Dr. Edgar said this measure met with his hearty approbation; indeed, he had recommended that this step be taken, and he was glad it had been proposed. That body had sprung from us; they had become a highly energetic, respectable, earnest, and in the main, orthodox body. Their General Assembly were probably at this moment meeting in his place.

A motion to docket the overture was made and lost. The House called loudly for adoption.

Rev. Dr. Scott, of San Francisco, said he only asked leave to say that it would be exceedingly gratifying to him if this measure prevails; the proposal recalled to him early and very dear associations, for he once was of them, and it was in his heart to say much, and give some account of this large branch of our brethren; but, as he saw the Assembly was anxious to adopt the Report, he would not detain them.

Rev. Dr. William Brown—It was not his purpose to offer an argument, but he could not allow the occasion to pass without giving some expression to the satisfaction and joy with which he should vote for this important motion. It is surely a movement in the right way, and, he trusted, a token for good. The true unity of the church, we should remember, was, and is an object dear to the Saviour, and should be so to all his followers. We cannot, dare not, sacrifice any principle; nor does a proposal of this kind at all bring in peril any part of our testi-

mony to the truth of God. But whatever may be wisely, safely done to increase that unity, or to manifest more conspicuously to the world the measure of it already existing, are we not plainly, sacredly bound to welcome and adopt? Especially did he say, and from the bottom of his heart, that it is right, wise, and pleasing in the sight of God, and good for us all to do whatever we righteously may, to bind together the whole Presbyterian family, holding in common as it does, in all its branches, and notwithstanding acknowledged and important differences, so much precious truth both of doctrine and of order. Let us all, sir, be united more and more heart to heart, and then shall we see more eye to eye.

He did rejoice in the persuasion that these sentiments—these feelings are wide-spread, and growing fast. To the providence of God, and the shedding forth of his Spirit it is due, and to his name be all the praise. This action proposed may be all that is practicable now, but there are others of the great Presbyterian name, to which he hoped, to which he knew the hearts of many are turned, and to which he could not doubt there will soon be extended, in sincerity and brotherly love, a similar invitation.

The overture was adopted.

Dr. Baird nominated Rev. Dr. Edgar as delegate to the next General Assembly of the Cumberland Presbyterian church, and the Rev. Dr. McMullen as his alternate, who were unanimously appointed.

Province of the Church.

Several memorials had been referred to the Committee of Bills and Overtures relating to Colonization, Temperance, the Slave trade, and Slavery, in reference to which the Committee recommended the adoption of the following resolution, viz.

Resolved, While the General Assembly on the one hand disclaim all right to interfere in secular matters, and on the other, assert the right and duty of the church as God's witness on earth, to bear testimony in favour of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrine and sin, wherever professed or committed, yet, in view of the repeated action of the Assembly in

reference to the subjects above referred to, it is inexpedient to take any further action in reference thereto.

More apprehension was felt in reference to this subject than any other which was expected to come before the Assembly. The ground understood to be taken last year at Indianapolis, was that the church was bound to restrict her deliverances to her own members, and to matters under her own control; that organizations outside of her pale, however objectionable or praiseworthy, could be neither recommended nor objected to; and the action of the state, however inconsistent with the word of God, could not be testified against. The repeated action of the church inconsistent with this principle, it was understood, was pronounced to be unwarranted and wrong. Very great and very general dissatisfaction was excited by this new doctrine concerning the right and duty of the church. It was felt that this would put a muzzle over her lips, and forbid her exercising one of her highest and most important prerogatives. It was also seen that if it was once admitted, that it was wrong for the church now to bear her testimony for or against anything not pertaining to her own action, or the faith and practice of her own members, all her past deliverances of this kind, which still stand as her testimony, must be expunged from her records; that everything she ever uttered on Bible Societies, Colonization, Temperance, Slavery, or the Slave-trade, must be recalled. It is now clear that the advocates of what was regarded as a new and revolutionary doctrine, and that the action of the last Assembly, had been misapprehended. The above resolution, which distinctly asserts the right and duty of the church, as God's witness on earth, to bear her testimony in favour of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrine and sin, wherever professed or committed, was adopted with cordial and intelligent unanimity by the Committee of Bills and Overtures, consisting of nineteen members, and representing all parts of the church. When reported to the Assembly, it was received without the least opposition, and adopted by an absolutely unanimous vote. Thus was this cloud rolled away, and every member of the House rejoiced in the goodness of God, in enabling so large a body to join hearts and hands on common ground.

Conclusion.

The Rev. Dr. Thornwell said that he rose to make a very unusual motion; but he did it by request. A resolution had been offered, tendering thanks to the citizens of Rochester for their hospitality. Never, in his estimation, was a tender of gratitude more richly deserved, and he felt sure the *heart* of the entire Assembly went forth with the vote of thanks. The citizens of Rochester desired permission to express their sentiments in regard to the sojourn of the Assembly amongst them; and he moved that an opportunity be now afforded. Carried.

Rev. Dr. McIlvaine, pastor of the church in which the Assembly met, said—Moderator, this call upon me is wholly unexpected, and I shall say but little, because what I *would* say cannot be expressed in words. We received the General Assembly with high expectations that on this “Plan-of-Union” ground, we should be able to give our people a more favourable view of the Presbyterian church than they had before an opportunity of obtaining; and our expectations have been more than *realized*. The influence of this Assembly, composed of persons from different parts of our common country, will be greater than it is possible for you to understand;—I mean its influence in mitigating acerbities and removing prejudices, which interested and imprudent parties on both sides have been diligent in fostering. Most pleasant to us, and happy in its influence has been your sojourn amongst us; and when it shall be the pleasure of this Assembly to withdraw from us, we shall bid you farewell, as one of our Committee of Arrangements has this moment instructed me to say, with the regret of every citizen of Rochester.

The resolution of thanks previously offered by Dr. Bocock was then *unanimously* adopted.

It was then

Resolved, That this General Assembly be now dissolved, and another, constituted in like manner, be required to meet in the Seventh Presbyterian church in the city of Philadelphia, on the third Thursday of May, 1861.

The Moderator then gave a few words of parting, expressing his thanks to the Assembly for the uniform and universal kind-

ness and courtesy with which they had sustained him whilst presiding over their deliberations. He expressed gratitude to God for the urbanity, dignity, and brotherly kindness which had prevailed. He reminded his brethren that the parting moment was approaching, and that it was certain we would not all meet together again in any earthly assembly; but expressed the hope that we would all meet in the General Assembly and church of the first born, written in heaven; in that glorious gathering,

“Where the Assembly ne’er breaks up,
And Sabbaths have no end.”

The hymn,

“Blest be the tie that binds
Our hearts in Christian love,”

was then sung by the whole Assembly, standing; prayer was offered by the Moderator, the benediction pronounced, and then the Moderator formally dissolved the Assembly, according to the previously adopted resolution.

In the commencement of this account of the General Assembly, it was stated that Dr. W. L. Breckinridge, the Moderator of the preceding Assembly was absent. It is proper that the reason of his absence should be given, that he may not be supposed voluntarily to have neglected an important duty. We, therefore, append his letter to the Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of Louisville:

OAKLAND COLLEGE, Miss., April 23.

Rev. Dr. HILL, Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of Louisville:

Dear Brother—The *Presbyterian Herald* of the 12th inst. has brought me the proceedings of our Presbytery, in session at Owensboro' on the 5th inst. They make known to me that I was chosen a Commissioner to the General Assembly, and, further, that “the Presbytery heartily approves (and requests the Commissioners to sustain) the action of the General Assembly of 1859, and also that of 1848, on the subject of the relations of the church of Christ, and voluntary societies formed for the purpose of Art, Literature, and Secular Morality.”

In the report of the proceedings it is added that "this resolution called out an earnest and animated discussion, in which its passage was advocated by Messrs. Robinson, Rice, and others, and opposed by Messrs. Matthews, Hopkins, Hill, and others. The motion was finally adopted without a count."

I recognize the absolute freedom of the Presbytery in the choice of its Commissioners. I acknowledge the right of the Presbytery to see that its mind is represented in the Assembly—whether by positive instruction, or by making known its wishes, and controlling the subject in some other way. I disown all claim to a seat in the next Assembly in virtue of my position as Moderator of the last, except such as may arise from the usage of the Presbyteries, and the courtesy which is due to the General Assembly and to a minister who has not forfeited the respect and confidence of his brethren. The duty imposed upon me by the will of the last Assembly, of opening the next with a sermon, and presiding until another Moderator shall be chosen, is subject to the pleasure of the Presbytery; and by the Presbytery I mean the actual majority in a lawful meeting, whether that majority be accidental, or whether it truly express the mind of the persons who properly and usually compose the body.

There is a very clear and wide distinction to be taken between the action of the Assembly of 1859 and that of the Assembly of 1848, cited by the Presbytery. The latter declares that the church has no power to require of its members the support of the societies in question; while it asserts the right, and, on occasion, the duty of the church to favour or oppose them, according to its judgment of their merits. This view of the subject I do heartily approve. I trust that I shall be ready at all times to defend and support it.

But the action of the Assembly of 1859 denies to the church all right to have anything to do with such institutions. Believing this view of the subject to be false in its principles, narrow in its spirit, and every way hurtful in its influence, I do heartily condemn it, and I can do nothing, under any circumstances, to support it. It is plainly in conflict with the sentiments and usages of our branch of the church, from the beginning. I think it has been justly described as setting forth a "new and

startling doctrine." I find no warrant for it in the letter of the divine word, or in the spirit of the gospel. I believe that it was inadvertently uttered by the last Assembly, without arresting the attention of the body; and now that it has fairly engaged the thoughts of the church, I do not doubt that it will be disavowed by the coming Assembly.

My brethren were not ignorant that I entertain these opinions. They were not uttered in the Assembly, because I was in the chair, and not on the floor. But they were freely expressed in the Synod of Kentucky, and came into the newspapers through the report of the proceedings of that body, whose mind was very clearly and strongly declared to the same effect. And they have never been concealed in private, while they have not been pressed upon others.

My brethren certainly do not expect me to change them, unless on the conviction of reason. They can hardly expect me to support the opposite of them in the General Assembly. Under these circumstances there seems to remain nothing for me to do, with a becoming respect for them and myself, but to decline the service to which they have appointed me.

You will be assured that I do this with much regret, while the necessity for it has taken me altogether by surprise. Had any of my brethren intimated to me, before I left them, the purpose which has now been executed, I would have relieved us all of the present embarrassment by declining the appointment in advance, excusing myself to the Assembly as well as I could. It would afford me great pleasure, if the will of God were so, to represent the Presbytery of Louisville in the General Assembly once more, before dissolving my connection with it, which must follow my removal to my new and distant home—a connection which has subsisted very happily through so many years. I shall not cease to cherish a deep concern for my brethren in the ministry, and for the churches in this venerable and honoured Presbytery. Peace be to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ. Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity.

Will you do me the kindness to give this letter an early place in the *Presbyterian Herald*, that the members of the Presby-

tery, and of the churches belonging to it, and our brethren of the General Assembly, may know why I shall not be present to perform the service which the ancient usage of that church requires of me.

I am, very truly, yours,

W. L. BRECKINRIDGE.

ART. VI.—*Presbyterianism.*

MUCH time was devoted, at the late meeting of the General Assembly at Rochester, to the discussion of the question, What is Presbyterianism? That question, indeed, had only a remote connection with the subject before the house. That subject was the Boards of the church. These, on the one side, were pronounced to be not only inexpedient, but unscriptural and unlawful; not only useless excrescences, but contrary to the divine rule prescribed in the word of God, and a reproach to our blessed Saviour. We were called upon to reject them as a matter of duty, or forfeit our allegiance to Christ. On the other side, it was contended that the Boards were not only highly useful, as experience had proved, but that they were entirely within the discretion which Christ had granted to his church, and therefore compatible with obedience to his will, and with our allegiance to his authority.

To make out any plausible argument in support of the doctrine that the Boards are anti-scriptural, required, of course, a peculiar theory of Presbyterianism; a theory which should exclude all discretionary power in the church, and tie her down to modes of action prescribed as of divine authority in the word of God. That theory, as propounded by Dr. Thornwell in his first speech on the subject, was understood to embrace the following principles: 1. That the form of government for the church, and its modes of action, are prescribed in the word of God, not merely as to its general principles, but in all its details, as completely as the system of faith or the moral law;

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and therefore everything for which we cannot produce a "Thus saith the Lord," is unscriptural and unlawful.

2. Consequently, the church has no more right to create a new office, organ, or organization, for the exercise of her prerogatives or the execution of her prescribed work, than she has to create a new article of faith, or to add a new command to the Decalogue.

3. That the church cannot delegate her powers. She must exercise them herself, and through officers and organs prescribed in the Scriptures. She has no more right to act by a vicar, than Congress has to delegate its legislative power, or a Christian to pray by proxy.

4. That all executive, legislative, and judicial power in the church is in the hands of the clergy, that is, of presbyters, who have the same ordination and office, although differing in functions.

5. That all power in the church is joint, and not several. That is, it can be exercised only by church courts, and not in any case by individual officers.

In opposition to this general scheme, "the brother from Princeton" propounded the following general principles:

1st. That all the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit, and consequently, where he dwells, there are those attributes and prerogatives.

2d. That as the Spirit dwells not in the clergy only, but in the people of God, all power is, *in sensu primo*, in the people.

3d. That in the exercise of these prerogatives, the church is to be governed by principles laid down in the word of God, which determine, within certain limits, her officers and modes of organization; but that beyond those prescribed principles and in fidelity to them, the church has a wide discretion in the choice of methods, organs and agencies.

4th. That the fundamental principles of our Presbyterian system are first, the parity of the clergy; second, the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the church; and third, the unity of the church, in such sense, that a small part is subject to a larger, and a larger to the whole.

Without attempting any development of these principles, the

remarks of the speaker in reply to Dr. Thornwell's first speech, were directed to the single point on which the whole question in debate turned. That was, Is the church tied down in the exercise of her prerogatives, and in the performance of her work, to the organizations or organs prescribed in the New Testament? In other words, is everything relating to the government and action of the church laid down in detail in the word of God, so that it is unlawful to employ any organs or agencies not therein enjoined? If this is so, then the Boards are clearly unlawful; if it is not so, the having them, or not having them is a matter of expediency. Dr. Thornwell, in his reply, instead of answering the arguments on that point, which was really the only point properly at issue, confined himself almost exclusively to attempting to prove that his brother from Princeton "was no Presbyterian." In doing this he first assailed the position that where the Spirit is, there the church is; or, as it was really stated on the floor of the Assembly, that the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit; and, therefore, where the Spirit is, there are those attributes and prerogatives; and secondly, he attempted to show that the parity of the clergy, the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, and the unity of the church are not the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism. As this question has a general interest, it may be proper to consider it more fully than respect for the time of the Assembly permitted in the presence of that body. A single statement of principles was all that was then deemed allowable.

As to the first of the above-mentioned principles, it was not presented as anything peculiar to Presbyterianism. It is simply an axiom of evangelical religion, admitted and advocated in every age of the church by all opponents of the ritual or hierarchical theory. As no man is a Christian unless the Spirit of Christ dwells in him, so no body of men is a church, except so far as it is organized, animated and controlled by the same Spirit. We may be bound to recognize men as Christians who are not really such, and we may be bound to recognize churches who are, in fact, not governed by the Spirit. But in both cases they are assumed to be what they profess.

We might as well call a lifeless corpse a man, as a body without the Spirit of God a church. The one may be called a dead church, as a lifeless human body is called a dead man. Nevertheless the Spirit makes the church, as the soul makes the man. The Bible says that the church is a temple, because it is the habitation of God through the Spirit. It is the body of Christ, because animated by the Spirit of Christ. It is said to be one, because the Spirit is one. "For," says the apostle, "as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body." It is the baptism, or indwelling of the Spirit, therefore, which constitutes the church one body. And as (so far as our present state of existence is concerned,) where the soul is, there the body is, so in like manner, where the Spirit is, there is the church, and where the Spirit is not, the church is not. The motto inscribed on the banner which the early evangelical fathers raised against the assumption of ritualists was, *UBI SPIRITUS DEI, IBI ECCLESIA*. That banner Popes and Prelatists, Patriarchs and Priests have for a thousand years striven in vain to trample in the dust. It has been handed down from one band of witnesses for the truth to another, until it now waves over all evangelical Christendom. The dividing line between the two great contending parties in the church universal, is precisely this—Is the church in its essential idea an external body held together by external bonds, so that membership in the church depends on submission to a hierarchy? or is it a spiritual body owing its existence and unity to the indwelling of the Spirit, so that those who have the Spirit of God are members of the church or body of Christ? The Papists say we are not in the church, because we are not subject to the Pope; we say that we are in the church if the Spirit of Christ dwells in us. Of course Dr. Thornwell believes all this as firmly as we do. He has as fully and clearly avowed this doctrine as any man among us. In the very latest published production of his pen, he says, "The idea of the church, according to the Reformed conception, is the complete realization of the decree of election. It is the whole body of the elect considered as united to Christ their Head. As actually exist-

ing at any given time, it is that portion of the elect who have been effectually called to the exercise of faith, and made partakers of the Holy Ghost. It is, in other words, the whole body of existing believers. According to this conception, none are capable of being church members but the elect, and none are ever, in fact, church members, but those who are truly renewed. The church is, therefore, the communion of saints, the congregation of the faithful, the assembly of those who worship God in the Spirit, rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh. That this conception is fundamental in all the Reformed Confessions, and among all the Reformed theologians worthy of the name, we will not insult the intelligence of our readers by stopping to prove. The church was co-extensive with faith. As true faith in the heart will manifest itself by the confession of the mouth, it is certain that the children of God, wherever they have the opportunity, will be found professing their faith; and as there is no method of searching the heart, and discriminating real from false professors but by the walk, all are to be accepted as true believers whose lives do not give the lie to their pretensions. The body of professors, therefore, is to be accepted as the church of Christ, because the truly faithful are in it. The gospel is never preached without converting some—these will profess their faith, and will vindicate to any society the name of a church. As to those professors who are destitute of faith, they are not properly members of the church; they are wolves among sheep; tares among the wheat; warts and excrescences upon the body. The visible church is, accordingly, the society or congregation of those who profess the true religion; among whom the gospel is faithfully preached, and the sacraments duly administered. And it is simply because such a society cannot be destitute of genuine believers that it is entitled to the name of the church. Profession must be accepted in the judgment of men as equivalent to the possession of faith, and the body of professors must pass for saints, until hypocrites and unbelievers expose themselves.”*

This is the idea of the church almost *totidem verbis*, which

* *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1860, p. 15.

was presented years ago in this journal. Dr. Thornwell derived his doctrine from the same source from which we drew ours, viz. the Scriptures and the Confessions of the Protestant churches, and writings of the Reformed theologians. This is the doctrine which was presented in few words on the floor of the General Assembly, where it was stated that the indwelling of the Spirit constitutes the church, so that where the Spirit is, there the church is. Dr. Thornwell, however, then denounced that doctrine. He said, speaking of his opponent, "His principle is no, no, no Presbyterianism; no, no, no churchism. He alleges that the church is where the Holy Ghost is. Moderator, is not the Holy Ghost in the heart, in the soul of the individual? Who can conceive of, where is the authority for believing that the Holy Ghost dwells in the church, in any other sense than as he dwells in the hearts of those who are members of the church?" He went on at some length to represent the doctrine that where the Spirit is, there the church is, as destroying the visibility of the church, resolving it into an impalpable invisible communion. "It is idle," he argued, "to say that when the apostle says God 'has set in the church,' he is speaking of the invisible church. Where would the apostles, and pastors, and teachers, &c., be in an invisible church? The thing is preposterous, and yet to such resorts have good men been driven, in order to get rid of the force of the arguments which go to establish our views." "The brother from Princeton," against whom all this was directed, had not said one word against the visibility of the church; he had said nothing on the idea of the church, further than was contained in the simple statement, that the Spirit stands in the same relation to the church that the soul does to the body, as its organizing principle, and the source of its attributes and prerogatives. Dr. Thornwell fully believes that doctrine. He taught it clearly and publicly in the month of April last. That he denounced it as preposterous in the month of May is to be accounted for only by the exigencies of debate. It would be hard to hold a lawyer responsible for all the arguments he may urge for his client. Dr. Thornwell had undertaken to prove *that* to be no Presbyterianism

which he and every other Presbyterian in the land fully believed. It was a mere passing phase of thought.

It has been strangely inferred that if we hold that all the attributes and prerogatives of the church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit, we must also hold that nothing relating to the organization of the church is prescribed in the word of God. It might as well be inferred from the fact that the soul fashions and informs the human body, that the body may at one time have the form of a man, and at another, the form of a beast. There are fixed laws assigned by God, according to which all healthful and normal development of the body is regulated. So it is with regard to the church. There are fixed laws in the Bible, according to which all healthful development and action of the external church are determined. But as within the limits of the laws which control the development of the human body, there is endless diversity among different races, adapting them to different climes and modes of living, so also in the church. It is not tied down to one particular mode of organization and action, at all times and under all circumstances. Even with regard to doctrinal truth, we may hold that the Spirit dwells in the believer as a divine teacher, and that all true divine knowledge comes from his inward illumination, without denying that a divine, authoritative rule of faith is laid down in the word of God, which it is impossible the inward teaching of the Spirit should ever contradict. We may believe that the indwelling Spirit guides the children of God in the path of duty, without at all questioning the authority of the moral law as revealed in the Bible. A Christian, however, may believe and do a thousand things not taught or commanded in the Scriptures. He cannot rightfully believe or do anything contrary to the word of God, but while faithful to their teachings and precepts, he has a wide field of liberty of thought and action. It is precisely so with regard to the organization of the church. There are certain things prescribed, to which every church ought to conform, and many things as to which she is at liberty to act as she deems best for God's glory, and the advancement of his kingdom. All we contend for is that everything is not prescribed; that every mode of organization or action is not

either commanded or forbidden; that we must produce a "Thus saith the Lord" for everything the church does. We must indeed be able to produce a "Thus saith the Lord" for everything, whether a truth, or a duty, or a mode of ecclesiastical organization or action, which we make obligatory on the conscience of other men. But our liberty of faith and action beyond the prescriptions of the word of God, is the liberty with which Christ has made us free, and which no man shall take from us.

What we hold, therefore, is, that the leading principles thus laid down in Scripture regarding the organization and action of the church, are the parity of the clergy, the right of the people, and the unity of the church. With respect to these principles, two things were asserted on the floor of the Assembly. First, that they are *jure divino*. That is, that they are clearly taught in the word of God, and intended to be of universal and perpetual obligation. By this is not meant either that they are essential to the being of the church, for nothing can be essential to the church which is not essential to salvation; nor is it meant that these principles may not, under certain circumstances, be less developed or called into action than in others. The right of the people, for example, to take part in the government of the church, may be admitted, and yet the exercise of that right be limited by the ability to exercise it. We do not deny the right of the people in civil matters, when we deny the exercise of that right to minors, to felons, or to idiots. The other position assumed was, that the three principles just mentioned are the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, in such sense as that those who hold those principles in their true intent are Presbyterians, and that those who deny them forfeit their claim to be so regarded.

That the above-mentioned principles are, in the sense stated, *jure divino*, may be proved, as we think, in very few words. If the Holy Spirit, as dwelling in the church, is the source of its several prerogatives, it follows that there can be no offices in the church, of divine authority, to which he does not call its members by imparting to them the appropriate gift. The apostle informs us, that the Spirit distributes his gifts to each one as he wills. Apart from those sanctifying influences com-

mon to all the children of God, by which they are incorporated into the body of Christ, he made some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers. Some had the gift of speaking with tongues, others the gift of healing, others the gift of miracles, others of government, others of helpers. Of these offices thus created, some were extraordinary and temporary, others permanent. Of those connected with the ministry of the word, were the apostles, prophets, and presbyters. The question, therefore, whether there is any permanent class or order of ministers higher than these presbyters, depends on the question, whether the apostolic and prophetic offices were permanent or temporary. It is admitted that in the apostolic church the apostles and prophets were superior to presbyters. If, therefore, we have now apostles and prophets in the church, then there are still two orders of the clergy above ordinary ministers. But if there are now no such offices, then the parity of the clergy is a necessary consequence. That the apostolic and prophetic offices were temporary, is rendered certain from the fact that the peculiar gifts which made an apostle or a prophet are no longer imparted. An apostle was a man endued with plenary knowledge of the gospel by immediate revelation, and who was rendered infallible in the communication of that knowledge by the gift of inspiration. A prophet was a man who received partial revelations and occasional inspiration.

It is not necessary that we should stop to prove that such were the gifts of the apostles and prophets. It is proved by the fact that they claimed them, that they exercised them, that their claim was divinely authenticated and universally admitted, and that the possession of those gifts was essential to their authority as teachers and rulers, to which all men were required to submit on the pain of perdition. It requires no proof that these gifts are no longer possessed by any order of men in the church, and therefore it requires no further proof that the apostolic and prophetic offices are no longer extant. This conclusion as to the temporary nature of those offices is confirmed: 1. By the consideration that there is no command to continue them. 2. That there is no specification of the qualifications to be required in those who sought them. 3. That there is no record of their continuation. They disappeared from the stage

of history as completely as the prophets, judges, and high priests of the Old Testament economy. On the other hand, the gifts of teaching and ruling, which constituted a presbyter, are continued; the command to ordain such officers is on record; their qualifications are minutely laid down; the account of their appointment is found in the Scripture, and they continue in unbroken succession wherever the church is found. These presbyters are therefore the highest permanent officers of the church for which we have any divine warrant. If the church, for special reasons, sees fit to appoint any higher order, such as are found in bishops of the Lutheran church in Europe, and in the superintendents, clothed with presbyterial power, (i. e. the powers of a presbytery,) in the early church of Scotland, this is merely a human arrangement. The parity of the clergy is a matter of divine right. They all hold the same office, and have the same rights, so far as they depend on divine appointment.

As to the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, this also is a divine right. This follows because the Spirit of God, who is the source of all power, dwells in the people, and not exclusively in the clergy; because we are commanded to submit ourselves to our brethren in the Lord; because the people are commanded to exercise this power, and are upbraided when unfaithful or negligent in the discharge of this duty; because the gift of governing or ruling is a permanent gift; and because, in the New Testament we find the brethren in the actual recognized exercise of the authority in question, which was never disputed in the church until the beginning of the dark ages. This right of the people must, of necessity, be exercised through representatives. Although it might be possible in a small congregation for the brotherhood to act immediately, yet in such a city as Jerusalem, where there were five or ten thousand believers, it was impossible that government or discipline should be administered by the whole body of Christians. And when the churches of a province or of a nation, or of all Christendom, united for the decision of questions of general interest, the people must appear by their representatives or not appear at all. Under the Old Testament, in the assembly or congregation of the people, in

the Synagogue and in the Sanhedrim, this principle of representation was by divine appointment universally recognized. By like authority it was introduced into the Christian church as a fundamental principle of its organization. This is the broad, scriptural *jure divino* foundation of the office of ruling elder, an officer who appears with the same credentials, and with equal authority as the minister in all our church-courts, from the session to the General Assembly. The third principle above-mentioned is the unity of the church. This unity is not merely a union of faith and of communion; not merely a fellowship in the Spirit, but a union of subjection, so that one part is subject to a larger, and a larger to the whole. This also is *jure divino*. 1. Because the whole church is made one by the indwelling of the Spirit. 2. Because we are commanded to be subject to our brethren. The ground of this subjection is not proximity in space, nor a mutual covenant or agreement, but the mere fact that they are our brethren, and, therefore, it extends to all brethren. 3. Because in the apostolic, as in the Old Testament church, the whole body of professors of the true religion were thus united as one body. 4. Because by the instinct of Christian feeling the church in all ages has striven after this union of subjection, and recognized its violation as inconsistent with the law of its constitution. This, again, by necessity and divine appointment is a representative union, and hence the provincial, national and oecumenical councils which mark the whole history of the church. We hold, therefore, to a *jure divino* form of church government, so far as these principles go.

The second position assumed in reference to the points above stated was, that those principles constitute the true idea of Presbyterianism. Dr. Thornwell's second speech was devoted to ridiculing and refuting that position. He objected to it as altogether illogical. It was a definition, he said, without any single distinctive characteristic of the subject. Let us look, he said, at these principles. 1st. Parity of the clergy. Why, sir, this is not a distinctive mark of Presbytery. All the evangelical sects except the Episcopal hold to it. 2d. The power of the people. That is not distinctive of Presbyterianism. The Congregationalists carry this further than we do.

3d. The unity of the church. Is this peculiar to us? Is it a peculiar element of our system? Rome holds it with a vehemence which we do not insist upon. "That Presbyterianism!" he exclaimed, "a little of everything and anything, but nothing distinctive."

This is extraordinary logic. And the more extraordinary, considering that Dr. Thornwell had just informed the Assembly that he had studied Aristotle, and every other great master of the science; that he had probably the largest private library of works in that department in the country, and felt prepared to measure swords on that field with any man alive. We do not question either his learning or his skill. We only know that the merest tyro, with logic or without it, can see the fallacy of his argument. He assumes that the only mode of definition is to state the genus of the subject and its specific difference. Thus we define God by saying that he is a Spirit, which states the genus, or class of beings to which he belongs; and we distinguish him from all other spirits by saying he is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. Another method, however, equally legitimate and equally common, is to enumerate the attributes of the subject which complete or individualize the idea. We may define man to be a rational creature, invested with a material body. Should any professor of logic ridicule this definition, and say it includes nothing distinctive, he would only show that his logic was in abeyance. Should he imitate Dr. Thornwell, he would say, "Rationality is no distinctive characteristic of man. God, angels, and demons are all rational. Neither is a dependent created nature such a characteristic. There are other creatures in the universe besides man. Nor is the possession of an organized body anything peculiar. Birds and beasts have bodies. Here, then, we have a little of everything and anything, and nothing peculiar. Is that a man?" Nevertheless, so long as, in the sphere of our knowledge, man is the only rational creature invested with a living body, the above definition is perfectly logical, all the followers of the Stagirite to the contrary notwithstanding. Now, as the principles above stated, the parity of the clergy, the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the church, and the subjection of one part of the church to a larger, and a larger to

the whole, are recognized by Presbyterians, and are not found among Papists, Prelatists, and Independents, or any other historical body of Christians, they are, in their combination, the characteristic or distinguishing features of the Presbyterian system.

Dr. Thornwell stated his own as an antagonistic theory of Presbyterianism. 1. That the church is governed by representative assemblies. 2. Those assemblies include two houses, or two elements, the preaching and ruling elder. 3. The parity of the eldership, all elders, preaching and ruling, appearing in our church courts with the same credentials, and having the same rights. 4. The unity of the church, as realized in the representative principle.

It is obvious that these principles do not involve anything to distinguish Dr. Thornwell's system from that advocated on the other side. He entirely overlooked the main point, and the only point in debate. It was asserted that the Boards are unscriptural and unlawful. They are unlawful, because not commanded in Scripture, and everything not commanded is forbidden. In opposition to this, it was said that the principle, that every mode of organization or action is unlawful which is not prescribed in the word of God, is utterly anti-Presbyterian and unscriptural. In his rejoinder, Dr. Thornwell does not say a word on that point, on which the whole argument turned, but devoted all his strength to prove that "the brother from Princeton" is no Presbyterian. Suppose that to be true, what had it to do with the question? Our being no Presbyterian would not prove the Boards to be unlawful. But even as to that subordinate, irrelevant object, the speech was a failure. Every one of his four principles is involved in those stated on the other side. 1. The principle of representation, as we have seen, is of necessity included in the doctrine of the unity of the church, and the subjection of a part to the whole. This theory can be carried out only through representative assemblies. 2. The union of two elements in these church courts is also embraced in the assertion of the right of the people to take part in the government of the church, for this right can only be exercised through their representatives sitting as constituent elements in ecclesiastical

courts. 3. The parity of the elders and ministers in these representative assemblies, is also included in the one system as well as in others. 4. The unity of the church was avowed on both sides, and was not claimed as peculiar to either. This is not an after thought. All these principles were presented years ago, in the tract, "What is Presbyterianism?" and shown to be involved in those which Dr. Thornwell repudiated as any just description of our system.

The true peculiarities of the new theory, Dr. Thornwell left out of view in his rejoinder. Those principles are, 1. A new doctrine concerning ruling elders. 2. The doctrine that all power in the church is joint and not several. 3. That every thing not prescribed in Scripture is forbidden. We shall say a few words on each of these points in their order.

First, as to the eldership. There are only two radically different theories on this subject. According to the one, the ruling elder is a laymen; according to the other, he is a clergyman. According to the former, he belongs to a different order from the minister, holds a different office, has a different vocation and ordination. He is not a bishop, pastor, or teacher, but officially a ruler. According to the latter, the reverse is true. The ruling elder belongs to the same order with the minister. He is a bishop, pastor, teacher, and ruler. This is all the minister is. They have, therefore, the same office, and differ only as to their functions, as a professor differs from a pastor, or a missionary from a settled minister. It is to be noticed that the point of difference between these theories is not the importance of the office of ruling elder, nor its divine warrant. According to both views, the office is *jure divino*. The Spirit who calls one man to be a minister calls another to be an elder. The one office is as truly from Christ as the other. Nor do the theories differ as to the parity of elders and ministers in our church courts. Both enter those courts with the same credentials, and have the same right to sit, deliberate and determine. The vote of the one avails as much as that of the other. On all these points, the theories agree. The point of difference between them which is radical, affecting the whole character of our system, relates to the nature of the office of the ruling elder. Is he a clergyman, a

bishop? or is he a layman? Does he hold the same office with the minister, or a different one? According to the new theory the offices are identified. Everything said of presbyters in the New Testament, this theory applies equally to elders and ministers of the word. What constitutes identity of office, if it be not identity of official titles, of qualifications, of vocation, of duties, of ordinations? This new doctrine makes all elders, bishops, pastors, teachers, and rulers. It applies all directions as to the qualifications and duties, as to election and ordination of presbyters, as much to the ruling elder as to the minister of the word. It therefore destroys all official distinction between them. It reduces the two to one order, class, or office. The one has as much right to preach, ordain, and administer the sacraments, as the other. The conclusion cannot by possibility be avoided on the theory that elders are pastors, bishops, and teachers, in the same sense with ministers.

The first objection to this theory is that it is entirely contrary to the doctrine and practice of all the Reformed churches, and especially of our own. In those churches the ruling elder is a layman. He has a different office from the minister. He has different gifts, different training, duties, prerogatives, and ordination. The one is ordained by the minister, the other by the Presbytery. The one ministers in the word and sacraments, the other does not. The one is appointed specially to teach and to preach the gospel; the other to take part in the discipline and government of the church.

Secondly, in thus destroying the peculiarity of the office, its value is destroyed. It is precisely because the ruling elder is a layman, that he is a real power, a distinct element in our system. The moment you dress him in canonicals, you destroy his power, and render him ridiculous. It is because he is not a clergyman, it is because he is one of the people, engaged in the ordinary business of life, separated from the professional class of ministers, that he is what he is in our church courts. Thirdly, This theory reduces the government of the church to a clerical despotism. Dr. Thornwell ridiculed this idea. He called it an argument *ad captandum*. He said it was equal in absurdity to the argument of a hard-shell Baptist, who proved that his sect would universally prevail,

from the text, "The voice of the turtle shall be heard in all the land." Turtles, said the Hard-shell, are to be seen sitting upon logs in all the streams, and as you pass, they plunge into the water, therefore, all men will do the same. Such, said Dr. Thornwell, was the logic of the brother from Princeton. Whatever may be thought of the wit of this illustration, we cannot see that it proves much. Does it prove that all power in our church is not in the hands of ministers and elders? and if elders and ministers are all alike bishops and teachers, all of the same order, all clergymen, does it not follow that all power is in the hands of the clergy? But, says Dr. Thornwell, the people choose these elders. What of that? Suppose slaves had a right to choose (under a veto,) their own masters, would they not be slaves still? If, according to the Constitution of the United States, the President, senators, representatives, heads of departments, judges, marshals, all naval and military men holding commissions, in short, all officers from the highest to the lowest, (except overseers of the poor,) must be clergymen, every one would see and feel that all power was in the hands of the clergy. It would avail little that the people choose these clergymen, if the clergy had the sole right to ordain, that is, to admit into their order. All power, legislative, executive, and judicial, would be in their hands, the right of election notwithstanding. This is the government which the new theory would introduce into the church. This doctrine is, therefore, completely revolutionary. It deprives the people of all substantive power. The legislative, judicial, and executive power, according to our system, is in church courts, and if these courts are to be composed entirely of clergymen, and are close, self-perpetuating bodies, then we have, or we should have, as complete a clerical domination as the world has ever seen. It need hardly be said that our fathers, and especially the late Dr. Miller, did not hold any such doctrine as this. There was no man in the church more opposed to this theory than that venerable man, whose memory we have so much reason to cherish with affectionate reverence. We do not differ from Dr. Miller as to the nature of the office of the ruling elder. The only point of difference between him and us relates to the

method of establishing the divine warrant for the office. He laid stress on one argument, we on another. That is all. As to the importance, nature, and divine institution of the office, we are faithful to his instructions. And this we understand to be the ground which our respected contributor in the April number of this *Review* intended to take. It is only as to the point just indicated that we could sanction dissent from the teachings of our venerated and lamented colleague.

Dr. Thornwell himself, in the last extremity, said that he did not hold the new theory. Then he has no controversy with us, nor we with him, so far as the eldership is concerned. The dispute is reduced to a mere logomachy, if the only question is, whether the ruling elder is a presbyter. Dr. Thornwell asked, If he is not a presbyter, what right has he in the Presbytery? You might as well, he said, put any other good man there. It is on all sides admitted that in the New Testament the presbyters are bishops—how then are we to avoid the conclusion that the ruling elder is a bishop, and therefore the same in office as the minister, and the one as much a clergyman as the other? This is the dilemma in which, as we understood, Dr. Thornwell endeavoured to place Dr. Hodge, when he asked him, on the floor of the Assembly, whether he admitted that the elder was a presbyter. Dr. Hodge rejoined by asking Dr. Thornwell whether he admitted that the apostles were deacons. He answered, No. But, says Dr. Hodge, Paul says he was a *διδάσκαλος*. O, says Dr. Thornwell, that was in the general sense of the word. Precisely so. If the answer is good in the one case, it is good in the other. If the apostles being deacons in the wide sense of the word, does not prove that they were officially deacons, then that elders are presbyters in the one sense, does not prove them to be presbyters in the other sense. We hold, with Calvin, that the official presbyters of the New Testament were bishops; for, as he says, “Quicumque verbi ministerio funguntur, iis titulum episcoporum [Scriptura] tribuit.” But of the ruling elders, he adds, “Gubernatores fuisse existimo seniores ex plebe delectos, qui censuræ morum et exercendæ disciplinæ una cum episcopis præessent.” *Institutio*, &c. IV. 3. 8. This is the old, healthful, conservative doctrine of the Presbyterian church. Ministers of the word are clergy-

men, having special training, vocation, and ordination; ruling elders are laymen, chosen from the people as their representatives, having, by divine warrant, equal authority in all church courts with the ministers.

The second point of difference between the new and old theories of Presbyterianism is, that all power in the church is joint, and not several. The objection to this doctrine is simply to the word *all*. It is admitted, and always has been admitted, that the ordinary exercise of the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of the church, is in church courts; according to our system, in sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, and Assembly. About this there is no dispute. But, on the other hand, it is contended, that according to the theory and practice of our own, and of all other Presbyterian bodies, ordination to the sacred office confers the power or authority not only to preach the gospel, but to collect and organize churches, to administer the sacraments, and in the absence of a session, to decide on the qualifications of candidates for admission to those ordinances; and when need be, to ordain, as is done in the case of ruling elders. This is a power which our ministers and missionaries have, and always must exercise. It can never be denied by any who are not the slaves, instead of being the masters of logic. On this point it is not necessary to enlarge.

The third point of difference between the two systems is the extent to which the liberty of the church extends in matters of government and modes of operation. According to the old, and especially the genuine American form of Presbyterianism, while it is admitted that there is a form of government prescribed or instituted in the New Testament, so far as its general principles or features are concerned, there is a wide discretion allowed us by God, in matters of detail, which no man or set of men, which neither civil magistrates nor ecclesiastical rulers, can take from us. This is part of that liberty with which Christ has made us free, and in which we are commanded to stand fast. The other doctrine is the opposite of this. It is, that every thing that is lawful as to the mode in which the church is to be organized, and as to the methods which she is to adopt in carrying on her work, is laid down in Scripture. It is not enough that it is not forbidden; it is not enough that it is in accord-

ance with the principles laid down in the word of God. Unless it is actually commanded, unless we can put our finger on a "Thus saith the Lord," in its support, it is unlawful. God, it was said, has given the church a particular organization, a definite number of offices, courts, organs, agencies; and for us to introduce any other, or even any new combinations, is an indignity to him, and to his word. On this ground, as we have said, the Boards were pronounced unscriptural. Their abrogation was made a matter of duty. It was urged upon our conscience as demanded by our allegiance to God. It is our firm belief that there were not six men in the Assembly who held this doctrine. There were sixty who voted for some organic change in the Boards, but so far as we know, there were only two who took the ground of this superlative high-churchism. It is utterly repugnant to the spirit of the New Testament, to the practice of the church universal, to the whole character of Protestantism, and especially of our Presbyterianism; it is so preposterous and suicidal, that we have no more fear of its prevalence among us, than that the freemen of this country will become the advocates of the divine right of kings. We have no intention of discussing this question at length, which we deem altogether unnecessary. We shall content ourselves with a few remarks on two aspects of the case.

In the first place, this theory never has been, nor can be carried out, even by its advocates. Consistency would require them to repudiate all organizations, not Boards only, but Committees also, and confine the joint agency of the church to sessions, Presbyteries, Synods and General Assemblies. They hold these only to be divinely instituted organs for joint action. And it is perfectly clear that if these be departed from, or if other agencies be adopted, the whole principle is given up. Accordingly, the first ground assumed by the advocates of the new theory, was that missionary operations could be carried on only by the Presbyteries. The law of God was said to forbid everything else. When this was found impracticable, then it was discovered that a board or court of deacons, was the divinely instituted agency, and the word of God was made to forbid any other. This, however, would not go. Then followed other discoveries, and at last it was found out that a

committee was the thing. God permits a committee, but to institute a board is an act of rebellion. But what is the difference? A committee is no more commanded than a board. The one is as much a delegated body as the other. Both continue as a living organism after the Assembly appointing them is dissolved and dead. We were referred to the Committee of Church Extension as an illustration of the radical difference between the two organizations. The only difference, however, is that one is larger than the other. There is not a single principle involved in the one, which is not involved also in the other.

It may be said, and it was said in the last extremity, that an executive committee appointed directly by the Assembly, is a simpler device than a board, and that the church is limited in her choice of agencies to what is absolutely necessary. But, in the first place, this is an admission that everything necessary is not prescribed in Scripture which is contrary to the theory. In the second place, the Committee of Church Extension, which was held up as the model, is not the simplest possible, by a great deal. A single executive officer is a simpler device than an executive committee, and much more so than a committee of thirty or forty members. In the third place, when it is said we are forbidden to adopt any means not absolutely necessary, the question arises, Necessary for what? For doing the work? or, for doing it in the best and most effectual manner? If the latter, which is the only rational view of the matter, then again the whole principle is abandoned; for it must rest with the judgment of the church to decide what measures are best adapted for her purpose, and this is all the discretion any body desires. It is obvious that the principle advocated by these brethren is one which they themselves cannot carry out. The church is getting tired of such hair-splitting. She is impatient of being harassed and impeded in her great operations by such abstractions. If, however, the principle in question could be carried out, what would be the consequence? Of course we could have no church-schools, colleges, or theological seminaries; no appliances for the education of the heathen, such as all churches have found it necessary to adopt. The boards of directors of

our Seminaries must be given up. No one pretends that they are commanded in Scripture, or that they are absolutely necessary to the education of the ministry. We had educated ministers before Seminaries were thought of. So far as we heard, not a word was said in the Assembly in answer to this *argumentum ad hominem*. The brethren who denounced the Board of Missions as unscriptural, had nothing to say against the boards of the Seminaries. Any one sees, however, that if the one is unlawful, the others must be.

The grand objection urged against this new theory, the one which showed it to be not only inconsistent and impracticable, but intolerable, was, that it is, in plain English, nothing more or less than a device for clothing human opinions with divine authority. The law of God was made to forbid not only what it says, but what may be inferred from it. We grant that what a man infers from the word of God binds his own conscience. But the trouble is, that he insists that it shall bind mine also. We begged to be excused. No man may make himself the lord of my conscience, much less will any man be allowed to make himself lord of the conscience of the church. One man infers one thing, another a different, from the Bible. The same man infers one thing to-day, and another thing to-morrow. Must the church bow her neck to all these burdens? She would soon be more trammelled than the church in the wilderness, with this infinite difference, the church of old was measurably restricted by fetters which God himself imposed; the plan now is to bind her with fetters which human logic or caprice forges. This she will never submit to.

Dr. Thornwell told us that the Puritans rebelled against the doctrine that what is not forbidden in Scripture is allowable. It was against the theory of liberty of discretion, he said, our fathers raised their voices and their arms. We always had a different idea of the matter. We supposed that it was in resistance to this very doctrine of inferences they poured out their blood like water. In their time, men inferred from Romans xiii. 1, ("Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation,") the doctrine of passive submission. From the

declaration and command of Christ, "The Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do," they inferred the right of the church to make laws to bind the conscience. On this ground Tories and high-church men sought to impose on the church their trumpery vestments, and their equally frivolous logical deductions. It was fetters forged from inferences our fathers broke, and we, their children, will never suffer them to be rewelded. There is as much difference between this extreme doctrine of divine right, this idea that everything is forbidden which is not commanded, as there is between this free, exultant church of ours, and the mummied forms of mediæval Christianity. We have no fear on this subject. The doctrine need only be clearly propounded to be rejected.

SHORT NOTICES.

Sermons. By Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner, Grand street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1860. Vols. I. II.

The unexpected death of Dr. J. Addison Alexander in the prime of life, and in the full maturity of his extraordinary talents, is a loss to the church and the world which cannot be estimated. It was natural that those best acquainted with his worth, should at once do all they could, by the publication of his literary remains, to compensate for so great a loss. It is to be lamented that these are so few. It was perhaps an incident of his mental superiority, that he could never satisfy himself. His ideal was always above the actual. The consequence was that he left many works unfinished. Many collections of materials in such a state as to be intelligible only to himself. Happily, this was not the case with his sermons. Many, indeed, of his discourses, the recollections of which, those who heard them cherish most fondly, cannot now be found. These volumes, however, are proof that a sufficient number were written out in full, and escaped destruction at his own hands, to give some idea of his power as a preacher. The impression which he made in the pulpit was less due to

any charm of voice and manner, than to the intrinsic excellence of his discourses. His sermons are of very different kinds, but all have certain characteristics which belong to all the productions of his pen. We find everywhere the same exquisite felicity of expression; the same freedom from redundancy; the same perspicuity and order; the same refined taste; the same weight of thought, soundness of doctrine, and devotional spirit. With these general characteristics, which never failed to delight his hearers, those accustomed to attend upon his preaching are aware that no two consecutive discourses were often constructed on the same plan. Sometimes he obviously had for his object, even when he selected a single verse for a text, to bring out all the richness of the context, and to show the intimate relation of the several parts of the discourse of which his text was only a fragment. At other times he would take a single idea and exhibit it in its manifold bearings. In some sermons the impression is produced mainly through the imagination, by a succession of imagery and graphic description, filling the mind with the radiance of truth. In others, the largest views are presented of the whole scheme of divine dispensations as unfolded in the Scripture, bringing everything to converge on a single point. Examples of these several modes of sermonizing may be found in these volumes. He rarely, if ever, preached a doctrinal sermon, that is, he was not wont to take up a theological subject, such as justification, regeneration, or the like, and give it a formal discussion. His discourses were all biblical in their form, and truth was always presented as he found it in the Bible. In everything he showed the hand of a master; and we doubt not that these sermons will go wherever the English language is known, and be read as long as that language is understood.

Forty Years' Familiar Letters. By James W. Alexander, D. D. Constituting, with Notes, a Memoir of his Life. By the surviving correspondent, John Hall, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner, Grand Street. London: Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1860.

The reputation of few men could stand the publication of their familiar letters, written almost weekly for forty years. That the reputation of Dr. James W. Alexander passes through this ordeal unscathed; that he appears from first to last, in the most unreserved self-revelations, the same man, the same gentleman, Christian, and scholar we contemplate, in the more formal and public exhibitions of himself, is the clearest proof of his sterling worth. It is natural that those who have been accustomed to contemplate him themselves, or who wish him to be remembered by others, as the preacher and author,

should feel some solicitude as to the effect of this clear revelation of his character, as seen at the fire-side. We think such fears are altogether unfounded. It is only a small part of the man which is seen in public; and still less can be exhibited in history. It is at home, among his friends, that the man is known; and in his familiar letters he is most faithfully portrayed. De Wette's collection of Luther's Letters, in five volumes, is worth manifold more than all the biographies of the Reformer, and all the histories of the Reformation, to give us a real knowledge of the man. He nowhere appears so great, so amiable, so disinterested and genial. It would be an unreasonable objection, that these letters are often on trivial subjects; sometimes thanks to the Elector for a present of game, or a petition for a new gown; or, as more frequently happens, intercessions for some poor widow or necessitous student. It is precisely these little things which let us into the real character of the man. In the letters before us, there are many which have no higher value in themselves than these begging letters of Luther, but they are nevertheless parts of the many-sided mirror which reflect the image of the writer, now at one angle and now at another. The collection extending over so long a period, constitutes not only a history of his inner life, but a history of his times, as viewed from his position. There is scarcely an important event in church or state, scarcely a noticeable production of the press, which is not the subject of remark. His pure English diction, his scholarly attainments, his zeal for truth and religion, his sound judgment and warm feelings, as here manifested, give not only an exalted opinion of the writer, but add a lasting value to this publication as a record of personal, ecclesiastical, and literary history. We doubt not that these volumes will be more and more highly estimated, the farther the flow of time removes the author and his age from the view of the reader.

The Epistle to the Romans, in Greek and English; with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary. By Samuel H. Turner, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Revised and Corrected. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. 1859.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, in Greek and English, with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary. By Samuel H. Turner, D. D., &c. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1859.

These handsomely printed volumes are revised editions of works already extensively and favourably known. The learned and venerable author has exhibited everywhere the evidence of mature scholarship, judgment, and moderation.

A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospel of John, for the use of Ministers, Theological Students, Private Christians, Bible-classes, and Sunday-schools. By John J. Owen, D. D. New York: Leavitt & Allen, 24 Walker street. 1860.

This volume completes the series of Dr. Owen's Commentaries on the Gospels, leaving only the one on Acts to the full accomplishment of his plan. The volumes already published have secured for their author a high reputation as a learned and judicious commentator, which cannot fail to secure for this work a cordial reception from the Christian public.

The Province of Reason: a Criticism on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By John Young, LL.D., Edinburgh, author of "The Christ of History." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. pp. 305.

Sir William Hamilton has earned for himself so high a name, and rendered such real service to philosophy, that there is danger that some of his principles, borrowed unconsciously, or rather, as it were, absorbed, from the German transcendentalists, and rendered more popular in the writings of his disciples, may gain a hurtful influence in the public mind. We rejoice, therefore, to see this vigorous protest from the pen of a writer of so much ability as Dr. Young. We cannot, in this short notice even indicate the points in controversy, much less express any judgment of the merits of the case. We can only commend the book to the attention of students in this department of science.

Analytic Orthography: an Investigation of the Sounds of the Voice, and their Alphabetical Notation; including the Mechanism of Speech, and its bearing on Etymology. By S. S. Haldeman, A. M., Professor in Delaware College, &c. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: Trübner & Co. Paris: Benjamin Duprat. Berlin: Fred. Dümmler. 1860. Quarto, pp. 148.

This is a work evincing great research and knowledge in the department of comparative grammar. It is replete with facts and suggestions, presented in a fragmentary form. It is rather a preparation for a full examination of the subject of which it treats, than a complete treatise of itself.

The Revelation of John its own Interpreter, in virtue of the Double Version in which it is delivered. By John Cochran. D. Appleton & Co., 443 and 445 Broadway. 1860. pp. 358.

The author's idea is that the events predicted in the Revelations, are first set forth briefly in a series of visions; and then these same events more fully described and disclosed in those which follow. The latter thus present, according to his theory, the prophet's own interpretation of the former. We must

refer the reader to the work itself for a further insight into its plan, of which we have not had time to get a more definite idea.

Memoir of the Life, Character and Writings of Philip Doddridge, D. D., with a Selection from his Correspondence. Compiled by the Rev. James R. Boyd, A. M., Editor of "English Poets," with Notes, &c. American Tract Society.

Mr. Boyd has made good use of the materials at his command, and given the Christian public in this country a pleasing and instructive memoir of one of the most useful men of the last century.

The Biblical Reason Why: a Family Guide to Scripture Readings, and a Hand-book for Biblical Students. By the author of "The Reason Why . . . General Science," "The Reason Why . . . Natural History." Illustrated with numerous engravings. New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, No. 18 Ann street.

The publishers, in giving the American public access to this pithy and comprehensive work, have rendered a good service, the nature and value of which those who have read the works on the same plan by the same author mentioned on the title-page, will be able to understand. It asks one thousand four hundred and ninety-three questions on all topics of Scripture history and antiquities, to which it gives concise and in general satisfactory answers.

The Signet Ring and other Gems. From the Dutch of the Rev. J. De Liefde. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Philadelphia: Smith & English. 1860.

The first part of this volume was published some years ago, and was favourably received. The American publishers have obtained two other small works by the same author, and included them in this work. The new Testament parables are the models from which Mr. De Liefde has derived his method of instruction, which is commended for its simplicity and rich vein of experimental piety.

Memoir of the Rev. Peter Labagh, D.D., with Notices of the History of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church in North America. By the Rev. John A. Todd, Pastor of the Second Dutch church of Tarrytown, New York. New York: Board of Publication of the Protestant Reformed Dutch Church. Synod's Rooms, No. 61 Franklin street. 1860. Pp. 339.

Dr. Labagh being long settled in this immediate vicinity, and highly respected beyond as well as within the bounds of his own denomination, this account of his life will be specially acceptable to his friends in New Jersey. The volume has its value also as a contribution to the ecclesiastical and religious history of the country.

Lessons About Salvation; from the Life and Words of the Lord Jesus. Being a Second Series of Plantation Sermons. By the Rev. A. F. Dickson, Orangeburg, S. C. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 264.

These simple discourses are well adapted for the instruction of the class of persons for whom they were intended.

Seed-Time and Harvest of Ragged Schools. By Thomas Guthrie, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860.

The religious education of the poor, particularly in our large cities, is the grand necessity of our age and country. The mass of the population in such great centres is growing up in heathenism or worse. In Europe, among Protestants on the Continent, the law provides for this great object. Scarcely a bare-footed boy in Berlin can be found who cannot read and write, repeat Luther's Catechism, and give a good account of the facts and doctrines of the Bible. Here men are without law in this matter. Whatever Christians and philanthropists can do to supply this great need by voluntary and systematic effort, it becomes them to do with their might, for the evil, actual and prospective, is portentous.

The Divine Purpose Explained, or All Things Decreed; yet Evil not caused, nor Moral Freedom impaired, and the Glory of God the end of all. By the Rev. George Morton. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson.

The high themes here discussed have never ceased to enlist the interest, and task the powers of all grades of thinkers. They involve an insoluble element which men never tire of attempting to solve. Even among those who agree as to the essential truths concerned, and accept the Calvinistic system, considerable diversity obtains as to their methods of explaining and vindicating them, and still more as to how far the problems presented by the existence of evil admit of any rational solution, i. e., whether the facts and truths on this subject, which are undeniably proved, can, with any light at command in this world, be explicated, on all sides, to the perfect satisfaction of mere human reason. Among the great mass of Calvinistic divines, however, the following points may be considered as established and catholic, and all contrary opinions exceptional and casual. 1. That God is absolutely sovereign, and hath foreordained all events, including the acts of free agents. 2. That man is absolutely free in all his acts, which are thus pre-appointed. 3. That man is the immediate cause or efficient of his own acts. 4. That these acts are determined as to matter and quality by the motives, i. e. the desires and dispositions which prompt them. 5. That God is the efficient cause of all holy desires and dispositions, and controls the

outward circumstances which soothe and direct all outgoings of desire and disposition, both holy and sinful. 6. That God is the cause of evil dispositions, desires, and consequent volitions, only in a privative way—only as the sun is the cause of night, or food of hunger. He is the privative cause of sin, as by his absence or withdrawment, he takes away those regulative and purifying influences, without which the more natural principles of humanity relapse into disorder and lawlessness, i. e. sin. 7. That this withdrawment of God from man, which results in his debasement, is the penalty of the first sin of Adam, committed while he was on trial as the representative of his posterity. 8. That Adam was created upright, perfectly good after his own kind, with every motive and aid for remaining so, and that he fell, not through any original evil in his nature, or any necessity inherent in him as a created and dependent being, but through the perverse exercise of his own free will. Although made holy, he was also made mutable. 9. God makes his own glory the ultimate end of all his decrees and procedures, not excepting those relating to the sins of his creatures. 10. The moral quality of the acts and dispositions of moral agents depends on their nature, not on their origin.

These are among the common-place of standard theology. Along with them it recognizes points in relation to the origin of evil, and the connection between the divine decrees and free agency, that are shrouded in mystery, and insoluble to human reason. From time to time, however, excellent and able men have struck out theories which have seemed to them to clear these difficulties, and solve all the problems they involve. These theories have never commanded permanent and general assent.

This work of Mr. Morton maintains with considerable ability most of the great principles of standard theology, which we have specified above. Beyond this, it undertakes to solve the perplexities which overcloud the subject by referring the origin of sin to necessary "creational imperfection." Though he says much that is ingenious, we find all the mysteries remaining as thick and deep as before. Does this "creational imperfection" render the holy angels and redeemed men liable to apostacy? The work has value in its true things, rather than its new things.

The Bible and Social Reform; or the Scriptures as a Means of Civilization. By R. H. Tyler, A. M., of Fulton, New York. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. 1860.

The doctrines maintained in this volume are excellent. That the Bible is the word of God, clothed with his authority, and

in all its parts obligatory on the conscience; the only true light for the guidance, elevation, and felicity of our spiritual and immortal nature; that it is the only source of permanent and trustworthy progress for our race, even in this world; that it is the only effective spring of true civilization and genuine philanthropy; that the declaration of some of our statesmen, that the government of the United States is "not in any sense founded on the Christian religion," is false—all these are truths of paramount importance, which are earnestly advocated in this volume.

We think, however, that in an esthetic and artistic view, the book is at fault. The style is careless, and too diffuse. It would be greatly improved by condensation, and a stronger tinge of classic neatness and elegance. It also suffers from an undue egotism. Of all which, the following, from the preface, is a small specimen: "I trust that to do good is the object of my effort; and the ultimate result will depend upon the ability with which the effort shall be made. The subject is abounding in merit, and herein I rely for success."

Morning Hours in Patmos: The Opening Vision of the Apocalypse, and Christ's Epistles to the Seven Churches of Asia. By A. C. Thompson, author of *Better Land*, &c. Boston: Gould & Lincoln.

The accomplished author of this volume adds to his other qualifications for it, the advantage of foreign travel over the very localities which are chiefly referred to in the portion of the sacred volume upon which he comments. This circumstance helps him to shed light and interest over his expositions. These cover the introductory portion of the Apocalypse, but stop short of the prophetic parts of it, which that prince of commentators, John Calvin, said he could not understand. The doctrinal and practical significance of this part of the book of Revelation are evolved by the author with great beauty and force. We find here what is so precious—the union of evangelical unction and devout feeling with raciness of thought and expression. The book belongs decidedly to the higher grade of our current popular religious literature.

Historical Vindications: A Discourse on the Province and Uses of Baptist History; delivered before the Backus Historical Society, at Newton, Massachusetts, June 23, 1857. Repeated before the American Baptist Historical Society, at New York, May 14, 1859. With Appendixes, containing Historical Notes, and Confessions of Faith. By Sewall S. Cutting, Professor of Rhetoric and History in the University of Rochester. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

While it is unnecessary for us to say that we do not accept such views in this volume as are peculiar to Baptists, it gives

us great pleasure to add, that we highly appreciate the able and scholarly character, and the high-toned Christian spirit of the discourse, which is the nucleus of this volume. It has a still higher value, as an important contribution to the history of a numerous branch of the church. The Creeds and Confessions of the Baptist bodies in Great Britain and America, which are found in the Appendix to this volume, are of great interest, both in themselves and as contributions to the history of Christian symbolism. That framed by representatives of the Baptist churches in London, in the year 1680, is of especial interest to us, on account of its close adherence, in matter and expression, to the Westminster standards.

The Homilist: A Series of Sermons for Preachers and Laymen. Original and Selected. By Erwin House, A. M. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1860.

These sermons are midway between mere skeletons, or the dry, dead frame-work of discourses, and the fully developed and finished sermon. They exhibit all stages of growth, between the first swelling of the germ and the matured product. They are more instructive and interesting to common readers than ordinary sermons, because they are more compact, go more directly to the heart of the subject, and stir the mind to think, in developing the germs of thought which are set in contact with it. At the same time, they are by no means bare of imagery and other accessories, which infuse the *vis vivida* into thought and expression. They are in a high degree suggestive and quickening. So far as these sermons are designed for preachers, they are quite above the average grade of helps of this sort which have been provided for them. It is, however, only under the most stringent limitations that we can commend, or even tolerate, the use of such helps to sermonizing. So far as they quicken, feed, and invigorate the mind—are digested and assimilated by it, and appear only in the effect they work upon its own living insight and thought—so far their use is both allowable and commendable. They are on the same footing with whatever nourishes or invigorates the mind, or goes to furnish it for any particular service. But so far as they are taken up simply as substitutes for one's own thoughts and acquisitions, and dealt out bodily as if they were his own mental products, the effect is most pernicious. It enervates the moral and intellectual faculties; it tends towards the paralysis of the soul, and often ends in utter moral and intellectual impotence. This volume will be most useful to those who employ it as a means of suggesting and quickening, most injurious to those who make it a substitute for, thought. Its tone is decidedly

evangelical. It is only occasionally that we detect even a tinge of Arminian theology.

A Commentary on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, intended for Popular Use. By D. D. Whedon, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This is an addition to our stock of Commentaries on the Gospels, so constructed as to be useful to all, but especially to private Christians and Sabbath-school teachers. It is well written, and will be welcome, not only to the Methodist body, to which its author belongs, but to many in other communions, who seek the aid of various interpreters in the study of Christ's life and teachings.

History of the Great Reformation in England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, France, and Italy. By the Rev. Thomas Carter. New York: Published by Carlton & Porter. 1860.

For those who desire to read an account of the Reformation reduced to a compass of one volume of moderate size, this work may be suitable, provided they rate at their true value its feeble thrusts at Calvin and Calvinism.

The Life of Jacob Gruber. By W. P. Strickland. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1860.

This is the biography of a Methodist minister, a Pennsylvanian by birth, who laboured in the early half of the present century. He was a man of rude, uncultivated strength, of narrow views, of intense energy. Often crude and rough in thought and expression, he has found a fit biographer in the writer of this volume, who tells us of "the Young Americas of Gruber's day, who regarded age as a synonym of fogysm," etc. One portion of the work, however, redeems it. It gives an account of the indictment and trial of Gruber, on the charge of preaching insurrection to the slaves in Maryland. The able arguments of Chief Justice Taney and his associate counsel, in defence of Gruber, are given in full. For various reasons, these monuments of the past will now be studied with interest and profit.

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No. IV.

ART. I.—*The Logical Relations of Religion and Natural Science.*

PHYSICAL science, at the present day, investigates phenomena simply as they are in themselves. This, if not positively atheistic, must be of dangerous tendency. Whatever deliberately omits God from the universe, is closely allied to that which denies him.

We cannot thoroughly investigate nature without asking for the origin and source of all things. Science undertakes to solve questions which compel either the acknowledgment of God, or the assertion of open atheism, or else a resort to that concealed atheism which quietly sets God aside without directly denying his existence. When, for example, a philosopher says that certain causes produced the present state of our earth, he is bound to answer the question, Did those causes arise from the will of an infinitely wise Creator? For, if the creating agency of Jehovah is admitted, we thus bring into scientific research an element which cannot be adequately comprehended except by an intellect equal to that of Deity. All physical theories must be exceedingly controlled and limited by the admission of such an element. That which to us seems impro-

bable and undesirable, may have been selected by God as by far the best at some former period of earth's existence. It is to avoid embarrassment from this source that physical science so frequently requires God (the unknown Infinite) to be excluded from her dominion. "The investigation of miracles can never be admitted into natural science."* But, if God created the universe miraculously, to omit the investigation of miracles is equivalent to abandoning the thorough knowledge of nature.

There is a tendency amongst physical philosophers to claim the right, as exclusive hierophants in the temple of nature, to dictate the interpretation of all phenomena. Woe to the rash mortal who touches the veil of Isis without their approbation. Whatever may be his other accomplishments, such a one is rejected with silence or contempt, should he venture on a region which belongs as rightfully to logic, history, and religion, as to natural science. But the most superficial are sometimes respectfully received, and, perhaps, have torches given to hold in the temple worship, if they deny, or seem never to have known, the Christian faith in Moses and the prophets. Even distinguished scientific attainment risks the forfeiture of its privileges when it would assign to the Bible a position similar to that of philosophy. De Luc was an eminent naturalist. Playfair was forced to admit that in his *Essai sur les Modifications de l'Atmosphère*, he "has succeeded where many men of genius had failed." In his tenth letter to De la Metherie, there is an attempt by De Luc to show, on scientific and *scriptural* principles, the condition of the earth before the appearance of the sun. Playfair, confessedly, never read this letter. Judging of it by its title, he says, "the absurdity of such an undertaking admits of no apology, and the smile which it might excite if addressed merely to the fancy, gives place to indignation when it assumes the air of philosophic investigation."† The

* Philips and Daubeney in the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*, vol. 6, Mixed Sciences, page 797.

† Illustrations of the Huttonian Theory of the Earth, pp. 478—480, Note xxii. In a very recent work of science the writer introduces an argument from the Bible. In a note he says, "the author was advised to omit the fourteenth method—because a reference should never be made in scientific works to the Bible."—*Studies of the Earth*, by S. E. Coues, Washington, D. C. 1860. Page 76.

ground of this bitter scorn is the idea of going "out of nature in search of knowledge." That is, permitting Scripture to have any place or authority in science. It would, however, be unjust to represent this as a specimen of the feelings of all men of science, or to group those men in an indiscriminate moral companionship. This would be like classing together the teachers of all religions. The Christian minister, the heathen priest, the North American medicine-man, have certainly some points of similitude, but many more of opposition. Thus, also, in the world of philosophy. It has teachers differing in moral character as much as the Christian pastor does from the Imām or the Brahmin.

Very few scientific theories are essentially impious. They are made so by the spirit in which they are taught, rather than by their own intrinsic nature; but almost any one of them, if perverted, may become a dangerous antagonist to religion. Saints and martyrs might believe that skulls are vertebrated; they might innocently be further persuaded that the cavities and limbs of the body correspond with the cavities and jaws of the head. But all the demons of the Hartz would be less terrible than the grotesque atheism that Oken held in connection with the alleged vertebration of the deer's skull found by him on those mountains. Any old-fashioned Christian, beginning with the nebular hypothesis and resolving the fire-mist into chaos, might, if need be, proceed to the creation of the world in six ordinary days. But La Place gave to that hypothesis a significance which excludes Deity from the universe. In every community there are many who dislike religious restraint and the authority of God. The more ambitious amongst these wish to be gods themselves in their own small way; and they hope by means of science to gratify this desire. If nothing more is gained, they may at least escape from the Bible. It is easy to find plausible hypotheses concerning strata, fossil remains, Egyptian hieroglyphics, or the races of mankind, which are utterly at variance with the Scriptures. With little or no investigation, views are adopted which free the soul from all unpleasant belief in the Book which tells of the strait gate, the narrow way, and camels passing through a needle's eye.

We believe, and shall attempt to prove, that revealed religion, as understood by the church of Christ, is entitled to a high pre-eminence over the theories of science. Examining the principles which underlie all systems of natural philosophy, we find that physical science must ever be to a large degree uncertain. It depends upon the investigations of imperfect and fallible men. They, at the utmost, can obtain but a very small portion of the premises required to solve most of the problems of nature. Fresh discoveries of facts constantly modify or reverse theories resting on insufficient grounds. So far as natural science has any valid rules for progress, it derives them in part from principles which religion gives directly or indirectly; or else from principles which avail more for the establishment of religion than of philosophy. Whilst examining the logical basis of scientific systems, we shall inquire into the truth of that modern canon of philosophy which asserts that existing causes, acting at their present rates, have produced all that we find in nature. The logical strength of religion shall afterwards be contrasted with the imperfection of science. Christianity receives its essential truths directly and fully from God. He has constituted such a connection between himself and the spiritual church, that she, though not infallible, is the appropriate and safe interpreter of Scripture. Consequently no one can be a rational philosopher who does not at least treat with modest caution and respectful candour, those expositions of the Bible which are commonly received by the church. But, before proceeding to consider any of these points, we must notice a formidable difficulty which meets us at the outset.

Men of science have alleged that religious teachers, even great Protestant divines, have ignorantly opposed their views of Scripture to the advance of genuine science. The examples of this which they give, are taken from astronomy. Dr. Pye Smith and Hugh Miller tell us that Voetius, Heidegger, and Turretine, denied the motion of the earth, and quoted the Bible against Copernicus. But those theologians did exactly what the philosophers demand. *They interpreted Scripture according to the science popular in their day and country.* Voetius relies on the authority of all "natural philosophers,"

“excepting one or two of the ancients” and the Copernicans. The Copernican system was rejected by all the Aristotelians, by Tycho Brahe, and by Lord Bacon, (*Adv. of Lear.* book iii. ch. iv. also *Novum Organon*, book ii. Aph. xxxvi.) The mistake of those great divines consisted in their permitting science to stamp its interpretation on the Bible; the traditionary error, thus made orthodox, survived even to the time of Turretine.

Besides this, we must distinguish between the claims of mathematical astronomy, and those of other branches of science. Nothing else in natural philosophy is at all likely to secure a position of similar certainty. “Why has mathematical analysis been able to adapt itself with such admirable success to the most profound study of celestial phenomena? Because they are, in spite of popular appearances, much more simple than any others. The most complicated problem which they present, that of the modification produced in the motions of two bodies tending towards each other, by virtue of their gravitation, by the influence of a third body acting on both of them in the same manner, is much less complex than the most simple terrestrial problem.” “The whole of organic physics, and probably also the most complicated parts of inorganic physics are necessarily inaccessible by their nature to our mathematical analysis.”* It is unfair to argue the ultimate triumph of other physical theories because those of mathematical astronomy are now established.

We proceed to consider the principles which constitute the basis of physical science.

Since the time of Lord Bacon, the method of investigating nature by induction, has been critically and profoundly examined. It has thus been made more complete, accurate, and valuable. We may regard the following rules and principles as including so much of this method as belongs to the matters now under consideration.

1. Before a scientific theory can be established as certainly true, we must collect all the facts or phenomena which belong

* *Philosophy of Mathematics*, translated from the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* par M. Comte. By W. M. Gillespie. New York, 1851. Pages 34, 37.

to the right decision of the questions necessarily entering into that theory, or else we must have an equivalent for such a collection. These facts or phenomena, or their equivalent, must be thoroughly understood in all the relations essentially connected with the subject matter of the theory.

2. An actual, universal collection of such facts and phenomena is commonly impossible, except in geometric, or other mathematical researches. In respect to most of the questions of physical science, we can obtain only a portion of the facts and phenomena which belong essentially to the subject investigated. Those which we obtain cannot be the basis of a safe induction unless they represent, or imply, the other facts and phenomena which lie beyond the scope of actual knowledge, or unless they are such as exclude the possibility of the truth of any theory except that which we would establish. So far as this representative, or excluding character is doubtful, there must be corresponding doubt as to all theories which rest on these imperfect premises.

3. Sooner or later in our investigations we shall need to form a supposition, or hypothesis, with which to collect scattered facts into one group. Whewell calls this the "Colligation of Facts." Borrowing a thought from Kepler, he regards the hypothesis as a string which ties up the sticks in one fagot.* But throughout this process, our aim should be, not to reconcile facts with our hypothesis, but rather to modify the hypothesis so that it may agree with the facts.

4. It is sometimes given by men of science as a test of true theories, that they shall lead to the discovery of some other truths hitherto unknown; as, for example, when Le Verrier discovered a new planet by reasoning from a previously established theory of the universe. But this rule must be taken with caution. Part of a theory may be true, and part false, and the true portion may lead to the discovery. The Hindoo astronomy, false as a theory, enables the Brahmins to foretell eclipses.

5. Powerful confirmation is given to a theory when we reach

* Kepler made nineteen wrong guesses as to the orbit of Mars, and pursued each to a demonstration of its falsehood, before he hit upon and proved the true theory that it is elliptical.

the same conclusion by independent trains of argument, arising from distant premises. But this of course depends for its value on the accuracy of each of these independent arguments. Before we thoroughly understand all the facts and conditions requisite for a just conclusion, it is very possible to make falsehoods seem to agree with and sustain each other.

6. So far as we fall short of absolute certainty that we know all the deciding facts or phenomena, and all their deciding relations, in the same proportion must our laws, theories, or hypotheses be uncertain. If, for aught that we know to the contrary, there lie outside of our knowledge innumerable unknown facts, which, if known, might seriously modify our conclusions, then all that we can attain is an hypothesis which may, or may not, be true.

But we have not yet reached the foundation principle of scientific progress. We have not come to the idea which justifies our advance from what we know to the truths which lie outside of the sphere of our present knowledge. Especially must we ascertain by what right some facts may be taken as representative of, or implying, others which are out of view. Perhaps we have seen a thousand instances of water heated above the boiling point. In each case it became vapour. But there have been, are, or may be, countless millions of instances of water thus heated of which we know nothing. How shall we reason from the known cases to the unknown, and feel certain that in all the water will be vaporized at boiling heat? By what right do we take comparatively, few facts as representing innumerable others which must for ever be unknown to us? Why are we not bound to make a perfect enumeration of all particulars before we frame a general law?

The great principle which underlies all physical theories and laws of nature is, that *the ordinary operation of nature is uniform*. Mill calls this "the fundamental principle or general axiom of induction." *Logic*, p. 184. Under similar conditions nature always acts in a similar manner. If Mars has an atmospheric condition like ours, a glass prism would refract sunlight there as here. From the unvarying course of known

phenomena we form the laws of refraction. We believe those laws to be universal, because the ordinary operation of nature is uniform. But we need to settle the authority of this foundation law itself. Why do we believe that under similar physical conditions nature will act uniformly?

If this law be an induction from our observation of nature, as Mill would have us believe, it is good for very little. No logical principle is better established, or more self-evidently correct, than this, that we must never state universally in the conclusion, any term which is not given universally in one of the premises. The course of nature, so far as we know it, is uniform; miracles and abnormal events excepted. But what we know is only an infinitesimal part of the entire course of nature, past, present, and future. Because an inappreciably small part is uniform, we cannot logically conclude from this, that the inconceivably greater whole is the same. Mere induction can never rightfully go a hair's-breadth beyond facts which we know, or which are included in others that are known.* One step beyond this runs into the logical error of drawing conclusions more extensive than the premises warrant. We reason in a circle when we attempt to prove this axiom of inductive philosophy by means of induction from known phenomena. The point to be proved is, that nature, under similar conditions, acts uniformly. We begin by asserting that observed phenomena pursue a uniform course. But before we can reason from this to the unspeakably greater number of phenomena unseen and unknown by us, we must, by some means, have a right to assume that those which have been observed, represent, in this respect, those which never have been observed. Here we come logically to a stand-still. Is there such uniformity in nature that we can be certain that the laws which govern the unknown are uniform and identical with those that govern what is known, so that we may reason from what we have seen to what we do not see? This is the very point to be decided. Until it is proved, we have no right to assume it. We cannot have a right to say that the known

* Playfair regards Bacon (*Nov. Org.* b. I. Aph. I.) as teaching that man cannot extend his knowledge "a hair's-breadth beyond his experience and observation of the present state of things."—*Illus. of Hist. Theo.*, &c., p. 19.

phenomena are representative, until we ascertain the uniformity of nature; and yet unless we can say that they are representative, we cannot reason from them so as to make out uniformity. Indeed, without this principle of the uniformity of nature, induction would be good for nothing, except to group ascertained facts under narrow generalizations. Induction, therefore, cannot prove this foundation axiom, which has to be added to the results of induction in order that it may extend beyond the limits of facts already known.

We admit that in order to form probable theories, and for practical purposes, empirical laws of nature, generalized from imperfect premises, may often satisfy us. In such cases, we must be content with the best we can get, and high probability is good enough. But when science asks any class of learned men to surrender or modify their beliefs, she is bound to show that she stands on logical ground, as good, at least, as theirs. If she requires the world to receive her theories as final truth, she is bound to prove by the most rigid logic, without a single flaw, the whole of her case from the first to the last.

Intelligent men who never inquired minutely into the foundation of their belief in the uniformity of universal nature, are apt to regard it as a sort of self-evident conclusion from the uniformity of so much as is seen by us. They may admit that it is impossible, in strict logic, to substantiate such a wide conclusion, from the narrow premises given by observation; but still there seems to be even a sort of necessity for our believing, as a universal rule, what we learn on a limited scale. If all that we know flows in one direction, it is claimed that, in the absence of contrary evidence, we have a right to say that all the rest is similar. If logic refuses to justify this conclusion, it will be amply borne out by instinct and common sense. Such has seemed to us to be the substance of the reasoning of some who contend for the principle, whilst admitting that severe logical proof is impossible.

But it is a striking truth that instinct and common sense never thus acted to aid philosophy, except where the Bible has been known. *We* receive the principle of the uniformity of nature almost as if it were self-evident. But it never was so

perceived by the ancient Greek philosophers as to avail for purposes of scientific progress.

What has been effected in philosophy without the Bible, may be learned from the fossil remains of human intellect obtained from Magna Grecia, Athens, and Alexandria; or the whole carcasses of it still to be found on the banks of the Ganges. From these we know that the heathen sages never taught accurately and adequately how science is to advance. That which prevented their progress was mainly their ignorance of the practical value and logical significance of this identical principle that we are considering. Other principles which appropriately belong to inductive investigation, are to be found sufficiently delineated in the writings of Aristotle.* But neither he nor any of his disciples, nor any other heathen philosopher, so understood that method as to use it for the advancement of human knowledge. In their hands induction was useless, because they did not unite with it the principle of the uniform action of nature under similar conditions. This is strikingly manifested in Plato's dialogue, called *Meno*, and by the remarks of Aristotle, made in connection with what is taught in that dialogue. The question is asked, How can we proceed from the known to what is now unknown? *We* can see, but *they* did not, that to assert the uniformity of nature is essential to an adequate reply. *Meno* presents this dilemma; if what we seek is known we need not search for it; if unknown, we shall not know what to search for. Plato makes Socrates reply that the soul is immortal (i. e. eternal.) It has inhabited all worlds and known all things. Scientific discovery is only an awakening of memory. Investigation of truth is but the calling our past knowledge out of obscurity. Aristotle refers to this question, and in his solution of it expresses the general idea of induction (*Post. Analyt.* book i. ch. 1.) But he gives nothing better than a mathematical illustration. First we conclude that triangles contain (angles equal to) two right angles. Thus having formed a general rule from known particulars, we assert concerning all triangles, even those the actual existence of

* *Post. Analyt.* book i. ch. 1 and 18. *Topica*, book i. ch. 12, book viii. ch. 8.

which is unknown, that they contain two right angles. But mathematics deal with fixed relations; and physical science with contingent, and partly unknown phenomena. Aristotle's answer, therefore, as he illustrates it, fails in respect to physics, as completely as that of Socrates or Plato. Nor does it appear that Aristotle and his followers ever surmounted the difficulty arising from an inability to collect all the particular phenomena connected with physical questions. (See *Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, &c. vol. ii. p. 73.) It is indeed well known to everybody, as a matter of fact, that neither the Aristotelians, nor the Platonists, nor any other heathen philosophic sect, had any available knowledge of the inductive method. And yet we find scattered through the works of Aristotle, an outline of that method, but it was useless for purposes of practical advance. Manifestly, not one of the Greek or Roman philosophers regarded the uniformity of nature as the true and sufficient basis for systems of science. Nor did the scientific world rise above their limits until the Scriptures had diffused through Christendom correct views of God as the Ruler of the universe.

The foundation axiom of inductive science, this law of the uniformity of nature, can be vindicated and established as a conclusion from what the Bible reveals concerning God. Let it be admitted that the universe is governed by a personal Deity, who has infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, and by one or two obvious logical steps we may deduce from this the doctrine of the ordinary uniformity of nature; and the Bible, wherever known, would irresistibly suggest this idea. Departures from uniformity are in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament attributed to the direct interposition of God, changing his regular course. The history in the first and second chapters of Genesis implies a uniform course of natural operations, as ordained by the Creator. In chap. viii. 22, we find the assertion, "While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold, and heat, and summer, and winter, and day, and night, shall not cease." This implies considerable uniformity as being certain in some important natural operations. The covenant with Noah in chapter ix. extends the application of this principle. Moses,

in the 90th Psalm, and the writer of the book of Job, distinctly teach that the universe is governed by laws which are to act until the purposes of God are accomplished. Solomon was the greatest physical philosopher of his day. (1 Kings iv. 30—34.) He formally asserts this principle: "The thing that hath been is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done." (Eccl. i. 9.) It is to be noticed that Solomon applies these words to natural, as well as moral, phenomena. The sun rising and setting, the circuit of the wind, rivers flowing to the sea, are given as examples of the application of this universal rule. The sacred writers, from David to the apostle John, in hundreds of passages, assert, at least by necessary implication, their belief in the ordinary uniformity of natural operations as being secured by the character of God. Various well known national peculiarities prevented the Jews, as a people, from making progress in natural science, notwithstanding their knowledge of its only safe foundation, which is the character of God. In this, as in many other matters, it was reserved for Christianity to make practical use of truths revealed under the ancient dispensation.

It is probable that, as a rule for practical use, we obtain this law of the uniformity of nature, partly as a consequence loosely drawn from our idea of God, and partly from a logically imperfect, but yet satisfactory, induction from visible nature. But, as a philosophical rule, it cannot be established except by reasonings logically deduced from what is taught in the Scriptures concerning the character and providential government of God.

The world of science appears to be indebted to the Church for that foundation axiom of induction which makes it possible for the philosopher to advance from the known to the unknown in nature.*

Not only does a belief in the existence of Jehovah thus

* Thomson, in his "Laws of Thought," part iv. sect. 119, fully recognizes the logical wrong of using induction to prove laws more extended than are the facts given in the premises. He, like Mill, would prove by induction the great canon of the uniformity of nature; but he confesses that thus "it partakes of the same formal defect that may be charged against other inductive results, viz. that its terms are wider than our experience can warrant." Again he

underlie all valid induction, but that truth needs to be kept in view as a polar star by those who would make safe progress in the knowledge of his creation. The history of science gives little encouragement to trust in even the physical philosophy of atheists. "The scientific speculations which produced an opposite tendency (i. e. opposite to belief in an intelligent Creator,) were generally those which, though they might deal familiarly with known physical truths, and conjecture boldly with regard to the unknown, did not add to the number of solid generalizations." (*Whewell's History of Inductive Science*, vol. iii. p. 515.) In this connection, Agassiz tells deep truths. Noticing the invisible thread which unwinds through the immense diversities of animated existence, he follows till it leads him to God; "Dieu personnel, auteur premier de toutes choses, regulateur du monde entier, dispensateur de tous les biens." This belief inclines and fits us to investigate truth for its own sake, and he expresses a conviction that if students of natural science would keep it in view, they would be more likely to make sure and rapid progress even in the special domain of the direct observation of nature. (*Recherches sur les Poissons Fossiles*, tome i., page 172, edition of Neufchatel, 5 vols. in 2.)

We now reach the margin of what has often been an enemy's country. From the days of Hutton until the present time, some of the most dangerous efforts of infidelity on the field of physical science have been made by means of a principle

says, "We draw a universal canon from an experience less than universal, and then employ it to justify us in drawing other universal truths from other particular experiences." By means of analysis and synthesis (Newton's method) he would establish laws of nature. But still he has to omit the almost infinite number of unknown cases which, if known, might reverse or modify the law. Much more satisfactory is Dr. W. D. Wilson in his *Treatise on Logic*. (Part II. chapter iii. section 5.) He represents a law of nature as an "indication of the Divine will and conception." "Therefore we expect all individuals in any class to conform to the essentials of that class, which essentials we are learning one after another by induction." This requires our belief that God ordinarily acts uniformly. In a note on page 312, Dr. Wilson quotes from Professor Agassiz, as follows: "To be understood well, the true relations of the system of nature ought to be considered as an analysis of the thought expressed by the Creator." This, of course, would make the canon of uniformity arise from, and depend on, the character and will of God.

which needs careful examination. It is assumed that the law of the uniformity of nature, which we have been considering, implies that the causes and the rate of action, in natural operations, have always been such as are operating at present. Dispensing scientifically with supernatural causes or action, this principle easily becomes anti-scriptural, if not atheistic. Let it be admitted that natural causes never acted with more than their present energy and rapidity, and that none ever operated except such as are now in existence, and we may be forced to accept theories of the formation of our world utterly at variance with any fair interpretation of the Scriptures. Very inconsistently, some believers in the Bible have adopted this principle, but most commonly it has been a favourite stronghold for infidels and atheists. Hutton fairly exhibited its tendency, when he said, "In the economy of the world, I can find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end.*"

The outside world looks at certain popular and dangerous systems, and wonders at the vastness and apparent strength of the structure. Researches, discoveries, astronomy, chemistry, botany, comparative anatomy, geology, mathematics, the history

* Quoted by Lyell, "Principles of Geology," Philadelphia, 1837, vol. i. page 71. Featherstonhaugh says that Hutton "presents the earth to us as a pure self-acting machine, operating eternal degradations and renewals." (*American Journal of Geology and Natural Science*, vol. i. page 254.) Such a belief assimilates naturally with the idea, "that all past changes on the globe had been brought about by the slow agency of existing causes." Playfair and Lyell felt, or affected to feel, displeasure at the charges of irreligion against their master. But neither can show that Hutton himself ever took pains to prevent the infidel effects of his views on the public mind. Lyell intimates his own belief that "the scheme of the universe may be infinite in *time* and space." (*Principles of Geology*, i. page 414.) If God is included in this universe, the words "may be" imply doubt of his eternity. If, as is more probable, the passage refers only to the physical universe, then the possibility of *it* being eternal and uncreated is asserted. But, with this conditional atheism in the first volume, in vol. ii. page 507, he represents it as a strange misconception to suppose that by "infinite in time and space," he meant anything more than "a minute and infinitesimal point in infinite space," and "a mere infinitesimal portion of eternity." How far we must accept as sincere the religious concessions of this writer, is made somewhat doubtful by his remark on page 75 of vol. i., that "we may feel regret, but must not blame" that "want of moral courage" which caused certain eminent scientific men to be "guilty of dissimulation" "out of deference to popular prejudices."

of the past and promises for the future; all are arrayed and combined in support of theories which sometimes are purposely so constructed as to conflict with the Bible.

But the keystone of the immense arch on which this temple of science rests is the principle that causes similar to those now in operation, and acting at their present rate, or substantially so, are to be regarded as having produced the former conditions of our earth. If this be false, the theories which rest on it, like the house built on the sand, fall with a great crash.

We deny the truth of this principle, and shall sustain this denial by showing, 1. That its advocates have failed to prove it, or even to state it in an available form. 2. That admitted natural facts are at variance with it. 3. That its most distinguished advocates have repeatedly been driven to abandon this principle.

1. The principle that the causes and rate of action in natural operations have always been such as are now in operation, has never been proved. It is not a self-evident truth; it rather contradicts the popular belief of mankind, if we may judge from the voice of nearly all religions and of all non-atheistic systems of philosophy. No one pretends that God has revealed it. Excluding self-evidence and revelation we have but one source left from whence this principle, if valid, can have come. It is logical reasoning, inductive or deductive. But we may safely challenge its advocates to state the accurate and well authenticated facts from which this principle can possibly be learned as a legitimate induction. In like manner we demand the well settled axioms of physical science from which we may derive it by deduction.

Its greatest advocate at the present day, Lyell, plainly showed that he did not know where to find logical proof for it, both when he wrote and when he suppressed the sentence recommending "an earnest and patient endeavour to reconcile the former indications of change with the evidence of gradual mutations now in progress."* Could he have ventured to assert as a clear result from safe premises the principle that

* Lyell's Prin. of Geology, book iv. chap. i., edit. of 1837. This attracted so much attention as violating the cardinal principles of induction by advising that we attempt to *prove*, rather than simply to *investigate*, an hypothesis, that

former changes arose from such "gradual mutations" as are "now in progress," (which is the foundation principle of all his system,) he assuredly would distinctly have laid down this vital truth, and would have stated its proof with something like clear and definite logical reasoning. Nor would he have silently changed its form into that of a suggestion to be inquired into, when it was assailed. He thus admitted that this corner-stone principle is, at the best, but a probability, the truth of which has yet to be investigated. Presently we shall see, that he and others of the most distinguished advocates of this idea abandon it whenever they are embarrassed by its operation. We may, therefore, well believe that it never yet has been proved to their own satisfaction.

We may also object to this idea its cloudy indistinctness. It is not well enough defined to be good for anything. No one can pretend to decide what *are* the causes now in existence; or what *is* their rate of action. Some natural operations greatly exceed in rapidity others of the same general nature. Is it certain that we have ascertained the limits of such variations? In the year 1759, the volcano of Jorullo, in Mexico, rose in a single night from the level ground to the height of 1600 feet. At this rate it would require but a few weeks to throw up mountain ranges greater than the Himalayas or the Andes. In 1783, the volcano of Skaptar Jokul, in Iceland, poured out two currents of lava, which, together, were equal to any continuous rock formation in England. In like manner we may take the more violent actings of wind, water, lightning, and other natural agencies. How shall we limit the rate of action of any natural agency whatever? If it be said that the *average* rate is to be taken, we may ask with Whewell, "Why must we insist upon it that man has been long enough an observer to obtain the average of forces which are changing through immeasurable time?"

Lyell expunged it after the fifth edition, and quietly placed it in book i. chap. xiii., as a recommendation to "an earnest and patient *inquiry*, how far geological appearances are reconcilable with the effect of changes now in progress." Whewell notices that even this, as Lyell brings it forward, is an unphilosophical "previous pleading" against the opposite doctrine. See note K. A. to book xviii. of Whewell's *History of Inductive Science*, vol. iii. p. 695. We may further regard this course of Sir Charles Lyell as a tacit but unequivocal confession of inability to maintain the great principle of his system.

2. Admitted natural facts are at variance with this principle. No physical truth is more familiar than that, in the beginning of many operations, there is great rapidity of action, which continues until equilibrium is produced, or the original causes are exhausted. Thus we find it in combustion, and in various chemical operations. But it is eminently probable that fire and chemical combination were largely concerned in the formation of our earth. Analogy would lead to the belief of a more vigorous action at first than now, when nature is probably in a state of comparative equilibrium. Geology is constrained to insist on a former very warm condition of our earth, if she would account for its condition by means of known causes. In like manner she is forced by this very principle to teach that formerly there was seven-fold more of carbonic acid in the atmosphere than now. But such a temperature, and an excess of carbonic acid gas, must have produced many results with a rapidity now unknown. If it were not so, then *this* would be a marvellous departure from the principle of uniformity in nature.

Still further: Geology has been constrained to accept creation. When entirely new types of life appear in any geologic era, they have to be accounted for by new creations. We may regard Professor Le Conte as expressing the conclusions of science on this subject when he says, "*As far as the evidence of geology extends, each species was introduced by the direct miraculous interference of a personal intelligence.*" (*Smithsonian Report*, 1857, p. 168. The italics are those of Prof. Le Conte.) But what are the conditions under which the creative power of God is exerted? Science is utterly unable to answer, for creation is a miracle, and therefore beyond her range. The original action of nature may have been, not only rapid, but even instantaneous.

3. The advocates of the principle in question, are frequently obliged to relinquish it. Of this we shall give a few striking examples.

Hutton's system depended on the principle "that all past changes on the globe had been brought about by the slow agency of existing causes." (*Lyell*.) Playfair is the acknowledged expositor and vindicator of this system. Kirwan

demanding the source of such heat as Hutton's igneous theory needs. According to Saussure's experiments, Hutton has to account for a degree of heat more than forty times as intense as the volcanic fire of Etna. Playfair goes to the hot stars and sun in search of this intense heat, but soon returns, apparently not satisfied. He then tells Kirwan that "friction is a source of heat unlimited, for what we know, in its extent, and so, perhaps, are other operations both chemical and mechanical." At last he says, "but if the only thing imputable to him (Dr. Hutton) is, that, being led by induction to admit the fusion of mineral substances in the bowels of the earth, he has assumed the existence of such heat as was sufficient for this fusion, though he is unable to assign the cause of it, I believe it will be found that his system only shares in an imperfection which is common to all physical theories, and which the utmost improvement of science will never completely remove. Thus then we are led, it must be allowed, into the region of hypothesis and conjecture, but by no means into that of chimeras." (*Illust. of Hut. Theory, &c.*, pp. 181—190.)

If all this is what is meant by "the slow agency of existing causes," the most violent believers in extraordinary catastrophes and convulsions need not hesitate to accept such a theory of uniform action. Nares might well say that no theory contains more extraordinary causes than Hutton's.

We have noticed already a striking case in which Sir Charles Lyell silently withdrew this principle from the place he had impliedly assigned to it amongst settled truths. In other instances we may find him directly abandoning it. Wishing to get rid of results deduced from the laws of compression of bodies below the surface of the earth, he says, "It is more than probable, however, that after a certain degree of condensation, the compressibility of bodies may be governed by laws altogether different from those which we can put to the test of experiment."* In this remarkable passage, it is conceded

* Principles of Geology, vol. i., p. 452 (book ii. chap. xviii.) By the laws of compression, as learned by actual experiment, water at a depth of three hundred and sixty-two miles should be as heavy as mercury. Steel should, at the earth's centre, be compressed to one-fourth of its bulk. This seems to conflict with La Place's estimate of the specific gravity of the earth as being only $5\frac{1}{2}$.

that, at a certain depth below the earth's surface, there may be laws of gravity differing from those we see in operation; or else that those laws will fail to act there as on the surface; or else that something, now unknown to us, will there act instead of gravity to decide the degree of the compression of bodies. This, if true, requires us to be very cautious in our attempts to decide, or conjecture the causes or the rate of action, of remote and unseen natural operations.

In another passage Lyell concedes that the former rapid and energetic action of natural agencies is in some important respects incapable of being made scientifically improbable. He says, "We are so unacquainted with the true sources of subterranean disturbances, that their former violence may in theory be multiplied indefinitely without its being possible to prove the same manifest contradiction and absurdity," i. e. the same "contradiction and absurdity" that he supposes there would be in the idea that torrents and moving waters once exerted an energy many thousand times greater than at present. (*Prin. of Geol.*, vol. i. 56, book i. chap. iii.)

We might add examples of a similar abandonment of this principle from Le Conte's Lectures on Coal; but it is unnecessary. He, inconsistently, contends for it, but repeatedly alleges facts which make it impossible. Such are the (alleged) early heat of the earth, the quantity of carbonic acid in the air, &c. He admits that "the most numerous class (of geologists) hold that the agencies of nature have decreased in energy from the earliest times until now." This is undoubtedly correct.

We have been the more thorough in examining the validity of this assumed principle, because it contains elements which are capable of becoming very pernicious. It is a poisonous weed which some have endeavoured to cultivate and expand into an upas-tree. The respectability of others who hold it with a better spirit should not make us lose sight of its tendencies to infidelity, and, perhaps, atheism.

There yet remain two elements of scientific progress so eminently important, and so imperfectly recognized in their true significance by most modern philosophers, that they require distinct notice. One of them is ADAPTATION OF MEANS TO AN

END BY AN INTELLIGENT FIRST CAUSE. Geoffroy St. Hillaire says, "I take care not to ascribe to God any intention," (i. e. in creating animals, &c.) He also says, "I know not an animal which has to play a part in nature."* But science cannot afford to cast away the belief that means are intentionally adapted to their ends by an intelligent First Cause. Sad havoc would ensue amongst geologic theories, for example, if we refuse to ascribe intelligent intentions to the Creator. All recent geologic theories depend essentially on a belief that the fossils found in different strata were once living plants, zoophytes, mollusca, fishes, or beasts. Time was when fossils were by some regarded as *lusus naturæ*. Voltaire contended for this when shells and fishes, found on inland mountains, were regarded as proofs of Noah's flood. But geology laughs to scorn those who believe that the stone shells, and skeletons, the coal calamites, and ferns, never were living animals or plants, but accidental forms; freaks of nature, like the calf with two heads. It is, however, impossible for the geologist to disprove this supposition except on the ground of a Creator, who intelligently adapts means to their ends. Let this be rejected, and, notwithstanding the contempt of science, the old idea of plastic nature, (e. g. a property which makes matter spontaneously assume different forms,) or the more modern idea of molecular attraction, producing such effects, will become as probable as any other supposition.

* "Je me garde de prêter au Dieu aucune intention." "Je ne connais point d'animal qui doit jouer un rôle dans la nature." (Quoted by Whewell.) St. Hillaire does not deny that God has intentions, but he demands that all arguments from them be excluded from science. Whewell gives a curious specimen of this naturalist's reasoning ability. St. Hillaire says, "I have read concerning fishes that because they live in a medium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculated so as to give them the power of progression under those circumstances. By this mode of reasoning you would say of a man who used crutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having a leg paralyzed or amputated." Here we have an eminent physical philosopher, the author of the European school of *Analogues*, incapable of distinguishing between the case of powers and faculties being adapted to the end they have to attain, and the case in which new instrumentalities are substituted when the original ones fail to attain the proposed end, or when they are entirely lost. St. Hillaire should deny that either the original leg, or the crutch, was made with an intention that it should be used for walking. This would be a parallel to his philosophy.

Argillo-calcareous matter has been formed by molecular attraction into the semblance of a human head and face, with a head-dress on; of a cat; of a broad-brimmed hat. (*Hitchcock's Elements of Geol.* p. 25.) Frost makes water crystallize on window panes so as to be like ferns, flowers, fishes, and what not. Stalactites are found in various shapes, and travertin is sometimes formed with extraordinary undulations and in laminated spheroids which cannot be traced with certainty to any known causes. Who shall set limits to the possible variety of forms in which the component parts of rocks may be aggregated? Why should not the ingredients of a fossil bone take that form as well without, as with, a living animal? Shall we say that nature always exhibits bones and shells as belonging to living animals? This is contradicted by the myriads of fossils themselves. No mortal eye is supposed ever to have seen a living animal in that fossil shell, or in any other of the same species, or even genus. On the seashore are countless millions of shells without animal life in them. On principles exclusively physical it would be impossible to prove that shells, bones, &c., may not exist apart from animal life, or that the carbonaceous matter of a coal-pit may not take the form of a tree as naturally as other carbonaceous matter does in a forest. Admit that both were formed by a wise and intelligent Being, who adapts means to their ends, and it becomes preeminently probable that the coal fossil was once a tree, and that the bones once constituted part of a living ichthyosaurus or pterodactyle. Take away the agency of such a Being, and, for aught that appears, the bones came to be such by chance, or by occult laws of nature which sometimes create living animals and sometimes dried skeletons.

This great truth of Divine agency, which is so fundamental to science, has a significance far beyond that which most philosophers assign to it. Not only does it prove that fossils are a record of former vegetable and animal life, it sweeps onward through all the great doctrines of natural religion. It bears us to the edge of the open portal of the most holy place, the oracle of the sacred Scriptures. That God, who adapted so wondrously the plants and animals of geologic eras to each other; who gave fresh water to the animals of lacustrine and

fluviatile fossils, and salt water to the pelagic; who produced beauty, order, strength, convenience, by means of such violent and destructive agents as fire and water; who arranged the planets and the stars; the marvels of air, electricity, gravitation, and life; He, certainly, is not limited to what we have thus discovered. Waiting for further knowledge, we may once more recognize in science a great principle which admits of being applied far beyond the precincts of mere physical philosophy. It is the principle of HISTORICAL VERITY. When the astronomer or geologist gives instruction as to the present condition of the universe, he requires us to rely on human testimony in respect to whatever we have not seen for ourselves. Whenever science teaches that which in part, or entirely, belongs to the past, she requires us to rely on historical information. All existing physical scientific systems must perish if historic verity cannot be relied on. Cut off the geologist from reliance on written testimony, and how much will he be able to retain of his science? The larger portion of the leaves of the "Great Stone Book" has, after all, to be read from paper sheets. He who has learned the most of the "Testimony of the Rocks" has heard it chiefly from human witnesses.

But we need, in regard to this principle also, to see what follows from admitting it. If La Place had a right to receive as truth the testimony of Hipparchus about the position of the stars two thousand years ago, (and we do not for a moment doubt it,) then other people may have an equal, or superior, right to believe what very much better authenticated witnesses, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, tell of what they saw eighteen hundred years ago. Those records which, more completely than any others of equal antiquity, satisfy the demands of the rules of evidence, bring unequivocal miracles into the list of well authenticated phenomena. Let the miracle be what it may, we must at least take it as a vast and wonderful departure from the ordinary course of nature. Without reliance on historic verity, no theory of astronomy or geology can stand for a moment. But, if we are to rely on the truth of history, science must accept miracles, and also a high, undefined, possibility of any operation between what we commonly see of nature and miracle itself. The probability of such events is

limited only by our power to show that any alleged extraordinary operations are not likely to have been instituted by such a one as God.

In view of all the principles stated thus far, we may look at science in two very different aspects. 1. As simply human, physical, and irreligious. In this light we can have no guaranty for the value of its theories, and alleged laws of nature, except in comparatively few cases, most of which are mathematical. 2. As connected with, and subordinate to, religious truth—by which we mean the Bible. In this aspect we may rely on much that science teaches. It is a doctrine of the Scriptures (not of physical philosophy) that God desires to be glorified by his creatures perceiving his eternal power and Godhead from the creation and government of the material universe. This gives a force and security to the conclusions of cautious inductive philosophy which otherwise they never could have. From the Bible we may infer that God does not use his power, ordinarily or miraculously, to baffle and mislead our humble attempts to see him in his works. Of course, many of the conclusions of science must be true and reliable. Religion has produced an impression on the community which men insensibly connect with the meagre conclusions of mere philosophy. Even infidels, unconsciously perhaps to themselves, appeal to a state of popular feeling which never could have existed, if the community had not been pervaded by principles learned originally from the Scriptures.

Valuable service has been rendered to science by the Christian religion teaching so impressively the value of truth. The decisive stress laid by the Christian system on faith as the great instrument of salvation, is a demand for the subjection of the soul to the power of truth, and for the consequent avoidance of falsehood. It is difficult to estimate too highly the impulse thus communicated by the gospel to the minds of men. Truth is the light which marks the road to heaven; falsehood is the darkness which hangs over the path to hell. This could not be received as religious doctrine without producing an impression of the value of all kinds of truth. Science became vigorous when she breathed this pure atmosphere, diffused by the church of Christ. Truth, as such, has never

been rightly estimated, except where Christianity has prevailed.

But if God demands from us belief of his testimonies, this implies that he is a faithful and true witness. That which he testifies is not limited to his written word. The Scriptures themselves require us to believe in his works and his providence, as implying still further a witness of his character and will. No one can be acquainted with either the Old or New Testament without perceiving that visible nature is designed as a part of God's testimony to mankind. This is asserted so clearly and prominently that it neither could nor did escape the notice of those who read the sacred volume. "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." "In Him we live and move and have our being." "The living God which made heaven and earth and the sea and all things that are therein—left not himself without witness, in that he did good and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." To these we may add many other similar passages; especially from the book of Psalms, of Job, and of Isaiah.

The veracity of God as a witness, whether in his works, or in his word, became a popular idea of Christianity, and, through the agency of the church, of nominal Christendom. No one acquainted with the ancient heathen writers needs to be informed that such was far from being their familiar idea of Deity. The poets, who formed the popular mind, do not hesitate to impute intentional deception to their gods. Doubtless some of the philosophers would, as an abstract doctrine, have admitted that veracity is an attribute of God. But neither they, nor the common people, looked upon nature as being designed to reveal a Creator who cannot lie.

It is taken for granted in the works of modern philosophers that men have, as it were, a *right* to discover truth when they use proper efforts. They admit the very limited power of science to search through nature, and also the logical wrong of drawing conclusions wider than the premises strictly warrant. Still it is felt that we are justified in assuming as absolutely

correct the universal laws formed from unvarying but infinitesimal experience. And, within certain limits, this is true. But it is only from the Bible that we can infer this right or learn the duty with which it is connected. Because it is morally fit for us to adore God as the Creator, he reveals himself to us in the visible universe. Our right to rely on careful and properly guarded scientific inductions depends on the confidence due to God who thus gives witness of himself. Infidel philosophy regards "nature" and scientific man as the deities to be relied on and glorified. In this, as in much else, she appropriates Christian truth to the service of falsehood, making such alterations as are essential to gain her end.

The Bible, especially the New Testament, is a book peculiarly well fitted to train the mind to accurate and systematic ratiocination. It shows by example how we are to combine scattered truths in general propositions, and also how we are to reason deductively from principles thus established. We may easily reduce to a strictly inductive form the scriptural arguments which terminate in the conclusion that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the Son of God. All that constitutes the substance of the inductive method is very obvious in the apostolical writings. Systematic theology is constructed so as clearly to exhibit that method. It takes religious facts instead of natural phenomena. From them it constructs a regular series of doctrines, just as the philosopher forms a system of science from facts obtained by investigating nature. Before Lord Bacon wrote, Melancthon, as a philosopher, and still more thoroughly, as a divine, had taught the principles of induction. If any one should take Melancthon's tract, entitled "A brief plan for the study of Divinity,"* and substituting natural phenomena instead of scriptural truths, should apply to the investigation of nature the method which it inculcates for the study of the Bible, such a one would be in the truest sense an inductive philosopher. It is a question worthy of examination how far the modern idea of induction arose from the mental discipline connected with the study of systematic writers on Bible doctrines. Certain it is that scriptural theologians,

* An abstract of this tract is given in the "History of the Church of Christ," published by the London Religious Tract Society, vol. vi. 449—452.

especially the inspired ones, gave to the world examples of the right kind of logic, long before either physical or metaphysical philosophers had just ideas in regard to the investigation of truth.

But even with the aid of religion, Natural Philosophy has not as much of certainty in its conclusions, as is generally supposed. Modern science has made wonderful progress. But this which is so much its pride is also its rebuke, when it offers theories as being finally and completely proved. No natural philosopher can ever feel secure that the next newspaper or scientific journal which he takes up, may not announce some experiment or discovery, which will overthrow much that now is regarded as firmly established. Every analogy of the past, and all the reason of the case, show that this is possible. The dying words of La Place were, "What we know is a small matter, what we do not know is immense." Sir John Herschell adopts the well known figure used by Newton. "Science, therefore, in relation to our faculties, still remains boundless and unexplored—we remain—standing on the shore of a wide ocean, from whose beach we may have culled some of those innumerable beautiful productions it casts up with lavish prodigality, but whose acquisition can be regarded as no diminution of the treasures that remain." We may add the following from the same distinguished writer: "There will occur a limit beyond which it is useless for merely human faculties to inquire; but where that limit is placed experience alone can teach us; and at least to assert that we have attained it, is now universally recognized as the sure criterion of dogmatism." If the unexplored fields of nature are thus unbounded, no one can foretell how great or how speedy may be the revolutions produced by new discoveries. Very instructive is the fact that one who writes on natural philosophy must be on his guard, lest he should become a laughing-stock, by believing what was accepted as sound science on many important points a century ago, or perhaps within half of that period. Philosophers who discovered the truth to-day, flout those who believe in the truth of last week, to be flouted in their turn a week hence. Few of the geologic or chemical theories of the eighteenth century continue to walk on all-fours. Many of them are already num-

bered with the respectable races of extinct mammalia; or the venerable but uncouth saurians of former eras. Fifty or a hundred years ago there were men whose authority was great in the world of science. But some of those stars are waning—Werner, Hutton, Playfair, with their cosmogonic theories; Bailly with his Preadamite Indian astronomical eras; the French *savans* with the zodiac of Dendera; the chemists before Lavoisier, with their phlogiston. And are not the atheistic physics of Oken; the analogues of St. Hillaire; the uniformitarian doctrines of Lyell; and the theory of different origins of men by Agassiz, inevitably tending to that Hades where so many once popular theories have already gone,

“to join

The innumerable caravan that moves
To that mysterious realm where each shall take
Its chamber, in the silent halls of death”?

It would indeed be more difficult to select those parts of natural science that are secure of life, than those that are likely to perish.

The analysis of scientific reasoning tends powerfully to produce scepticism in regard to much that is now esteemed by many to be settled truth, especially when that alleged truth seems to conflict with the far better proved truths of religion. But scepticism has so bad a character, that some may regard an attempt to repel scientific aggression by calling in such an ally, as being the same as though sheep should invoke the wolf to protect them against goats. We must therefore distinguish between religious and scientific scepticism.

There is no need to repeat the arguments which show that very much of scientific theory must be doubtful, because of the (to our view) infinite universe of facts which are beyond our reach and which may materially affect the conclusion. The powerful security of scriptural science consists in, and arises from, exactly the reverse in her case. She can, and does, include the Infinite in her premises; an Infinite *not* unknown, *quoad hoc*. Whether we look at those intuitive principles of right and wrong which underlie all religion, and which God himself gave to our souls; or at those internal and external testimonies by which the God of providence has authenticated the Bible as

his word; or at the direct communication between God and the hearts of Christians, by the Holy Ghost—far better established as fact than the greater part of the best proved phenomena of physics—in either of these cases we have the unequivocal testimony of God to the primary principles of religious truth. As rational beings we are frequently bound to call in question much that is very widely believed in as science. But this no more justifies religious scepticism than our right to doubt the accuracy of an engineer who has not surveyed the thousandth part of his field would justify our doubting the demonstrations of Euclid.

It is neither requisite nor practicable for us to exhibit in this article the force of the arguments in support of religious truth which we have just indicated. They may be found in many well-known, unanswered and unanswerable books. Works of the highest order of intellectual merit on moral science, on the evidences of Christianity, and in vindication of the reality of spiritual religion, may easily be procured. We are at liberty to refer for the proof of essential points to the writers who have thoroughly and professedly examined those particular subjects. It is thus that the geologist refers to the chemist, the anatomist, the botanist, in support of a large part of his positions. He justly requires all who doubt, to examine for themselves in the appropriate books. We have a right to do the same in regard to a matter of infinitely higher moment than any philosophy that human reason ever discovered or conceived of. We may justly complain, not now religiously, but philosophically, of those who profess to be teachers of their fellow-men in branches which require either a practical recognition or rejection of some parts of Christianity, and who set it all aside as if unworthy of notice. Not pretending to disprove the stupendous array of testimony and reasoning by which the Bible is shown to be the word of God, they pass it by in silence.

Amongst the Bible truths established by overwhelming evidence is the doctrine of the spiritual light and life of Christians. In all ages of the church there has been a class of persons distinguished from the rest of mankind by having received the wondrous gift of a supernatural spiritual illumination. To some degree, such light is possessed by every genuine member

of the church. If we admit this, can there be any rational doubt as to who are most likely to be sound interpreters of the Scriptures? Shall we learn the meaning of God's book from those who are in immediate communication with him, or from those whom he represents as having neither eyes, nor ears, nor heart, to appreciate his truth? We may admit that this illumination does not extend to mere science, even though scientific truth be mentioned in the Bible. But we have a right to regard it as belonging to all cases in which religious truth is complicated with physics. Whether the sun moves round the earth, or the earth round the sun; how many continents and what mountain ranges were above the surface of the ocean in Noah's day; are questions which seem to lie beyond the scope of those for the solution of which the aid of the Spirit of God is promised to believers. But questions which include the spiritual relations of the races of men to Adam or Christ, or which involve the connection between the sin of man and death, are of a very different nature. The church of Christ is not an infallible interpreter even on such points; at least not until she has sufficiently examined them with special prayer and waiting for Divine light; but very much less is any one else capable of deciding them authoritatively. Natural philosophers have no right to assume as certain any interpretation of Scripture which is not understood to be acceptable to those who fairly represent the light of the spiritual church. It is, however, to be remembered, that natural philosophers, who are themselves Christians, may frequently have peculiar advantages for the just interpretation of such parts of the Bible. But these pious philosophers are liable to err by mistaking the relative claims of religion and science. They may not always adequately remember how immeasurable is the superiority of a revelation from God, interpreted by "the children of light," who "have an unction from the Holy One and know all things," over the teachings of science, which, from beginning to end, have to be worked out by fallible human reason from very imperfectly known premises.

None who have taken the Bible as their guide have ever doubted this doctrine of the Divine illumination specially given to all true Christians. A mighty ocean of evidence flows down

through eighteen centuries, from all branches of the church, sustaining it as a catholic belief; "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." Tens of millions have experienced it for themselves. And we have our own eyes and ordinary reason by which to judge whether it is in the Bible. Rationalists, "liberal Christians," &c., who reject this doctrine, seldom have the effrontery to say that it is not taught by prophets and apostles. But if this stupendous advantage exists in the spiritual church, it is illogical and irrational to neglect or undervalue her opinion when science would investigate nature. Revelation and the true theory of nature are closely connected at so many points of contact that neither can be fully understood without the other. But revelation is older, better established, and more thoroughly investigated than natural science. By every title she may claim a superior place.

The ministers of Christ, if worthy of their office, are versed in the noblest of all sciences. Theology is such, not only in its subject matter, but also in the reasoning by which its great outlines are deduced from thoroughly proved first principles. But theologians need to be cautious when they would resist the aggressions of infidel natural philosophy. Such science is like a fortress built on soil where sappers and miners can easily work; but having walls too thickly compacted to be beaten down by direct battery. It is folly for one whose life is devoted to theological studies and pursuits to contend on their own field with those whose whole time and efforts are directed to natural science. An eminent philosopher, for example, alleges that a human skeleton has been found in a stratum a hundred thousand years old, or that the Falls of Niagara have been thirty thousand years receding from Queenstown to Goat Island. Nothing more than hardy assertion and a contemptuous allusion to investigations, which none but practical geologists can comprehend, is requisite to silence those who would argue against him directly. But the result may be very different if any one should analyze his arguments, and demand that he should produce all the conditions requisite for substantiating the conclusion. An ordinary pastor contending directly with a practical geologist about the age of certain strata, would probably make a poor figure. But if that pastor should insist

on the geologist proving that we are acquainted with the agencies formerly at work ; and also that Nature then acted at the same rate as now, the philosopher might, peradventure, make a much worse figure.

It is a grievous, but very common, superstition, to believe that philosophers are, of course, accurate reasoners because they are profound mathematicians, or extensive examiners of nature. Even Sir Isaac Newton had but a limited comprehension of the logical principles of science, as Whewell shows with great force in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."* Men decidedly inferior to Newton are, of course, much more liable to be deficient. Industry in collecting facts, ingenuity and imagination, joined to the power of writing attractively, may invest a man with the popular character of a great physical philosopher. But these qualities do not imply so much as a moderate ability to reason with logical discrimination. The highest patricians in the world of science have no right to plead privilege against the writ of *quo warranto*. Philosophy, being merely human, must vindicate her entire claim at the bar of human reason. And, on the field of logic, others are fully as competent to judge as any natural philosophers that ever lived.

It is right to rebuke the dogmatism of science when it would exalt itself above revealed religion. An innumerable number of facts, essential to final theories, may for ever lie beyond the reach of investigation. Radical and rapid changes, arising from new discoveries, constantly occur in all the natural sciences. Logic refuses to sustain some of the most important conclusions of philosophy, until the physical is supplemented by religious principles derived from the Bible. Revealed religion, on the other hand, has its historical and logical proof much more complete than science. Besides this, it is directly authenticated by God to the heart of each true believer. Pride

* Part II., book xii., ch. xiii. The celebrated rule for *veræ causæ*; i. e. "we are not to admit other causes of natural things than such as are both true, and suffice for explaining their phenomena," is shown by Whewell to need serious modification, before it can have any real significance. All four of Newton's rules in the third book of the *Principia* are either too vague to have value, or else philosophically incorrect. Whewell's discussion of these rules is worthy of careful attention.

of intellect, and the aversion of sinful men to the holy commands of God may produce scorn, or anger, when science is reminded of its inferiority. Still it is true that there is no real wisdom except such as exists in subordination to the Bible, and in sympathy with that holy church which God himself has constituted the "Pillar and Ground of the Truth."

ART. II.—*The Higher Christian Life.* By the Rev. W. E. BOARDMAN. "That ye may be filled with all the fulness of God." Boston: Henry Hoyt. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1859.

THE importance so justly attached to the subject of Christian experience, in its various phases, and the deep personal interest which, in the very nature of things, it must always awaken in the mind of every true believer, cannot fail to render it in the future, as it has been in the past, one of the standing themes of religious inquiry and discussion. To a person who has known what it is to be under conviction of sin, to be brought to the point of self-renunciation and self-despair, to cast himself down in helpless trust upon the only Saviour of the guilty and perishing, to taste the joy of forgiveness, and to feel the power of a great hope springing up in his heart, there is, and there must be, in the history of others who have passed through a similar process, something of the same freshness and force of attraction which we find in a painting, or in a graphic description of scenes which were once familiar. The history in the one case, like the painting or the description in the other, is the reproduction of the past. It charms and takes us captive. We follow whither we are led, and at each successive step the objects, the associations, and the feelings of other days, become the vivid realities of the present.

A picture or a description of scenes which exist only in the imagination of the artist or the author, may possess elements of surpassing loveliness, and with all the power that taste and genius can impart, may appeal to the inward sense of beauty; but, if it be wanting in those features which suggest the asso-

ciations and experiences of the past, it will fail to move or even to reach that chord in the human heart which responds only to the touch of tender and sacred memories. The principle which explains the phenomena here referred to, is equally operative in determining the impressions produced upon the mind by the delineations of religious experience. A history of spiritual progress, which the writer has drawn rather from a peculiar theory of his own, than from the actual facts as they occur in the lives of Christians, which is more striking as a creation of skill and fancy, than as an accurate presentation of Scripture truth—may be read with interest as a theological curiosity, or as a brave attempt to revolutionize the settled convictions of the church, and introduce a new system of doctrine and biblical interpretation; but it can never receive the assent of an enlightened and disciplined understanding, or call forth the responsive sympathy of the heart. No power of logic can overthrow, in the Christian mind, the convictions which spring from the clear testimony of a profound consciousness in harmony with the teachings of God's word.

It is just here, as we think, that the volume entitled "The Higher Christian Life" is liable to objection. It was written, doubtless, with a commendable design, and contains many things that are worthy of serious consideration. But starting with a theory which is no less at variance with the general consciousness of Christians, than with the law of spiritual growth, as it is set forth in the sacred Scriptures, the author found himself obliged, almost from first to last, to distort the facts of individual history, and to contradict not only the sentiments of others, but those also which he evidently entertains himself. The attempt to construct a harmonious theory of Christian experience out of elements which not only have no affinity for each other, but which are mutually and absolutely antagonistic, is the true explanation, doubtless, of much of the incoherence and vagueness which are manifest on nearly every page. It would be impossible to point out in detail, within the limits of a brief review, all the inconsistencies of statement and reasoning, and all the errors in regard to matters of fact, into which the author, by a strange fatality, seems to have inadvertently fallen; but we may say—and it is thought the asser-

tion will be abundantly sustained by a candid examination—that not a single example, of all those employed to illustrate and establish his peculiar theory, can fairly be made to serve the purpose for which it is adduced. While every experimental Christian, of whatever name, will appreciate the motives and cordially sympathize with the ultimate design of the author, few, we apprehend, who read the book and weigh well its contents, will be disposed to accept its ruling theory, or assent to the validity of the arguments by which it is sought to be maintained.

Before we proceed to the examination of the theory itself, it is proposed to dwell for some moments upon a few matters of fact. In the preface to his volume the author calls our attention to one of his peculiar modes of expression, as follows:

“In the use of terms, the Bible principle—not the strict one—has been followed, ‘second conversion,’ for example. Of course it is not intended to convey the idea of a second regeneration, but that expressed by President Edwards in the term ‘remarkable conversions,’ which is the title of his account of several remarkable cases of higher life attained after conversion.” P. vii.

The inquiry at once suggests itself on reading this paragraph, What Bible principle is it that the author follows in his use of the term “second conversion?” That he does not use the word “conversion” in the sense of regeneration, is rendered perfectly clear by his own disclaimer. What, then, precisely is the idea which it is here intended to express? Does it mean that movement of the soul toward God, which is the effect of regeneration, or in other words, the actual turning away from sinful habits and sinful acts, and the renewed surrender of the heart and life to Christ, which is characteristic of every one who has been born of the Spirit? If so, then we ask, Why *limit* us to a *second* conversion? Why not go on to a third, fourth, or fifth, to a five hundredth, or a five thousandth conversion? For, like Peter returning after the denial of his Master, every time a Christian repents and supplicates forgiveness, every time he returns from his backslidings and wanderings to Christ, the shepherd and bishop of his soul, then, in the proper sense of the term, and according to the Scripture

usage, he is converted. To single out a *second* conversion, therefore, and to lay special emphasis upon that, as a matter of great importance, and at the same time to pass in silence over every subsequent conversion, as if it were a matter of little or no importance, is equivalent to saying that a Christian should be very careful to repent and turn to God after his second sin of omission or of commission; but in regard to every subsequent sin, there is no particular occasion to insist upon repentance and amendment. The absurdity resulting from this sense of the author's favourite expression, precludes the possibility of supposing that it could have been thus employed. What he does mean by it, as we gather from his book, is simply this: That in the ordinary and normal progress of the Christian life, after regeneration has taken place, and after the soul has accepted Christ by faith as its Saviour from the condemnation and penalty of the law, there is a point at which it begins, for the first time, to believe in Christ for sanctification, and becomes conscious of a sudden transition into a new and higher state of experience. This is the "second conversion." In the first conversion, the soul does not embrace Christ as the complete and only Saviour. It looks to him only for justification and deliverance from penalty. In the second, it looks to him for everything, and it receives everything. It passes "out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of the Epistle to the Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth." It is "freed from the dead body of sin." It is "now linked by the three-fold cords of faith, hope, and love, to the living Saviour as its deliverer from present corruption, and from all the power of sin. The dead body is dropped. The living Jesus, sweet Jesus, precious Jesus, gracious Saviour, constant Friend, mighty Deliverer, has taken its place." P. 268.

Those who have not experienced this second conversion "have not yet learned that Jesus, through faith in his name, is the deliverer from the power of sin, as well as from its penalty." P. 266. They must suppose, therefore, that, having provided for the past, he leaves them in the future to take care of themselves. Like Paul, these poor half-way believers cry out, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" They "sigh and groan in their bondage, as if there was no

deliverance this side the grave." P. 266. Of course there is deliverance, but they do not know it. "A moment's thought should make them see that they are not honouring the Bridegroom Deliverer (now, the bridegroom is Christ) when they point to this hopeless bondage; this struggling, sighing, groaning condition; this slavery to sin; this wedded state with a body of death as the bridegroom, (now, the bridegroom is the body of death) as the state and condition to which he (Christ) has introduced them. A poor bridegroom surely he must be, who holds his bride as a slave, sighing and groaning for liberty, and crying out, 'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death!'" P. 277, 8.

Those who experience the second conversion, though previously regenerated, then for the first time "really practically receive Jesus for sanctification by faith, as before he had been received as the sacrifice for sin." "This practical, experimental apprehension of Christ is instantaneous in every case, whether the instant can be marked or not." The soul then "leaves every other way, and trusts solely in Jesus." P. 55, 6. Up to that time it is implied, of course, that the soul had trusted partly in Jesus, and partly in something else. In this new experience, although the subject of it has already been regenerated, there is a "change of one principle of action for another." P. 58. What principle of action in a regenerate person is changed in this second conversion, we will not now stop to inquire. In regard to the "right and truth" of his doctrine, the author asks and answers the question: "Exactly what is attained in this experience? Christ. Christ in all his fulness. Christ as all in all. Christ objectively and subjectively received and trusted in." P. 58. "By faith the soul is now placed in the hands of Christ, as the clay in the hands of the potter." P. 59. It is quite evident that before this experience Christ is not attained. Christ is not received in all his fulness. Christ is not accepted as all in all. Christ objectively and subjectively is not received and trusted in. The soul is not placed by faith in the hands of Christ, as the clay in the hands of the potter. And yet it has been regenerated and justified; yet the person is a believer and a disciple of Christ. This is strange, passing strange, to one who has derived his

ideas of experimental religion from the word of God. But we are told that this second conversion is "only the entrance, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification—not sanctification completed." P. 60. If by introducing the expression "fully and consciously," the author intended to remind us that the process of sanctification has been going on for years, it may be, but has only now for the first time attracted the notice and recognition of the mind, then we ask, why call that a second conversion which is only an intellectual discovery of something which has long existed, the mere opening of the mental eye upon a fact which had till then escaped its observation? And why not, for the same reason, call every subsequent addition to our knowledge of spiritual things, a third, fourth, or fifth conversion, and so on to the end? But if it is intended to express the idea that the soul now for the first time, absolutely, enters by the right principle upon the process of sanctification, then the question arises, How is it possible to conceive of a Christian who, after he has been regenerated and justified, and has received the principle of Divine life in his soul, continues for one, two, or three years, or for "a whole life time," p. 200, 211, without even entering upon the process of sanctification? For if he does not enter upon that process by the right principle, he does not enter upon it at all. The truth is, regeneration is itself the beginning of sanctification, and glorification is sanctification completed.

The author informs us, however, that this is a mistake; that they who have experienced the second conversion have learned that from the body of death, that is, from indwelling sin, "there is deliverance now here in this life through faith in Jesus." P. 266. They can unite with the apostle of the Gentiles in his memorable affirmation, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man;" but they have reached a height of spiritual attainment which renders it impossible for them to add, with him, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

In view of the sense in which the author employs the term "second conversion," the reader will no doubt concur with the

statement in the preface, that "the Bible principle" followed in the use of terms is "not the strict one." And he will probably be inclined to think that the statement would have been still more accurate, if the author had said that the principle which he followed was no Bible principle at all, either "strict" or loose.

The same remark might be made in regard to the precedent for the use of the term "second conversion," which the author professes to find in the writings of President Edwards. The statement that President Edwards wrote an "account of several remarkable cases of higher life attained after conversion," which bore the title of "Remarkable Conversions," is only one out of the many examples of carelessness and error in which the book abounds. No such account was ever written by President Edwards; at least it is not to be found in his works. He did indeed write what he called a "Narrative of Surprising Conversions," but there is no reference in the whole narrative, from first to last, to a solitary instance of a Christian, who, after he was regenerated, experienced a second conversion, or attained to a higher life, as they are understood and described by the author of the volume before us. Neither the name nor the thing is once alluded to.

The examples of Luther and D'Aubigné are also adduced by the author as illustrating in their Christian experience the practical workings of the doctrine he so earnestly maintains. He discovers in the history of each what he regards as unquestionable evidence of a second conversion. In regard to Luther, he asserts that during the interval between his first conversion and his visit to Rome, where he experienced a second conversion in the year 1510, "the truth that Jesus is all to the sinner, that in Jesus he has all if he takes him for all, he had not yet perceived. Christ a propitiation he accepted, but Christ a sanctification he rejected," p. 30; and that when the new light broke upon his mind at Rome, while ascending Pilate's staircase on his knees, then, "for the first time, he was freed from all false processes of salvation, and fully established in the true. Faith now, as the condition, and Jesus as the salvation, he saw was the whole." P. 31. Whatever else may be said of these assertions it cannot be denied, that they have the merit

at least of being explicit. But it is not a little remarkable that the very truth which Luther is here said to have rejected before his visit to Rome, and which he is said to have apprehended for the first time on the steps of Pilate's staircase, he is represented by D'Aubigné to have "received into his heart, as if God himself had placed it there," a full year before he set out on his journey. In the year 1509, while lecturing in the University of Wittemberg, on the Epistle to the Romans, he came to the seventeenth verse of the first chapter, where, says the Historian of the Reformation, "he read this passage from the prophet Habakkuk: 'The just shall live by faith.' This precept struck him. There is then for the just a life (not a mere justification or deliverance from penalty, but a life) different from that of other men: and this life is the gift of faith. This promise, which he received into his heart as if God himself had placed it there, unveils to him the mystery of the Christian life, and increases this life in him. Years after, in the midst of his numerous occupations, he imagined he still heard these words: 'The just shall live by faith.'" So also, we are told by the same high authority, in regard to the preaching of the Reformer before he went to Rome, that "the great seriousness that pervaded all Luther's sermons, and the joy with which the knowledge of the gospel had filled his heart, imparted to his eloquence an authority, a warmth, and an unction that his predecessors had not possessed." He knew nothing of this newly invented doctrine of one kind of faith for justification, and another kind for sanctification. "Faith in Christ," said Luther, all faith, any faith, that is scriptural and true, "takes away from you all trust in your own wisdom, righteousness, and strength. Then you learn to despise all those things which you see to be unavailing. Nothing remains but Jesus—Jesus only—Jesus abundantly sufficient for your soul. Hoping nothing from all created things, you have no dependence save on Christ, from whom you look for all, and whom you love above all." But perhaps the most remarkable fact connected with the point now before us, is that although our author represents Luther, while at Rome, to have been "for the first time freed from all false processes of salvation, and fully established in the true," and to have experienced the second conversion in which "the dead

body (of sin) is dropped," yet Luther himself, in a letter to George Spenlein, dated April 7, 1516, not less than five years after his return from Rome, declares, concerning the lingering tendency which he still discovered in his nature to seek for a personal righteousness and purity by his own good works, that "he was yet struggling unceasingly against it, and had not yet entirely triumphed over it." He has expressed the same sentiment in still clearer and stronger terms in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, first published in October, 1519. In commenting on the twentieth verse of the second chapter, he says to the young men to whom he was lecturing: "Ye are not infected with these pernicious errors, wherein I have been so nursled and so drowned even from my youth, that at the very hearing of the name of Christ my heart hath trembled and quaked for fear; for I was persuaded that he was a severe judge. Wherefore it is to me a double travail and trouble to correct and reform this evil: first to forget, to condemn, and to resist this old grounded error, that Christ is a lawgiver and a judge; for it always returneth and plucketh me back; then to plant in my heart a new and a true persuasion of Christ that he is a Justifier and a Saviour."

No comments of ours can add to the annihilating force with which these simple facts encounter the statements upon which our author rests the truth of his theory. That Luther was fettered in many respects by the prejudices of early education, which it was very difficult for him to throw off, is quite manifest from his own confessions quoted above; but, in regard to his view of Christ as the great central sun of the gospel system, the one and only source of spiritual light and life, the eye of his faith, when once fairly turned to behold him, was ever, from the hour of his first believing apprehension, as clear and keen as the eagle's. Isaac Taylor has truly said of him, that "he threw off the errors of the church, article by article, from the interior force of a spiritual vitality; or as a husk which the ripened fruit rejects. The false principles and corrupt usages in which he had been bred, and to which he had been most firmly attached, shaled away one by one from his mind, from his conduct, from his creed, as exuviae which the energy of a genuine piety could no longer endure."

The same thing may be said of D'Aubigné. It required a hard struggle for him, even after his conversion, to break away entirely from the influence of his theological training. Although the new life had been implanted in his soul, and his faith had apprehended Christ as the only and all-sufficient Saviour, he yet found himself involved in difficulties when he attempted to adjust and harmonize the several doctrines of the gospel in a connected system, against which all his former education and convictions had been arrayed in uncompromising hostility. We are informed by a competent authority, that "the theological faculty in the Academy of Geneva, when Dr. Merle D'Aubigné was a student, was wholly Socinian in its character. Whatever were the shades of difference in regard to doctrine, which prevailed among its Professors, they all agreed in rejecting the proper Divinity of the Saviour and of the Holy Spirit; salvation through the expiatory death and intercession of the former, and regeneration and sanctification by the influences of the latter. With these cardinal doctrines of the gospel, others which are considered by all evangelical Christians to be fundamental in the system of their faith, were also renounced. It was under such instruction that Dr. Merle pursued his studies for the sacred ministry."* It is not to be wondered at that D'Aubigné, for a long time after his conversion, not only from sin, but also from doctrinal error, should frequently have found himself engaged "in a terrible struggle." When he called upon Kleuker, the Biblical Professor at Kiel, what was his object? Was it to be informed whether he should accept Christ by faith as his all in all, or in what way he could attain to a second conversion? Did his difficulties have respect to the essence of Christian experience, or to matters of detail in regard to the teachings of sacred Scripture? He has himself given us the answer in the narrative quoted by our author. He tells us that he called upon the Professor with the request that he would "elucidate several passages of Scripture;" that the Professor declined to "enter into any detailed solution of his difficulties," which he represented to be "difficulties of detail." But can a person who hesitates to receive Christ as his com-

* Dr. Baird, in a biographical sketch prefixed to a volume of D'Aubigné's miscellaneous writings, published in 1846.

plete and only Saviour, be said to be labouring under a mere "difficulty of detail?" This surely, if anything, is a difficulty of the most vital and tremendous importance. And as no one who is entitled to be called "an old champion of the word and an experienced Christian," would ever speak of such a difficulty, as Kleuker speaks of that of D'Aubigné, we must conclude that the difficulty in question was altogether different from what our author would lead us to suppose.

The very narrative of our author carries its own refutation with it; but if anything be required to render it more conclusive, it can easily be furnished in the words of D'Aubigné himself. In one of his discourses, entitled "Faith and Knowledge," he lays down the broad proposition that "it is impossible for a Christian, and by consequence, for a minister, to exist without the life of faith." If, then, at the time of the interview with Kleuker at Kiel he had not yet entered upon the life of faith—that faith in Christ by which the soul is sanctified, (Acts xxvi. 18,) that faith which is the victory that overcometh the world, (1 John v. 4)—so that he could say with the apostle, "The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me," (Gal. ii. 20,) then, according to his own declaration, it was impossible that he should have been a Christian. And we therefore conclude that either that was his first conversion, or else his difficulty did not relate to his entrance upon the life of faith and consequent sanctification. So, likewise, we find in another discourse, entitled "The Children of God," delivered at Geneva, in July, 1829, the following sentences which bear hard not only upon our author's statement in regard to this particular case, but also upon his whole theory: "Examine yourselves, to see if you truly possess the faith of which the Scripture speaks. You imagine that one can receive Christ and become a child of God by faith, without this faith producing any change in the heart. This is the third error that we would refute. . . . It may happen in the world, if a good man adopts a wicked child, that this adoption, under the Divine blessing, may change the character of the child; but that which in human adoption may or may not occur, always takes place in the adoption of God. The child of God receives

not only the name, but also the nature of his Father. Every man, who is adopted of God, receives at the same time a new spirit, and becomes a new man. . . . In proportion as you approach the great day in which you will be put in possession of your incorruptible inheritance, have more elevated, more holy thoughts, and become more desirous of heavenly things. One frequently sees a great heir, before the period of his majority arrives, think very little of what he is to become, and entertaining feelings very little in accordance with the grandeur of his future state. But as he increases in years, he becomes more grave, and acquires the consciousness of what he is. Children of God! heirs of eternity! the hour of your entire redemption draws nigher every day. 'The children of God,' said a faithful pastor of the fold of Christ, 'have three birth-days. They are born at first of a natural birth; they weep, but their parents rejoice. Afterwards, by conversion, they pass from a state of nature into the life of God; then they often weep bitterly, but the angels in heaven rejoice. Finally comes that which we call death, and this the primitive Christians regarded as the true birth of the children of God; there is still much weeping and grief, but when all is accomplished, the joys of eternal life begin, and there are no more tears for the children of God.'"

It is held, therefore, by D'Aubigné, that the great transformation, or the process of sanctification, begins at the very time of the Christian's adoption as the child of God, and that he passes out of "this struggling, sighing, groaning condition"—"out of the bondage of the seventh" chapter of Romans, and into the "entire redemption," the "full salvation" secured by Christ, only when he passes out of the world and into "the joys of eternal life."

But we are told by our author that the religious experience of Richard Baxter affords another remarkable case of "second conversion," "quite as distinct," says he, "as either Luther's or D'Aubigné's, both as to his final full apprehension of Christ as all in all, and as to his conversion years before." P. 40. We are willing to admit that this remark is entirely correct. The second conversion of Richard Baxter was "quite as distinct as either Luther's or D'Aubigné's." But how distinct

that was, we leave the reader to determine for himself. It is well known that Baxter, toward the end of his earthly course, wrote out a solemn review of his life, which is still included in his published works; and although at his second conversion, as our author would have us believe, he was "freed from the dead body of sin;" although "the dead body was dropped," and he "found his way out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth," we yet find him using, among the last and most impressive utterances of his life, the following language:

"In my younger years, my trouble for sin was more about my actual failings; but now I am much more troubled for inward defects, for want of the vital graces of the soul. My daily trouble is for my ignorance of God, weakness of belief, want of greater love to God, strangeness to him, and to the life to come, and for want of a greater willingness to die, and more longing to be with God in heaven. . . . Had I all the riches of the world, how gladly would I give them for a fuller knowledge, belief, and love of God and everlasting glory! These wants are the greatest burden of my life, and which make my life itself a burden."

Strange language this for a person who has already been "freed from the dead body of sin!" for one who has already been delivered from the "struggling, sighing, groaning condition!" for one who has already "found his way out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth!" If this was all his second conversion did for him, he might as well have stopped at the first.

There is only one other example of "second conversion" upon which we shall at present pause to remark. It is that of General Sir Henry Havelock. Of him also the author of "The Higher Christian Life" asserts that he was converted twice; once on board the ship "General Kyd," while outward bound for India, and again, the second time, in "Fort William" at Calcutta, the British Indian capital. After giving an account of his first and second conversion, the author adds:

"Now, Havelock would have been a distinguished soldier, and a decided Christian without doubt, even if he had not been met and blessed the second time as he was. But to understand

the philosophy of his unswerving dauntlessness in religion, and the deep solicitude he felt for the conversion of his soldiers, and of the heathen, to find the source of the steady brilliance of his light, we must look to the two scenes, the first on the 'General Kyd,' but not less to the second in 'Fort William,' and see how there the living union was formed first, and then more fully opened afterward by faith between him and his Saviour." P. 88.

We are here told that Havelock would undoubtedly have been "a decided Christian" even without a "second conversion;" that is, without "trusting solely in Jesus," (p. 56,) without receiving "Christ as all in all," (p. 58,) without "placing the soul in the hands of Christ as clay in the hands of the potter," (p. 59,) without "receiving Jesus by faith for sanctification," (p. 55,) without an experience which is "true as real, and as blessed as true, and as necessary as blessed," (p. 71.) He would have been "a decided Christian" without these! would he? Then, if he would, we can only say that the author's idea of "a decided Christian" is very different from ours. But we are told again, that although he would have been "a decided Christian" in the contingency supposed, yet we could not understand, could not account for, his solicitude for the conversion of soldiers and heathen, did we not take into consideration the fact of his second conversion. That is to say, if we should overlook his second conversion, we should find it impossible, or, at least, extremely difficult, to understand how he could be anxious for the salvation of others. Here, then, we have a man, who, although he does not trust solely in Christ as his only Saviour, is yet "a decided Christian;" and although he is "a decided Christian" he does not feel any particular solicitude for the conversion of sinners. Such "a decided Christian" surely bears very little resemblance to the apostle Paul. When Agrippa said to him, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian," he immediately replied, "I would to God, that not only thou, but also all that hear me this day, were both almost and altogether such as I am, except these bonds!" It is our opinion in regard to all such "decided Christians," as those to whom our author refers, that the church ought to

pray, that as few of them might be permitted to exist as possible.

But of the many singular and astonishing statements in which this volume abounds, there are two yet remaining which we cannot forbear to quote. Lest we should be suspected of a design to awaken the prejudice of the reader by a mere caricature of the book before us, we shall allow the author to speak for himself. We frankly confess, that if we had been told in the language of a third person that any Protestant evangelical writer had published statements like those to which we refer, we should have had serious doubts in regard to the accuracy of his interpretation. In speaking of "the experimental apprehension of the principle of sanctification by faith as the privilege of all," the author expresses himself as follows:

"Why has the fact not had greater prominence in the past? Why have eighteen centuries been allowed to roll away before it is brought distinctly and prominently before the mind of the church?"

"The answer is, that until now the time has never come for it. Now is the time. That it is no new thing, practically, is clear. . . . And yet, until now, the time has never fully come to give it the prominence which now it is destined to take and to hold in the future history and progress of the kingdom of God in the world." Pp. 215, 216.

Now we ask, in regard to this statement, what system of Protestant Biblical Theology has ever been written, what Protestant evangelical church has ever adopted a confession, in which this very idea of sanctification by faith in Christ is not incorporated as one of its fundamental truths? To say nothing of a long catalogue of others, which might be mentioned, it is enough to remind the reader that in the Belgic Confession, the Confession of the Reformed Dutch Church, which was first published in the year 1563, and in the Westminster Confession, the doctrinal standard of the Presbyterian Church, which was drawn up in the year 1643, this identical principle is recorded with the transparency and splendour of a sunbeam. A man might as well lift up his head and inquire, Why have eighteen centuries been allowed to roll away before the sunlight is brought prominently before the public eye? We are rather

disposed to inquire, Where has this author been living? What was his business before he undertook to write a book?

The other statement to which we alluded, has reference to the doctrine of regeneration, or the new birth. And here also the author shall speak for himself. These are his words:

"It is only one hundred years since the great truth of the new birth, as a distinct experience, the privilege of all, began to receive its full power of application to the heart and life of the church." P. 216. "To the great central doctrine of justification by faith, revived before in the Reformation, the fact of the new birth, as an experience for all, was now (one hundred years ago) added to the faith of the church in the great awakening." P. 222.

How any one with a whole heaven of light streaming upon him in brightness above that of the noon-day sun, with every Protestant confession, every doctrinal symbol of the evangelical church from the Reformation down to this hour, proclaiming its clear and emphatic denial, could ever have put on record, in sober earnest, a statement like this, it surpasses our ability to conceive. If the great truth of the new birth was "added to the faith of the church" only a hundred years ago, what did Calvin mean, when, in the year 1559, he recorded this sentence? "As we have stated that complete salvation is found in the person of Christ, so, to make us partakers of it, he 'baptizes us with the Holy Spirit and with fire,' enlightening us into the faith of his gospel, regenerating us so that we become new creatures, and, purging us from profane impurities, consecrates us as holy temples to God." What did Ursinus mean, when, in the year 1570, he expressed this, as his undoubted conviction? "Man's conversion in this life is so necessary, that without it no one can obtain everlasting life in the world to come, according to what the Scriptures teach: 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.'" What did Arminius mean, when, in the year 1610, he laid down this proposition in regard to "the restoration of mankind?" "This restoration is the restitution, and the new or the second creation of sinful man, obnoxious through sin to death temporal and eternal, and to the dominion of sin." Again we inquire, Where has our author been living?

Where was he educated for the ministry, what books has he been accustomed to read, that he rises up three hundred years after the Reformation, when the doctrine of regeneration by the Holy Spirit took its place anew in the theological firmament, where it has ever since been blazing with the splendour of a constellation, and asserts, with the profoundest gravity, that the great truth of the new birth was "added to the faith of the church" only a hundred years ago? If anything can prove the correctness of the proverb, that "wonders will never cease," surely it must be this!

It can serve no useful purpose to occupy these pages, or to tax the patience of the reader with additional exhibitions of the error which characterizes this book in regard to almost, if not quite, all its pretended matters of fact. Enough has already been said to show that its statements indicate a most singular and unaccountable infirmity of apprehension. In concluding this part of the examination, therefore, we shall content ourselves with saying, what is scarcely a deviation from the strict sobriety of didactic utterance, that, taken as a whole, a book more completely destitute of all claim upon the reader's confidence, we do not at this moment remember ever to have read.

We pass on to the consideration of our author's peculiar theory. What that theory is, the reader may be reminded by referring back to the seventh page, and thence onward to the twelfth. It involves several important questions; for example: What is the law of spiritual growth? What are the principles laid down on this subject in the sacred Scriptures? Does a Christian have two distinct experiences which may be denominated conversions—just two and no more—or does he have but one? Is "the entrance, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification," postponed until after his "second conversion?" Is the transition into the new state of experience, subsequent to regeneration, generally sudden and striking? Does a Christian ever, in the present life, arrive at a point of spiritual attainment at which it may properly be said, that he is "freed from the dead body of sin," and delivered from a "struggling, sighing, groaning condition?" Of course, it is not intended to discuss these questions

separately. It is proposed merely to offer a few general observations which in a greater or less degree affect them all.

It might be objected to the theory of our author, that its practical tendency is adverse to the sound, intelligent, substantial piety of Scripture principle. But without dwelling at length on this phase of the subject, it will be sufficient to state briefly a few points of exception, and then proceed to what may, in some sense, be called the philosophy of Christian experience, including that peculiar experience which is here designated as "second conversion." The points of objection to the theory, on the ground of its practical influence are these. First, it has no foundation in the word of God. We are nowhere told that a Christian has one kind of faith (kind, not degree) for justification, and another kind for sanctification. Or, in other words, that he may have a true faith, when all the while, as our author says of Luther, he "accepts Christ as a propitiation, but rejects him as a sanctification." P. 30. On this principle a man may be justified, and, we suppose, go to heaven—for "whom he justified, them he also glorified;" (Rom. viii. 30)—while rejecting Christ in one of his most important offices as a Saviour. A more gross and revolting error could not well be conceived. But as all error in its proportion is detrimental to piety, and as Christians are said to be sanctified "through the truth," it follows that a theory which involves consequences like these must be anything but beneficial in its practical effects. We are far from saying that our author intended to teach this. It is only one of the absurdities which result from his theory. Second, while it does at some points invite Christians to higher degrees of attainment, it furnishes at others an excuse for them to continue as they are. It teaches that a man may be a decided Christian, as in the contingency supposed of General Havelock, for example, without experiencing a second conversion; or, in other words, without accepting Christ for all in all, without even "entering, fully and consciously, by the right principle, upon the process of sanctification," and without feeling any deep solicitude for the salvation of sinners. There are some professors of religion—whether they are possessors or not it is not for us to judge—who may possibly reason in this way: 'It is here said that a man may be

a decided Christian without yielding up all to Christ and looking for all in him, and without feeling any special anxiety for the conversion of others. True, if he wants to experience a high degree of spiritual peace and joy, he must be converted a second time. This is no doubt desirable and pleasant, but it is not indispensable, for the faith of justification will exempt him from penalty and render him a decided Christian, and that is enough for me. I shall not distress myself, therefore, in regard to anything further at present, especially as the claims of business require my undivided time and attention.' The idea involved in this inference the author would no doubt reject with abhorrence. But how he is to give any intelligible sense to much of the language of his book, and yet escape the inference, we confess our inability to perceive. Third, the theory in question has a tendency to divert the thoughts of Christians from the word of God, as the great immutable criterion of all true piety, and direct them to the changing moods and experiences of the mind. The inquiry of the author when looking for the evidence of Divine grace in the heart, is not so much, What say the Scriptures? and what are the indestructible principles, which, lodged in the soul, shine on for ever, like stars in the sky, with a brightness unchanged by the clouds and storms of the atmosphere below? as it is, How do you feel? Are you walking in light or in darkness? Are you in a "struggling, sighing, groaning condition," or are you "freed from the dead body of sin?" The religion which the book is most concerned about, is what is sometimes called the religion of sense. The appeal is characteristically away from principles to emotions. Of this kind of religion it was well said by good old Thomas Brooks, nearly two hundred years ago: "Those are the most excellent and heroic acts of faith that are most abstracted from sense and reason; he that suffers his reason to usurp over his faith, will never be an excellent Christian; he that goes to school to his own reason, hath a fool to his schoolmaster; and he that suffers his faith to be overruled by his reason, shall never want woe. Where reason is strongest, faith usually is weakest; but now the Lord, by forsaking his people for a time, makes them skilful in the life of faith, which is the choicest and sweetest life in this world." Fourth, the theory

of the book has a tendency to lower the standard of Christian piety. It is a sort of nondescript perfectionism. There is so much contradiction in it, that it is hard to tell precisely what it is. It will and it won't, it does and it don't. Now it is one thing, and now it is another. The general idea, however, seems to be that when a person has been converted a second time, he receives what is called "full salvation." He passes "out of the bondage of the seventh (chapter of Romans) into the sweet liberty of the eighth." "The dead body (of sin) is dropped." "Bondage is gone, freedom is come. Sighs give place to joys, fears to hopes." The happy subject of this experience has "learned that there is deliverance now here in this life, through faith in Jesus." All this is adapted to produce the impression that in this world there is nothing more to be looked for. The soul is constantly going up and down to heaven in a chariot of rosy exhalations, with clouds of perfume floating along its path. The idea of struggle and conflict is either kept out of sight or discouraged. And the effect, as any reflecting mind can easily perceive, is to make the person feel that now surely he needs nothing more. He has reached the goal. The end of the race is beneath his feet, and he looks abroad,

"Where rears the terminating pillar high
Its extra-mundane head."

He forgets that profound utterance of the Psalmist, "I have seen an end of all perfection : but thy commandment is exceeding broad." He forgets that he is called to be "perfect, even as his Father which is in heaven is perfect;" that it is only when Christ "shall appear," that his people "shall be like him;" and that "every man," no matter what his degree of attainment, "that hath this hope in him, purifieth—keeps on purifying—himself, even as he is pure." Thus the standard of Christian piety is lowered, and the aspirations of the soul are lowered in a corresponding degree to apprehend it.

It is almost superfluous to say that all this is utterly inconsistent with genuine growth in grace. The more a Christian is transformed into the image of Christ, the more he feels his own vileness, and the more he sees the need of transformation. And it is for this, among other reasons, that, so long as he is

"in this tabernacle, he groans, being burdened." That eminent master of Israel, Dr. John H. Livingston, for so many years Professor of Theology in the Seminary of the Reformed Dutch Church, has left on record these weighty words: "To grow in grace is to be emptied of all dependence upon ourselves, and practically to constitute the blessed Jesus our all in all. He must increase, but we must decrease. We take him for our all when first we believe; but what that fully implies, we do not, when first we believe, yet understand. To grow in grace is the unfolding of that mystery. It is experimentally to know that Christ is of God made unto us sanctification; that in the Lord we have not only righteousness, but in him also we have strength. It is to experience that when we are weak, then we are strong, and when we grow downward in humility, patience, and resignation, then we most effectually grow upwards in holiness. In this last particular, perhaps more than in any other, the saints are enabled to discern their growth in grace. They become in their own eyes, more vile, more empty and helpless, while the grace of Christ proves sufficient for them, and his strength is made perfect in their weakness."*

Thus much in regard to the practical influence of our author's theory. Let us now pass on to the remaining topic already referred to. The point from which we start is the clear and powerful declaration of the apostle Paul: "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other." (Gal. v. 17.) The connection in which this passage is found requires but little explanation. The apostle had been exhorting the Galatian Christians to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ had made them free, and not to dishonour their profession by returning to the rites and usages enjoined by the ceremonial law. And then, having counselled them to avoid, as far as possible, all occasion for controversy among themselves, which generally arose from the infirmities of nature, and was but ill-adapted to promote the reign of fraternal concord and love, he urges them to walk, or to order their lives, according to the impulses of

* Two sermons on "Growth in Grace," delivered in the Collegiate Church, New York, in 1790.

the Divine Spirit, and so they would not gratify the wayward and forbidden propensities to which the unregenerate were accustomed to yield. With this, the passage stands in immediate connection. The apostle begins it with the particle "for," as if he had said, You have great need to walk in the Spirit, and thereby to subdue the rebellious lusts of the flesh. For the flesh strongly inclines men to act in opposition to the dictates of the Spirit; and these two forces, although they are frequently lodged in the same breast, are contrary and antagonistic the one to the other.

This seems to be the idea which the sacred writer intended to express. And it accords very fully with the universal experience of God's people in every country and in every age. The Christian has never yet lived, and so long as the sacred Scriptures continue to represent the Divine will in regard to the process of salvation, he never will live, whose heart either was not, or will not be, the theatre of a life-long struggle between the new principle of grace and the old principle of fallen nature. Our Saviour came into the world not only "to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law," and so render it true that "a man's foes should be they of his own household," but he came also to set a man at variance against himself—to introduce into his heart, into the very seat of life, and the very throne of self-government, a new principle to dispute the sovereignty of the old one that had reigned there from his birth. And the final issue of the conflict thus inaugurated, he intended to be, the supreme, and peaceful, and everlasting dominion of the new principle of Divine purity and love. True it is, that the contest will be a long one; that it will never terminate until every sinful instinct and passion shall be slain, and Christ shall reign triumphant in the closing experience of this mortal career. But the end is sure, the victory is certain. And then, the soldier who has endured hardness for the Master's sake, shall hear the beat of the soft peacemarch that calls him home, where he shall

—"Walk up the heavenly street,
And ground his arms at Jesus' feet."

There may be, in this statement of the Christian life, an aspect which the men of the world—the unconverted—and even some professors of religion, will regard as anything but inviting. But it cannot be helped. It is true, nevertheless, because it is the uniform statement of the Gospel. And whatever exemption from conflict we may appear to enjoy, or whatever unusual experience we may suppose ourselves to have undergone, if it be not clearly indicated and provided for in the infallible Word, the only standard of living Christianity, it is but the dream and delusion of an ungoverned fancy, that must yet be dispelled, as the mists of the soul's morning twilight before the rising sun of truth. The sacred Scriptures speak to us, on this subject, with no uncertain voice. Whatever occasion for doubt there may be elsewhere, here there is absolutely none. Every Christian, at every period of his life, when the principle of grace is in healthy exercise within him, finds "a law in his members warring against the law of his mind." Every Christian, from the youngest to the oldest, who has not fallen from his first love, or is not now in a backslidden condition, can trace through all the intervening years, from the time when, consciously to himself, he was born of the Spirit, down to the point at which he thus stops to reflect, the overwhelming evidence of the truth, that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other." The spiritual life is nursed into vigour by the rugged discipline of conflict. It is like the mountain oak, that springs up from the acorn only a frail and tender plant, but with increase, either slow or rapid, as the soil and the various influences around it may determine, and yet always with a proportioned and gradual progress, not by sudden and unnatural springs and starts, becomes massive and strong, by its exposure to the elements, and its wrestlings with the storm.

This is the true emblem of all healthy spiritual growth. It is, indeed, remarkable, that the even and steady advance of vegetable and animal life, step by step, toward its full development and maturity, is the favourite and standing symbol, by which the sacred writers, both of the Old Testament and the New, represent to us the progress of the Divine life in the soul. We find in their statements no provision for gaps or intervals

during which the onward movement is expected to halt and stand still, and then be followed by a sudden and violent spring, like that which occurs when the sinner is at once translated by the Holy Ghost into the kingdom of Christ. It is, on the contrary, gradual, even, proportioned, always going forward toward its ultimate point. Without multiplying quotations, a few out of many will suffice. God says to his people by the prophet Hosea: "I will be as the dew unto Israel; he shall grow as the lily, and cast forth his roots as Lebanon. They that dwell under his shadow shall return; they shall revive as the corn, and grow as the vine." So also he says by the prophet Malachi: "But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in his wings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves of the stall." The figure passes down from the prophets to Christ and his apostles. It pervades the New Testament. Our Saviour says, in regard to the tares and the wheat, in the parable: "Let both grow together until the harvest." To those who were in the infancy of their spiritual life, the apostle Peter says: "As new-born babes, desire the sincere milk of the word, that ye may grow thereby." And to all Christians, in all the various stages of their progress, he addresses the exhortation, "But grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

The idea thus expressed by the sacred writers, and repeated in almost innumerable forms, is fresh, and beautiful, and cheering. It is the scriptural idea, and the only scriptural idea, of Christian progress. A distinguished exegete and scholar, who is scarcely less distinguished as a poet, has expressed this idea in terms which are quite as remarkable for their poetic beauty, as, in the present application to Christians, they are substantial in their Scripture truth; so beautiful and so true, that the reader will not be disinclined to peruse them. In a poem, addressed to a little child on the day of his baptism, the writer says:

"No harsh transitions Nature knows,
No dreary spaces intervene;
Her work in silence forward goes,
And rather felt than seen:

For where the watcher, that with eye
 Turned eastward, yet could ever say,
 When the faint glooming in the sky
 First lightened into day?
 Or maiden, by an opening flower
 That many a summer morn has stood,
 Could fix upon the very hour
 It ceased to be a bud?
 The rainbow-colours mix and blend
 Each with the other, until none
 Can tell where fainter hues had end,
 And deeper tints begun.
 But only this much doth appear—
 That the pale hues are deeper grown;
 The day has broken bright and clear;
 The bud is fully blown.
 Dear child, and happy shalt thou be,
 If from this hour with just increase
 All good things shall grow up in thee,
 By such unmarked degrees:
 If there shall be no dreary space
 Between thy present self and past,
 No dreary, miserable place
 With spectral shapes aghast:
 But the full graces of thy prime
 Shall, in their weak beginnings, be
 Lost in an unremembered time
 Of holy infancy.”*

Now this, just this, as we have already seen, is the scriptural idea of religious growth. But the question may be asked, Are there not exceptions to this rule? Does it not sometimes happen that professing Christians, at certain points of their history, are conscious of a transition into a new state of experience which is so marked and sudden as to appear almost like a second conversion? We answer, Yes—it does undoubtedly happen; but never, in any case, where there has previously been a healthy spiritual growth. It is always the result of some antecedent disease or defect in the soul, just as the rapid increase of flesh and the sudden spring into new life and vigour, of which an invalid is conscious when recovering his bodily health, is the result of the previous disease and prostration which he has suffered. If, in the ordinary and natural condition of the body, a child, for example, should increase in size and strength in the

* Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Dean of Westminster.

same ratio in which he increases after a long period of sickness, it would justly be considered monstrous, and furnish a proper occasion for alarm. But as the law of spiritual growth—at least as it is given in the Bible—is precisely the same as the law of physical growth in the case of the “new-born babe,” to which the apostle Peter refers—gradual, even, progressive—so, if these sudden and violent transitions should occur in the experience of a person, who, after his regeneration, had enjoyed an ordinary and healthy spirituality, then, according to all the rules of scriptural judgment we should pronounce that person to be, not a Bible Christian, but a spiritual anomaly, in one sense a spiritual monster. It is no more inconsistent with the law of physical growth for a healthy child to expand and swell out suddenly into the breadth and stature of opening manhood, than it is inconsistent with the law of spiritual growth for a healthy babe in Christ to expand and swell out suddenly into the breadth and stature of an opening manhood in Christian experience. The one is just as reasonable as the other, no more, no less. But the truth is, such a thing never happens in either case. We are reduced to this simple dilemma, either the idea is altogether erroneous, or else the Bible representation is not true. In all such cases, however, the Bible is to be preferred as a standard of judgment to any imaginary experiences of our own.

It is not denied that the sudden transitions referred to—or, as they have very injudiciously been styled, “second conversions,” a name liable to great perversion and abuse—do sometimes occur. But judging from the uniform and consistent teachings of sacred Scripture, they are a simple impossibility, except as the result of at least one of five antecedent conditions. First, the absence of regeneration at the outset. Second, erroneous views of Scripture doctrine. Third, bodily weakness or disease producing mental languor and melancholy. Fourth, the temporary withdrawal of Divine light and comfort from the soul. Fifth, religious declension. From any of these, either singly or combined, these sudden transitions into a new experience may undoubtedly result. But in no case can they properly be styled, in the ordinary sense of language, a second conversion. In the first case, the change

is, simply, regeneration. In the second, it is the illumination of the mind and heart in regard to the teachings of Divine truth. In the third, it is the restoration either of the body or the mind to comparative health, and to consequent cheerfulness and vigour. In the fourth, it is the renewed communication of Divine light and comfort to the soul. In the fifth, it is the return of the backslider to Christ.

Now call these changes by what name you please, they are all the result of a previous defect, or an unhealthy condition, of the intellectual and spiritual nature. They no more form a part of the ordinary and normal growth of the principle of Divine grace in the soul, than the rapid and extraordinary increase of flesh and strength after long sickness forms a part of the ordinary and normal growth of a child. And to ascribe to a person superior attainments as a Christian, because he has experienced this sudden transition, is like ascribing to an invalid who is now convalescent, superior health and vigour because he has been sick. So far from being "the higher Christian life" it is the lower; it is, in fact, the lowest of all, just as the point at which a sick man begins to recover his health, is the point at which the principle of physical life is nearest to absolute extinction. So far from being the index of spiritual strength, it is the index of spiritual weakness. The person who has experienced it, has only begun his Christian life, or has but just recovered from a relapse which has retarded his progress. But the future is all before him. And he has reason to rejoice and be thankful in view of the happy work thus commenced, when he reflects that "He which hath begun a good work in us will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ."

There is, no doubt, a difference in the rapidity of spiritual growth in different Christians, just as there is a difference in the rapidity of physical growth in different plants, or in different children. In one case, it is greater, in another, it is less. But greater or less, as the case may be, it is, when normal and healthy, always symmetrical, proportioned, gradual, progressive. It is not simply the result of the increasing power of the Spirit, as opposed to the flesh. It is that increase itself. It is the grain of mustard seed sprouting, springing up, grow-

ing in girth and altitude, expanding itself into a great tree upon whose leafy branches the birds of heaven may come down and rest themselves, and sit, and sing. It is the little leaven diffusing its subtle but irresistible energy, extending the circle of its influence, permeating the whole mass, leavening the whole lump, assimilating every constituent particle to itself. These are the symbols of Christian growth. What these things are, in their proper relations, in the natural world, that the kingdom of God is, in the heart of man. Planted there by the Holy Ghost, an agency secured for poor, and guilty, and dying sinners, by the precious blood, and the surrendered life of Him who hung upon the tree, its vitality and increase are guarded and fostered by the same Power to which it owed its beginning. Its central object is Christ, radiating the life of purity and love, as the sun radiates the light. The manifestation and exercise of that life is the out-breathing of the soul after God, on the one hand, and the strenuous exertion of conflict with the powers of sin, on the other. Its aspect toward holiness and God, is loyalty and love. Its aspect toward sin and Satan, is war and battle. Its march, is onward. Its expansion is conquest, the trophies of victory wrested by the Holy Ghost from the Prince of Darkness.

In the heart of man—in your heart, reader, and mine, if we are now the people of God, or ever shall be—is this struggle to be maintained, is this triumph to be won. Hurléd headlong from his throne by that act of the Divine Spirit which regenerates the heart, and emancipates the sinner into the glorious liberty of the new life, the great enemy of God and man is yet to be driven, step by step, beyond the limits of the dominion he has usurped. In this territory of the heart he marshals his forces, and there he awaits the conflict. The depraved instincts and passions, anger, wrath, malice, evil speaking, impurity, covetousness, the love of the world, self-sufficiency, “the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life,” they are all on his side, and they present a formidable and threatening array. But, thanks to the compassion and self-sacrifice of the Friend of sinners, there is a power to meet them, and to dispute the victory with no unequal arm. It is the inexorable power of God’s truth and Spirit; the power of a Saviour’s suf-

ferings and a Saviour's blood. Their forces of light and love shall move on, step by step, and the enemy shall retire before them, until in death the last remnant of opposition shall be vanquished and expelled, and Christ, the King of Truth and Peace, shall reign with unquestioned sway.

This is the conflict. This is what we may expect. This is the result in which the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit will finally end. The result is glorious and cheering to contemplate. But we have not yet reached it. If we are Christians, indeed, then in our hearts the power of the flesh has been broken, but not yet entirely subdued. To his people, in the olden time, did God say, in regard to their enemies in the land of Canaan, "I will not drive them out from before thee in one year. By little and little I will drive them out from before thee, until thou be increased, and inherit the land." This is what he says to his people now. In the heart of every regenerate sinner, the good work has already commenced. Within the narrow compass of every believer's body, like the struggle between hostile soldiers contending within the walls of a fortress, the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit is now going on.

There is a passage in Brock's *Life of General Havelock* in regard to one of the most important events that occurred during the great Sepoy Rebellion in India, which is almost singular for the clearness and force with which it illustrates the conflict between grace and nature in the heart of man. In recording the history of the siege of Lucknow, the biographer informs us that early on the morning of the 16th of November, 1857, "Sir Colin (Campbell) began his march on the Sikunder Bagh, a strong square building, surrounded by a wall of solid masonry—as usual, loop-holed all around. It was evident the enemy was here in great force, and its possession would be hotly contested. A village on the opposite side of the road was also held by them. It was necessary to at once reduce the Sikunder Bagh, and drive the enemy from the village. The General saw that to effect this, artillery was wanted in a position that could not be reached without passing between a raking cross-fire from the village and the Sikunder Bagh, but in a moment two batteries were galloping their guns through a perfect stream of fire.

This done, a dazzling line of bayonets, closing around the loop-holed village, cleared it at a run. The brave soldiers swept across the ground without firing until they had faced the enemy, then the sharp gleams of fire, and the quick rattle, as of a single shot, and the bayonet in its terrible strength concluded the work.

“Meanwhile the artillery had been battering the walls of the Sikunder Bagh with little effect. At last a breach was made—a hole of two feet square, and then began a charge which for heroic daring has never been surpassed, and rarely equalled. The Sikhs and the Highlanders rushed to the wall and through that hole—for breach it could not be called; they flung themselves in upon the foe. The entrance once effected, woe to the mutineers! From the prison they had chosen there was no escape, except through barred windows high up in the building, and through the barricaded gate, which was within a few yards of the cannon’s mouth. What passed within that house of horrors none who survive care to tell. Now and then a plumed bonnet and a tartan plaid were laid upon the grass without the blood-stained entrance. Beneath them lay a stalwart form whose eye will never more gladden the northern cottage from which the dead man came. Hour after hour passed in that awful struggle. Anxious men stood round this crater outside, wondering how the battle sped, and when it would be won.

“But the volcano within the thick walls still raged like a fiery furnace, and life was its costly fuel. Gradually the sphere of action widened as different parts of the building were carried and forced to admit fresh men; but not more than four hundred soldiers of our (Sir Colin’s) army were at any moment inside, and, once in, there was no egress. The mutineers, whose numbers were at first overwhelming, struggled hard for life against the avenging column. At last the struggle closed; the work of death was done; the Sikunder Bagh was theirs; and as they looked on the piles of dead, men”—remembering the pitiless and savage butchery of helpless men and women, and dear little children at Cawnpore, and the glutting of that horrid well with the mangled bodies of the slain—“were constrained to say, ‘Here is retribution for Cawnpore.’”

Such was the struggle within the walls of the Sikunder Bagh, and such its termination. Strong as were the rebels in hatred and number, they could not stand before the charge of Highland courage, and the Highland arm.

But there is another Sikunder Bagh. It is in the heart of man. And the rebels against God and his dear Son are there, strong in hatred and strong in number. "For the carnal mind," says the Word of Inspiration, "is enmity against God." It is a hard and rocky fortress. Its walls are granite, and its gates are barred. But there is a power in the sweet, and gentle, and loving Spirit of God, in its silent working, that is mightier far than all the shot ever belched in thunder from the cannon's mouth. Those walls shall be broken; those barricaded gates shall be carried by the forces of the Prince of Peace. And when the struggle is over, and the last sin is slain, the angels of heaven shall look upon the scene and say: Here is retribution for Calvary's blood.

If we are the disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ, our hearts are the theatre of many a conflict. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary, the one to the other; so that we cannot," as the apostle says, "do the things that we would." We have pledged our loyalty to our blessed Saviour, and our consecration to the same cause which he holds so dear; and now he calls upon us to be "workers together with him." We are to take our stand with Christ, with the Holy Spirit, with the word of Divine truth, and coöperating with the influences which they put forth, we are to maintain a life-long struggle with Satan, with the world, with the sinful propensities and passions which yet linger in our hearts. We need not expect, while on this side of heaven, any sudden elevation above the atmosphere of conflict and toil, any miraculous exemption from the necessity that lies upon us to endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ. If we do, then just so surely as God's word is truth, we shall find ourselves mistaken—sadly, wofully mistaken. The great issue is not to be settled in a day. It is not to be decided by a single stroke or battle. It is a long campaign. And the Captain of our Salvation says, "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life." In

reliance upon Him, in self-denial, in prayer, in watching, in the use of all appointed means, in sacrifices, in diligence, in labours, with patience and meekness and love, we are to persevere to the end. Many a time we shall be weary. Many a time we shall suffer humiliation. Many a time we shall go into our retirement with shame and pour out our confessions before God. Many a time our hearts shall ache, and the big tear shall steal unbidden down our cheeks. Do these things appal you? Do you shrink back from the encounter? Do you feel that you have no stomach for the fight? If you do, then you are not worthy to be Christ's disciple. No; we were not called to indolence and ease. We were called, like enlisted soldiers, to fight the battles of our King. Religion doubtless has its joys. But we are not always to be speaking of them, and never of the good fight of faith. We want to see the enemies of our peace, who, and what, and where, they are. We want to be reminded of the issue of this struggle in which we are now engaged. We want the truth of God's blessed word brought down upon our hearts to animate, and stir, and rouse our sleeping courage into life and action.

Amid the endurance and the labours of the present, direct your eye toward the future. This conflict will have an end. The victory shall be yours. You shall be more than a conqueror through the blood of Him who loved you. Your humiliation will be past. Your heart will cease to ache. Your tears will cease to flow. Heaven's unfolding gates, and the fellowship around the eternal throne, will be a recompense for all the sorrows of the way. Let this, then, be the lesson that we shall learn from this examination into Scripture truth—that we have a warfare to accomplish—that we are to maintain it to the end—that the victory shall be ours—that the fruits we shall reap from it shall be eternal rest, and eternal glory, at God's right hand.

In closing these observations there is a single suggestion upon which those who are living in impenitence and fancied security would do well to reflect. To all such we beg to offer the remark: Do not congratulate yourselves that you are exempt from the toils and trials of the conflict to which we have referred. Your exemption in that respect does not fur-

nish an occasion for rejoicing. But it does furnish an occasion for grief—grief to yourself, and grief to all who love you, and wish you well. If you do not bear the cross, you cannot wear the crown. If you do not engage in the battle, you cannot share in the fruits of the victory. If you are not on the side of Christ, he will regard you as on the side of his foes. “He that is not with me, is against me, and he that gathereth not with me, scattereth abroad.” You know what the doom of all such will be. Remember it, and act in view of it, as wisdom and duty suggest. Do not suppose that you are in a condition of safety, because you sit down to enjoy the world in quietness and peace. There is such a thing as a treacherous repose; as a fatal exemption from struggle and pain. The sick man, who has long tossed upon his bed of anguish, may find a point in his experience, when all his sufferings appear to cease, and the power of his disease to be exhausted. His rest is undisturbed. All is quiet and still. But, alas! he little knows with what fearful activity the sappers and miners of death are performing their work in the dark. Mortification is there, subtle, silent, creeping up, with stealthy pace, toward the vital seat. Suddenly—when least expected—with the spring of the panther, and the grasp of the giant, it seizes his heart, and crushes out his life. Was that man safe because he had no pain, because all things appeared to be promising and fair? Ah, no! Better, a thousand-fold better, the keenness of anguish than that insidious rest, which is but the herald of approaching death. Better, a thousand-fold better, the most rugged conflict of the spiritual life, than that deceitful and transient repose, which is the precursor of torments that shall never end.

- ART. III.—1. *The Leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia.*
By H. B. 8vo. pp. 120. Philadelphia, 1859.
2. *An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address.* By HORACE BINNEY. 8vo. pp. 250. Philadelphia, 1859.

OF human fame, there is none more perishable than that of the lawyer. His greatest efforts in the lower Courts pass away with the moment, like things that perish in the using. And in the appellate Courts, the ablest and the most brilliant forensic arguments are preserved only in their skeletons, by the Reporters, shut up as in a mausoleum, where none ever enter except the lawyer, as a matter of business, searching for a precedent. Yet no class of men better deserve to be remembered than lawyers, even when only considered as upholding the causes of clients, with the full measure of their learning, their ingenuity, their physical strength, sometimes under the frown of power, the displeasure of the public, and often not only without pay, but at great personal loss. For all this is done avowedly to uphold justice; and without all this professional devotion, justice would be but the will and word of the dominant power holding the sceptre only to be abused. But lawyers deserve to be remembered for something more important than upholding the private interests of clients. To them is due the preservation and development of the law itself, which, like an unseen Providence, gives protection to the smallest right, and takes under its comprehensive vigilance all human interests, whether of individuals or of nations, on land or on sea, securing them to be adjusted according to rules of justice against the hand of the plunderer. It protects even the sanctuary of the church.

The Common Law of England is the great mother of American lawyers. From her bosom they imbibed that spirit of freedom which places law above power; from her strictly logical procedure, separating facts from law, rendered necessary by jury trial, they acquired the logical cast of mind and common sense so preëminently their characteristic. Many, too, of the leaders of the old American bar were educated at Westminster

Hall, and there acquired the habits of the English lawyer. When American institutions came to be established, the lawyers were everywhere the master-builders. They organized not only the judiciary, but also the legislative and executive departments of government. They were, from the nature of the case, the only competent architects of government. And wherever lawyers had the least influence, there the worst government was established, as in Pennsylvania, where Dr. Franklin had influence enough to have a legislature of one house established, which, however, because of its inadequacy, was soon abolished. All over this vast country, lawyers have built our institutions; and so far as the law is concerned have exclusively administered it as judges, attorneys, and counsellors; and even the legislation has been directed and controlled by lawyers. In fact, the lawyers have been the leaders of the nation. And if he who was at once the Secretary of Cromwell and author of *Paradise Lost*, spoke truth, when he said, "Peace has its triumphs no less renowned than war," then, the trophies won by lawyers on the great theatre of human action, deserve no less to be preserved in history than those of warriors.

Doubtless, views like these induced Mr. Binney, himself one of the greatest of lawyers, to rescue from oblivion the names of the leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia, behind whose example he grew up in those accomplishments with which he so long dignified his profession. Feeling lonesome, as one without professional comrades, when he looks at the Bar of the present day, he recurs to the Bar of the past for companionship, and presents to his professional brethren of this generation, portraits of the lawyers of the past as they stand mirrored in his memory. Mr. Binney feels that the times have changed, and that the Bar has changed with them. And like a parent, who feels that his mantle has not fallen on his sons, he suggests, rather than declares, that, in the mutation of things, the Bar of to-day has not fulfilled the hopes of its predecessors. And he wishes that examples of the old lawyers shall be presented to their successors in a portraiture more certain than the vague traditions of the Bar, to which his own professional character will soon be committed. Mr. Binney has done something far more important than rehearse, in a finished and animated style,

pleasant reminiscences of Lewis, of Tilghman, and of Ingersoll. It is well for lawyers of to-day to know the lawyers of the past, and profit by their example in learning and in general accomplishments. The Bar, we are pained to believe, has deteriorated, and more painful still, is deteriorating. The training with which law-students are now disciplined is but a sham, when compared with the hard mental gymnastics by which the old lawyers were invigorated and sharpened for the conflicts of the forum. And the modern digests, both of reports and of statutes, enable the lawyer in practice to cram himself for the occasion, without disciplining his faculties, as searching through the reasonings of cases and collating of statutes did in earlier times.

Another cause of change in the character of lawyers is the establishment of local courts, with their separate bars. Formerly there were courts of wide territorial original jurisdiction in the States, which brought all the lawyers together at the same bar for the trial of causes before the jury. The wider field for forensic ambition and rivalry furnished in these courts, stimulated lawyers to greater exertion. It is said, that when the old General Court of Maryland was established to give place to the local courts, Pinckney, the greatest of Maryland lawyers, said, "The glory of our bar is gone for ever!" Even the appellate courts do not now call the lawyers of the several inferior courts together. The increase of business in the appellate courts has made it necessary to divide the docket into sections suited to the convenience of each local court; so that the lawyers from the several courts do not now meet even in the appellate courts. Any wide fraternity of the Bar is thus rendered impossible.

The attempted law-reforms, too, have tended to lower the intellectual ability of the Bar. These pretended reforms have abolished the technical common law pleading, and substituted a loose and unscientific mode of statement, thereby begetting in lawyers loose and illogical habits of mind. The guiding idea in these reforms seem to be, that science is an obsolete thing, well for the old fogies of the past, but behind the practical enlightenment of this age of progress. Maryland has been wiser than her sister States in her law reforms. She simplified and rendered more scientific the old common law pleading, thereby

bringing it nearer to common sense and practical efficiency. The success of the simplified system was fully proved by more than three years' practice in all the courts of that State, without a single difficulty. The system was found fully adequate to all the exigencies of justice; while, as a logical discipline for the student, it was far better than even the old common law pleading. But commissioners, who had digested the statutes of the State which assume the existence of the old common law pleading, found themselves in the dilemma of either making their work conform to the simplified pleading, which they knew was their duty, or else so cutting up the simplified pleading as to enable them to let their work remain as it was, full of obsolete things. They chose the latter easier alternative, and the legislature, without knowing it, adopted their work; and the mutilated pleading now stands an appropriate chapter in a Digest, which puts lecturers on science, literature, morality, and religion, in the same category with stud-horses, jackasses, circus-riders, rope-dancers, and other such characters.* Whether the study of this code will influence the Maryland Bar for good, we, at least, have our doubts.

But a still more potent and fearful cause of the demoralization of the Bar, is the change in the tenure of the judicial office. The judiciary is no longer, as it was of old, independent by a life tenure in office; but is, upon theory, and avowedly, made dependent upon the popular will; and is re-eligible, so that the elective franchise is held in terror over the judges. The principle upon which our forefathers thought a pure and enlightened administration of justice dependent, is now repudiated. The administration of justice seems to be drifting towards Lynch law. The doctrine of a law, higher than decisions of courts, or enactments of legislatures, or even of constitutions, is openly proclaimed. When this doctrine shall be the rule of judges, as it is of some legislators, the abomination of desolation, as woful as that spoken of by the prophet, will come, and that quickly.

There never has been a country where the judicial function was so important, and integrity so necessary to the judge, as

* See pp. 394, 395, vol. i. Maryland Code.

this. No other judiciary ever entertained questions of such magnitude; involving, as they often do, fundamental political rights that are hotly contested by infuriated national parties; and at other times, involving pecuniary interests of amounts astounding to those who only look at the common transactions of courts. The Dred Scot is a case of the first kind; and a case before the Supreme Court, at its last term, presenting the question, whether the rolling stock on railroads is liable to execution for the debts of the company, involving, as it did, millions of dollars, is one of the second kind. But a still more portentous class of cases in the Supreme Court, at the last term, were claims against the United States Government, involving millions of dollars' worth of land in California, founded on pretended grants from the Mexican government before the cession of California. These claims were attempted to be supported by forged public documents, forged public seals, and the perjured testimony of professional witnesses, and had been fraudulently sold, by those who got them up, for large sums of money to those who prosecuted them before the court. The claimants could, in the aggregate, have afforded to give millions of dollars in bribes to the judges. The court decided against the claims. Similar cases will, from time to time, come before the court, from newly acquired territory. Let the nation ponder these things! If our institutions are to be preserved, it must be done by the law administered through an enlightened and upright Bench and Bar. The Bench and the Bar must stand or fall together. They are mutually dependent. There is not an enlightened citizen who believes in the wisdom of an elective and re-eligible judiciary for a term of years; and yet, amidst universal condemnation, it is becoming a universal policy. "Our lawyers (says an eminent English judge) read with admiration, and consult with the greatest respect, the text-books of American lawyers, and the judgments of American judges; and our legal education and system of study have greatly profited by our emulation of that broader and more varied character which the peculiar circumstances of America necessarily tend to create." How long will this high and acceptable praise be merited, if the present progress of decadence in the legal profession be not arrested?

The change in the tenure of the judicial office is the effect of party politics. Adhesion to party had become the criterion by which the judges were appointed by the executives of the States; and, as a remedy for the evil, the judicial office was submitted to the vote of the people. Mr. Binney's first book has led us to these reflections; and here we appropriately take up the second, which is connected with the politics of the country.

In the state of dissevered sympathies, political, ecclesiastical, and social, presented at this time by the great community which in its aggregate relations constitutes the American people, the character of the father of the country is often invoked to mitigate, by its historical greatness and the national memories which cluster around it, the exacerbations of party strife. One of our most distinguished statesmen has, of late, traversed the country, delineating in a noble rhetoric, the intellectual and moral grandeur of Washington. And but a few weeks ago, a great British statesman, when installed as Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, in presenting from his own wide experience the precepts and examples best fitted to guide young men through the trying vicissitudes of life, especially pointed them to Washington, as the one great public man whose character was such that, in all time to come, the degree in which it shall be esteemed will constitute the measure of the civilization of the age. Of all the actors in the great spectacle of history, Washington is far the wisest and the most dignified; if it be wise to make all your ends those of your country's and of truth's; and if it be dignified to give up power at the earliest moment when your country can spare your services. When his sword had won the victories which made his country an independent nation, he delivered it back to the country as the instrument only of war and not of government. And when the sceptre of civil power was placed in his hands, he laid it down at the earliest period which patriotism would allow. Such was the moral greatness of Washington, that he felt that he could, without any show of vain-glory on retiring from the office of President of the United States, advise, in a farewell address, the people whom he had led to victory in war, and conducted to freedom in peace, upon the great principles of policy which

should guide them in the political career now begun in history, and initiated by himself. In the solicitude which he felt about this advice and warning to his countrymen, he called to his aid a friend, whom he had found wise and faithful in his whole public life. As nothing of importance in public affairs ever transpires without being more or less misrepresented, the formation of Washington's Farewell has been, by some, made a matter of reproach to Washington, and by others, to Hamilton, who was the adviser. It is to clear up this misrepresentation that Mr. Binney has written the book before us. And he has accomplished his purpose, and placed the question, once and for ever, on the foundation of truth, leaving Washington's wisdom unimpaired, and Hamilton's honour unsullied.

Ours is not a political journal; but it is within its scope to treat occasionally of the great principles upon which our institutions and social order repose. And because a spirit of disappointment may seem to darken the picture which we have presented, it must not be inferred that we despair of the Republic. No nation ever yet perished on the threshold of her history. Degenerate times have come to all nations, and must come to ours. But under the merciful providence of God, we have confidence in the fulfilment of a great end by our country.

We cannot close without expressing regret, that so masterly a writer as Mr. Binney should have given so much of his time to the labours of his profession, and not spared more to literature and mankind.

ART. IV.—*The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively considered.*

By the Rev. JAMES McCOSH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, author of "Divine Government, Physical and Moral," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Limits of Religious Thought Examined. In Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, in the year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College. First American, from the third London edition. With the Notes translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The Province of Reason: A Criticism of the Bampton Lecture on "The Limits of Religious Thought." By JOHN YOUNG, LL.D., Edin., author of "The Christ of History," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

The Philosophy of the Infinite; with Special Reference to the Theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. By HENRY CALDERWOOD. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1854.

WE prefix the title "Reason and Faith" to this article, not because we propose to enter upon an exhaustive, or even formal, discussion of the subject, but because it is a prominent topic in all, and the chief subject treated in a part, of the books whose titles are given above, which we thus bring before our readers for comment and criticism. If it is the avowed and chief subject of two of these works, it is also largely and ably handled, either directly, or in the discussion of questions fundamental to the solution of it, in the other two. Not only does the question as to the general relation of Faith to Reason thus constitute the *commune vinculum* between these treatises, but more specifically, the discussion, to a greater or less extent, of this relation as affected by the philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned, and the various modes of speculating about the Infinite, the Absolute, the Eternal, and the Uncreated, that were initiated by Kant, and have made themselves felt as forces in shaping the current of philosophic and theologic speculation until now. They had, however, long ruled in Ger-

many before they were insinuated into the French mind through the fascinating lectures and publications of Cousin. Still more recently have they penetrated the Anglo-Saxon mind. But they have now become a formidable power in some of the high-places of Britain and America. As they wane in the country of their birth and early triumph, they wax in force and obtrusiveness in these countries of their later adoption. The problems and issues which this type of thinking raises, confront us on every hand. It impregnates very much of our current literature, philosophy, and divinity. The infection is in all grades of potency. We have simple and unmitigated Transcendentalism, the blankest Pantheism, theoretical and practical, running out, as in the school of Emerson, into the most shameless and articulate scheme of fatalistic licentiousness. We have transcendental mysticism and transcendental rationalism. We have decoctions of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in histories, essays, reviews, original and translated, native and imported. We have Rational Psychologies, Cosmologies, and Theologies, proving not merely how God has made, or even ought to make, but how he *must* make the universe, if he make it at all. We have theologies which identify God man and nature, and make Christ, or the Incarnation, the mere incoming of a theanthropic life into humanity, to bring it back to the depths of the Absolute Deity, of which it is the effluence—a life, according to some, permeating and recovering the entire race, or humanity as such—according to others, husbanded in the external and organic church, and distributed through the sacraments and other outward ceremonies, only to such as receive these ritualistic administrations at the hands of duty authorized hierophants. Others, again, show the bias which their thinking and writing have received from these sources, in their antagonism to this philosophy and its fruits. They are known chiefly as polemics against it, some assailing it with intelligence as to its nature, its truths, and its errors, while they attack the latter with well-chosen and well-directed weapons; others dashing at it blindly, and making havoc alike with friend and foe, truth and error.

We have blind giants, who appear to regard it as their mission to hurl bomb-shells somewhere, as a demonstration against

Transcendental heresies, whether these hit the foe, or fall and explode with destructive effect in their own or a friendly camp. Worst of all, some of the mightiest men who have undertaken to grapple with this Kantian philosophy and its monstrous progeny, and have flattered themselves and others that they have vanquished it, give unequivocal signs of being in a mournful degree mastered by it. They have caught somewhat of the distemper in the attempt to cure it. They seem, scarcely knowing it, to be striving to inoculate philosophy and theology with the virus, for the purpose of fortifying them against it; as will yet more fully appear.

Before proceeding to Mr. Mansel's great work, and the vigorous answer to it by Dr. Young, which will form the central topic of the observations we are about to offer, we wish briefly to characterize the treatise of Dr. McCosh. Some of its more particular statements relative to the great questions handled in Mr. Mansel's work, we hope to bring before our readers, when we come to the heart of our discussion.

Dr. McCosh has won high rank among the Christian philosophers of our day by the works he has already published. His treatise on "The Divine Government, Physical and Moral," introduced him most favourably and widely to the notice of cultivated and thinking men in both hemispheres. His next work on "Typical Forms," &c. was welcomed by a narrower circle, because more scientific and technical. At the same time it was recognized as a valuable contribution to apologetics, and a confirmation of the author's high rank as a thinker. We rate the present work above either of its predecessors, alike as regards the ability it manifests, the difficulty of the questions elucidated, and the importance of the solutions, direct and indirect, which he offers to some of the great issues which now enlist the mind of the church. His works have the merit of speaking to living questions and meeting an existing desideratum. They touch apologetic theology at that point in which, for the time being, the enemies of the gospel are most successful in perplexing and annoying its friends. They deal with it, as it is impugned, obscured, or endangered by the scientists, metaphysicians, rationalists, and mystics of our day—in short, by whatever constitutes the prevalent "philosophy falsely so

called." They repel not merely those who assail Christianity in name, and deny the divinity of the Scriptures, but those who, under the name and guise of Christians, virtually emasculate or annihilate it, for the purpose of bringing it into accord with the supposed demands of reason, spontaneous or reflective, scientific or philosophic. He has the merit of meeting the exact issue, of facing instead of shirking the difficult problems which are either intrinsic to philosophy, or which emerge in the attempt to conciliate it with religion. In short, Dr. McCosh's great specialty is metaphysics, including the metaphysics of physical science, and these especially as related to Christianity; and in our opinion he has cultivated it with signal success. We do not indeed class him with Hamilton, or even with Mansel, as to the order of his mind. We miss the gigantic intellectual energy, the immense learning, the mighty momentum of the former. But then we miss his vehement prejudices, his frequent one-sidedness, showing itself occasionally in the emphatic contradiction of what he had as emphatically affirmed,* and above all, his entanglement in that net-work of Kantian relativities, and antinomies, which he seemed, now to tear into shreds, and now to bind more tightly about him in the very effort to burst it—a giant brushing away these monstrous fictions, like so many puny reptiles, by the mere sporting or effortless play of his powers, and anon charmed, spell-bound and, in a sort, paralyzed by them. We miss also in McCosh the preëminent scholarly culture, the choice philosophic learning, the severely classic style, and the dialectic keenness of Mansel. But we are also glad to miss what is a heavy drawback to these high qualities—that enslavement to certain logical quibbles or fictions concerning the Absolute and Infinite, which figure so largely in the new philosophy of the conditioned, and which are treated by him as first truths that must be allowed to dominate over reason and faith, philosophy and theology.

But if less vigorous and brilliant than either the master or disciple, who, in spite of their faults, stand at the head of late writers on philosophy in the English tongue, he has merits

* See, for one instance, Hamilton's *Lectures*, pp. 223—256, in the first of which it is maintained that there is, in the second, that there cannot be, consciousness without memory.

which more than compensate for this sort of inferiority. There is a certain quick discernment of truth and error, good and evil; of the weak side of splendid and imposing philosophic systems; of the friendly or hostile bearing of metaphysical dogmas, or arguments upon scriptural and evangelical truth; a facile and felicitous exposure of the fallacies and sophistries which lend them plausibility; a ready perception, and happy setting forth of the harmony between the light of Nature and Revelation, and all this with reference to living issues, which impart great value to his writings, especially his latest work. If he does not rank among the foremost as a discoverer or originator of new opinions, he has few peers in power to detect and expose the chaff and the wheat, to separate, and help others to separate, the precious from the vile. Others may be more inventive, ingenious, and eloquent, as advocates. Dr. McCosh shows rather the qualities of a judge, whose "senses are exercised to discern between good and evil." Like the magnet cast into a heap of sand and iron-filings, it spontaneously picks up the true metal, and rejects the worthless dirt. It is this sound, sensible, judicial quality of mind that renders him a sober and safe thinker, and communicates to his works a healthy tone, and salutary influence. In this view, their wide popularity is both deserved and explained.

The very title of his book, although certainly not striking for euphony or terseness, discovers what is far better, the happy tact for discerning a work, that needed to be done, and appreciating its relative and intrinsic importance. "The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated," has long been a great desideratum with reference to some of the chief issues which agitate christendom. And yet, on a superficial glance, the very phrase savours of a solecism. For the very *differentia* of a truth known by intuition is, that it is not reached by induction, but *a priori*—i. e., known prior to, and independently of, such induction, which is an eminently discursive mental process, going from a long observation and comparison of individual instances, to the evolution of a general law. The idea of proving the illimitableness of space or time, the propositions of geometry, or that we ought to do unto others as we would that they should do unto us, by

induction, or inductive generalization, is simply absurd. This is not what is meant by the inductive investigation of our intellectual intuitions. Induction is not here employed as another or rival method of knowing the same things which we know by intuition. It is not a cöordinate source of knowledge. It is rather a means of learning what our intuitions really are and what they actually contain, what precisely is the amount of their self-affirmations and immediate beholdings. Thus, that space is illimitable, that every event must have a cause, that justice ought to be done, that all qualities must belong to a substance—these are truths which are intuitively seen in their own light. They are not only not dependent for confirmation upon experience, but they are incapable of being proved by any amount of experience. For they affirm what is true, not only in, but beyond all actual experience; nay, all supposable or possible experience. They, of course, are not obtained by inductive observation and generalization, which have place only within the sphere of experience, and with reference to matters known exclusively by experience. *But then it is a matter of experience, a fact or phenomenon of our consciousness, that we have these intuitions which discern and affirm truths beyond experience, and a priori.* It is, therefore, a fair field of inductive inquiry, to ascertain what are the intuitions which manifest themselves in our conscious experience, how they arise, what are their circumstances and surroundings, what is their precise import, what are the criteria which test them, and whether the formulas which are commonly employed to express them, declare their content fully and exactly, neither more nor less. Thus the intuition of causality is sometimes enunciated in this wise: “everything must have a cause.” But its true statement is, “every *event* must have a cause.” The difference is vast—as great as that produced by the insertion or omission of a Greek letter in the Athanasian controversy. On the former statement, we require an infinite regress of causes without finding any First Cause. On the latter, a First Cause is inevitably postulated. Our intuition of the Infinite is that it is illimitable, and that the object of which infinitude is predicated, admits of no increase of degree. This is one thing. The dogma of the advocates of

the philosophy of the conditioned, developed from Kant's antinomies, that the infinite is that which includes in itself all actual and all possible existence; that therefore an infinite God is incompatible with finite or created beings; that creation is impossible, and pantheism the only possibility conceivable by the human intellect, is a very different thing. Men are exceedingly apt to take partial views of things, and unconsciously shut their eyes to whatever does not accord with their own likes and prejudices, and to exalt the tenets of their own clan, party or sect, or their own pet conceits and logical quibbles, to the dignity of intuitive truths, about which they are impatient of all doubt and controversy. *Unaquaque gens id legem naturae putat quod didicit.* On the other hand, fierce partizans will often deny even intuitive truths which militate against their favourite dogmas. Besides all this, there are not wanting those who, pleading a *quasi*, if not real, sanction from Locke, deny all intuitive truths; assert that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, without any original ideas or first principles, potential or actual, and that its only resource for general truths is by induction from the facts of its outward and inward experience. For the elucidation of such questions, and the settlement of such controversies, the inductive investigation of our intuitions is indispensable. And to this work, Dr. McCosh has addressed himself with signal success.

A chief point which he emphasizes is the manner in which our intuitions first operate and display themselves. They always first perceive the truths they discern, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, as qualities of individual objects or actions. These are afterwards, having been observed in connection with a number of such individual things, generalized and formalized into abstract propositions or principles, whose truth the mind sees intuitively as soon as they are stated. That no two straight lines can enclose a space, that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same moment, that worship is right and blasphemy wicked, this and all else the like is first seen concretely in individual cases. The observation of these qualities in such instances suggests and induces the statement of the universal abstract principle, which is seen to be true as soon as stated, by its own self-evidencing light.

Space and time indeed are *sui generis*. Body perceived in space, and events in time, may first direct the attention of the mind to them. But when once turned towards them, it intuitively knows them to be boundless, and incapable of being conceived as non-existent. In this illimitable and necessary character, time and space of course are not first seen concretely in any object or event, but in their own immensity as the receptivities of all existence.

Dr. McCosh shows that there are three aspects in which these intuitions manifest themselves. First, they appear as regulative principles, whether they are distinctly apprehended by the mind swayed by them or not. Secondly, they are to be regarded as facts of consciousness in all mental phenomena which betray their presence. Thirdly, they are to be viewed as objective general truths, which represent what is involved in the concrete instances in which they appear, in an abstract and universal form, and which, as thus formalized, are intuitively seen to be true. These intuitions appear as regulative forces in the case of those who have never consciously recognized them, or who even deny them. The peasant who has never thought of free-agency, and the fatalist who denies it, both alike show that they are controlled by a conviction of it, in estimating their own responsibility and that of others. Others may have never presented to themselves the proposition, that moral good and evil are such intrinsically, and that there is an ineffaceable difference between them. They may be even Epicureans or Utilitarians in theory. But they will make it manifest that their moral judgments are often regulated, in spite of their theories, by the intuitive conviction that some acts are right and others wrong in their own nature. So in regard to idealists. Their conduct is regulated by the conviction that there are real external non-egoistic substances. The idealist clergyman, whose horse was stolen, was no wise comforted by being informed that he still possessed the idea of his horse.

Another point on which Dr. McCosh well and strenuously insists, is that the genuine intuitions of the mind apprehend realities, not mere fictions of the imagination, not a mere ideal colouring or shape which the mind throws out from itself. Thus, if we discern the quality of moral goodness, or moral

evil in actions, these are real objective qualities of those actions, not mere subjective shadows projected upon them from our minds—unless their action be morbid and abnormal. Space and time, the nexus of events with causes, and of qualities with substance, are objective realities, not mere subjective forms of thought. This principle we deem of the first importance, as it is maintained by our author, in regard to the intuition both of external objects through the senses, and of supersensual truths. It in reality closes the crevasse opened by Kant, through which Transcendentalism breaks out, levelling all embankments, burying common-sense, sound philosophy, and pure religion under its devastating flood—and which still, as we shall see, sends out its empoisoned currents to mingle with and vitiate Christian philosophy and theology. The beginning of all this sublimated folly of those who professing to be wise become fools, lies just here—in resolving objective truths and realities into mere subjective impressions or forms of thinking.

The criterion of these intuitive truths Dr. McCosh finds to be three—self-evidence, necessity, catholicity. Herein he substantially follows Hamilton, who also adds to these, simplicity and incomprehensibility. If a truth be compound and not simple, then it is not intuitive, but deduced from the conceptions or judgments of which it is compounded. And the same is true, if it be comprehensible, i. e. referrible to and explicable by other truths on which it is dependent. As to self-evidence, this criterion is self-evident. As to catholicity, that is, being confined to no nation, sect, or party, but showing themselves in all healthy and developed minds, this is an obvious characteristic of intuitive truth. As to necessity, this is of two kinds. 1. As denoting that, the contrary of which is inconceivable. 2. That which the mind cannot help regarding as self-evident as soon as presented to it, although the contrary is not inconceivable. Of the former sort of strict and literal necessity, the proposition that of two contradictories one must, and both cannot be true, is a specimen. Of the latter sort of relative necessity, the proposition that our normal consciousness is a true, and not a lying witness, and that its results are knowledge, and not imposture, is a specimen. It cannot be questioned that the foregoing are real and sufficient criteria of intuitive truths.

All this, and much more the like, is ably put, argued, and applied by our author to some of the great questions which hinge thereupon. Nor is it necessary that we say more by way of evincing what we have indicated as the sound and healthy character of the author's mind, especially as shown in this volume. Of course, he is not always equally forcible and felicitous. We find ourselves at times tried by a certain diffuse style and fragmentary method, where we look for a more compact and continuous evolution of the subject in hand. At first, in speaking of the will, he uses certain phrases which look like asserting the Pelagian theory of contrary choice. As we proceed, however, we find that he maintains a causation of the acts of will, only that this causation is not physical, but moral, and congruous with freedom of choice. This is the truth. It is all that most of those, whom the author seems to think himself opposing, claim. We observe at times a confused mode of statement in regard to necessary truths, as if they were dependent on induction for proof. At other times, however, he defines with great clearness and exactness the distinction between inductive and necessary truths. We now take leave of this important work, except as we may have occasion to quote from it, in dealing with Mr. Mansel, to whose great book on the "Limits of Religious Thought," we now turn.

This book is designed as an antidote, primarily to Rationalism; secondarily and incidentally, to what he calls Dogmatism. These respectively he thus defines: "Theological dogmatism is thus an application of reason to the support and defence of pre-existing statements of Scripture. Rationalism, on the other hand, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the independent conclusions of the natural reason, and to be rejected where that adaptation cannot conveniently be made. By *Rationalism*, without intending to limit the name to any single school or period in theological controversy, I mean generally to designate that system whose final test of truth is placed in the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition, by whatever previous process these faculties may have been raised to their assumed dignity as arbitrators. The Rationalist, as

such, is not bound to maintain that a Divine revelation of religious truth is impossible, nor even to deny that it has been actually given." "And," adds Mr. Mansel, "he claims for himself and his age the privilege of accepting or rejecting any given revelation, wholly or in part, according as it does or does not satisfy the conditions of some higher criterion to be supplied by the human consciousness." Pp. 47, 48.

This is a good definition of Rationalism. And the author has well ascribed to it a tendency to diminish, dilute, and destroy all the distinctive doctrines, the very substance of Christianity. As to Dogmatism, which he farther explains as being an attempt to exhibit the unsystematized statements of Scripture, "as supported by reasonable grounds, and connected into a scientific whole," he claims that its perils are of an opposite kind. It tends to add human opinions to the body of revealed doctrine, and to weaken the authority of this doctrine by resting it on mere rational considerations, and substituting human for divine authority. As to this, we only observe, 1. That this is an unusual application of the word dogmatism, and fitted, if not designed, to cast gratuitous odium upon the systematic statement and defence of scriptural doctrine. 2. That it is the proud abuse and overstraining, not the use, of efforts to methodize and harmonize Christian doctrine that beget unscriptural additions to it. 3. That the effort to show that a doctrine or system is accordant with right reason, or not repugnant to it, at various points and in various aspects, is by no means inconsistent with founding it on Scripture. Nor does it lessen the authority of Scripture, when its statements are shown not to be repugnant to reason, or to have a response and witness in the conscience of men. It is only when the reason of men usurps the prerogative of the Infinite Mind, and denies that to be true which God affirms, or when it soars to meddle with things too high for it, utterly beyond its grasp, as in pronouncing against the possibility of the Trinity and Incarnation, that it becomes pernicious and destructive. This, however, if Dogmatism, is, in a far higher degree, Rationalism. Of this, more hereafter. These few provisional words have been said here, because we do not wish to encumber our progress by any further discussion of Dogmatism.

For these foes of Christianity, the one really portentous, the other, in its legitimate use, imaginary, the author thinks he has discovered a sovereign antidote, which it is the object of this volume to set forth. The principle which solves the whole difficulty, is thus stated and italicized, by himself: "*The primary and proper object of criticism is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its relation to Religion.*" P. 61. If it can thus be shown, that the human mind is wholly incompetent, in virtue of its own laws, to make the Infinite an object of thought without running itself into contradictions, then it follows that it is wholly incompetent to criticise a revelation from God upon matters pertaining to God. The Rationalist is caught in the entanglements which he weaves for the orthodox believer. "If it can be shown that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are both the same; that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and, from the nature of the case, must occur, the chief foundation of religious Rationalism is cut away from under it." P. 64. Our author then proceeds, in the second and third lectures, to demonstrate the necessary incapacity of the human mind to make the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite—i. e., God, (see pages 28, 29, foot-note,) an object of thought or knowledge. Of course, everything here depends on what is meant by thought and knowledge. If he means the full comprehension and perfect knowledge of God, of course none will dispute with him. But if he means a partial knowledge, yet a knowledge true, although partial, then all christendom will protest against it, except that superstitious antichrist which teaches that "ignorance is the mother of devotion." What he means, will appear more fully as we examine his proofs in support of his position. He says:

"There are three terms familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, Absolute, and as Infinite. By the *First Cause* is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the *Absolute*, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being. By the Infi-

nite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that, than which a greater is inconceivable; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity.

“The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded as consisting of an infinite number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length, but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded in a third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness in an infinite degree, but devoid of others. Even if it be granted, which is not the case, that such a partial infinite may without contradiction be conceived, still it will have a relative infinity only, and be altogether incompatible with the idea of the Absolute. The line limited in breadth, is thereby necessarily related to the space that limits it: the intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes, coexists with others which are thereby related to it, as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness. The metaphysical representation of the Deity, as Absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality. ‘What kind of an Absolute Being is that,’ says Hegel, ‘which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?’ We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation; but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute and Infinite is an object of human conception at all, this, and none other, is the conception required. That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible, modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. Indeed it is obvious that the entire distinction between the possible and the actual can have no existence as regards the absolutely infinite; for an unrealized possibility is necessarily a relation and a limit. The scholastic saying, *Deus est actus purus*, ridiculed as it has been by modern critics, is in truth but the expression,

in technical language, of the almost unanimous voice of philosophy, both in earlier and later times.

“But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction, by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the Infinite. How can the Infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. Creation at any particular moment of time being thus inconceivable, the philosopher is reduced to the alternative of Pantheism, which pronounces the effect to be mere appearance, and merges all real existence in the cause. The validity of this alternative will be examined presently.

“Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary; and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject, and an object of which he is conscious. . . .

“The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself.

"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple: it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible." Pp. 75—79.

"The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended, if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from an original warp and woof:—namely, the impossibility of conceiving the coëxistence of the infinite and the finite, and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us, according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infinite." Pp. 81, 82.

It was hardly necessary for the author to go on and demonstrate that Pantheism and Atheism afford no relief, but are capable of being easily run out into similar antilogies, and of shattering reason against itself in its very effort to apprehend them. Indeed, what is not capable of this treatment, if there be any substance or validity in this sort of logical legerdemain, which can be practised with equal facility upon any object, finite or infinite, and reel off an equal profusion of contradictions? But before examining these antilogies at length, which are but ramifications of Kant's famous antinomies,* we will

* Antinomies of Kant:

First Antinomy.

The world has a beginning in time, and is limited in regard to space.

The world has no beginning in time and no limits in space, but is in regard to both infinite.

Second Antinomy.

Every composite substance consists of simple parts, and all that exists must either be simple or composed of simple parts.

bring to the notice of our readers, Mr. Mansel's attempted demonstration of the source and the necessity of these contradictory conceptions of things, as lying in the very nature of consciousness and personality.

"That man can be conscious of the Infinite is thus a supposition, which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation, for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and *actually nothing*; (!!) for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must be conceived as *actually everything, and potentially nothing*: for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature, by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness. ⁸

"This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for, when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation—if, whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception regarded as finite—the *infinite*, from a human point of view, is merely a

No composite thing can consist of simple parts, and there cannot exist in the world any simple substance.

Third Antinomy.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world; to account for the phenomena we must have the causality of freedom.

There is no such thing as freedom, but every thing in the world happens according to the laws of nature.

Fourth Antinomy.

There exists in the world, or in connection with it, as a part or as the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being.

An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it, as the cause of the world.

name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." P. 94.

It was surely a work of supererogation for the author to tell us, on the next page, that consistency requires us to "refuse to attribute consciousness to God," if we attempt any conception of him, because consciousness implies "limitation and change;" and still further, that we cannot conceive of God except under some characteristics—i. e. distinction and limitation: and yet that if we attempt to set aside or ignore these limiting modifications, "the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;—pure being is pure nothing." A finite being or nothing! O thou Most High God! is this the dread position into which the minds thou hast given us are, in the phrase of this author, "cramped by their own laws, and bewildered by their own forms!" that they should be compelled to conceive of thee either as a limited being or as nothing!

Similar quiddities, shall we call them? are evolved by the author, from the fact that consciousness involves relation, while "the Absolute as such is independent of all relation"—therefore "we cannot conceive it as existing." Pp. 96, 97. Still further, from the fact that consciousness in human experience involves duration and succession, a tissue of like contradictions is woven. Pp. 98, 99.

Consciousness, moreover, involves Personality. So also do "the various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example. . . But Personality," says our author, "as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation . . . a relation between the conscious self and the various modes of his consciousness. . . Personality is also a limitation, for the thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each other, and the several modes of thought are distinguished from each other by limitation likewise." Pp. 102, 103.

So the author strengthens, while he echoes, his great conclusion that the "*Absolute* and the *Infinite* are thus, like the *Inconceivable* and *Imperceptible*, names indicating not an object of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." P. 110. "It follows, indeed, that the infinite is beyond the reach of

man's arguments; but only as it is also beyond the reach of his feelings and volitions. We cannot indeed reason to the existence of an Infinite Cause from the presence of finite effects, nor contemplate the infinite in a finite mode of knowledge; but neither can we feel the infinite in the form of a finite affection, nor discern it as a law of finite action." P. 117. "The very conception of a moral nature is in itself the conception of a limit." P. 127. As to "a partial, but not a total knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute," we are told, of course, "the supposition refutes itself." P. 97.

If this series of dialectic feats tires the reader, this is not our fault. It is still more trying to the writer to transcribe, analyze, and refute them. Similar extracts might be multiplied at pleasure. We have thought proper to quote thus largely, in order to let the author speak for himself on the most fundamental point in his treatise—a question of intrinsic and acknowledged difficulty. We have thus before us the destructive portion of his theory. The constructive side will remain to be considered, when we have disposed of this. Those who are familiar with German transcendental modes of thought and expression, will recognize little that is new in these portentous demonstrations, which make it the prime function of human reason to commit suicide. The novelty lies in the use to which they are put by Mr. Mansel. He has undertaken to utilize modes of thinking heretofore employed in behalf of Pantheism or Atheism, and the demolition or corruption of Christianity in order to neutralize their own venom, and parry their own assaults upon our faith. He shows our supposed enemy to be our faithful and invincible ally. It is indeed true, according to Kant, Hegel, and their followers, that the mind of man cannot think of God as Infinite, Absolute, and First Cause, without running into all manner of contradictions and absurdities. But this need not alarm us. It proves not Pantheism or Atheism, but the utter incapacity of reason or philosophy to grasp religious truths at all, or exercise any critical judgment about them. Of course, all rationalistic or philosophic objections are undermined. For the very reason itself which makes them, is undermined, *quoad hoc*, and proved incapable of thought in the premises. This

is what is proved by the antilogies into which it runs, rather than the reality of those antilogies. Thus philosophy may at least evince its own futility. It is an engine which at least consumes its own smoke.

All this seems very good, only that it is too good. It is surely a good work to annihilate rationalism. But when this is done by quenching the light of reason as a faculty which can make the infinite God an object of thought, even when taught by his own Word and Spirit, (for the author's reasonings tend to all this, or they mean nothing,) we pause, and inquire if the boon proffered be not too great, and its cost too great?

"What is God? God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This we were taught in our infancy. No words are more familiar to the old and young, the learned and unlearned of our own and many other communions. No words more articulately or happily utter the common faith of christendom in the premises. And we say, without hesitation, that they convey more real and more salutary truth in regard to the High and Lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, than all the books ever written in the vein of the foregoing quotations. Do these words convey to the mind no ideas, or express no thoughts, or objects of possible thought? Or, what is worse, do they convey only notions bristling with stupendous contradictions and fatuous absurdities! Does the attribute of infinity intimate the blasphemy, that in order to be true of God, he must comprise in himself all finite beings, all possible existences and modes of existence, including sin,* which our author says follows by "unassailable reasoning," if we can have any thought of the Infinite at all? Is it endurable that Christians should be taught by a Christian teacher, that the absolute

* In his preface to this edition, Mr. Mansel notices the severe criticisms which have been justly brought against the passage here referred to. He endeavours to parry their face by offering the following analogous passage:

"Suppose that an author had written such a sentence as the following: 'A circular parallelogram must have its opposite sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference shall be equal to each. The conclusion is absurd; but the reasoning is unassailable, *supposing a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.*'"

"Would such a statement involve any formidable consequences either to

moral perfections of God imply limitations inconsistent with his Infinitude, and relations inconsistent with his Absoluteness? Are we to listen silently while men tell us, that if we attribute consciousness or personality to our God, these likewise involve limitations and relations inconsistent with his infinity and absoluteness, and that the only escape from this is found in denying all attributes to the Great Supreme, till beneath the lowest deep, we reach that lower still, that abysmal nihilism and Hegelian pantheism, in which "pure being is nothing"? Is all this, and much more like it, true of this admirable answer to the question, "What is God?" or is it not, in all points capable of being understood, in a sense not irrational nor self-contradictory, and, however inadequate or disproportioned to the object, yet true, edifying, and fitted to inspire with devout feeling? This question answers itself in the consciousness of the whole church of God.

The first sentence in the Bible is, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." We ask if this does not present what is a true object of thought and knowledge regarding God? Does it not set before us what illustrates and confirms, not what contradicts, the absolute and infinite perfection of his being? Do "unrealized potentialities" before, or additions to the sum of being through and after the work of creation, conflict in the least with any real conception of the Infinite and Absolute of which we are conscious? Is not creation itself rather an outgoing and evidence of infinite power?

But perhaps it is time to meet the question directly, Are cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, apprehensible or knowable by man, so as to be in any manner or degree objects of his thought? We answer, Yes. God is an object of apprehension and knowledge. This knowledge is partial, for the finite of

geometry or logic?" Perhaps not. But if the conception of a "circular parallelogram" be a fair parallel to our conception of an infinite God, we think it involves very "formidable consequences" to theology and religion. For as the first conception is an impossibility, so, by parity of reason, must the latter be. This the author maintains, as also that if such conception of God were possible, it would include evil as a part of it. This is quite "formidable" enough for us.

course cannot fully grasp the infinite. But as far as it goes, it is true knowledge. The definition of God already cited from the Catechism, sets forth attributes which we can apprehend, however imperfectly, and which are the foundation of our love, trust, and adoration of the Most High. If any of them were wanting, it would diminish so far forth our confidence and reverence. All feel that this would inevitably be so. But how could it be so, if each one of them, "infinite" among the rest, does not convey some intelligible idea to the mind? Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, denies even a "partial knowledge" of the Infinite. But though partial, it by no means follows that it is untrue, or unreliable. If so, then all knowledge is fallacious. We know nothing fully, from the dew-drop to the ocean, from the mote in the sunbeam to the stellar worlds, from our own bodies and souls, and their mysterious union, to the infinite God. But we know, or may know, all that is needful for us, TRULY. In proof of this we adduce:

1. The testimony of Consciousness. We are certainly conscious of some thoughts of God as a being of power, goodness, and wisdom; and of these as unlimited. Nor does the latter attribute, although but partially comprehensible by us, detract from; it enlarges and intensifies our idea of the former.

2. The testimony of Scripture. This certainly teaches—
1. That there are vast depths in the nature, plans, and ways of God which we cannot fathom. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord?" "Who by searching can find out God?" "How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out?" These representations surely strike down all Rationalism. They show the absurdity of our sitting in judgment on the procedures or declarations of Him whose judgments are a great deep. But they do not show that we can know nothing at all about him. On the contrary they show that we "know in part," partially, that we know parts of his ways, though so little a portion is heard of him. "Secret things belong to God, but the things that are revealed are for us and our children." In Rom. i. 20, it is clearly taught that the heathen are culpable for not knowing his eternal power and Godhead. Nay, the Scriptures make the knowledge of God indispensable to true religion and salvation. Christ teaches that "this is life eternal, to *know God* and

Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. (John xvii. 3.) Every one that loveth is born of God and *knoweth God*." (1 John iv. 7.) He teaches that infidels and heathens worship "they know not what," an "unknown God;" that true worshippers know whom they worship, (John iv. 22,) and must worship him in spirit and in truth. How is this possible for those utterly ignorant of him, and incapable of making the Infinite an object of thought.

3. There is no true religion without faith in God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, substantially as they are revealed in the Scriptures. But how is faith possible in respect to that which is in no manner a possible subject of thought or apprehension? How can aught be brought within the sphere of faith, which cannot be brought within the sphere of cognition? Mr. Mansel employs his doctrine that God and the things of God cannot be objects of the mind's thought or knowledge, any more than a "circular parallelogram," to prove that these high matters must be handed over from Reason to Faith. There is a high sense in which this latter is true, as may yet more fully appear. But it is not the sense of our author. In this sense faith is an impossibility. It is so, from the utter absence of any apprehensible, credible, or definable object of belief, unless we take the old maxim of some extreme super-fidians, "it is certain because impossible." But downright contradictions, or contradictory affirmations or attributes cannot be objects of faith. We cannot believe in round squares or circular parallelograms.* The

* "Hamilton represents the notion of infinity as an 'impotency' of the mind, an impotency to conceive that space and time should have bounds. I am endeavouring to show in these paragraphs that there is more than this. Hamilton admits that we have a belief in the infinite. 'The sphere of our belief,' says he, 'is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge, and therefore when I deny that the Infinite can by us be *known*, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed. This I have indeed anxiously evinced both by reason and authority.' (*Metaph. App.* p. 684.) Handing us over in this way to belief, he has nowhere explained the psychological nature of this belief, or of belief in general. Must not a belief of a thing of which we have no conception be a belief in *zero*?" (*McCosh*, note, p. 218.)

This last interrogatory strikes us as quite unanswerable. It is quite noteworthy that such eminent philosophers, as Hamilton and Mansel while proposing a psychological solution of these problems, and remanding so onerous a service to Faith; should nowhere have attempted, by a psychological analysis of its nature, to prove it capable of the labour they assign to it.

mind may believe that some apparent contradictions are not real, and that completer knowledge will dissipate them. This state of things may often occur with regard to God and divine verities. But it is wholly different from that contemplated in this volume. It is perfectly consistent with our KNOWING in whom we have believed, and that he is able to keep that which we commit to him. Nay,

4. We believe that he is "ablè to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." We *know* that love which yet *passeth knowledge*. We comprehend in one sense, a height, and depth, and length, and breadth, which in another sense defy comprehension. We know God. We know his attributes. But we know his attributes and excellencies as unlimited by the bounds of our knowledge, or any other bounds—i. e., as infinite. But while God has thus all perfections in a degree surpassing our comprehension, yet we have some knowledge of what thus passes our knowledge. Have we no idea of what is meant by omnipotence, eternity, absolute and infinite wisdom and goodness? A standard method of defining the manner of our knowledge of God, is, that we obtain it by way of causality, by way of eminence, by way of negation. Our own consciousness of producing effects by our own volitions enables us to have some idea of the First and Omnipotent Cause making all things out of nothing. We have a consciousness of knowledge, of approving righteousness and condemning iniquity. We can have some idea then of consummate intellectual and moral excellence in the Most High. By negation is meant the removal of limits to any excellence or attribute of God. Do we not in this way attain a true though imperfect knowledge of God, and his adorable perfections? It is to no purpose to retort upon this, as is done by writers of the German school, that we thus form a conception of a magnified or infinite man, rather than of God. We have the testimony of God himself, that man was made in the image of God, and that this image consists in knowledge and righteousness. And can we not know God primarily from this similitude to him, and secondarily and still more fully by the infinite distance between him and us, between the Infinite and the finite? Dr. Young very forcibly calls attention to the

striking fact that Hamilton, notwithstanding his doctrine of the unthinkable character of the Infinite and Absolute, and of causality, still teaches that we ascend to the knowledge of God from the points of resemblance to him in our own souls. He says, as quoted by Dr. Young, "Though man be not identical with the Deity, still he is created in the image of God. It is indeed only through an analogy of the human with the Divine, that we are percipient and recipient of the Divinity." "Mind is the object, the only object, through which our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of God."* We are unable now to put our eyes on these passages in Hamilton. But language essentially equivalent to it will be found in the second of his *Lectures on Metaphysics*. And even Mr. Mansel says, pages 104, 105, "It is from this intense consciousness of our own real existence as persons, that the conception of reality takes its rise in our minds; it is *through that consciousness alone that we can raise ourselves to the faintest image of the supreme reality of God.*"

5. The mode of knowing God by negation, of which we have spoken, is something quite contrary to the negation of all thought—the mere mental impotency into which the school we are criticising resolve all our mental exercises in regard to cause, infinite, absolute, unconditioned. It is, viewed from another side, the greatest, the most positive affirmation the mind can make. It simply denies all limits, and in so doing affirms being, energies, excellencies, beyond all bounds imaginable, *ad infinitum*. Is this a mere negation of thought? When the mind affirms that space and time are illimitable, is this a mere negation of thought, or is it not the most positive and intense mental energizing?†

6. Nor does this involve the absurdity of conceiving the

* See *Province of Reason*, pp. 166, 167.

† A negative predicate, in form, is often the most positive in fact. When the subject is wholly undefined, except by a negative predicate, then this predicate becomes simply indefinite; it simply points out one thing that the subject is not, leaving it wholly uncertain what of all other things in the universe it is. Thus, if we say of any subject which is in itself wholly undefined, that it is not Washington, not a stone, not broad, we deny these attributes of it, but we point out nothing concerning it. But if we deny of any defined subject, qualities congruous with it, we may thus predicate the most

Infinite as comprehending in itself all possible, and all actual being. Dr. McCosh has forcibly demonstrated this in his chapter on our intuition of the Infinite. He says, "We can talk of space and time and God as being infinite. We can utter judgments about it, as that the infinite God is in every given place; there is no place of which we may not say, Surely the Lord is in this place. We can even reason about it; thus we can infer that this puny effort of man, set against the recorded will of God, shall surely be frustrated by his infinite power." P. 229. In a note he adds, "I decidedly demur to the statement of Mr. Mansel, 'that which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.' . . . I would rather agree with Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel than any metaphysicians of the past or present age. But whether I agree with them or not, I must hold it to be quite possible to muse and reason about the attribute 'infinite,' as it is in fact conceived and believed in by the mind, without falling into the difficulties in which the German supporters of the absolute have involved themselves, and that we can think of God and write about God, as infinite, without being compelled by any logical necessity to look upon him as embracing all existence, or to reckon it impossible or inconceivable that he should create a world and living agents differing from himself. We cannot conceive that God's power should be increased, but we can conceive it exercised in creating beings possessed of power. We cannot conceive his goodness to be enlarged, but we can, without a contradiction, conceive him creating other beings also good. Nor can we by this conception be shut up to the conclusion that the creature-power or creature-excellence might be added to the Divine power and goodness, and thus make it greater. To all quibbles proceeding in this line, I say that,

positive properties. Thus, if we predicate of a man, that he is not wise, or good, or poor, or influential, or of water that is not pure, or of a stone that is not soft, we make the most positive affirmations respecting them. So, if we declare of an intelligent and moral being that his wisdom, goodness and power, are infinite, this is the most positive kind of thought. On this and related points, Mr. Calderwood offers some excellent observations. See *Philosophy of the Infinite*, chap. iii.

for aught I know, it may not be possible they should be added, or that if added, they should increase the Divine perfections; and no reply could be given, drawn either from intuition or experience, the only lights to which I can allow an appeal." (*McCosh on Intuitions*, pp. 228, 229.)

Finally, the whole alleged antagonism in our conceptions of the infinite and absolute is a groundless assumption, a pure fiction of philosophers; it is unknown to the normal consciousness and intuitions of the unperturbed human mind. Who but the transcendentalists and those moulded by them, ever conceived that the absoluteness of God was invaded by the correlation and harmony of his own attributes, or by his relations to his creatures, or by any relations *ad intra* or *ad extra*, which do not imply a dependence on something without himself? Who ever imagined that consciousness and personality in God are inconsistent with his infinitude; or that it is impossible to conceive of space and time not only as absolutely limited but absolutely unlimited? On this subject we again refer to McCosh. Speaking of this antilogy as put by Hamilton, he says, "The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense in which the word 'conceive' is used. In the second of these counter-propositions the word is used in the sense of imaging, or representing in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions, the word 'conceive' is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. When thus explained, all appearance of contradiction disappears; indeed, all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions will vanish, if we but carefully inquire into the nature of the convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there is no contradiction. They stand thus: 'We cannot imagine space without bounds;' 'we cannot think that it has

bounds, or believe that it has no bounds.' The former may well be represented as a creature impotency; the latter is most assuredly a creature potency, is one of the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed, and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn." (*McCosh*, p. 219.)

Having thus examined the destructive side of Mr. Mansel's system, in which he demolishes Rationalism by the attempt to establish the utter impotence of the human mind to attain any true speculative conception or knowledge of God, or to essay it even, without plunging into a chaos of contradictions, we now pass to consider the constructive side of the book—how it tries to reclaim to man that effective knowledge of God, without which religion is a nullity, and which it seemed to have taken away.

He first summons to his aid the great dogma of Kant, which, in various potencies, has streamed or been filtrated through the subsequent masters of Transcendentalism, until we find a portentous infusion of it in Hamilton and Mansel. We refer to the doctrine of what is technically called the "relativity of knowledge." It is in substance this. When the mind apprehends any object, whether material and by the senses, or immaterial and supersensual, it contributes from itself a part or the whole of the phenomenon—how much it is impossible to tell. Therefore, it is impossible to tell how much of what is perceived is subjective, and how much is objective, how much belongs to the object discerned, how much to the mind discerning. Therefore we have no knowledge of things *as they are in themselves*, but only as they exist in relation to our faculties. Whether, and how much of this mode of existence, as perceived by us, comes from the percipient mind or from the object, is wholly uncertain and unknowable. But what we appear to know may safely enough be taken for practical truth to regulate our own conduct with regard to it. If this be so in regard to all objects of thought and knowledge, much more is it so with regard to our knowledge of the Absolute and Infinite. Therefore, while we can have no knowledge of God as he is, yet we can have such apprehensions of him as may safely guide our practice. We can have, through the Scriptures, a safe regulative, although not a true speculative knowledge of him.

He says: "The object of which we are conscious is thus, to adopt the well-known language of the Kantian philosophy, a *phenomenon* not a *thing in itself* (called by Kant a *noumenon*):—a product resulting from the two-fold action of the thing apprehended, on the one side, and the faculties apprehending it, on the other. The perceiving subject alone, and the perceived object alone, are two unmeaning elements, which first acquire a significance in and by the act of their conjunction.*

"It is thus strictly in analogy with the method of God's Providence in the constitution of man's mental faculties, if we believe that in Religion also, he has given us truths which are designed to be regulative rather than speculative; intended not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but *how he wills that we should think of him* in our present finite state." Pp. 142, 143.

"To have sufficient grounds for believing in God is a very different thing from having sufficient grounds for reasoning about him. The religious sentiment, which compels men to believe in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of his existence, but not an exhibition of his nature. It proves *that* God is, and makes known some of his relations to us; but it does not prove what God is in his own Absolute Being. The natural senses, it may be, are diverted and coloured by the medium through which they pass to reach the intel-

* Hamilton puts the matter thus: "However great and infinite, and various, therefore, may be the universe and its contents—these are known to us, not as they exist, but as our mind is capable of knowing them." (*Lec. on Meta.* p. 48.) "Whatever we know is not known as it is, but only as it seems to us to be: for it is of less importance that our knowledge should be limited than that it should be pure. . . . I see a book . . . let us suppose in the example I have taken, that the full or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made up of three several parts—of four contributed by the book—of four contributed by all that intervenes between the book and the organ—and of four contributed by the living organ itself."

"I use this illustration to show that the phenomenon of the external object is not presented immediately to the mind, but is known by it only as modified through certain intermediate agencies." (What then, we ask, becomes of Hamilton's doctrine of immediate perception?) . . . "But this source of error is not limited to our perceptions; and we are liable to be deceived, not merely by not distinguishing in an act of knowledge what is contributed by sense, but by not distinguishing what is contributed by the mind itself." (*Id.* pp. 102, 103.) If all this be so, what is left to us but utter incertitude and scepticism?

lect, and present to us, *not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us*. And this is manifestly the case with the religious consciousness, which can only represent the Infinite God under finite forms. But we are compelled to believe on the evidence of our senses that a material world exists, even while we listen to the arguments of the idealist, who reduces it to an idea or to non-entity; and we are compelled by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a personal God; though the reasonings of the Rationalist, logically followed out, may reduce us to Pantheism or Atheism." Pp. 128, 129.

"Religious ideas, in short, like all other objects of man's consciousness, are composed of two distinct elements—a Matter furnished from without, and a Form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." P. 158.

It does not appear to us that such a system can plant itself very widely or deeply in the soil of sturdy, old-fashioned English common-sense. Its clear statement is its refutation.

1. While it is, of course, true, that we know only what is in relation with our faculties; and while it is further true, that we may know but a portion of the properties of any object which may be known to other intelligences, still it must be maintained that our faculties, in their healthy and normal modes of operation, know truly. Otherwise they do not know at all. And if we know, we know that we know, for the former involves the latter. Of course, an uninstructed person knows little of a quartz crystal in comparison with a mineralogist; little of his own body, compared with the anatomist or physiologist. Still he knows the colour, the shape, the hardness of the former; he knows most of the exterior members, proportions, organs, hues, functions, and the interior vital sensations of the latter. He knows them truly, even if he have never studied them, or qualified himself to state them in an orderly manner. He knows them so far forth, as truly as the scientist, although he is ignorant of much lying beyond, which the latter knows. The dangerous point in this scheme of "relativity," is not that we know only what is in relation with our faculties, and that we know only in part,—but that we do not and cannot know truly, or, at least, be sure of knowing

truly. As Hamilton phrases it, "it is of less importance to us that our knowledge should be limited, than that it should be pure." "The Matter," says Mr. Mansel, "is furnished from without, and a form imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself." "Form" in the nomenclature of these philosophers means whatever is phenomenal in objects, the characteristics by which they are known. How do we know any Matter or substance sensuous or super-sensuous, except through its form or manifested properties? Be this as it may, according to all the forms of statement which we have quoted from Hamilton and Mansel, how is it possible to know in regard to any object, material or immaterial, what portion is contributed by the mind, and is subjective, what comes from the object, and has objective reality? It is clearly impossible. We are plunged into absolute uncertainty as to the reality of objects without us in the realms of both matter and spirit. If the mind contributes the form, why not the matter; if it creates the phenomenon, why not the *noumenon*; and what remains but the absolute subjectivity and infinite egoism into which Fichte so logically developed Kant's theory? At all events, the best that can be said of it, is that it lands us in utter uncertainty and scepticism. It destroys knowledge by destroying its certainty.

2. The reason why objects are apprehended by us as we apprehend them, is that they are such—such whether we know it or not. In order that a book may be known as a book, a tree as a tree, they must be such in themselves, whether we know them or not, and as the condition of our knowing them. Our minds do not give them their form or appearance. We could not perceive them as we do, unless they were as we perceive them. Our minds are dependent on the presence of these objects for their perception of them. But these objects are not dependent on our minds for their being and form. Space is no mere form of thought. It exists outside of and independent of any man's thinking, and as the condition of his thinking it. We know things thus, so far as we know them at all. It is witnessed by our deepest consciousness that objects are what they are, irrespective of our cognitions of them, and and in order to those cognitions. Any other system, as

O. A. Brownson says, in one of the finest passages he ever penned, ends in a "sublime system of transcendental nullism." And we must insist that it contradicts Hamilton's doctrine of the veracity of consciousness. It is a first principle with him that the absolute and universal veracity of consciousness is to be maintained; that if its testimony to the non-ego cannot be trusted, neither can its testimony to the ego; that the maxim applicable to all other witnesses holds with regard to this; *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*; that on this hypothesis, "every system is equally true, or rather all are equally false; philosophy is impossible, for it has now no instrument by which truth can be discovered—no standard by which it is to be tried; the root of our nature is a lie." (*Metap.* p. 196.) This cannot be gainsaid. But it is utterly annihilating to the scheme, which makes these objects or properties, or phenomena, subjective or egoistical, which are apprehended in consciousness as objective realities external to the mind itself. Mr. Mansel makes a futile effort to parry this argument, by telling us, that the reality which the mind understands itself to cognize in consciousness, "is not identical with absolute existence unmodified by the laws of the perceiving mind." P. 307. The mind holds itself to perceive objects and properties as they are, not as they are "modified" by its own "laws" or agency. Or rather it holds itself so constituted as to be veracious, not false, and under "laws" which lead it to know things as they are, not as they are modified by itself. He tells us, on the same page, that Kant's theory "amounts to no more than this: that we can see things only as our faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of other intelligences, embodied or spiritual." With all respect, we will ask if this is precisely the Kantian doctrine as he had before defined it? And whether it be or not, and whatever may be the superiority in the extent and mode of knowing in other intelligences, we submit whether it is not an intuitive conviction that all intelligences, so far as they know at all, know alike? One may know more and another less, one may know through the senses, the other by spiritual faculties alone; one by intuition,

the other discursively; but so far as they know at all, in reference to the same matter, they know not in contradiction of, but in harmony with each other. All intelligences who know at all in the premises, know that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that blasphemy is wicked, that an oak tree is not an apple tree, that an elephant is not a man, and that black is not white. Any ideas not conformable to these representations, amount not to knowledge, but to ignorance. This does not mean that we never err through inattention, carelessness, passion, even in matters within our scope; nor that the sphere of our knowledge is broad; nor that our insight is more than insignificant in comparison with other intelligences. But it postulates that this insight, be it more or less, is insight, and that what we know, be it more or less, we know. Less than this, as it seems to us, cannot be maintained, without absolute scepticism and intellectual suicide. The whole issue is, after all, a very plain one, when we once brush away the dense fogs in which philosophy has shrouded it. It is merely, whether the minds with which our Creator has endowed us, are (so far as we know) so made, as to see, so far as they see at all, things, not as they are, but as they are not, not truth but error?

3. We are now prepared to estimate the value of the hypothesis that our knowledge of God is regulative merely, not speculative—intended, “not to tell us what God is in his absolute nature, but how he wills that we should think of him in our present state;”—“not things in themselves, but things as they appear to us.” We fear this solution will not stand. The question is not whether we can know God completely; not whether we can see the mutual harmony and consistency of all that we do know concerning him; not whether we know in regard to God or creatures so infallibly that nothing remains for us to learn or correct; but the question is, whether our knowledge of God, in its best estate, is *real knowledge*, and gives us true or false conceptions of Him. It is not whether our “reason is satisfied,” in the sense not only of knowing that things are, but comprehending *how*; not whether the scriptural representations concerning God are not sometimes

made in figurative language, not whether the propositions delivered to us are not regulative, or designed for the regulation of our faith and practice; but whether they are TRUE: whether what God "wills that we should believe" concerning himself is the TRUTH. This question we conceive is fundamental. We take it for an axiom, which no sophistry and no logical dexterity can shake, that we ought to believe and be governed by the truth, so far as it is within reach, and by nothing else: and especially, in regard to the things of God, by the realities of eternal truth, not by any representations prepared for effect, which disguise, distort, or in any manner give a false or erroneous version of these realities. We do not think this can be an open question till all the pillars of morality and religion are undermined. And "if the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do?" But we are not left to our own reasoning or intuitions on this subject. God himself teaches us that by the truth we are "begotten," "made free," "sanctified." "But ye have an unction from the Holy One whereby ye know all things. I have not written unto you because ye know not the truth, *but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth.*" (1 John ii. 20, 21.) On the opposite theory, truth is no better than error, the search after it is irrational, and "the root of our nature is a lie." If this is the antidote to Rationalism, the remedy seems to us, if not worse than the disease, at least tainted with it. If there is any type of rationalism specially offensive to us, it is that which maintains that God does, or says, or requires things for regulative and practical purposes, which are variant from truth and reality. This is that empoisoned stream which, issuing from German Transcendentalism, has flowed down through Schleiermacher, and from him through various diminutive channels in England and America. It has given us a Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, which are unrealities, mere modes of representation for the purpose of working the mind of the race in devout practice. It is abhorrent to every well-constituted mind. It leaves every one free to accept or reject, (as far as the truth of it is concerned,) as much or as little of the Bible as he pleases. We hardly understand how Mr. Mansel should have fallen into this view

after the pungent condemnation he has uttered in regard to an analogous view of prayer, as set forth by Kant.*

A corollary from the foregoing positions, which our author enounces, is that "the legitimate object of a rational criticism of revealed religion, is not to be found in the *contents* of that religion, but in its *evidences*." Pp. 204, 205. He seems, however, to be aware that the two cannot thus be separated and sharply contrasted. A most material part of the evidence is the contents of revelation. It is this in-evidence of divinity that has borne it to the hearts of God's people of every age and nation in demonstration of the Spirit and of power. It is because they hear a voice therein speaking as man never spake, and see a radiance of divinity not paralleled in the material creation or the light of nature, that they are conscious of vastly stronger evidence that the Bible is the word, than that the material world is the work of God.

It is not merely miracles in contrast to the "contents" of revelation, but these very contents, too, that attest its Divine origin. Mr. Mansel says, "The primary and direct inquiry which human reason is entitled to make concerning a professed revelation is—how far does it tend to promote or hinder the moral discipline of man. It is but a secondary and indirect question, and one very liable to mislead, to ask how far it is compatible with the Infinite Goodness of God." P. 210. With all deference, this seems to us a *δυστερον προτερον*. It is because we see the impress of the "Infinite Goodness of God" upon the Scriptures, that we believe them "given by inspiration of God, and thus profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be per-

* "Let us hear then the philosopher's *rational* explanation, upon this assumption, of the duty of prayer. It is a mere superstitious delusion, he tells us, to consider prayer as service addressed to God, and as a means of obtaining his favour. The true purpose of the act is not to alter or affect in any way God's relation towards us; but only to quicken our own moral sentiments, by keeping alive within us the idea of God as a moral Lawgiver. He, therefore, neither admits the duty unconditionally, nor rejects it entirely; but leaves it optional with men to adopt that or any other means, by which, in their own particular case, this moral end may be best promoted;—as if any moral benefit could possibly accrue from the habitual exercise of an act of conscious self-deception." P. 56.

fect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17.) The first judgment of natural men, of a great majority of philosophers and thinkers destitute of spiritual illumination, has been, that the Christian method of salvation by grace tends to licentiousness—not "to promote but to hinder the moral discipline of man," by encouraging him "to continue in sin that grace may abound." It is only as man sees that the Infinite Goodness and Wisdom which manifest themselves in the Scriptures have provided this method of salvation; as its Divine efficacy to promote holy living is known to him by its fruits in the case of those who embrace it; and as he himself is effectually taught by the Holy Spirit; that he makes trial of its efficacy, and finds in blessed experience how, "being made free from sin, and become servants to God, we have our fruit unto holiness and the end everlasting life." Moreover, if miracles prove the doctrine, the doctrine also proves the miracle, at least negatively—insomuch that signs and wonders wrought in support of idolatry would thus be proved to be not from above, but beneath. (See Deut. xiii. 1—5.) Doctrine and miracle are both parts of one arch, and they are interdependent.

Nor does this enthrone man's reason over the Scriptures, or allow it to reduce their contents to its own measure and standard. On the contrary, there being clear evidence in the divinity of the contents of Scripture as well as from miracles, that it is the word of God, this enforces the submission of our reason to its teachings, whenever they surpass or confound it. It constrains us to take the yoke and learn of Christ,—to lay aside all rationalistic cavils and doubts, to take the Bible in its plain import without torturing it into accord with our preconceived views, and if we find what is incomprehensible, still to accept it; not doubting that there is a solution worthy of God, whether we are permitted to see it or not. So our faith will not stand in the wisdom of men but in the power of God. Indeed, what can seem more monstrous than that the deliverances of the Infinite Mind should be attenuated to the standard, and subjected to the revision of our short-sighted reason or common-sense? As well might we test the luminous capacity of the sun by our gas-lights.

And yet this revelation is delivered to rational beings, and

addressed to their reason. It supposes and requires the exercise of reason in ascertaining its evidences and import. It supposes an intelligent subject whose reason it employs, and at the same time purifies, enlarges, and perfects. Now there is a very limited range of subjects in regard to which we cannot doubt what is true, without a denegation of our rational nature. No amount of authority can convince us that two contradictories can be true, *i. e.*, that a thing may be, and may not be at the same time. If we know that we exist, we cannot believe the contrary. If we know that a body occupies space, we cannot believe that it does not occupy space. We cannot believe that things equal to the same thing are not equal to each other, or that a bit of bread on earth is the body of our Lord in heaven. So far forth, all competent divines have allowed a *judicium contradictionis*, in the interpretation of the word of God, *i. e.* that it must not be interpreted to teach contradictories, because contradictories can never both be true. Yet this principle is allowable only within very narrow limits. The contradiction must be immediate, unambiguous, undeniable,—not a matter of inference, or the result of inaccurate statements, or disputed definitions and representations of the points to which the alleged contradiction pertains. The in-evidence of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures, patent to the eye of faith and of unperverted or spiritually illuminated reason, will stop all that tampering with the plain averments of Scripture, which is known as Rationalism.

Our readers will agree with us that it is time to hasten to a close. Our specific object has been, not to treat with any minuteness of Mr. Mansel's book as a whole, but of that theory which constitutes its novelty and peculiarity, and which it is specially framed to commend to public acceptance. We do not wish to disparage the work in other respects. It has excellencies which have not been exaggerated by its warmest admirers. The notes in the appendix constitute a thesaurus of choice extracts from the great masters of the different schools of philosophy and theology, such as no mere philosophic pedant could have gathered. These alone are worth more than the cost of the volume. The Lectures themselves withal, abound

with observations at once just and profound in regard to the virus of Rationalism, whether it be intuitional, logical, or sentimental. Many things said in accordance with, and in support of the line of demarkation between Faith and Reason recognized by the church, are said with a precision, force, and beauty, such as cannot be found in writers of less scholarship, culture, and philosophic insight. These features of the work impart to it a high and permanent value. But these do not constitute the feature,—the differentia of the book. This consists in its new psychological method of annihilating Rationalism. Along with much that is true, it seems to us to contain a false and pestilent element, the exposure of which is important, just in proportion to the great power and plausibility with which it is presented and enforced.

We fully appreciate the triumphant exposure which these giant metaphysicians have made of the Philosophy of the Unconditioned: we mean that philosophy or theology, which from some postulate, true or false, in regard to the *primum ens*, undertakes to evolve the whole process of being, becoming, and knowing all forms of existence, God, man and nature, and all systems of philosophy and religion. From all such “intellectual intuitions,” whether transcending or transcended by consciousness, and their correspondent monster systems of ontology and metaphysics, we pray to be delivered, and we devoutly hail our deliverers. But it sometimes happens, that physicians who combat malaria or contagion most effectively, themselves inhale the poison in a greater or less degree. And all the more so, if they employ the poison to counterwork itself. It is one thing to deny the competency of human reason to spin out a trustworthy system of theology from its innate and unregenerate intuitions; another, to maintain such incompetency of human reason on the ground that its normal intuitions, in their best and purest estate, with regard to the Infinite and Eternal, are a chaos of absurdities and contradictions, and that consequently the Infinite God cannot, even partially, be an object of thought. This, to be sure, undermines Rationalism. But it does more. And it does too much. It renders the possibility of faith itself even, problematical, to say no more. When we see Hamilton shattering to fragments the proud fabric of the

Philosophy of the Unconditioned, we rejoice. But when he tells us, that the Philosophies of the Conditioned and Unconditioned "both agree that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy," this is more than we desiderate. It is too much alike for our Reason and our Faith.

A remarkable characteristic of the types of Rationalism originating with the modern transcendental and pantheistic philosophy, is that they attenuate and undermine the truth, by overstating it, and weaken faith by overdoing it. They accept Christian doctrine in a generous breadth, so far exceeding the reality, that it must be battered down to a thin film before it can expand to these vast dimensions. Of course, the pantheist can simulate and intensify the vocabulary of the highest orthodoxy in regard to the divine foreordination and in-working in Nature, Providence, and Grace; the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement. And in using such phrase he means so much more than the truth as to nullify it. We meet with those known as sceptics and rationalists, who astound us by the gracious announcement of their belief, not only in the inspiration of the Scripture writers, but of all, or of the more eminent Christians and sages of every age and nation—a volatile scheme, which now evaporates into the most super-sublimated mysticism, and now condenses into the most icy rationalism—but in either case destroys the proper divine inspiration and objective truth and authority of the Holy Scriptures. So we have those who impugn rationalism by invalidating reason to an extent inconsistent not only with rationalism, but with faith itself. We hear of the relentless adversaries of the doctrines of the church, all at once, not only retracting their opposition to creeds, but "ready to accept as many as are offered them" by virtue of a "chemistry of thought," which melts them all into each other, by melting them away to nothing. The principles of this "Broad Church" school we cannot sanction, even when advanced by men having no communion with it, and for the worthiest ends—as we understand to be true of Mr. Mansel.

ART. V.—*Napoleon III. and the Papacy.*

AMONG the remarkable events with which the agency of Napoleon III. is to be connected in the history of our age, we may record the termination of the temporal power of the Papacy. The event has not yet become a formal fact; but its probability is now so universally recognized, both in Protestant and Catholic Christendom, that we feel free to make this record of our views respecting it, as one of the events of the time. It is true that newspaper reports cannot be fully relied upon, till they are more variously confirmed than some which we shall here reason upon as true; but unless there is unaccountable error in the late rumours, we have Catholic testimony in favour of our assumption; having just now noticed the report that Cardinal Wiseman lately retired from a mortifying interview with the Pope, saying to his friend, "It is full time to bow to the hand of Providence, by which the downfall of the temporal power is visibly decreed."

It is now some fifteen hundred years since the Bishop of Rome began to claim supreme spiritual authority in the church, and to receive peculiar deference and veneration from a large number of his brethren. This gradual ascendancy of the Roman diocesan over the prelates of other localities was partly, and perhaps mainly, the natural result of circumstances. Rome was an opulent, refined, and influential metropolis; a centre of learning, of commerce, and of almost unbounded political power. The position of the Church of Rome was commanding. The bishop there had superior means of knowledge on most matters of general interest to the church. His large revenue, sumptuous living, personal refinement and dignity, and his pomp of official display, challenged the reverence of the populace, and secured a marked respect for his presence and opinions in the councils of the church.

It was natural that under such circumstances the successive bishops of Rome should become ambitious of power; and should study the means of obtaining it; and the ignorance and rudeness of the people, and the want of learning and culture

among the inferior clergy, enabled the Roman prelates to use their power with great advantage to the church. Such a leading influence from Rome was easily established, and finally led to the erection of a supreme constitutional power and jurisdiction.

Thus arose, in due time, the Papacy, fully confirmed in ecclesiastical supremacy. And now this supremacy must be secured against the interference of the civil government. The seat of its power must not be ruled by a worldly sovereign. It must have revenues free from the control of secular authority. It seemed unavoidable, that the Pope should have a territory subject only to himself. In those times, when the church was not clearly distinguishable from the state, the ecclesiastical authority was liable to serious annoyance from the secular powers. The spiritual power must be independent of the civil. If the church be subject to a government administered on worldly principles, how can she administer her own affairs according to her spiritual nature and design? This necessity was inseparable from the times; from the character of the people, and that of the governments. The church must everywhere have sole and supreme jurisdiction, under Christ, of her spiritual affairs. She must understand and adopt for herself, the doctrine and the discipline given her from heaven, judge the qualification of her ministers and members, and choose the means of guarding her communion. Her decisions must be final with her members, and not be liable to be annulled or reversed by the temporal power. Not to insist on this, would be to deny the authority of her Head in herself. This is the great point contended for by the Free Church of Scotland; and the great prerogative so securely enjoyed by the church, and so happily placed beyond all controversy, in these United States of America.

The way to prevent the spiritual and temporal power from frequent and violent conflict was not then known. The jurisdictions of the two were not distinctly separated. The church had no resource but to assert her superiority to the state. This she claimed the right to do, by virtue of the supreme importance of the spiritual interests of men. Her standard writers held that "the church exercises the same sway over the state

that the soul does over the body; that it is the right and duty of the spiritual authority to curb the secular whenever the latter becomes prejudicial to religion." (See Bellarmine de Rom. Pontifice V. VI.) It was never the received doctrine of the church that the Pope had the power of regular civil legislation over princes; though Ranke asserts that Sextus V. cherished that opinion, and was displeased when any abandoned it. But it was the evident and justifiable aim of the church writers of the middle ages, to present the best speculative vindication possible at the time, of her right and her duty to secure herself in the free administration of her spiritual affairs.

But granting the entire propriety of the medieval endeavours of the church for temporal power, so far as to protect her own rights, we can still justify her only by her temporary exigency; and now that the exigency is past, the provision should be relinquished. Now, the only necessity for that sort of defence, is created by the Catholic church herself; by her pertinacious and perverse alliance with corruption, and her opposition to the true progress of the human race. When nations and governments have knowledge of Christianity, and respect for its claims, they will protect the church in her spiritual rights and duties. She safely trusts her defence to them. All the enlightened nations who have any experience of freedom, understand the relation of the church to the state; and in this country, as in others, it has been demonstrated that the church need not bear the sword to secure the effectual use of the keys. The fall of the temporal power is thus inevitable, and the facts we have mentioned are the historical conditions of its termination.

This event does not come from local and temporary causes merely. It follows a long and general preparation in the social progress of the world under the impulse of the Christian truth and life. Of this, the prominent human agency employed by Providence in the movement, is a remarkable illustration.

The part of Napoleon III. in these proceedings is prominent and significant. It is incidental to the influence he seems destined to exert in European affairs. We do not know enough of his religious history to pronounce upon his religious faith; but we think it very doubtful whether he entertains any con-

scientious preference for the Catholic church. We recollect no acts of his in favour of Catholicism, nor any practices of himself or his household, which signify more than a prudential and political deference for the faith of the great body of his subjects, whose religious sentiments he could not wisely offend. As for his military defence of the Pope, he foresaw good reason, in the important contingencies of Europe, for choosing rather to supply that defence himself, than to let Austria supply it; and while this supposition sufficiently explains the fact, it is not unworthy of the man. He receives a compliment for his deed—the title of “the true son of the church,” which only shows the Pope can be grateful for past favours in the hope of favours to come. That Napoleon, therefore, in proposing to humble Austria, should not scruple to endanger the Pope, is not at all surprising. He is not open to the charge of inconsistency or treachery; for all see by this time, even those who saw not before, that the French arms in Rome did not represent Napoleon’s conscience as a Catholic, but his policy as sovereign of France, and manager of Europe. We know not that he has ever professed a personal, conscientious interest in any of the religious matters he has been politically concerned with; whether in promoting spiritual reform in the Catholic church, or in weakening her in favour of Protestantism. But by his timely and effective intervention in Italian affairs, he became a prominent, providential agent in the present depression of Rome; and in every word of his to the Pontiff, he has shown that the important and disastrous result to the Papacy agreed with his expectation and design. Having enlarged Sardinia, till her exaltation attracted Romagna, and roused that part of the Papal dominions to revolt, he virtually required the Pope to forbear resistance; and the impotent shadow of falling power was able only to protest. The history of the final temporal depression of the Papal chair cannot be written without placing Napoleon III. foremost among the conscious agents of Divine Providence in the event.

This prominent agency of the French Emperor in these proceedings is very significant. In his mental habit there appears a settled consciousness of being an agent of the overruling power, and of all the political leaders known to history, there

was never one more alive to the providential significance of passing events than he. The world is fully prepared to give him credit for remarkable sagacity; credit which he has earned by his uniform success in one of the boldest series of human undertakings. Whatever his pretensions or his experience in evangelical religion, (and of this we know nothing,) he is evidently willing enough to regard himself, and to be regarded, as an instrument or agent of Providence in accomplishing the destiny of France; and in this conceit resembles his illustrious predecessor. With this impression of himself, and with his extraordinary sagacity in human affairs, with his acknowledged ascendancy in Europe, and even with all the selfish ambition which his bitterest revilers allege against him, his leading part in the passing events of Italy is richly suggestive.

All things were, in his view, so prepared for a great political change in northern Italy, which might work the interest of France, that he promptly resolves to encourage the movement, and set himself forward as its guide. While coveting glory from that field, he saw that the way to that glory lay through a contest in behalf of human freedom. He had cherished before a presentiment of some such opportunity; and had fortunately provided, by having kept an army for years in Rome, on pretence of protecting the Pope, that nothing should be done in that quarter by Austria, Sardinia, or Rome, without his intervention. When he set out upon his expedition, it was with the motto, as it were, upon his banners, "The Freedom of Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic;" and knowing, of course, that to displace the Austrian despotism must destroy the Papal, he betrays no misgiving nor hesitation, but moves steadily on through Solferino to Villafranca, with the destiny of the Papacy in his hand, yet with a courtesy, prudent and well-sustained, towards an office held sacred by so many of the rulers and people with whom he had to do. That amusing proposal of an Italian confederacy of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, under the presidency of Rome, naturally with the tacit understanding that the Emperor of France would continue dictatorial adviser, now appears more like a witty evasion, for the time, of the real design of the mover, than like an earnest suggestion for the permanent settlement of Italy. He evidently

looked for a long and sweeping progress of the change he had inaugurated—the coveted restoration to France of Savoy and Nice, and remoter results, not definitely foreseen, yet naturally probable, when questions can be raised about them which have been predetermined by management. And it is to be presumed that he as fully expected to annihilate the temporal power of the Papacy, as to overthrow the Austrian dominion in Italy. In a word, he saw those large populations, ripe for partial emancipation, and looking wishfully towards the constitutional kingdom of Sardinia, whose king looked wishfully towards France. There was a rising spirit of freedom. It was seen to be not a blind and transient impulse, but a movement of the rational instinct; and the circumstances were now such, that humanity there might be expected to take an advanced position, from which it would not recede. So sure was this sagacious observer of human affairs that the set time for the freedom of Italy had come. When he enjoined upon the Pope to institute substantial and reasonable reforms, it could not have been with the expectation that the requisition would be heeded; for the reforms must extend to matters on which his Holiness had announced his unfavourable determination, and which the whole spirit and tenor of the Papal government would repel. That government must, therefore, fall. “He that now letteth will let until he be taken out of the way.” The man whose hand was upon the springs of that great movement had “principles which would not allow of armed intervention” to prevent the States of the Church from withdrawing from the temporal jurisdiction of Rome. And it was even among the earliest of his suggestions, that his Holiness contract his jurisdiction to the limits of the metropolis. As the cause of Italian liberty was now so plainly receiving the patronage of Providence, it was time for those who would secure the favour of Providence to pay a prudent respect to the demands of civil and religious liberty. Such was Napoleon’s judgment of the times. With this conviction he allows the sword he has drawn for Italy to fall on the secular arm of the Papacy; and such a conviction in such a man, is a welcome sign of providential preparation for a permanent advance of Italy in the line of human progress.

The position and character of Napoleon gives this movement at Rome another point of significance. When he strikes for liberty as one of the ways to secure the ascendancy of France in Europe, he strikes virtually for Protestantism. Now, a conscientious and devoted Protestant might honestly allow his zeal to mislead his judgment, and promptly and blindly hazard other great interests, without reasonable assurance of success to his favourite cause. Considering himself merely as the representative of Protestantism, he might act from special and local views which do not comprehend the general current of human affairs. But Napoleon, with no Protestant predilections, and with no design of promoting any religion, except as means to an end, undertakes an expedition at vast expense and political risk, to release millions of people from the social constraints incident to the domination of the Papacy. Without hesitation, and with sure execution, he lifts his sword against a tyranny thoroughly baptized into Romanism, and allows the blow to fall on the Papal throne itself, whose feeble incumbent he holds like an infant in his own arms. He gives this bold and forcible expression of his clear conviction that Protestant liberty is about to awake, and that France can make her interest out of the occasion; that there is no glory to be gained in maintaining the temporal power of the Pope; that the sun of Papal Rome is going down, and the noonday of Protestantism is near. This sagacious leader among the sovereigns of Europe, the glory-seeker of the world, a despot on his own throne, with no Protestant bonds upon him, like those which bind the British crown—incapable, as his enemies insist, of disinterested zeal for truth and right, and sure of grateful adoration from the Catholic world, for service he might render to the church of Rome—sees nothing to hope from propping up the tottering Papal power, and will not stake the prestige of his own name and the renown of France, in a campaign for Romanism and the Pope. He feels no political motive to do the Romish interest a service when he might. His hope is in a blow for liberty; such liberty as Romanism tends to destroy. This also shows how little, in his own view, he has to fear or to hope from Romanism in his own empire. He reads on the leaf of Providence now turned, the decree that the Roman Babylon is to fall; that it has no

longer a name nor a place among the agencies of advancing civilization; and that the spirit of Protestantism, under whatever form, as opposed to Popery, must take its place. This is a sign. The eye of Protestant hope may rest upon it. It is the rainbow of promise, set in the receding cloud of European despotism by the God of Protestant liberty; a sign that the flood of arbitrary power shall never destroy the nations again.

The principle by which we are estimating the passing events at Rome, would not allow a remainder of civil jurisdiction to the Pope, even within the walls of the metropolis itself. If the church no longer needs the sword in her own hands, to fulfil her destiny, then why should she cleave to a municipal authority in Rome? Why should the head of the Catholic church in Rome any more require a civil jurisdiction there, than a Protestant Episcopal Bishop in New York, or the Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in Philadelphia? If Catholicism now wants special laws for her protection, let her ask for them, as other institutions do, through the free and enlightened legislation of the state; and let her do in Rome as she must do in this country—convince the community that her influence is a great public benefit, that she is not living unto herself, but for the good of the state and of the world—and she will then command all that her real usefulness requires. The intelligence and free conscience of the civilized world are now a guaranty for the security of the church in her sacred immunities, far better than the sceptre of civil authority can be in her own hands; and as the only necessity for that power which ever existed has now passed away, it is not meet that she should leave the word of God, to serve in the secular field.

And must it not come to this? The people of Rome, as well as those of the Romagna, must naturally desire to be governed like the prosperous and progressive people around them. Especially will they repel the degradation of being left behind in a triumphant migration of their countrymen from Egypt towards a land of promise. Will they be content as an isolate, forsaken community, whose neighbours have left them for better associations? Will they respect and love a government detested and cast off by the mass of its former subjects, without dignity or influence, and cut off from healthy and improving intercourse

with the rest of the world? And why should so populous and renowned a city, with a situation central for social advantages, with facilities for commerce, with a history the most memorable, next to Jerusalem, of all the cities of the world, and with a name as venerable in the circles of literature and jurisprudence, as in the Christian church, be doomed, in an age of light and of surrounding advancement, to that ignominious bondage?

God has accomplished a great work in the world by the Catholic church. Despite of her manifold corruptions she was the depositary of precious truth. The doctrines of the Trinity, of God in Christ crucified, of salvation through his blood, of the Holy Ghost, of the forgiveness of sin, of the resurrection of the body, and of the life everlasting, are the light of the world. And these doctrines that church always professed. By the power of the truth thus maintained, thousands within the pale of the Romish communion were beyond doubt brought to the knowledge of God; and the light of the gospel was preserved from utter extinction. But her work is accomplished. Her form a pillar of salt between Sodom and Zoar. The Spirit of God goes out of her into other forms; while she, with her fanatical conceit of infallibility, forges chains of bondage, and yokes of galling captivity for her people out of the very truth which should make them free. Her vices, as an institution, are concentrated and immovable. She can never again be a form and an embodiment of Christianity for the world. She has nothing more to do in her present shape, but to linger with her lessening train, till her followers have walked by her flickering taper to the grave, and their children have become disciples in another Christian school.

What then should Romanism do? And what should this generation expect?

Popery, as such, should give up the ghost. We would not consign it to death as a punishment for having existed. Grant all that may be claimed for it as useful in its time. But its work is done, and done long ago. The Pope has done no good in any country for the last hundred years. And we cannot conceive a condition of things as likely to arise out of the present state of the church and the world, in which a Christian man, with the title of supreme and universal head of the church,

and residing in Rome or anywhere else, can do any real service even to the Catholic branch of the church. The Catholic communion may continue, and may be *the church*, even in her view of the matter. She may continue to claim apostolic grace in her sacrament of ordination, to the full satisfaction of the bishops and all others concerned; but the dogma of the primacy of St. Peter would fall, of course, with the Pope; and it is that late-born and unmitigated falsehood which has broken down the constitution of that church and consumed her life. And as the patrimony of St. Peter is the temporal power, and that is falling for ever, the holder of the patrimony may as well disappear; for what is the heir without the inheritance. The only necessity for his continuance lies in the fact that he exists, and there is no constitutional provision to abolish him. If once he were removed, and Catholic people were no longer plied with the devices of priestcraft, to keep alive in them a factitious reverence for his unseen person, there would be found, even in the present nature of Catholicism, no want or tendency that would reproduce him. It is impossible that the spirit of Catholic piety, if left to its natural course, should produce in an American Catholic the need of a Roman Pope, whom he never sees, and whom he never hears of, except as his Holiness is forced on his notice by the priest who uses the name and pretended dignity for his personal ends. The Catholicism of France makes virtually nothing of the Pope. The Gallican church denies, in form, his power over civil rulers, his infallibility, and the superiority of his decisions over those of councils. And this leaves nothing for the Pope that renders his office or authority of any practical value for the people. We would say then, in the plain, simple language of Presbyterianism, let the Pope, in view of the whole state of things, consider whether his usefulness in that capacity be not at an end; and, if so, let him take his dismissal, and let his session, the college of cardinals, be dissolved. A body of men with talents and address to attain to such places, can, with the right spirit, be very useful in other offices, but in that they can do nothing. We do not speak thus because we think the voluntary resignation of the Pope or the dissolution of any portion of the hierarchy probable, or even possible, but we take this method of expressing what we think

of the present condition of the Papacy, and of the value of the office in determining the religious future of the world.

We incline to anticipate successive modifications of the Catholic system, by the continued and accelerated progress of change which has been inaugurated in the United States. The silent but growing disuse of dogmas and of practices which have become distasteful and unprofitable to the altered mental conditions has already gone much farther among the Catholics of the United States, and even among those of foreign birth, than is generally known. Some twenty years ago, we heard, in the leading Catholic congregation of one of our largest Atlantic cities, a discourse from a priest which took us quite by surprise. It was an exhortation concerning the duty of confession, and complained of great and growing neglect of this ordinance of the church, and remonstrated—"Why should the church have to mourn that one of her most binding ordinances should be so generally neglected by her members who are engaged in the business of the world, or have risen to the higher ranks of intelligence and culture?" And from statements as to the number of members in the charge, and the number who attended the confessional, it appeared that scarcely one in a hundred pretended to comply with the requisition of the church, by the habitual abuse of the confessional; that those who did confess, were mostly of the lowest class, or in extremity. This is the inevitable course of usages which do not agree with the advancing ideas of propriety, and which cannot adapt themselves to some rational sentiment of utility, even while fulfilling an acknowledged scriptural requirement. So it has already been with the Catholic church in this country, and so it will continue to be. The changes will naturally be the more rapid within the church as the usages become the more conformed to the religious sentiment prevailing in the age, and as the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant becomes less bitter and violent, while the transition of individuals and of communities from Romanism, will also be more free and frequent. Circumstances will also hasten the work. While the spirit of the two great divisions of christendom towards each other is conformed more and more to the gospel, the greater religious susceptibility of

Protestants will be communicated to the Catholics by the tendency to equilibrium, so long as Protestants continue in what we know to be their freer and higher communion of the Spirit.

The instinct of the awakened religious sentiment of Protestantism, leads to an immovable assurance of our improved condition in comparison with Romanism. That assurance may be freely and thankfully expressed without vaunting, and without vain, self-complacent and irritating taunts, or supercilious and repulsive exultation. And the true spirit of the Reformation will keep Protestants more and more on their guard in this respect, even in the height of triumph. And this assurance of which we speak has so many and such patent confirmations in the course of Providence and the progress of grace in the world, that the meek and grateful utterance of it, in all direct and indirect expressions compatible with the lowly mind of piety, must be a commendation of our cause to all earnest and candid seekers after truth. We are under temptation, indeed, from the bearings of all the social changes of the world in favour of the Protestant interest; but our imperfections are enough to employ the most diligent circumspection, to keep us alive to the admonitions of the Spirit, through Providence and Scripture, and to preclude all self-reliant and boastful indulgence.

But the progress of the world is like a demonstration in our favour. The changes are all in one direction. The progressive civilization of the world brings forward the Christian nations which have the most easy and free communion with the spirit of Protestantism, and throws back those most shut out from that spirit, and confined to that of the Romish church. Wherever the two systems are brought into direct conflict among people enjoying freedom of conscience and opinion, the gain is in favour of Protestantism. In mixed communities, where the two classes of people have free scope for mutual influence, the tendency is uniformly in the line of Protestant progress. Thus, in countries wholly Catholic the people are left by the church in ignorance; plainly showing that it is no part of the policy of that church, when left wholly to herself, to promote the universal diffusion of knowledge. This appears undeniable from the history of Catholic influence where it has not been disturbed, as in Mexico, Spain, Central and Southern Italy, and the South

of Ireland. But in this country, the Catholics are not behind in their zeal for education. They enter freely and at great expenditure of funds and labour into competition with the Protestant system of universal education; and though, for the most part, they take this course as the only condition of successful rivalry with the prevailing Protestantism, the effect is to change the entire Catholic policy in relation to mental culture, and by consequence, to modify, in important respects, the details of discipline and worship. The difference between the methods for public edification in the Catholic assemblies of this country and those of thoroughly Catholic countries, strikes all travellers who witness it. This invariable conformity shows that the tendency of the two bodies under mutual influence is in the Protestant line, and not in the Catholic. Thus also the withholding of the Scriptures from the laity, which is an undeniable and prominent feature of Romanism, in theory and practice, gradually disappears in this country, as in other countries increasingly Protestant, and the Scriptures, in the same form as used in public teaching, are distributed among the people. And the people are instructed in public on the presumption that the Bible is possessed and read in their families. We have ourselves heard in Catholic assemblies, whole discourses framed throughout on this presumption, and in this respect not differing at all from those of a Protestant pulpit. The cases we witnessed were those indeed of the most cultivated congregations of an enlightened city; and though not probably a sample for the whole Catholic population, prove nevertheless the tendency to conformity; which is our point. And what we have said of education, and of the popular use of the Bible, is equally true of other matters, which we should mention if time would permit.

It would therefore not be contrary to the course of Providence in analogous cases, if silent and half unconscious, and legally unauthorized modifications of Romanism should go on, and be immensely accelerated as the time draws nigh for all antichrists to be destroyed; and if, in process of time, the dissolving petrification of the ante-reformation Catholicism, in trying to recover some dim sense of her identity, should find that she was not. Thus England awoke, upon a time, to the

consciousness that she was not under arbitrary rule, but had a constitutional government, while her constitution was never written, but only grew, as a power, in the hearts of rulers and people. Thus old things pass away, in the most ordinary course of Providence and grace; not by a stream of formal repeals and abolitions, but by a constant shedding of the obsolete, and the silent descent of outgrown usages into desuetude.

As for the Papacy, it is outliving its time. Its spirit and power are gone. What is it? We speak not of the Catholic church as a whole, but of the Papacy, with its appendages, as an office of that church. What moral or religious influence has it with the people, for instance, of this country? What questions of any real moment, in doctrine or practice, has its infallibility to decide? Suppose the Catholic churches of the United States were severed from Rome, as the American Episcopal church is separated from its mother-church of England, having all merely legal matters adjusted to its separate state, and what would it lose? Of what moral or religious benefit would the Catholic Christians of this country be bereft?

With the fall of the temporal power of the Pope, will cease also, in a great measure, the acknowledgment of his spiritual influence. The early and continual endeavours of the Papacy after temporal powers, betrayed the conviction that, without the dignity of secular dominion, the universal headship of the church could be little more than a vain show. How much more must that conviction reveal itself in these times, when the people have become more enlightened, and capable of asking and weighing the reasons of things? And now that the secular dominion is coming to naught, it becomes more than a mere query for the curious, what the spiritual powers of the Papacy will hereafter in practice amount to. The revolting states of the church, as they pass under a government tintured with Protestant liberty, will have more spiritual sympathy with progressive christendom than with Rome; and if Rome herself should join the progress, she would soon dissolve in the elements of freedom, like the morning mist in the light of advancing day. While the people are forsaking the Pope, and adopting another government of their own preference, they

take with them the great body of the clergy. The priests and bishops are as decided Catholics as ever, and may give their new government great trouble before they can learn to adjust themselves to their new conditions; but they must serve the people in their office. Their new king is an excommunicate, and their allegiance to him is a contempt of the spiritual power of the Pope, with which all pretences of submission in other things will be incompatible. The populous and influential state of the church which has already revolted, will feel little more regard for the spiritual power than it felt for the temporal. The Northern States of Italy, whose efforts for freedom were opposed by all his influence, can only hold him as a defeated enemy. The spiritual ministrations of an office which has been associated by the people with so odious a resistance to their welfare, must be of small account.

Indeed, the power and dignity of the Papacy are now so low, that no future changes in its government will be of any public concern. They can be nothing to the world, nothing to Europe; nothing in church, nor in state. The unhappy pontiff feels this, as he shows in his plaintive epistle to the sufferers in Syria. And a letter is now mentioned, but not yet come to hand, in which he is said to give up all as lost, and to declare his purpose to meet death in Rome rather than flee. He seems to expect no restoration; and it does not seem possible that any future changes of the world should replace him. The time has been when the Pope received the profoundest homage of princes; when he could compel them to wait at his gate, and to hold his stirrup, and could exact of them whatever might increase his power, and gratify his ambition. But he has now no powerful friend for his time of need. Sicily is lost to his interest, and other revolutions in Naples seem near. The only two powers of Europe confessedly Catholic, can do nothing for him. Austria, in her poverty, turmoil, and infirmity, can render him no aid. Spain, once the richest and greatest of the kingdoms of Europe, now lies in weakness and humiliation, needs help herself, and seems on the point of selling a portion of her independence for some mess of pottage from Napoleon. There is no help for his Holiness, and it does not yet appear how the affairs of Italy can be permanently

settled on any terms which will allow him to remain in Rome.

So complete is the prostration of that once mighty office. And it falls not by a tempest of foreign force, but by its own natural decay. Its root has died in the soil of humanity. It belonged to the childhood of the church, and is now put away as a childish thing. It belonged to a forming period of the Christian nations; and now as fast as the nations attain to manly intelligence and freedom, they cast off the Papacy. There never was on earth a temporary institution, not even the feudalism of Europe, or the divinely appointed system of Moses, that was more manifestly preliminary and provisional, intended to prepare the way for something better; none that has more evidently had its day, and become more thoroughly obsolete, than the institution of the Papacy. The fall is a sign of the steady and sure progress of the kingdom of Christ. So must also everything decline which belongs only to her training through the successive stages of her growth; everything which does not belong to her perfection as the body of Christ, and is not an organ and ornament of her glorious manhood.

The changes now in progress in the populations of Europe and Asia, to say nothing of other parts of the world, are more suggestive than any which the history of those countries has recorded before. Great events are taking place, and greater still are approaching. The Turkish empire seems virtually at an end; waiting only for the political system of Europe to digest and secrete the material. It has been already compelled, in its weakness, to tolerate Christian missionaries, until thousands of its Mohammedans have had their attention invited to the Holy Scriptures. We refer not to the Catholic Christians of Syria, who are now suffering so dreadfully from the barbarities of the Druses, but to those in Turkey, reached by the labours of Protestant missionaries. Millions in Italy are now accessible to Protestant influence, who never have been before. Even the Catholic portion of the church is leaving the Papacy behind, in many quarters, and pressing forward to that which is before. The kingdoms of the world are becoming the kingdom of Christ. They are everywhere preparing to protect his people in their privileges and their duties as Christians. They

thus become one kingdom, with Christ for its acknowledged head. All are learning to recognize and illustrate the universal brotherhood, and are expecting to see the human race return to the fellowship and union of a single family. Thus the kingdom of God will come, and his will be done on earth, as it is in heaven.

ART. VI.—*The recent Theory of the Eldership examined.*

THE ruling elder according to this theory is the *presbyter* of Scripture and of the Christian church in the early period of its history. It is the one fundamental order of which the preacher is a class—a functionary—who, by virtue of an additional gift, performs different duties, “but is by no means of a different order.” There is, therefore, but one order of rulers in the church—deacons being only assistants or helps.

According to Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Thornwell this theory involves all that is essentially distinctive of Presbyterian government.* The issues are therefore of vital import. The theory is dogmatically “affirmed” to be sustained by arguments “clear, conclusive, and irresistible.” (*Review*, p. 7.) “The Scriptures and our Standards both EXPRESSLY teach that the ruling elder is strictly and properly a presbyter, and therefore entitled to participate in all the acts—(*of necessity he would be*)—in which any presbyter, *as such*, can bear a part.” (*Ib.* p. 57.) “The presbyter, as a title of office, means a ruler, and *nothing more* than a ruler.” (*Ib.* p. 58.) This “is clear from the passage which proves *beyond the possibility of a doubt*, that presbyters and ministers of the word are not synonymous terms. That passage is 1 Tim. v. 17.” (*Ib.* p. 61.) “From the account given of the meaning of this word it follows, that it is not

* See *The Christian Pastor* and *Appendix*, by Dr. Breckinridge, Baltimore, 1845, and *The Elder Question*, by Dr. Thornwell, in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, June, 1848.

applicable to preachers as ministers of the word." (*Ib.* p. 66.) In support of these strong affirmations we are referred to the Old Testament, to the synagogue, to the plurality of elders in every church, and to the above text, and the subject is urged upon us by the solemn asseveration, that "these surely are not slight questions—they affect the very heart of our system—and in deciding them we settle the distinctive principles of our government." (*Ib.* p. 35.)

We will now proceed to examine in detail the grounds on which, scripturally and historically, this theory is based. With every possible effort to condense, and omitting much we might advance and have even written, we must task the patience of our readers. But as we can only oppose facts to authority, we may reasonably hope that all interested in the question of the true value of the ruling eldership will give to our argument a calm and dispassionate consideration. This is all we ask. To the law and testimony of God's word, and to our Presbyterian Standards is our confident appeal.

Meaning of the term Presbyter, i. e. πρεσβυτερος.

The fundamental position on which this theory is based is that the essence of the presbyter is rule, and that the fundamental meaning of the term presbyter is a ruler.

Let us then first inquire into the original meaning of the term *presbyter*.

Presbyter (πρεσβυτερος) does not primarily mean a ruler. It is the comparative degree of πρεσβυς, old, an old man, and means older, an older man, and has a superlative πρεσβυτατος, oldest, the oldest man. The word came to have the sense of reverend, or honoured, from the great respect paid in early ages to the aged and experienced, and especially to parents. The secondary meaning of the word, according to Passow, is an ambassador, and it is only in its third derivative sense it means, as it did at Sparta, a political title—a ruler. In this as well as in the other senses, it is found in some analogous form in almost every language, and very commonly in the Hebrew, and among the sacred race, whose history is preserved in the Old Testament Scriptures.

Precisely the same is the case with the Latin word *senior*—

the term, be it remembered, which was employed by the African Fathers, by Calvin, and Knox, by the Books of Discipline, and by the Waldenses. *Senior* is also the comparative degree of *senex*, old, and means older, and is generally applied to age, and to the respect and endearment associated with age, and not to office or rule. Senator and not senior is the Latin term for the members of the Roman Senate, whose position was not considered an office, but rather a dignity or rank like that of the *nobili* of Venice.

The Presbyters of the Old Testament—What?

This theory finds no support, therefore, from the primary and fundamental meaning of the terms *presbyter*, in Greek, and *senior*, in Latin. It is however affirmed, that the elders of the Old Testament, and of the ancient synagogue, were, *as this theory requires, of one order as rulers, of whom there were two classes*—one of rulers only, and one of rulers who were teachers also; and that these were not laymen, but ecclesiastics, who were both ordained, and ordainers by imposition of hands. Our Saviour and his apostles, it is said, found this theory of the eldership in practical operation, and transferred it to the Christian church. Let us then take up these positions.

On the real use and import of the term *elder*, and its Hebrew cognates, we regard the work of the now late and deeply lamented Dr. J. Addison Alexander on "The Primitive Offices of the Christian Church," to be exhaustive. He illustrates its use "from the very beginning of time, in all countries, under every variety of government, and under all changes in the form of government. It belongs, in short, to the phraseology of the patriarchal constitution of the earliest societies, and is employed in Scripture in application to the elders of Egypt, of Midian, of Moab, &c.; and not only to elders of countries, but also to local magistrates and judges." (P. 5, &c.) In all cases, these elders "were representatives of the people," and are frequently "taken for the people," and "for ALL the people." (P. 4, 5.) They were also the representatives of the people in civil and in sacred things. "The people therefore were originally and properly the chief depositaries of the governing power. They were convened and consulted on all important occasions, and without

their consent nothing could be lawfully done;” and hence, what the elders did was spoken of as done by the people.

But these elders among the Jews were not their established religious *teachers*. Enoch preached and prophesied of Christ. Noah was a preacher of righteousness. Such also were Abraham, Jacob, Job, Moses, and all the prophets, the spirit of whose prophecy was its testimony to Jesus. Those became “accredited agents and messengers,” the immediate representatives of God, and mediators between God and man. But besides these, a particular order was set apart to be the teachers and priests of the people *with whom* the elders were *associated* in the government and discipline of the church. From the beginning to the end, therefore, the elders were lay representatives of the people, and under the theocracy were entirely distinct from the sacred order of teachers and preachers.

Preaching, therefore, was not “a new function superadded by our Saviour to the old office of elder,” so as to constitute a subdivision under it. Teaching and preaching had always constituted a fundamental office in the church of God, and also in the synagogue. And it has ever been the doctrine of the Presbyterian church that in these ancient ministers of the word, the Christian ministry was represented and foretold, according to the typical nature of the ancient economy. That the priests and Levites in the Jewish church were entrusted with the public reading of the word, praying, preaching, teaching, blessing the people, &c., is affirmed by the Westminster Form of Government, which says, “The ministers of the gospel have as ample a charge and commission to dispense the word, as well as other ordinances, as the priests and Levites had under the law; see Isaiah lxvi. 21, and Matt. xxiii. 34, where our Saviour entitleth those whom he will send forth, by the same names of the teachers of old.” Again, quoting Numb. vi. 23—26, with Rev. xiv. 5, and Isaiah lxvi. 21, it is said—“Where under the names of priests and Levites, to be continued under the gospel, are meant evangelical pastors.” And again—“As there were in the Jewish church *elders of the people* who *joined with* the priests and Levites in the government of the church, so Christ also hath instituted government and *governors* to join with the

ministers," &c. (See *Form of Government* in Confession of Faith of Church of Scotland, pp. 388—391, Edinburgh edition.)

Preaching was not therefore, as Dr. Breckinridge affirms, "a new function manifested among the elders unknown to those of the Jews," but only an old function which, like the law of brotherly love, became a new commandment by the new authority, and motives, and sphere of Christ's kingdom. Nay, Dr. Breckinridge himself, in the same chapter, teaches that "the worship of the synagogues consisted in the reading and *expounding* of God's word, and in offering up prayers to him." (*Knowledge of God*, vol. ii. pp. 631 and 634.) It is also evident that the ministers of the New Testament are not the successors of the *elders* of the Old Testament, but of a separate and sacred order of preachers and expounders of God's will and word. Vitringa, in his learned work on the ancient synagogue proves at length that it had regularly ordained preachers.*

The Presbyters of the Synagogue.

The argument for this theory, founded on the supposed analogy of the Jewish Synagogue, though assumed by Dr. Breckinridge to be conclusive, will not, therefore, avail to its support. (See *Knowledge of God*, vol. ii. p. 621.) In the first place, while the synagogue *was*, in all probability, the model and basis of the first Christian churches, nevertheless to suppose that this was the case, not only in its *general* form and order, but in a slavish imitation, is, as Lytton well observes, (*On the Church*, p. 193,) "neither consistent with recorded facts nor with the spirit of the Christian dispensation." Secondly, it is impossible to ascertain *what was the polity* and order of the synagogue in our Saviour's time, or to harmonize the remaining statements of Rabbinical lore into any definite system. There is much confusion and contradiction, so that the most patient investigators into the originals—such as Maimonides, Buxtorf, Vitringa, Selden, Lightfoot, and Schoettgenius—contradict each other and themselves, and confess that much is a matter of the most doubtful disputation.*

* See Book III. chap. v. vi. and vii.

† See Dr. Miller on Eldership, pp. 35—48, and his frank admissions that his

Vitringa has shown that there was no one constant form of synagogue government, but that it differed according to circumstances and places, and that of these various modifications the one adopted for the government of the Apostolic church was a *Senatus plurium Doctorum qui quoddam Consistorium sive Presbyterium constituerunt*.*

That the universal Jewish appellative term *elders* was given to some of their officers, sometimes to all, sometimes to a select number, may be admitted. But that *any* of these elders were invested with the clerical order is denied by Stillingfleet† and others, while that the term *elder* was given in any other than the *most general* sense to those who did not preside and preach, is denied by perhaps all the original authorities. Vitringa is of this opinion, and establishes, he thinks clearly, that the term rendered by *presbyter* was properly employed by the Hebrew writers to designate “those who composed the sacred consistory of doctors or teachers. This consisted always of a plurality of these learned doctors, but the exact number depended on the size of the place, the number of such doctors convenient, and other circumstances.”‡ Selden corroborates this judgment by proving, as he thinks, that the powers of presbyters, within and without the Holy Land, were different, and that the former combined teaching and ruling, while the latter had power to teach, to bind, to loose, to prophesy only, and were *non in judicandi creati*. He also teaches that just as in every large city there were many synagogues, so also there were many Christian churches and presbyters.§ The sum of what is admitted, so far as we can gather it, may be briefly stated as follows:

1. The elders of the synagogue represented the people, and “were laymen of reputed wisdom and experience, who, in practical matters, might be expected to give sound advice.” (*Dr. Killen’s Ancient Church*, p. 252.) They formed “a lay coun-

authorities are against him, and at no agreement among themselves, pp. 45, 46; or *Killen’s Ancient Church*, p. 252. Vitringa exposes the views of Lightfoot, Selden, Petitus *doctissimus*, Capellus, &c.

* See Book ii. Ch. xii., p. 592, &c.

† See Dr. Miller on Eldership, pp. 45, 46.

‡ See Vet. Synag. Book iii. Ch. i. and Ch. xvlii. p. 874.

§ Selden de Synag. Vet. Ebræorum vol. ii., lib. ii., ch. vii. pp. 329, 325, 252, 319, 320, *et passim*.

cil." (*Id.* p. 232.) In this respect, therefore, the elders of the Synagogue were essentially different from those defined by this theory. According to Lightfoot they were "magistrates who judged in matters in contest arising within the Synagogue" and who "ruled in civil affairs." (*Quoted as authority by Dr. Killen*, pp. 233, 234.)

2. These elders of the synagogue were not ordained. Vitranga, after stating the difficulty of understanding clearly the views of even Maimonides, and differing in interpretation with Lightfoot, says: "Perhaps we may conclude this much, that while the affairs of the Hebrews flourished in Canaan, the presidents and ministers of the synagogue, who depended for their support upon the synagogue, were confirmed in their office by imposition of hands."* Lightfoot, speaking of their preachers, says: "None of these were admitted to his public employment of teaching and preaching, but he had ordination as a state call and commission to that office."† "And therefore," says Maimonides, "it was far from being a common use, *from being any use at all*, among the Jews, in their church, to let any mechanical or unordained man step up into the doctor's chair, or minister's pulpit, to read divinity publicly, or to preach in their synagogues, as impudency or folly would put them forward to do it; but they had a solemn state call . . . by a lawful ordination, by men themselves ordained. *Only these rabbis, doctors, or bishops, were ordained.*"‡

3. The Hebrew word, translated *elders*, was given to these teachers, preachers, or presidents, only in conjunction with other titles, which made its restrictive official application apparent. These elders laboured in word and doctrine, and conducted the exercises of public worship, prayers, and exposition of the Scriptures. They were also called by the title, *αρχισυναγωγοι*. (Compare Luke vii. 8, and Mark v. 22, Acts xiii. 15.) One of these presided in turn, or according to arrangement. (Luke viii. 41, 49, Mark v. 22.) From this last passage, and Acts xiii. 15, and xviii. 8, 17, it appears that there was a plurality of these in one synagogue. Maimonides describes the bishop, or presiding officer of the synagogue, as

* De Vet. Synag., p. 837, 838.

† Works, vol. v., p. 121, 122.

‡ See in Lightfoot, *il.* Bernard Synag. of the Church, 85, 86, 169, 183.

“the presbyter, who laboured in word and doctrine.” Neander says, “while all the officers of the synagogue were elders, those who presided were called, among other names, *προεστωτες των αδελφων*, that is, presidents over or of their brethren.”* This president was also called *chazan*, angel, bishop of the congregation. “This person,” says Lightfoot—“the public minister of the synagogue, who prayed publicly, preached, &c.—was called the angel of the church, and *chazan*, or bishop of the congregation; and certainly the signification of the word bishop (and presbyter,) or angel of the church, would have been determined with less noise, if recourse had been made to the upper fountains. . . . The service of the temple being abolished as being ceremonial, God transplanted the worship and public adoration of God used in the synagogue, which was moral, into the Christian church—to wit, the public ministry, public prayers, reading of God’s word, preaching, &c. Hence the names of the ministers of the gospel were the very same—the angel of the church and the bishop (or presbyter,) *which belonged to the ministers of the synagogue.*”†

In every particular, therefore, in which anything like agreement can be found, the synagogue theory of the eldership was in harmony with that of our church, and contrary to that now challenging its adoption. We find, therefore, that in the Westminster Assembly, Selden and Lightfoot, and out of it, Vitringa, and other Hebraists, were in opposition to it.

The Presbyter of the New Testament.

Let us then proceed to an investigation of the real presbyter of the New Testament, and the *usus loquendi* of the title.

With the termination of the civil theocratic commonwealth of the Jews, ceased also their ceremonial and typical economy, and it became necessary that around its permanent laws, rites, and religion, Christ, by his apostles, should re-organize a government and discipline adapted to the simplicity and spirituality of the church, as God’s instrumentality for the conversion of the world. The very first act of Christ’s public ministry was therefore the institution of the sacred order of

* Maim. De Sanh., chap. iv. Neander, *Planting of Christ*, vol. i., p. 177.

† Works, vol. ii., pp. 88, 89; and Bernard, chap. x.

the ministry, as his representatives, heralds, and ambassadors. This, also, was his last act upon earth, when in commissioning his church, he made the preaching of the gospel its fundamental business, and preachers its essential rulers; and when Christ ascended up on high, and gave gifts unto men, pastors and teachers—that is, the sacred order of the ministry in its two fold work of oversight or rule, and instruction—was the all comprehending permanent order which he instituted in his church. Around this order, to secure to it greater efficiency, more certain purity, and popular adaptation, there were gathered, from time to time, as occasion opened up the way for their institution, the order of BRETHREN, called also *governments*, and *rulers*, to represent and act for the people in conjunction with the order of ministers; and besides them, the order of deacons to act under, and in coöperation with both in the government and administration of the church.

It is, therefore, most assuredly to be expected that the order of the ministry, which is so fundamental, will be designated by titles and qualifications *peculiar* to itself. In this way alone can its divine institution, dignity, and usefulness be adequately set forth. And as the term presbyter is among other titles employed to represent the ministry and its qualifications, there is a most violent presumption against this theory which applies that term primarily, in its most official and distinctive meaning, to the same class of officers which are otherwise specially designated brethren, rulers, and governors.

The proper official meaning of the term presbyter in the New Testament, when not employed evidently in its derivative general sense, may be ascertained by considering its use in those passages which are the most clear and unambiguous. The conclusion arrived at by Dr. J. Addison Alexander, in his work on "The Primitive Officers of the Church," is the same as that reached by every other analyst of Scripture;—by Dr. Owen, and all modern Congregationalists; by Methodists and non-Episcopal denominations; and by a large body of Episcopalian writers and critics; namely—that "presbyters, as PRESBYTERS, possessed and exercised the highest powers now belonging to the ministry." (P. 29.) They preached; they administered the sacraments; they presided over and conducted all public

services. They ordained also other ministers and other officers. From a very thorough examination of the Council at Jerusalem, (Acts xv.;) the address of Paul to the presbyters at Ephesus, (Acts xxviii.;) the address of Peter, (1 Pet. v.;) and from the order of other churches mentioned in the New Testament, Dr. Alexander concludes—in opposition to the claims of prelates to be an order of ministers higher than presbyters—“that *the presbyterial office* was, as they admit, established in the primitive church, and was intended to be permanent; that it was clothed with the important powers of preaching the gospel and administering the sacraments; and that it is repeatedly spoken of in terms which, taken by themselves, would imply the possession of the highest powers belonging to the ministry . . . including those of discipline and ordination.” (Pp. 66, 67.) “How could *they*,” asks Dr. Alexander, speaking of the Ephesian presbyters as charged by the apostle, “comply, unless intrusted with the keys both of discipline and doctrine, with the power not of teaching merely, but of maintaining purity of doctrine by deciding controversies, trying heretics,” &c. (p. 35.) “They were to act as shepherds, fulfil all a shepherd’s duty—collecting, reclaiming, protecting, feeding—to do, in short, what our Saviour embodies in his full commission of the ministry, ‘Feed my sheep, feed my lambs’—what the apostle Peter, who received that commission, delivered to the presbyters addressed by him, (1 Pet. v. 1—3;) and in both cases to do this, not as under-shepherds appointed by others who were over them and superior to them, but as commissioned, called, and qualified by the Holy Ghost. The terms, therefore, in which presbyters are spoken of in these standard passages for determining the *proper official* purport of the term—(which in its general meaning may, like its cognate term, bishop, have relation to œcumenical, civil, military, naval, judicial, or religious matters)*—are a “metaphorical description, *in its whole extent*, of the ministerial office as comprehending all that is essential to the continued existence of the church, and the attainment of the ends for which it was established.” (*Alexander*, p. 33.)

The term presbyter, as thus expounded by inspired usage, is applied by both Paul and Peter, not to the presbyters of

* See Wordsworth’s Greek Testament, on Acts xx. 28.

Ephesus alone, but to those at Miletus also, that is, to all included in that missionary field; and also to those in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Bithynia, and therefore to presbyters universally, everywhere.

The official meaning of the term *presbyter* is further determined by its application to themselves by the apostles. Peter calls himself a fellow-presbyter. John also styles himself a fellow-presbyter in the inscription of two epistles. The controversy at Antioch was referred to "the apostles and presbyters," (Acts xv. 2.) "It pleased the apostles and presbyters," (vs. 22.) "The apostles, and presbyters and brethren," (vs. 23.) "The apostles and presbyters." (Acts xvi. 4.) "The apostles and presbyters with the whole church," (xv. 4.) Now observe the conclusiveness of this usage. The ministerial commission was first given to the twelve and seventy,* and their ministerial duty is described by Christ as feeding his flock. Afterwards, when the ascended Saviour had given "pastors and teachers" to feed his flock, the term *presbyter*, which was endeared by immemorial use, as a term of dignity, reverence, and affection, was employed, and in connection with Christ's peculiar description of the office of his ministers—"feeding the flock of God"—and is appropriated by the apostles to themselves, and to all other ministers, as fellow-presbyters, and as those who feed the flock of God, over which the Holy Ghost has made them overseers. Add to this the universal appointment of presbyters in every church, even when no other officers are mentioned; their ordination by imposition of hands; their uniting in ordaining other ministers by imposition of hands; the reference to them as the only ministers, as when the apostle James directs any who are sick to send for the presbyters, and let them pray for them; and the very emphatic fact, that there is no other name besides *presbyter* (and the other terms used interchangeably with it,) for designating the fundamental and essential office of the ministry, nor any other delineation of its nature, functions, responsibilities, and authority.

The office of the presbyters was to watch over all the inter-

* That their commission was the same as that of the twelve, see Luke x. 1, 10, 17; Matt. x. 17; and Mark vi. 7—14.

ests of the church, to instruct the ignorant, (1 Tim. iii. 2,) to exhort the faithful, to confute the gainsayers, (Titus i. 9.) to warn the unruly, to comfort the feeble-minded, to support the weak, to be patient toward all, (1 Thess. v. 14,) to “feed the church of God, which he had purchased with his own blood.” They are to speak to us the word of God, and watch for souls. (Heb. xiii. 7, 17.) They are *ἡγούμενοι*, leaders, guides, captains, such as have precedence. They are the *ἄγγελοι*, the angels, messengers, apostles, or missionaries of God. They are *διδασκαλοι*, doctors, or masters in doctrine. They are to “attend on teaching, to be instant in preaching, to labour, (*be occupied in it as their business*,) in the word and doctrine.” They are shepherds, watchmen, messengers, and ambassadors of God. They are to be patterns to the flock; to lead and go before them, as a captain before his troops; as a shepherd before his flock; as a guide before the traveller; and as such they are to be followed. They are to give attendance to reading; to give themselves wholly to these things; to be instant in season and out of season; and to be supported so as to be able to give themselves to the word of God and to prayer, that their profiting may appear unto all. (1 Cor. ix. 7—14; 1 Thess. v. 12, 13; 1 Tim. v. 17.)

The conclusion therefore is, that the familiar and much-loved term, *presbyter*, has been selected under the teaching of the Holy Ghost, as one of the permanent and peculiar titles of the ministry of the gospel, and the one which is most expressive of dignity, veneration, and authority; and that it is not employed in its official sense, as this theory teaches, to designate a general order of office-bearers, of which ministers are *only a class*.

The Presbyters in the Synod of Jerusalem—Acts, chap. xv.

But it is urged against this conclusion, that there are several passages in which the term *presbyter* must be understood to include representatives of the people, as well as ministers. Of these, one of the most important is the use made of it in the account given in Acts, chap. xv., of the model Synod, held in the model church of Jerusalem, to determine certain questions of doctrine and order. “Certain men,” “certain others also,” besides Paul and Barnabas, were sent to consult with the apos-

tles and presbyters, who "came together to consider of this matter." Now admitting all that Presbyterian writers have ever said on the conclusiveness of this proof of the Divine warrant of government by presbyteries and synods, the question arises, Who composed the body? Was it composed of apostles only, so far as a right to deliberate, and decide, and give judgment was concerned, as Romanists affirm; or of apostles and and presbyters, as Prelatists teach; or of apostles, presbyters, and members of the church at large, as Congregationalists affirm; or of apostles, presbyters, and representatives of the people, as Presbyterians maintain? This question depends very much on the genuineness and meaning of the terms "certain men," "certain others also," "the brethren," by which the words "church" and "the whole church," are restricted; and by whose concurrent voice the matter was decided, and the decree promulgated.

Dr. Breckinridge and Dr. Killen both attach great importance to this Synod. The former however makes nothing of these terms, and the parties they represent. They are in the record, but they are not in his book. He ignores them altogether, and assumes that as *presbyters* included both teaching and ruling elders, these were merely "lookers on in Venice." Dr. Killen, however, found them lying across the track of this theory of the ruling and teaching presbyters; and designating, IN ADDITION to apostles, teaching presbyters, and ruling presbyters, "certain others also," called THE BRETHREN. They must therefore be put out of the way, since in them there is an evident reference to "representatives of the people," who were different and distinct from "the presbyters." He calls, therefore, to his aid every one who can lend a hand towards clearing the track. Congregationalists take hold, and at once identify "the brethren" with "the whole church," or "the whole assembly present." (See *Ancient Church*, p. 84.) But as this would not help the cause, Prelatists and Romanists are set to work; and it is decided that they only intimate that the decision "met the universal approval of the meeting;" or "they were gifted members;" or what settles the question, the true reading, as "now recognized by the highest critical authorities, and sustained by the whole narrative," is, "the apostles and pres-

byters—brethren,” and therefore, “the apostles and elders, brethren were the only individuals officially concerned in this important transaction.” (P. 85.)

Now what are we to understand by all this? Plainly this, that in order to coerce Presbyterians at least, to admit the appellative meaning of the term *presbyter*, as including teaching and ruling presbyters, in this narrative,—to secure, we say, this theory, Congregationalists, Prelatists, Romanists, and latitudinarian critics, are to be employed to nullify the clearest possible delineation of representatives of the churches, sitting, deliberating, and deciding, in this model ecclesiastical court. But the labour is all lost.

For, 1. The omission of “the brethren” in one verse does not expunge it from *ten* other passages in this chapter, nor the other expressions which are clearly expressive of special delegated office. 2. The reading in our authorized text is not abandoned, but maintained, by the best critics and the weightiest authorities. “The reading of some old manuscripts,” says Baumgarten, and he is sustained by Dr. Alexander, and many more, “must, on closer examination, appear to be an intentional alteration which had its source in the prejudice that in these discussions and decrees none but the apostles were concerned.”* 3. Romanists will lead to still further expurgation, and exclude, according to the reading attributed to Clement, both the words “presbyters and brethren.”† 4. But let us adopt the reading of Dr. Killen, and it only follows that “presbyters” were co-equal and co-ordinate with apostles, and were therefore ministers and not “a mixed multitude” of different classes, and of whom some only ruled. 5. Dr. Killen, however, repudiates his own interpretation and reading. He calls these brethren “deputies commissioned to consult.” “The conclusion,” he says, “met the universal approval of the meeting, *including the deputies on both sides.*” “The apostles and elders, *with the whole church*, send *chosen men* of their

* Apost. Hist. vol. ii., p. 33. Alexander on Acts ii. 89. See also Griesbach, Bloomfield, Wordsworth, Tischendorf, Schaaf, Calvin, &c. It is sustained by Ebz., E. G., and H., and by the great body of the Cursive MSS., and by the Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic versions, and as Dr. Alexander says “commonly.”

† See Baumgarten, as above.

own company." He alludes to the "certain *other deputies*," and to "*a distracted constituency appointing commissioners*," to "the deputies on both sides," including "Syrian deputies commissioned to consult." (Pp. 84, 85.) Dr. Killen, in reviewing this council from another stand-point, (p. 620) again declares, "A few years afterwards the *representatives of several Christian communities* assembled in the holy city and ordained decrees."

We have here, therefore, a very remarkable proof that the word "presbyter" in the New Testament was the official designation of ministers, and that other terms are employed to distinguish "the representatives of the people" as a separate order of officers. The term "the brethren" is certainly used in a special as well as in a general sense. It is embodied in the record of their decree, and in the introductory address of the decree itself, in marked separation from apostles and presbyters. It is found also in similar distinction from the people in many salutatory passages.* The *bishops* in Acts xx. 28, and presbyters in v. 17, are included under the title *brethren* in v. 32. An official representative sense must also be given to this term in Acts xviii. 23—27; Acts xvi. 2. Compare Acts xiv. 23; 1 Tim. iv. 14. That the term *brethren* is used as a title of distinction as well as a common Christian appellation, is maintained by many.† It is also employed to denote a colleague in office.‡ Bloomfield concurs with Mosheim and Kuinoel in thinking that these brethren "were select persons from the laity, of most knowledge, influence, and credit, perhaps *delegated* from the whole body." (*Crit. Digest*, Acts xv. 6.) Neander considers these brethren as representing all, and acting in their name. (*Hist.* vol. i., p. 205.) Bishop Hinds regards them as "other official persons met as the plenipotentiaries, each of his own body, who may be called the whole church, because appointed to represent it." (*Hist. of Rise and*

* See 2 Cor. i. 1; 1 Thess. iii. 2; Heb. xiii. 23; Phil. i. 20; 2 Cor. ii. 13 and viii. 18, 22, 23, and xii. 18, and ix. 35; Gal. i. 2; 1 Cor. i. 1; Phil. ii. 25, and i. 14; Eph. vi. 21; 1 Pet. v. 12; 2 Pet. iii. 15; Rev. xix. 10. Compare xxii. 9.

† Vorstius in Phil. Sacr. cap. iii. 166, determines the meaning, in some cases, to be dignissimus quem adeas. See also Suicer Thesaurus *in verbo*.

‡ Robinson's Greek Lexicon *in verbo*.

Progress of Christ., pp. 145, 146.) This was also the opinion of Bishop Jewel, Whitaker, and other Episcopalians, and of Bishop White, who, on this ground, urged and secured the popular lay representation in the Episcopal Conventions in this country. Wordsworth (*Greek Test.* in loco,) says, we have in this Council the model of all succeeding ones, and for the presence “of the laity assisting at the deliberations, and giving force to the decree of the council.” (*Ib.* v. 2.) Many of our own writers take this view of the council, such as Professor Jamieson, Blondel, Bucer.* In v. 22, these *brethren* are called *leading men*, that is, leaders, *governors*, or rulers, and in v. 7, &c. “*the whole church or multitude, because,*” as Dr. Wordsworth says, “the presence of all is continually assumed in cases where the assembly is open to and representative of all.”

Pastors and Teachers. Eph. iv.—What?

Let us then pass on to the consideration of another passage, in which these theorists endeavour to find support for the common application of the same names to ruling and teaching presbyters, by dividing the “pastors and teachers,” in Eph. iv. 8—11, so as to correspond with the ruling and teaching elders it seeks in 1 Tim. v. 17. These two words, however, have been given to Christ’s under shepherds ever since he had a flock to tend, or wandering sheep to be sought for amid the mountain wastes of sin and sorrow. But according to this theory, “pastor” means ruling elder, and “teacher”—what does it mean? According to this theory it only sometimes refers to the minister, but not less officially, as both Dr. Killen and Dr. Adger teach, to the ruling elder, whose function it is to teach, and to be apt to teach, and from house to house. The “pastors and teachers” given by the ascended Saviour have, however, been generally regarded as denoting the very form of metaphor under which Christ commissioned and designated his first ministers, who call themselves and their successors presbyters; under which Paul gave his final charge to the presbyters at Miletus; under which Peter charges these same and all other presbyters; and under which Christ, the great exemplar

* Jamieson’s Cyprianus Isotemus, 542, 13. Blondel in do. 542.

of all his ministers, is represented as the shepherd, or *pastor*, and bishop or *teacher*. Ruling and preaching are also associated in all those passages in which, by almost universal consent, the ministry is spoken of—"Remember them that have *the rule* over you, who have *spoken* unto you the word of God," &c. (Heb. xiii. 7, 17.) "Aptness to teach," as well as capacity to rule, is made an essential characteristic of a presbyter-bishop, (1 Tim. iii. 2;) and again in Tit. i. 9, where it is required of a bishop that he "hold fast the faithful words as he had been taught, that he may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers"—passages which, until this theory arose, no one had ever dreamed of applying to any but to presbyters and bishops, as ministers. "The Constitution and Discipline" of Dr. Killen's own church under section 4, treats of "bishops, presbyters, pastors, teachers, ministers, commonly called clergy," and after quoting as proof-texts all the above passages, including Eph. iv. 11, (*pastors* and *teachers*,) as referring to the ministerial office, with its two-fold functions of ruling and teaching, it concludes by saying, "Every regularly appointed teacher, pastor, or minister, was an apostolic presbyter, and every presbyter labouring in word and doctrine (*and it never applies the title of presbyter to any other*) was the apostolical bishop or overseer." (Pp. 5, 6.)

But even where these terms have been divided, they have been considered as representing different but not distinct officers—the one a preacher and pastor, and the other a doctor, professor, or systematic instructor. "None of these distinctions, however," says Dr. Eadie, "can be sustained scripturally and historically. We agree with those who hold that one office is described by the two terms." "The one office is honoured appropriately with two appellations. It comprised government and instruction." "Such pastors and guides rule as well as feed the flock, for keeping or tending is essential to the successful feeding." (*Commentary in loco*, p. 288, &c.) "The absence of the article before teachers proves," says Dr. Hodge, "that the apostle intended to designate the same persons as at once pastors and teachers." He quotes Augustine and Jerome, and adds: "In this interpretation, modern commentators,

almost without exception, concur." (*Comment* on pp. 226, 227.) "These officers," says Schaff, "are undoubtedly the same with those elsewhere in the New Testament, commonly called presbyters, and fewer times bishops, whose business is expressly declared to be the feeding and oversight of the flock." (*Apost. Church*, p. 522.)

Neander, who originated this theory and interpretation of "pastors and teachers," admits that at the time of the Pastoral Epistles, presbyters, on account of heresies and heretics, were required to be able to teach. "The gift of teaching, and the order of teachers are then spoken of as constituting an entirely distinct function and order." (*History of Church*, vol. i. p. 260.) The passage in Titus i. 9, he thinks, "certainly implies that the bishop must possess the gift of teaching," or "the ordinary and regular office of teaching." (Pp. 258, 267.) But when he assumes a *very late date* for these epistles, he relies upon "an extremely doubtful hypothesis of a second imprisonment of the author at Rome."* "The conclusion, therefore, is that the presbyters or bishops of the apostolic period were the regular teachers and pastors, preachers, and leaders of the congregations;"† and it is very pleasant to find Dr. Killen concurring in our views when he interprets from another stand-point. Thus, on page 260, after showing that the churches of all Asia, (see pp. 258, 259,) were included in Paul's farewell charge, (Acts xx.) and in Peter's solemn appeal, (1 Peter v. 1—5,) to the presbyters of so many provinces, Dr. Killen declares that the metaphorical illustration and "the designations are identical." The exhortation of Peter in verse 5, "*is obviously addressed to ministers*. This command can be acted upon *only by ministers* who are confederates, and hold the same ecclesiastical status." He would therefore on this occasion render the words thus: "Likewise ye younger (presbyters) submit yourselves unto the elder, and ALL to ONE ANOTHER." "I have," he adds, "supposed *presbyters* (his own italics) to be understood as the apostle is speaking to *them* in all the preceding part of the chapter."‡

* Schaff, *Apost. Church*, pp. 531, 528—547.

† Ibid.

‡ *Ancient Church*, page 260. The reconciliation of this with pp. 232 and 258, we cannot of course be responsible for.

Vitringa discusses at length the meaning of the terms pastor and teacher. "One thing," he says, "is certain, and *admitted by all*, that Paul by pastors designates the ordinary presidents (*Praefectos*) of the church, those I say, which are otherwise called presbyters and bishops." This he illustrates by the synonymous use of these titles, and by Ignatius, and by a multitude of passages from the Jewish writings, and among them from Philo and the Zohar, to prove that every part of the office of the doctor of the synagogue is attributed to pastors; whence we conclude that pastors (פְּרִיְשִׁיִּים *Parnasim*) formerly signified learned and pious men, who were devoted to the work of making prayers and exhortations to the people, and expounding the Holy Scriptures. They were not, therefore, as Lightfoot supposed, the deacons, but "those rulers of the synagogue who were at the same time doctors, eminent for learning and piety."* In Vitringa's day, the term pastor was admitted to mean docere, monere, sacramenta administrare, et omni potestate a Christo ministris suis concessa, gregem gubernare. Vitringa could therefore triumphantly ask "whether any one could *seriously* dare to assert and defend the application of these titles of pastor and bishop to lay presbyters, (*Presbyteris laicis.*)" Since his day confidence has considerably increased, but perhaps, if the authority for it is traced up, it may terminate in an elephant resting upon nothing.

The argument from the plurality of Presbyters.

We are thus led to notice another, and indeed the most relied upon of all the grounds on which this theory is based. This is the admitted fact, that in general a plurality of presbyters is spoken of as existing in one and the same place, and sometimes even in one and the same church. On this subject we have already said enough to undermine its apparent strength by calling to mind the missionary character of the apostolic and primitive churches, and the relation of these many presbyters to the whole field of their united labours. Like all the other premises from which this theory draws its conclusions, this argument is at once prelatie and congregational, and is employed by both parties for the overthrow of

* De Syn. Vet. Lib. iii. part I. chap. ii. pp. 621, 627, et passim.

Presbyterians. As employed by prelatists, it may be found discussed and most ably refuted by Clarkson, in his very learned works on Diocesan churches and Primitive Episcopacy, and by others.

Mr. Guthrie, whose recent work on the eldership we noticed as an intended manual for the Independent Morrisonian churches, carries out *the admitted premises of all these theorists* in this manner. It is granted that when the New Testament speaks of a plurality of presbyters and bishops in every particular church, they allude to the two classes of the one order of rulers, called indiscriminately presbyters, since we could not imagine a plurality of preachers in any one infant church. All arguments, therefore, founded upon such a plurality of preachers for a presbytery, are baseless, and “a territorial church or a national church is a purely human institution—a hissing shibboleth sounds in their very names.” (P. 2.) On page 15, Mr. Guthrie boldly avers that the largest cities mentioned in the New Testament—and he names “such large metropolitan centres as Jerusalem, Antioch, and Rome—had but one church.” “The principle that harmonizes and explains the whole is, that while all elders in the apostolic churches were rulers, only some were teachers.” (P. 80, &c.) Now this is precisely the argument of every one of the writers we have examined. Mr. McKerrow, for instance, occupies a whole chapter in proving that the order of “presbyters” existed in the apostolic churches, and then, in another chapter, offers two proofs that these presbyters were of two kinds—ruling and teaching: first, their plurality; and second, 1 Tim. v. 17. But the first we perceive leads to Congregationalism, and the second is an assumption which is disproved by the established usage of the New Testament, and, as we will show, by inherent critical difficulties. Both Vitringa and Selden make it evident that there were many synagogues in one place, and also a plurality of presbyters in one synagogue, varying in number with circumstances.* The whole analogy of the synagogue usage, and the missionary character of the apostolic churches, concur in rendering the uniform ancient Presbyterian interpretation the only true and satisfactory one. This is well expressed by Thorndike,

* Vitringa, Lib. III., chap. xviii., p. 874.

who says there were anciently "presbyters in every church," and "presbyters in every city;" "not meaning one in a place, but presbyteries, that is, colleges, bodies, companies of presbyters, with common advice to order the *churches* planted in those cities." The character of these churches must, from the nature of things, have been the same as every such church in heathen lands now. In Shanghai, for instance, there are "six missionary churches, and many smaller preaching-places afford facilities for inquirers. This is felt to be the case by the younger missionaries, in such a degree that most of them are anxious to go out into 'the regions beyond;' leaving to those who first broke ground here the task of training up, and building up in the faith, those who in the course of Providence are attaching themselves to the army of the Lord, and are requiring to be more perfectly instructed in the way of life."

In exact accordance with what is thus taking place in heathen lands—and such as constituted the field of apostolic and primitive Christianity—we find everywhere the presbyters acting as a combined, organized body; we find household churches (ἐκκλησία καὶ οἶκον) frequently mentioned and greeted;* and we have found the apostolical epistles addressed, not to any one of these, but to the whole body of Christians in and around Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, &c., as all together forming *one body or church*.†

The conclusion, that because there were generally a plurality of presbyters in every apostolical mission church, therefore the majority of them were not preachers, and must have been ruling elders, is a triple *non sequitur*, 1. in assuming any other meaning for *presbyter* than minister; 2. in confining all to one congregation and locality; 3. in arguing from a *forming* to a *fixed* condition of the church. No such officers as ruling elders were then known under the title of presbyters. Many congregations were united under the care of one mission church, and economy, comfort, and efficiency would not only justify but require the association of several ministers together. A plu-

* Rom. xvi. 4, 5, 14, 15; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2.

† 1 Thess. i. 1; 2 Thess. i. 1; 1 Cor. i. 2, v. 1 sq.; 2 Cor. i. 1, 23, ii. 1 sq.; Col. iv. 16. This Neander, in both his works, recognizes, and Baur. See Schaff, 526, 527.

rality of presbyters in one mission church no more proves that this term referred to ruling elders as well as ministers, than the same fact does at Shanghai, Ceylon, and elsewhere. Nay, Dr. Owen himself teaches, that there may be many ministers as well as *one*, even in a single congregation, and the Presbyterian Standards of the Reformers, of Geneva, of Westminster, and of the Scottish, and all affiliated churches to this day, provide for such a plurality. This theory is, therefore, built on the sand—upon baseless assumptions—upon a loose interpretation of an equivocal term—upon an inconclusive argument, which understands the term *presbyter* in one sense in its premises, and another in its conclusion.

The Presbyterian of the Fathers and Reformers.

The conclusion, therefore, remains, that in the usage of the New Testament the term *presbyter*—and its collateral terms *bishop*, *pastor*, &c.—mean the same office that they do now, and refer exclusively, in a strict official sense, to the order of ministers. This is true also of the apostolical and primitive Fathers, and, as we have seen, of the Reformers, and of all Presbyterian Standards. The assertion that because among the mission churches of the early Fathers, and the growing corporations of later and corrupt churches, a plurality of presbyters is spoken of, therefore they must have been in greater part ruling elders, is simply preposterous. The language of these Fathers, and the condition of their churches, are precisely analogous to those of the New Testament writers and churches. Presbyters and bishops are their ministers, and are one and the same order, until by degrees (*poulatim*, as Jerome says,) the bishop was regarded as a higher, and the presbyter a second or lower order, and deacons a third order of MINISTERS. This fact of the original identity—as the one and only order of ministers—of presbyters and bishops, is the corner-stone of the historical argument for the scriptural, apostolical, and primitive polity of Presbyterianism. Render the term *presbyter* equivocal and appellative, and the argument falls to the ground. But if there is anything historically true, it is that the terms *presbyter* and *bishop* have come down to us as the invariable and untransferable titles of the ministry.

According to Augusti and other archæologists, the term presbyter was usually retained in ecclesiastical writings, or if translated into Latin it was rendered by *sacerdos*, pastor, and the like.”* The Saxons used the word *preostre*, and afterwards, by contraction, *prester*. The High and Low Dutch have it in the word *priester*. The French say *prestre*; the Italians, *prete*, and the Spaniard, *presbytero*. The translation of the word into English occasioned much controversy. In the English translation of 1562 the word priest was employed to translate presbyter.† Hooker justifies this rendering as being liable to no mistake, but as it had been so long perverted he was willing to drop it.‡ Beza and Erasmus retained the word presbyter. Our translators, being all prelatists, and acting for King James, after he had become such, found it necessary to conceal much of the argument in favour of presbytery by adopting the ambiguous word *elder*. But having been introduced, it has come to be used by Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, &c. for their ministers as distinguished from the laity or brethren, and from officers called deacons, stewards, &c. “*There is, therefore, no dispute,*” says Riddle, “*that the term presbyter continued to denote those ministers to whom the New Testament gives indifferently the title of presbyter or bishop.*”§ Suicer, in his *Thesaurus of the Fathers*, sustains this statement, and though in favour of the distinction of ruling and teaching elders, gives no attempted example of it earlier than Bullinger and Illyricus among the Reformers.|| Bentley, therefore, to sustain prelacy, invented the theory that in the next generation after the apostles all Christendom agreed to use the term *bishops* for prelates as successors of the apostles, and leave presbyter to denote ordinary ministers under them.¶ But the identity of presbyters and bishops was openly acknowledged in remarkable testimonies by the most learned of the Fathers—Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theo-

* Riddle's *Antiquities of the Christian Church* based on Augusti, &c., p. 232.

† See Fulke's *Defence of the English Translation*, 1583, p. 250. Parker Society ed.

‡ Ecclesiastical Polity.

§ Riddle, *ibid*, p. 57.

|| Tom. I., Πρεσβυτερος.

¶ See in Wordsworth's *Greek Testament*, on Acts xx. 28.

doret, &c.—even after the Romish prelatical system had become completely established.* This is the standing and irrefragable argument of Presbyterians against Prelacy. It was the sledge-hammer of the Reformers, and is the substance of Dr. Killen's able work, and of his skilful application of the late discovered statue of Hippolytus and his Philosophumena, and of the Catacombs of Rome, and of the insoluble riddle of the early prelatical succession at Rome and elsewhere.† “The pastor, (presbyter) and not the prelate,” says Calderwood, one of the earliest Scottish champions of presbytery, “is the minister whom the apostles did approve. Such were Linus, Clements, Cletus, Anacletus, fellow-presbyters at Rome at *one time*.”

It is perfectly preposterous to question a position now universally admitted by Prelatists themselves. Dr. Barr and Rothe agree therefore in the opinion that “both the presbyter and bishop were originally the same in their sphere with the later bishops;”‡ and a most valuable part of Dr. Killen's work—and it enters into every Presbyterian argument§—is his elucidation of the process by which the moderator, or as he calls him in one place, “the chief *pastor*!” “became permanent, and was called by eminence the bishop.”|| Gieseler and Guericke elaborate the same argument.¶

It is of some weight to mention that such critically accurate and candid writers as Archbishop Whately and Bishop Hinds use the term *elder* interchangeably with minister, and give authority for the exclusive application of the original word presbyter to ministers.**

We have prepared an analysis of the evidence presented from the Fathers to prove that by presbyters they must have under-

* See Gieseler, Rothe, l. c., 207—217. Schaff, p. 524, &c.

† Ancient Church, pp. 344, 348, 350, &c., and 331 *et passim*.

‡ See Olshausen on Timothy, Introd., p. 174. Edinb. ed.

§ See, for instance, Hill's Lectures, vol. ii., on Episcopal and Presbyterian Controversy.

|| See pp. 556, 578, 579, 580, 584, 585, 619, &c.

¶ Gieseler, vol. i. p. 108, 109.

** Whateley's Lessons on the Worship of God, Lesson v. § 11, 12, &c. Hinds' History of the Rise and Progress of Christianity, last ed. 1 vol. pp. 231, 232, 233, who quotes several early Fathers.

stood ruling elders, which, however, we must omit. Separate from such quotations, the proofs founded upon plurality of presbyters, and upon the existence of *other persons* called *seniores plebis*, *seniors of the people*—(not ruling elders nor *presbyters*, but *seniores*)*—and there is not a particle of proof that the PRESBYTERS of the Fathers were, in any case, any other than ministers authorized to preach and administer ordinances. “*Nothing*,” says Vitringa, “*is more certain, nothing in all ancient history is more determined,*” than that presbyters “were part of the clergy, like the bishops, or, if you please, like the ministers of the word of our time, having power to administer sacraments, baptize, anoint, preside at the Lord’s Supper, distribute the elements, bless the people,” &c., “and that in the oriental churches presbyters were preachers equally with bishops, is a fact beyond dispute.”† By an examination of evidence analogous to that of the statue of Hippolytus, Rothe has concluded that the *seniores plebis* were civil magistrates. At any rate they were laymen, (*plebis*) representatives of the people, not even called presbyters, but enumerated after, and in addition to them, and were confined to the North African churches.‡

1 Timothy v. 17, examined.

We have now examined every ground upon which this theory attempts to establish the claim of ruling elders to be the presbyters of Scripture except one. We have seen that in the New Testament the term presbyter refers to ministers of the word “able to teach others also,” and to commit their office, by ordination, to faithful men in perpetuated succession.

We are now, therefore, prepared to take up the consideration of the only passage in which apparent authority has ever been found for the theory which makes presbyters one order of rulers with two classes, that is, 1 Tim. v. 17. As translated by Alford, the words are, “Let the presbyters, (*πρεσβυτεροι*) who have well-presided, (over their portion of the church’s

* That these *seniores* were not church officers at all is the opinion of Vitringa. See Vitringa at length at p. 511, &c. He is of opinion that a reference to them does the cause of ruling elders more harm than good.

† See page 489, 511.

‡ Ibid.

work) be held worthy of double honour, especially those that labour in the word and teaching."

There is, it will be evident, nothing here to *suggest* any other distinction than that of work or occupation among officers holding the same offices, and members of the same order. Prelacy and Popery have eagerly sought to establish a distinction of order (or class,) in order to create a divine right for an order of rulers who, while authorized to preach, are chiefly commissioned to exercise the power of jurisdiction. A *distinction* in this passage makes, therefore, for Prelacy and Popery, and hence many authorities from among Prelatists can be quoted for the distinction. By an equivocal, indeterminate meaning of the word *presbyter*, they hope to destroy our argument for the one order of co-equal ministers. But even if such a meaning and such a distinction are admitted, what is gained for the theory that makes *ruling* the one fundamental order and *preaching* a class under it? Nothing but contradiction in the very words of the passage itself. For they plainly reverse that order and subordinate ruling to teaching. And so do Calvin and the other Fathers of the Presbyterian church. Let us hear old Ayton,* and to understand fully his language, let it be borne in mind that when lay elders or governors were agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly, the Independents and Erastians in Parliament succeeded in destroying the whole system by securing the right of appeal from ecclesiastical to civil courts, and the presence of four elders in each ecclesiastical court to one minister.† Ayton, like other defenders of Presbyterianism of that period, urges that as licensing probationers, ordination of ministers, suspension, deposition, excommunication, and the like . . . nearly and particularly concern the ministerial office," "it is reasonable that in concluding any acts of jurisdiction or government in the church, it ought to be by plurality of ministers. The pastoral office is a SUPERIOR ORDER to that of mere ruling elders."

This passage, therefore, on any interpretation, can never be sufficient to authorize the theory which makes ruling elders and

* Primitive Constitution of the Church, &c.

† See Reid's Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Vol. 2, pp. 33, 34.

not ministers the one fundamental order, neither does it warrant any other meaning of "presbyter" than what we have found to be the *uses loquendi* of the New Testament, and of the Presbyterian and all other churches, in all ages. Presbyter in this passage means just what we have seen it means in every other passage—the minister to whom rule *and* authority, presidency over the churches, *and* labouring in word and doctrine, were assigned as his peculiar functions. Presumptively this is and must be its meaning, unless it can be proved that it is not. We are not called upon to prove that it is, nor to give any satisfactory and unobjectionable interpretation. This must be given by those putting on the word presbyter here a meaning not found elsewhere, and by no means necessary here. There are a number of explanations which have been given of the passage, as having exclusive reference to the ministerial office, while no adequate reason can justify the foundation upon it of two indivisible, indeterminate, unequal, and fundamentally distinct classes of presbyters—one to rule *ONLY* and one to do what? To labour in word and doctrine *only*? This would be the *contrast*, and the necessary contrast, *if there is, as is alleged, a division into two classes*. But this is not the theory which the words are made to sustain, nay, to originate and authenticate. That theory makes the two classes to be, one that rules well, or ruling elders, and one that does this, *and while doing this* labours in word and doctrine. The text repudiates any such division. It implies no division, but affirms that while all presbyters that act well their parts as rulers in the church are worthy of double honour, they are especially so if they labour hard and faithfully in what is their chief end and business, under the commission of Christ—in the preaching of the gospel—labouring in word and doctrine. There is here no distinction in order or class, but only in the department in which efficient labour is most to be commended, and to discharge which the ministry is to be supported, and ministers enabled to give their whole time, and study, and labour, to pastoral duty.

The Provincial Synod of London say: "They (ministers) are called *such as rule well*; not in any civil way, as state officers, but such as labour (rule well) in word and doctrine." This is,

after all, the force of the passage. Double honour—that is ample support—and being esteemed highly in love for their works' sake, are *not to be given*, except where the well-ruling of the presbyter (who is officially both ruler and teacher) is shown in his labours in the word and doctrine. Preaching and teaching—teaching while preaching—earnestly and zealously applying the word and doctrine to the flock publicly, and from house to house—this is the “rule well” that is to be honoured and supported. In other words, ruling is in order to preaching, and not preaching in order to ruling. Authority and rule—the keys—are given to impart efficiency to preaching, and to render it the power of God unto salvation—the intermediate causative agency between the two final ends of the church of God, “the perfecting of the saints,” and “the edifying (or completing) the body of Christ.” Mean what it may, therefore, this text must mean the exaltation of “the ministry of reconciliation,” and not ruling; and mean what it will, it *cannot* mean what this theory of a two-fold presbyterate teaches, and requires it to declare; since, if it does divide it, it will be into those that rule *only*, and those that labour in doctrine *only*. There is no alternative. If they who are required to labour well in word and doctrine, are also required to “rule well,” then are they one and the same, in office, in authority, in qualification, in function, and in rights, however differing in personal gifts or in official devotedness. If, on the other hand, the “rule well” and the “labour in word and doctrine” are distinct, then they are distinguished here as those that only “rule well,” and those who *do not rule*, but labour only in word and doctrine. But that helps this theory as little as the Presbyterian view, and is contrary to what is elsewhere established as true of presbyters, and to the whole context, which refers only to one order of presbyters, and that—as Calvin and all other interpreters admit—the order of the ministry.

The emphasis in this passage, according to the Greek language, is: 1. On the word *presbyters*, which is the subject of the proposition. 2. On *προεστώτες καλως*, who *do well* what is implied in acting as a *proestos*, that is, one who presides. 3. On *κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ*,* &c.; *they* who “labour in word and doctrine.”

* See Taylor's Emphatic New Testament. London. 1854.

"The meaning of the term *presbyters*, we have established to be *ministers*. By *προεστως* is literally expressed one set over, at the head of, as the president or the mayor of a city." (*Plato* and *Polyb.*, in Liddell and Scott.) By "*who labour*," is literally expressed, who are beaten out, wearied, and faint with their zealous ministerial labours.* What is predicated of *presbyters*, therefore, is, that they preside and moderate in all church assemblies, and are engaged in imparting instruction. And what is declared of *presbyters* who preside and administer *well*, and *labour zealously* in preaching and teaching, is, that they deserve double honour. In this verse, the term *presbyter* is therefore determined to mean that officer who is both a *labourer* in word and doctrine, and a *proestos*—a leader, president, administrator of ordinances, steward of mysteries, and ruler, having the keys of the kingdom.

A clear exposition of the indubitable official use of the term *προεστωτες* translated "*rule*," will of itself determine the untenableness of the theory that applies it to ruling elders, and not to ministers. The term has been already shown to be a correlative term with *presbyter*, expressive of the same persons and offices. The *proestos* in 1 Thess. v. 12, had pastoral care of souls, closely laboured among them, and admonished them as an ensample to the flock of which he was the shepherd. Justin Martyr uses the word *proestos* six times for the minister who presided in public worship, preached, prayed, gave thanks, and blessed the people. Irenæus speaks of "*presbyters* who are elated with pride at their exaltation to the *chief seats*." Firmilian speaks of "*the church where presbyters presided*, in whom is vested the power of baptizing and imposition of hands." Hilary says, "*A presbyter is he who is distinguished with the first seat*." Ambrose says, "*by the angels of the Apocalypse, we are to understand the rectors or proestotes*." Epiphanius says, "*Aerius, having become a . . . presbyter in Alexandria, presided over a church (προϊστατο) called Baucolis*." Tertullian calls the *presbyter* the "*summus sacerdos qui est episcopus*." (See Killen, pp. 531, 563.) Hermas speaks of "*the bishops, that is, the presidents of the churches*." (Ibid.) Dr. Killen calls Polycarp "*the apostolic presbyter*,"

* See Emphatic New Testament, by Taylor, *in loco*. Bagster. London.

“the presiding minister of the church.” (Pp. 557, 558.) “We have shown,” (says Dr. Killen, p. 560,) “that in various cities the senior presbyter continued to be *president* (*proestotos*) until about the close of the second century.” The name of presiding presbyter (*προεστως προεβυτερος*) continued, he says, “to be given to the Roman bishop until at least the close of the second century.” (Pp. 332, 333.) But we must stop, for we might fill pages of proof from Dr. Killen alone.* The term *proestos* limits and restrains the *possibly indefinite* meaning of *presbyter* to its strict official and ministerial one, and renders any other interpretation impossible.

But the emphatic and qualifying term, *καλως*, translated *well*, increases the impropriety of such a reference, since it declares that the distinction affirmed is not in office, nor even in function, but in their perfect or imperfect discharge. Judicious presiding required no ordinary ability and wisdom. In all assemblies, the regularity or irregularity of their proceedings depends much on the wisdom and prudence with which they are conducted; and in the infant state of the church, when confusion and disorder did prevail, and made specific instruction necessary, and when enemies were ever ready to take advantage of anything which could be converted into calumnious charges, the security, as well as prosperity of the churches depended essentially upon the judicious, as well as winning manner of their presiding ministers.† But, while all this is true, yet the earnest and edifying presentation of the truth as it is in Jesus, well and laboriously prepared, and affectionately conveyed from house to house, as well as from the pulpit—this was the throne and sceptre of the ministry, the shepherd’s crook, by which souls were won and watched for Christ, and therefore the apostle adds the word “*especially*,” (*μαλιστα*) to carry on the emphasis of the word “*well*,” (*καλως*), and thus by one of the most general and commonly used terms expresses this thought—that is to say, if they also “labour in,” or diligently and faithfully hold forth the word of life. The term *μαλιστα* does not divide things that

* See pp. 506, 516—518, 576, 580, 584, 560, 564, 575, 576, 578, 619, 508.

† See Bloomfield and Benson in do. Crit. Digest, in loco.

are essentially different, but only marks a difference between things essentially alike. It is the remotest possible from scientific classifying phraseology.

It points here to some specified peculiarity of a portion of the same class by which they are distinguished from the rest, and not—as *this theory requires*—to two distinct classes. Neither does this theory allow “labouring in word and doctrine” to be peculiar to either class, but makes it common to both; and, undoubtedly, there is nothing in these words to imply public authoritative preaching any more than in others which this theory applies to ruling elders, such as “apt to teach,” which is made a necessary qualification for ALL elders in this same epistle, in conjunction with “ruling well”—both being required as proofs of any person being qualified for the difficult task of governing the church of God.* All that is here described is therefore of one class, and of every one of that class—which must be the ministry.

But the class referred to is further determined to be the ministry, by the words “double honour,” (τιμης,) to which the word *especially*, and the subsequent word *labour*, are relative, and of which they give the reason. “Let the presbyters that rule or govern their flocks well be counted worthy of double honour, especially (μαλιστα,) that is, if they also,” says Benson—“and that chiefly and because or in respect of their labour in word and doctrine,” says Mede.† That this word refers to an ample and honourable support, is made very nearly certain by the connection. “From the consideration of the relief of the poor the apostle proceeds to the support of the clergy,” says Bloomfield; and in confirmation he proceeds to give proof in v. 18. “To be thought worthy” means “the obtaining that of which one is thought worthy.” Theophylact and Chrysostom interpret it “a liberal stipend.” “And in this,” says Bloomfield, “most of the recent commentators are agreed.”‡ “The use of the term τιμη for stipend,” he adds,

* See Litton on Church of God, p. 391.

† Mede’s Works, vol. i., book i., disc. 19, p. 92. See also Litton on the Church, pp. 391, 392.

‡ Critical Digest. He refers to Wolf’s Sch’l Lex., Heinrichs, Whitby, and “many eminent moderns.”

“may well be considered among the delicacies of Greek phraseology and of the apostle.” “From the general tenor of examples, as well as from the context, *it is evident*,” says Alford, “that not merely honour, but recompense, is here in question.” Grotius refers the allusion to the double portion of the first born. The passage is given by the later Helvetic Confession as proof of the “stipend due to ministers—all things that be necessary for themselves and families.” Calvin does not oppose Chrysostom’s interpretation, and adds afterwards, “Paul enjoins that support shall be provided chiefly for pastors who are employed in teaching.” In his Institutes, also, Calvin says, “The apostle here refers not only to the reverence due to them, (i. e. pastors,) but to the recompense to which their services are entitled.”*

Doddridge interprets the words an “honourable maintenance, according to what they need, given in a liberal and respectful manner.” Adam Clarke says, “Almost *every critic* allows that *τιμή* here means reward, stipend.”† Wordsworth (*Greek Testament*) interprets by “double pay,” and refers to Mede, Barrow, and others. On the analogous passage in 1 Thess. v. 13, “esteem them very highly in love, for their work’s sake,” Bloomfield remarks, “which of course includes providing for their honourable maintenance.” (*Critical Digest*.) And Koppe on this text remarks that the words “plainly signify, provide him with sustenance.”

But let us turn to the other term here employed, which combines to fix its meaning, and that is “*labour* (*κοπιῶντες*) in word and doctrine.” “This is a very general term,” says Bloomfield, (*Crit. Dig. on 1 Thess. v. 12*) “to denote labouring for the promulgation of the gospel;” and Mosheim thinks that this kind of ministerial labour is made prominent, because especially necessary at that time.‡ The word evidently implies that the ministry is their *labour*—their daily, regular, and

* Book ii., chap. viii. § 35.

† He dwells upon the thought, and again fully on verse 18.

‡ Comment on the Affairs of Christians, vol i. See Rom. xvi. 6, 12; 1 Cor. xii; 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 10; xvi. 16; Gal. iv. 11; Phil. ii. 16; Col. i. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 10; v. 17. See also Limborch Theol. lib. vii., cap. iv., § 10.

exclusive occupation, so much so, that in order to give themselves wholly to it they must be supported.

We thus perceive that by the established use of the term presbyter; by the general tenor of the passage; by the context; by the force of its several terms; this passage must be interpreted as applying only to ministers, and that the *invariable* application of it to such by ancient interpreters, and by the very general consent of modern commentators, renders this interpretation certain, and most assuredly overthrows the theory which BUILDS upon IT a twofold order of ruling and teaching presbyters.*

Finally, on this passage let it be noted, that the Westminster Assembly, which perfected the Form of Government which is constitutionally that of all Presbyterian churches except our own and the Continental, rejected this text as a proof text for ruling elders, but employed it to prove that the minister had a ruling power in the church as minister, and that while there *ought* to be in every church one both to rule and labour in word and doctrine, "the precedence is due to ministers."†

1 *Thessalonians* v. 12.

This conclusion, however, will be still further strengthened by referring to the very analogous passage in 1 Thess. v. 12, 13, "And we beseech you, brethren, to know them who labour among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you; and to esteem them very highly in love, for their works' sake." In making this the text for his discourse before a convention of ruling elders on the nature of their office,‡ Dr. Thornwell said, "Commentators are universally agreed, that the rulers of the church are the persons to whom the apostle here refers." Now, this is true. But the rulers to whom these commentators refer it are ministers, and ministers only. We have been able to find no diversity among all within our reach, except one, who is of no permanent authority, referred to by Poole in his

* Poole in his Crit. Sacra, scarcely alludes to such an interpretation, and in his Annotations, after enumerating several interpretations (not including this) declines giving an opinion.

† See in Gillespie's Notes in his Works, vol. ii. pp. 4, 20, 58, 64.

‡ Held in Charleston in January, 1860. See Report of, in the Courier.

Synopsis. Their unanimity is wonderful and decisive. Dr. Thornwell's statement is equivocal. The middle term (*ruler*) in the syllogism—necessary to include ruling elders within the affirmation—must be employed in different senses in the two premises. This text does refer to rulers, and ruling elders are rulers. But it does not follow that it refers to ruling elders, since ministers are rulers in a very different sense from ruling elders. *They are rulers of ruling elders*, and before, and independently of them, by the very nature of their office, call, qualifications, and authority given to them *directly* by Christ, through the Holy Ghost and his word, and *mediately* by his appointed church court. They are brought into relation to the *people* only when licensed or ordained by that court to preach; and to any particular church, only when called to become, by mutual covenant, their pastor. "Ruling elders," however, "are *properly the representatives of the people, and chosen by THEM* for the purpose of exercising *government and discipline* in CONJUNCTION WITH pastors or ministers." Now, it is exclusively to pastors or ministers commentators universally refer this passage, and since it is closely analogous to 1 Tim. v. 17, the whole weight of their authority is in favour of the same interpretation of that passage. Calvin has a comment on this passage of nearly three octavo pages, and refers it exclusively to "pious teachers," "good ministers," "ministers who faithfully *preside*," "pastors," "teachers," "true pastors, that *by teaching govern* properly and faithfully," *fidèles ministres de la parole*, "whom the Spirit of God honours with the distinction of *presidency*." This *presidency* denotes "spiritual government . . . in the name and by the commandment of Christ . . . *presiding in the Lord*." Unquestionably that any one may be ranked among lawful pastors, it is necessary he should show he *PRESIDES IN THE LORD* . . . and what else is this but that by pure doctrine he puts Christ in his own seat," &c.

Dr. Owen, who is only second as authority to Calvin, with these theorists, on Heb. iii. 3—6, where ministers are declared by him to be partakers of the honour and glory of Christ as the great builder of the church, and therefore to be highly

esteemed, quotes in proof this passage. (*Exposition*, vol. vii. p. 563.)

We need not do more than refer to all the authorities in *Poole's Synopsis*, and to the full and argumentative exposition in his *Annotations*, to Matthew Henry, to Scott, as edited, with additional comments, by Dr. Symington, (Glasgow, 1858, vol. iii. 4to;) to the very full and able note of Guyse; to Burkitt and Clarke; to Gill, in a very extended note; to Doddridge, Barnes, and others. Alford refers the passage to presbyters or ministers as the rulers of the church, and all the terms to the same office.

Chrysostom and Theophylact, are explicit in giving the same application of the words. "If," says the latter, "you honour those who *preside* over you in temporal affairs, how much more should you respect those who do it in spiritual things—who regenerate you in baptism, pray for you," &c. See in Valpy, who expresses his views through them. (*Greek Testament*, with Notes.)

Grotius and Benson both refer the passage to "religious teachers," to whom respect, honour, and comfortable maintenance are due.* Wordsworth attaches importance to this passage, as proving, in this earliest period and church, the organization and regular support of the Christian ministry since "we have here a body of men labouring and *presiding*, and admonishing the rest—in a word, a body of clergymen, settled and established." (*Greek Testament*, with Notes.) So also speaks Bloomfield. (*Synops. Critic.*) "Ministers," adds Doddridge "*by virtue of their office*, may be said to preside over Christian assemblies." "This," says Litton, (*on the Church* p. 134,) "is an ultimate and essential idea in the office of a minister or preacher, and hence even the apostles and seventy were a body of persons authorized by Christ to *preside over* and conduct the affairs of his kingdom."

Some, however, besides these theorists, have found a diversity of rulers here spoken of, but of what kind? Ruling elders? No! Some, like Mosheim, say *if* the order of presbyters is to be divided, there are *three* kinds of *teachers* spoken of; and Bloomfield, Reeves, Barrow, and others, find

* *Elders* has this meaning in Gen. xxxix. 6.

here a chief bishop, or prelate ruling over his two inferior orders of clergy, so that while these were *pastores gregis* (*pastors of the flock*) he was *pastor pastorum et gregis*, (pastor of both pastors and flock,) as Charles I. was fond of saying. In every way, therefore, this passage is limited to ministers, who are, as all writers admit, (*προεστωτες*) *presiding rulers*, and hence this passage strengthens the similarly striking general concurrence in the interpretation of 1 Tim. v. 17.

Our Historical Name.

There is one other assumption in this theory, of which we desired to present a full historical refutation. It is, as stated by Dr. Adger, that "the distinction between bishops or elders who teach and rule, and bishops or elders who rule *only* . . . gives us our name of the Presbyterian church—the church that holds to government by elders, *the essence* of whose office is *ruling and not teaching*." (See *South. Presbyterian Review*, p. 167, 1859.)

Now this is contrary to fact, since elders are found in the Methodist, Lutheran, and—historically and constitutionally—in Congregational, Baptist, Independent, and, as Owen declares, in some form and name *in every church in the world*.

This is also contrary to history. The name of Presbytery was given to our system by Beza, perhaps a century before the name of "ruling elders" was commonly given to these representatives of the people; before the distinction referred to was definitively made; while as yet the church had not either the wish nor the power to make the office a purely spiritual or permanent one; while the office was denominated by various names in different churches and countries; before the office was uniformly or universally adopted, or made obligatory; and, finally, before even the courts of the churches were generally called presbyteries. These positions might all be fully sustained.

Presbytery, in its generic and historical meaning, is that system of polity of which the highest, the fundamental, and the absolutely essential officer is the *presbyter*, as opposed to prelate on the one hand, and to the people on the other. It is the presbyter who gives coherence, resistance, and attraction to

the whole body, combining in one organization the laity and the clergy; repelling the arrogancy of prelatic despotism; and attracting and attaching to it, the body of the people, by associating with it in co-equal government their chosen representatives, both for disciplinary and distributive rule—for the management both of its spiritual and temporal affairs.

The presbyter as opposed by, and opposed to, the prelate, and then again to the *plebs* or mass of the people, was to the Reformers the first point of assault and repulse, around which the battle of liberty was fought; the scriptural and impregnable fortress into which they ran, and the armoury from which they drew the sword of the Spirit to pierce even to the dividing asunder all the unscriptural despotism and dogmas of prelates, and to secure for the Lord's people his own priesthood, commissioned and sanctified by one Spirit, their long alienated birthright and inheritance in Israel. Let any one read the history of the Reformation at Zurich, at Geneva, at Wittemberg, at Edinburgh, everywhere; and he will see that the presbyter, as God's divinely instituted minister in opposition to unauthorized prelates, and to uncalled, unsent, visionary, or fanatical lay preachers, was the head and front of all their contentings, the fore-front of the hottest battle. Read the Scottish Confession, the Books of Discipline, the Book of Common Order, the Confessions of every Church, the Solemn League and Covenant, the Acts of the Scottish Assembly for the first fifty, yea, hundred years; let him read the "Pastor and Prelate" of Calderwood and other early apologetical vindications, and he will have no doubt that we wear the honoured name of Presbyterian in testimony to this cardinal office of presbyter with its all-embracing authority and relations.

Horror of Popery everywhere led to an almost equal horror of Prelacy; and in England, Scotland, and Ireland led to the Solemn League and Covenant to seek its complete extermination, and caused the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty. Down with prelacy and up with presbytery was the shout of a reformed and liberated church, especially among the Reformed, who rejected the different orders of ministers which even Luther was willing to tolerate, and who gloried in the name which at once pointed out their specific differ-

ence and seminal principle. And the long series of fearful persecutions endured at the hands of both Popery and Prelacy has imbued the minds of all Scotch and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians with a cherished ancestral love of the simple presbyter and their own appointed representatives and elders.

The Reformers, says Principal Hill, "*laid the foundation of Presbyterian church government on this principle, that all ministers are equal in rank and power.*"*

But to all this it is objected, that this attaches to our name as a church nothing that is peculiar to it. But were it so, a denominational name very rarely, if ever, expresses what is peculiar, but rather what is prominent. In its original and undivided condition, the doctrine of the presbyter was peculiar to Presbytery, and was carried as a fundamental basis, by every separating body, into their distinctive organizations. Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists, are therefore to this extent Presbyterians, and have received names indicative of their points of difference. And, in truth, it could easily be shown that the doctrines of the unity of the church as catholic, and the principle of representation, are embodied more or less fully in the creeds of other churches besides the Presbyterian.† As a generic church, in contrast to Popery and Prelacy, the presbyter is the essential characteristic of Presbytery. The Presbyterian church is, therefore, a historic rather than a denominational title. It is generic, and not specific. It is founded upon the doctrine of the presbyter, and not of the ruling elder.

Before leaving this point, let us press the considerations, that this theory would actually sectarianize our holy catholic church, diminish her sun into a satellite, and thus obscure her glory. Our founders and fathers—Paul being witness—abjured any name that would narrow the one foundation, or substitute man and his measures for Christ and his glorious gospel. Enter not, O my soul, into their counsels, who would restrict that name

* See his whole exposition in his View, as above, and p. 43, &c., 8vo edit.; and his Lecture on Presbytery and Episcopacy, in his Lectures on Divinity. Paul Henry suggests this reason, (Life of Calvin, vol. i. p. 398,) on the whole argument, to which we could only allude.

† See the Platform of the Congregationalists, issued by their Board, 1855.

which has waved in bannered and exultant triumph amid the smoke and flame of many a battle, and in the hands of many a dying martyr, to the shibboleth of any party! Let it remain, as it was intended to be, a platform so simple, catholic, and broad, that all who believe in one generic order of divinely commissioned ministers—and this will include not only non-Episcopal, but many also among Episcopal communions—and also in holding forth to perishing sinners the pure gospel of the grace of God, may cordially work and strive together in furthering the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, in the unity of the Spirit and the bonds of peace.

The Destructive Tendencies of this Theory.

We have thus applied the axe to both root and branch of this new theory, growing, under such powerful and combined stimulus, to a portentous influence. None are abler advocates, or more ardent lovers of the doctrines, order, and polity of the Presbyterian church, than many of its defenders; nor would any abjure more solemnly than they, the dangerous consequences which, if generally adopted, it would logically entail. This theory, however, we do regard as, in its logical consequences, destructive to Presbyterianism—to the ministry, to one fundamental historical proof of Christianity, to the eldership, and to the deaconship—and in its controversy, needlessly provocative of division and debate among brethren, who love one another and the honoured mother of us all.

1. This theory is, *logically, destructive to the argument for Presbyterianism*, by making—just as prelatists wish us to do—our middle term equivocal, and our conclusion sophistical. The argument for Presbyterian polity against Popery, Prelacy, and Erastian “Popularity,” (as Owen and others were wont to call a purely democratic polity,) is this: The twelve apostles, and the seventy others, commissioned by Christ to proclaim the gospel of the kingdom, must have permanent successors—according to the commission, promise, and ascension gift of Christ—as the teachers and rulers of the church, “always, unto the end of the world.” But the only permanent successors of the apostles, as teachers and rulers in the church, are PRESBYTERS; (*otherwise called*, synonymously, *bishops*,

leaders, presidents, pastors and teachers, angels, ambassadors, heralds, &c.) Therefore, *presbyters* are the only permanent ministerial successors of the apostles.

This argument, around which all the research and reasoning of the many champions of presbytery are gathered, requires two points to be established. It is necessary first to prove that all these terms are used for one office and order—that is, for the PRESBYTER; and secondly, that the term *presbyter* refers unequivocally to *ministers*. For when prelatists are compelled to admit the overwhelming demonstration of this fact, they save themselves by appealing to “the miserable sophistry of names.” “*Presbuteros*—i. e., *presbyter*,” argued Dr. Mason’s prelatistical opponents, “signifies an elder man, whence *alderman*. By this new species of logic, it might be proved that the apostles were aldermen, and aldermen apostles.” (*Mason’s Works*, vol. ii. p. 40.) This is a standing Romish argument. “To translate *presbyter* by *elder*,” say they, “is as wise and reasonable as if a man should translate *major Londini*, greater of London, and not *mayor*; and *Universitas Oxoniensis* the *generality*, and not the *University* of Oxford.*

Now, in his unanswerable and triumphant argument, Dr. Mason establishes the position that “the officers of the church are distributed, *without a single exception*, into the two general classes of presbyters or bishops, and deacons;” that these must mean something *official* and *appropriate*, and *fixed*; that they are *particular*, and not *general*, since it is impossible to believe that such an immense society should “be destitute of names by which the officers might be correctly known, so that when an official term is mentioned, no ingenuity could guess whether an officer inspired or uninspired, ordinary or extraordinary, highest or lowest, in the church was intended.” He proceeds to show from Acts xv. that apostles and presbyters are *specific* terms of office, and from the regular ordination of presbyters in every city, and qualifications given in particular instructions, that these are not *general* terms of office, from which a prelate as well as a presbyter might be

* See in Fulke’s Defence, pp. 267, 268.

inferred, but "were as distinctive, and were annexed to certain officers with as much regularity and exactness as any official terms can be at this day;" and that "the allegation of the hierarchy [*and our theorists*] that the term presbyter is an indefinite term, *signifying merely a ruler* without reference to his station [*as a minister*], is altogether false, and the objection, [*and the distinction into two classes, officially distinct,*] founded upon this allegation, is altogether frivolous." (Pp. 48, 40.) In pursuing his opponent, who prosecutes his argument from "the promiscuous use of the terms presbyter and bishop in the sacred writings," Dr. Mason shows that "his conclusion is vain, because the premises are false," in overlooking "the distinction between the *absolute* and relative use of terms." "The sum is that the terms apostle, bishop, presbyter, and deacon, designate *with precision* officers known and established in the apostolic church." (Pp. 60, 48.) To admit, therefore, that the term presbyter designates two classes of officers, the one clerical and the other *lay*, (as Dr. Mason calls elders, vol. i. p. 191,) is therefore to destroy the whole argument on which Presbyterianism rests.* "Presbyterianism," says Dr. Baird, "is so called (and is what it is called) because it is governed by presbyters, and not by prelates." (*Religion in America*, Art. *Presbyterianism*.)

2. *But, secondly, this theory is, by the same argument, shown to be destructive to the ministry, as a distinct order and office in the church.* That it is both, the Provincial Assembly of London prove, in their unanswerable work on the Divine right of the gospel ministry,† by many arguments, one of which is, "From the *peculiar* names or titles whereby they are distinguished from other saints. "If God hath given peculiar names and titles . . . then this office is by Divine institution. For as the judgment of God is, so are the denominations which God giveth to things, *according to truth*. Surely the only wise

* We cannot, as we would have wished, enforce this argument from Dr. Kilien's *Ancient Church*. Compare pp. 550, 551, 552, 553, 562, 563, 568—585, Hill's *View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland*, pp. 19—28, &c. Conybeare and Howson's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 434. Schaff's *Apost. Church*, p. 525, and every writer from Blondel to Dr. Miller, Shimeall, Coleman, &c.

† See *Jus Divinum Ministerii Evangelici*, pp. 1—202.

God will not distinguish where he himself hath made no difference. But God hath given *peculiar* names and titles to ministers, such as: 1. pastors, (Eph. iv. 11; 1 Peter v. 2;) 2. teachers, (1 Cor. xii. 28; Gal. vi. 6;) 3. rule well, (1 Tim. v. 17;) 4. presidents, (Heb. xiii. 17, 24;) 5. superintendents and overseers of the flock, (1 Peter v. 2; Acts xx. 18; 1 Peter iv. 15,)” &c. Other arguments are drawn from the peculiar gifts and qualifications enjoined—the peculiar duties required of them, and towards them; the particular promises made to them; and many more.

Dr. Owen says, “Four things are required unto the constitution of a divine office, 1. An especial trust. 2. An especial mission or commission. 3. An especial name. 4. An especial work.” (*Works*, iv. 355.) He repeats these proofs of a divinely instituted office, and gives twelve arguments to sustain the divine institution and authority of the ministry, including those above-mentioned, and all the texts usually given and involved in this discussion. (1 Pet. v. 2, &c.; Acts xx. 28; Eph. iv. 11, 12, 13; 1 Cor. xii. 28; 1 Tim. iii. 1—7; Tit. i. 5—9; Rev. ii. 1—5; Heb. xiii. 7, 17; 1 Tim. v. 17; and also all the names and titles in question; such as pastor or shepherd, bishop, elder (*presbyter*,) ruler, including “pastoral feeding, teaching, and ruling,” &c. “On this office and the discharge of it, Christ,” says he, “hath laid the whole weight of *the order, rule, and edification of his church*, in his name and by virtue of his authority.” (Vol. xvi. 47—54.) In vol. ix. on Eph. 4, 8,* he proves the ministry to be the gift of Christ, “the *office*, and the persons to discharge that office.” Gifts, says he, (*even the charisma of teaching*) “make no man a minister; but all the world cannot make a minister without gifts.” He shows that the power in the church to call a minister consists in an absolute compliance with the command of Christ. “No church can make a man *formally* a minister that Christ hath not made so *materially*.” “The way whereby the church doth call or constitute any person unto this OFFICE thus appointed, is by giving themselves up unto him in the Lord.” (Pp. 431—436.)

This theory, therefore, annihilates the divine right, institution, and independence of the ministry. It deprives it of any

* He here assumes that pastor and teacher refer to the same office.

peculiar name or title, "ordained, defined, and limited by God himself."* Every name is converted into an appellative, and made to refer to the ministry only as one of two classes, or rather, the *function* or work of a portion of one class; and to refer primarily to the ruling elder. Every qualification is, in like manner, appropriated to the ruling elder, with every function, promise, responsibility, and required obedience, love, and honour. THE ministry is not among Christ's gifts, for ruling elders are "pastors and teachers," and are to be "apt to teach." It takes away all precision from official names, office, and work. They are neither ordained, limited, nor defined. The ministry is only "a new function, a gift added to a ruling elder and making him a teaching elder." But gifts, we have seen, without a direct authoritative mission to a divinely instituted OFFICE, "ordained, defined, and limited," cannot make any man a minister.†

On this theory, any man who believes himself to be gifted and called, is an authorized minister. Why not? if he can get people to believe as he does. This theory led to some thirty sects, with self-ordained lay preachers, at the time of the Westminster Assembly; and to all the melancholy evils during the great awakening so loudly deplored by Tennent and Edwards.‡ This theory has led the Virginia pastor and reviewer logically and practically to the same conclusion. The large body of Campbellites act upon this theory. "A Christian," they say, "is by profession a preacher of truth and righteousness, both by precept and example. He may of right preach, baptize, and dispense the supper, as well as pray for all men, when circumstances demand it." (*Chris. Sys.* p. 85.) Mr. Fall says: "We do not 'deny a gospel ministry,' as you charge; but we do deny *the exclusive claims* of any body of men, distinct from the body of the people to the sole right of teaching the people, of preaching the gospel, and of administering ordinances. We consider this the quintessence of Popery."§ (P. 42.)

* This is Dr. Breckinridge's proof of a divinely instituted office. (Vol. ii. p. 652.) And "every thing has a divine authority or no authority, at all." (Ibid, p. 542.)

† See Jus. Div. Min. Evang., pp. 67, 115.

‡ See Neal's Puritans and Hodge's Constitutional History, vol. ii. 99, 100.

§ Dr. Rice's Expositor, vol. ii. p. 191.

The Plymouth Brethren in England, and in their extended churches and members over the world, are distinguished by this rejection of a distinctive office of ministry, and have only general officers to rule, who may, any or all, preach. Now, as Dr. Thornwell observes, "extreme cases prove principles," and if we would avoid a similar *result* we must crush the serpent in the egg.*

This *theory*—not its advocates—is certainly Romish in that it makes ruling and the ruler paramount, and preaching and the preacher subordinate; since it makes the ruler fundamental and first, and the ministry only a new function or gift attached to it.

This theory is also suicidal. The *distinction* between the *potestas ordinis*, (*i. e.* "the power of teaching and administering the mysteries," which belongs to the minister or teaching elder, and the *potestas regiminis*, (*i. e.* power of rule or government,) is, says Dr. Breckinridge, "*fundamental*; and the *difference* in the exercise of the two powers is also *fundamental*, (pp. 641, 642,) *which distinction must exist also in those who hold the power, or else ALL of them MUST hold BOTH forms of church power, and the inherent distinction in the nature of the power be liable to constant disregard.*" Now, the argument of Dr. Mason carries these premises with irresistible force to the conclusion, that there must be distinct and different names by which the holders of these powers, so *fundamentally* and inherently distinct, may be correctly known. To think otherwise is to attribute to God what never has happened in the affairs of men from father Adam down to the present A. D. 1860, and what is inconsistent with the nature and use of human language.†

And finally, on this point, by destroying the independence of the ministry, and making ministers representatives of the people, and dependent upon them, this theory destroys the balance of power inherent in the senatorial character of the ministry, and reduces our polity either to an oligarchy or a democracy, which even Dr. Owen repudiates.

* Southern Presbyterian Review, 1859, p. 619.

† See Works, vol. ii., pp. 44, 45, &c.

3. Before passing to the bearing of this theory on the eldership, we would press upon our readers its disastrous effect in seriously undermining an argument for the truth of Christianity, which may be regarded as a key-stone in the arch, or a corner-stone in the building. An order of ministers, known as presbyters and bishops, has always existed, from the times of the apostles continuously to this day.

"Now," as Archbishop Whateley puts the argument, "if a century ago, or ten centuries ago, or at any other time, a number of men had arisen, claiming to be the immediate successors (as above described) of persons holding this office, when, in fact, *no such order of men had ever been heard of*, such a silly pretension would have been immediately exposed and derided. There must always, therefore, have existed such an order of men, from the time of those apostles, who professed to be eye-witnesses of the resurrection, and to work sensible public miracles in proof of their divine commission. And consequently, the Christian ministry is a standing *monument* to attest the *public proclamation* of those miraculous events at the very time when they are said to have occurred. Now at that time there must have been great numbers of persons able and willing to expose the imposture, had there been any.

"And you are to observe, that this argument for the truth of the sacred history is quite independent of any particular *mode* of appointing Christian ministers. If, for instance, these had been always elected by the people, and had at once entered on their office, without any ordination by other ministers, still, if they were but appointed (in whatever mode) as immediate successors of persons holding the same office, the argument is the same. That mode, indeed, of admitting men into the ministry, which was practised by the apostles, has in fact been retained in all ages of Christianity. But the argument we have been now considering is quite independent of this. It turns entirely on the mere fact of the *constant existence* of a certain order of men."

Now if it is true—as this theory, in its various forms, teaches—that the terms *presbyter* and *bishop*, by which this order of ministers is known to have always existed, and to have perpetuated itself, "are not applicable," as Dr. Thornwell

explicitly concludes, "to preachers as ministers of the word;" and if, as he also declares, "it is clear, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that presbyters and ministers of the word are not synonymous terms," (see *Southern Presbyterian Review*, 1848, pp. 61, 66)—then the whole argument falls to the ground. For that such a succession of ruling elders, as distinct from ministers, can be clearly made out, is denied not only by infidels and by nine-tenths of the Christian world, but also, as we shall see, by a weighty number of the most learned Presbyterians.

4. *This theory destroys also, and for many of the same reasons, the ruling eldership.* It founds the office upon an equivocal term—upon an English rendering of the words (*καλως προσετωτες*) *the wise or judicious presidents*—upon a *very partially* supported interpretation of one single text, in contrariety to the universal criticism of all other denominations—to the positive decision of the Westminster Assembly, and to its form of government, which is the received standard of all Presbyterian churches but the American. An office and a name based on such a foundation, must rest upon shifting sand amid ever-wasting tides.

Besides, either the ruling elder alone, or the minister alone, must be understood by presbyter and be designated in its qualifications, call, gifts, offices, and obligations; and it is very certain the Christian world will never dethrone her ministry to enthrone the eldership over her demolished empire.

But further. Legitimate interpretation, of which Calvin and Owen are examples, almost necessitates the honourable support and exclusive occupation of the presbyters in 1 Tim. v. 17, and 1 Thess. v. 12, 13, and is presumptive proof that they cannot be ruling elders.*

Again. By clothing the eldership with all the names, and requiring for it all the qualifications, and imposing upon it all the duties, and fearful responsibilities, and laborious devotion attached in Scripture to presbyters, we render it impossible for any honest conscientious man to assume the office;

* Dr. King, on the eldership, allows that "it must be admitted that the word translated *honour* does sometimes allude to pay or wages, and that the allusions which follow do seem to favour this interpretation. Dr. Wardlaw argues from it as incontrovertible. See in do. 37, 35.

since, if fit and prepared for such an eldership, he is of course fit and prepared for, and must feel impelled to desire the office of a minister.

Now, Dr. King acknowledges that the great difficulty of getting elders "would be rendered insuperable by attaching preaching to the office," and surely all the qualifications required for a bishop must include this under "aptness to teach," and the many other forms in which teaching, instructing, and admonishing are made their duty.

Dr. Thornwell, in the discourse referred to, said that we may err in raising the standard of qualifications for the eldership too high, and that good common sense, prudence, ardent piety, and active zeal, were all that the office required. But if ruling elders are the presbyters and bishops of Scripture, they must possess ALL their required qualifications, and perform ALL their duties, and be EVERY ONE of them *apt* to teach, trained, skilled, and officially devoted to teaching. This, and nothing short of this, is on this theory demanded, under the solemn sanction of a vow, and a "woe unto them," if faithless. "There prevails amongst us," says Dr. Adger, (p. 177, do.,) "too low a conception of what the office is, and what it involves. The ruling elder is not a mere assistant of the minister. He is a high spiritual officer in Christ's house. He is a shepherd of the blood-bought flock. He rules in Emanuel's kingdom. He is a judge in the courts of the Lord. Sitting in that court he has committed to him the keys of the kingdom of heaven—and as he binds or looses on earth, it is bound or loosed in heaven!"

Let our elders think of this. If *presbyters*, they must be all this, or else rashly assume an office for which they may have neither the call, the qualifications, nor the desire. And then, by this theory, the elder ceases to be a layman, or properly a representative of the people. Not being a layman, he is of course a clergyman, "for he is not," says Dr. Breckinridge, "*by any means a different order*,"* and as "the government of the church is exclusively in the hands of elders," (do. p. 632,) it follows that the government of the church is a clerical oligarchy. For it is not the existence of a sacred order of

* Dr. Breckinridge, vol. ii. p. 641.

ministry, called and commissioned by Christ, and as independent of the laity as is a Senate in relation to a House of Representatives, that constitutes a hierarchy or priestcraft. No, but it is the exclusion of the *laity* and of the representatives of the laity, as a separate and independent house of lay delegates that makes a despotic priestcraft, a prelacy. And such a prelacy is logically created by this theory, which must land us either in Dr. Owen's abhorred "popularity," (i. e. *democracy*,) or in a clerical oligarchy of "ONE ORDER." The principle of representation is destroyed, and with it our glorious free representative and conservative commonwealth, of which we may say in the language of Milton, "it is the divinest, noblest, safest, and freest commonwealth that can be established among men."

Nay, by this theory, the very *existence* of ruling elders at any time, or anywhere, either in apostolic or subsequent times, is seriously endangered. The evidence for a divinely instituted *presbyter*, that is not by office and ordination qualified to preach and administer sacraments, &c., has been called in question on critical and historical grounds by many of our own ablest judges, and best friends. Dr. Miller admits that many of his brethren rejected it. Principal Hill regards the evidence for it as very slender. (View, as before.) Dr. Wilson of Philadelphia searched in vain to find such mute presbyters during the first three centuries. Professor Jamieson of Scotland, one of the ablest and most learned champions of presbytery, after having published in favour of such presbyters, publicly renounced it.* He quotes Blondel as of the same opinion, and many Presbyterians. The Westminster Assembly rejected the *name* ruling elder, which had been even voted upon, &c.,† 1 Tim. v. 17, as a proof-text for any such presbyter. Baxter says this was the prevalent opinion among Presbyterians in his day.‡ It was also, as we have seen, among the French Presbyterian churches, and those of the Remonstrants. Mr. Boyce, in his very able work on the Ancient Episcopacy, (p. 208,) affirms (and quotes Blondel as believing) that "the primitive presbyters were all ordained to

* Sum of the Episcopal Controversy, p. 87. Cyprianus Isotimus, p. 541.

† See in Gillespie's Notes.

‡ Orme's Life of, pp. 74, 77, and on Episcopacy.

the sacred office of the ministry." Gieseler rejects the distinction made by this theory. Mosheim does the same. Dr. Coleman and Riddle, in their "Antiquities of the Christian Church," founded upon Augusti and others, declare against this theory. Selden and Lightfoot, the greatest Hebraists of modern times, were against it in the Westminster Assembly. Vitringa, to whom all our knowledge of the synagogue is now chiefly referred, expresses himself in the most unqualified manner. "I am not," he says, "opposed to lay elders, but contrariwise greatly like them. I will not, however, offend against the brotherhood, of which I form a part, if I openly declare that I am able to find no such elders in the apostolical church of the first age; none such in the church of the age following; none in the *writings* of the apostles, or in the records of the age following, as far as they have been examined by me or others. This opinion, in which I have long been fully confirmed, I consider it no fault freely to divulge, though contrary to that of others, and which no other reason or presumption than the force of truth has compelled me to embrace. And can any one then dare," he adds, "seriously to assert and to defend the position that to these *lay elders* the name of *bishop*, or the name of *pastor*, can be appropriated? And if no one can so dare, then the question is settled concerning them, since no other presbyters (or elders) are acknowledged or constituted in the church of the Apostles, except those who are at the same time pastors and bishops," &c.* Professor Jamieson, as referred to above, uses similar language: "I can't find," says he, "during the first three centuries express mention of these seniors or ruling elders; for I freely pass from (i. e. *abandon*) some words of Tertullian and Origen, which I elsewhere mentioned as containing them, and so also from what I said of the Ignatian *presbyters* being ruling or non-preaching elders."† The very learned non-conformist writer, Clarkson, of whom Baxter says he was a man of "extraordinary worth for solid judgment and acquaintance with the Fathers," &c., coincides in this judgment, and so do many others.‡

* De Vet. Synag. p. 484.

† Jamieson's Cyprianus Isotimus, p. 544.

‡ Primitive Episcop. pp. 92, 100, 104, 105. See others referred to in Bib. Repert. 1843, p. 327.

Finally, Rothe, the most learned living antiquarian of Germany, has found, upon elaborate investigation, that the supposed *ruling presbyters* of the North African churches, the *seniores plebis*—Tertullian, Augustine, and Hilary, were, without doubt, *laymen distinguished from, and set over against the clergy, and no other than the civil magistrates within the parish or congregation—nobilissimi*. (See p. 237. Schaff also takes a similar view, *Apost. Church*, 239.) Dr. Killen ignores this remarkable discovery.

Is it then, we ask, expedient to rest the office of ruling elders upon a text and a distinction so plainly repudiated by our greatest authorities and acknowledged standards, and by claiming that they are and must be *presbyters*, imperil their Divine warrant, and weaken their authority and influence?

This theory, therefore, by attempting to make the *ruling elder* the *presbyter*, and destroying his true glory and dignity as the representative of the Christian body under Christ, for the election of their own officers, endangers their very existence itself.

But to all this it is replied that the view we have presented of the ruling elder as “properly the representative of the people,” “and not properly the presbyter of Scripture, as Dr. Thornwell announced to the last General Assembly, destroys the office altogether.” But how? Does it not ascribe to it scriptural titles and functions, scriptural exemplifications, and actual exercise? And do not these secure for it a divine right, divine appointment and institution, under the immediate sanction and authority of Christ, the only King and Head of the church? We do not say that it is, as Dr. Thornwell does when he represents in order to refute our views, (*South. Pres. Review*, 1848, p. 51,) “the creature of the people, possessed of no other powers but those they have chosen to entrust to it.” The appointment of officers as representatives of the people in the “discipline and distribution” of the church, is by Christ’s institution and authority as much and as truly as that there shall be particular churches regularly organized whom they represent, and “in whose name they act.” (*Form of Gov.* chap. i. § 3.) These are not contradictories. They are both

true, both by divine right, both made authoritative by the power, and regulated by the word of Christ. "It is the true doctrine of the Scriptures," we agree with Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Owen, whom he quotes, (See do., p. 52,) "that all church power *in actu primo*, or fundamentally, is in the church itself, *in actu secundo* or its exercise in them that are especially called thereunto," and we again cordially unite with both (do., p. 531,) in the statement, "while, therefore, all church power, which is nothing but a right to perform church duties in obedience to the commands of Christ, and according unto his mind, is originally given unto the church essentially considered, yet, *in all regularly organized churches*, it has evidently "a double exercise—1. The call or choosing of officers; 2. In their voluntary acting with them, and under them in all duties of rule." Our standards, and our Reformers, and all Presbyterian Confessions maintain both facts. In opposition to Erastianism, they teach "that Christ hath appointed officers not only to preach, &c., but to exercise discipline for," &c. And in opposition to Romanists and Prelatists, they teach "that it is incumbent upon these officers, AND UPON THE WHOLE CHURCH IN WHOSE NAME THEY ACT, to censure or cast out the erroneous or scandalous." (*Form of Gov.* chap. i. § 3, quoted as above, p. 52.) In many ways our congregations exercise this power. The first act of "The Congregation" in Scotland, was to organize and elect officers, though they had as yet no minister. And Gillespie in one of his later works, and while establishing the above doctrine, vindicates and shows the consistency of an opinion formerly avowed, "that nothing should be done without the concurrence of the people or congregation."

Dr. Thornwell may, therefore, pronounce his suppositious theory, "without hesitation, absolutely false;" but our view he cannot, without self-contradiction, charge with destroying the eldership. When, however, he affirms that consistency requires "to abolish the office as a human contrivance, and a useless appendage to the church," when "the arguments for its divine appointment drawn from the natural meaning of the title, the *acknowledged* (?) constitution of the Jewish Synagogue, and the plurality of elders, confessedly ordained in the apostolic

churches are rejected; and when he declares it to be "idle to tell us that Paul speaks of GOVERNMENTS, and using the abstract for the concrete, means governors themselves," although on the next page (p. 59,) he quotes our Form of Government (chap. v. book 1.) where the very passage and term, *governments*, is quoted in proof of ruling elders, we may well ask which theory tends to the destruction of the office.*

But in the fifth and last place, this theory is logically destructive to the Deaconship. It ignores its existence as an office instituted by Christ, for the assistance of the elders and ministers, in the full and proper administration of his church. "Government," it is said, "is *exclusively* in the hands of *elders*," and "deacons *have no power* of regimen or order." What, then, we ask, are they? God hath set them in his church as ordinary and permanent office-bearers. Their creation, name, qualifications, election, ordination, and personal names, even, are handed down to us. They have existed, without dispute, and with special honour put upon such as discharge the office well, always, everywhere, until the theory in question led practically to the absorption of them in the office of ruling elder, as is declared to have been the case in Scotland by Principal Hill, and in Ireland by the Book of Discipline, and in the United States by Dr. Wilson and Dr. Miller.†

Now, deacons were required to be men full of Christian zeal, faith, wisdom, prudence, and exemplary piety, sound, and well instructed in the truth, holding the ministering of the faith in a pure conscience. Stephen was full of the Holy Ghost and power, and he immediately began to speak for Jesus; "and they were not able to resist the wisdom and the Spirit by which he spake." Another of them, Philip, was so gifted as to be afterwards an "evangelist." From their connection with the

* If it is asked, as it may well be, what is the great practical benefit sought by this theory, the answer is, the right of ruling elders to impose hands in ordination, "*a potentiality*," which has never yet been developed into exercise under the constitutional authority of any Presbyterian church in the world, and as Dr. Miller's learned correspondent assured him, certainly not in the Church of Scotland.

† Miller on Ruling Elders, pp. 237, 238, 242. Dr. Wilson Princ. Gov., and Hill's View of the Church of Scotland.

agapai, or love-feasts, (Acts vi. 2,) and the general care of the poor, they are believed to have had the supervision of, and to have assisted in the daily administration of the Lord's Supper, and other services of the church, (Acts ii. 42.) And it is accordingly declared, that they who use this office well, "purchase to themselves a good degree, and great boldness in the faith which is in Christ Jesus." (1 Tim. iii. 9—13.) Taken from among the people; chosen entirely by them; intimately acquainted with all their wants—they are admirably qualified to assist the pastor and elders with counsel and coöperation, in everything common to their mutual interests, and to their special department of general temporal and charitable ministration, and to constitute a bond of living union between them and the people.

The most ancient authorities of the purest and primitive age, undoubtedly represent them as assisting ministers in their religious services and other official duties. "They whom we call deacons," says Justin Martyn, "distributed the consecrated bread and wine and water to each one that is present." The same service is enjoined in "The Apostolical Constitutions." They had general oversight of the assembly during religious worship, and distributed the alms. In the church of Scotland, whose *first* formal act of organization was the appointment of elders and deacons, the minister breaks the bread and distributes the cup, "all the while the elders *and* deacons, in a competent number, and in a grave and reverend manner, do attend about the table, to see . . . that all who are admitted may have the bread and wine,"* &c.

"Deacons are not only to distribute the charity of the church to the poor, but ought also to visit them at their own houses, counsel them, pray with them, and otherwise assist them." So speaks Mr. Lorimer. And in the Irish Church Discipline it is said, "they should *exhort* the poor to be rich in faith, and to become heirs of the kingdom of God." (P. 7.)

The deacon, therefore, is not only an ecclesiastical and spiritual officer, like elders, but "he is," as Mr. Lorimer remarks,

* Compend. of Laws, vol. i., p. 306. Pardovan, Book II., § 20, tit. iv.

“to a certain extent a *ruler*, . . . ruling their own family well, being one of the tests by which he is to be proved.”* “To them,” says our Form of Government, “may be properly committed the management of the temporal affairs of the church.” What our standards say deacons *may properly* do, their First and Second Book of Discipline make positively their duty: “Their office and power is to receive and distribute the whole ecclesiastical goods unto them to whom they are appointed, . . . that the patrimony of the kirk be not converted to men’s private use, nor wrongfully.” Under this patrimony is drawn out whatever pertains to property held, rents, bequests, collections, and income generally; and the support of ministers, teachers, schools, churches, manses, &c. The office of deacon is, in short, the treasury department and municipal or home government of the church, and as important and honourable in its sphere as the legislative and executive functions; and when *properly* officered and invested with its rightful authority, it evidently holds in its hands the efficiency and prosperity of each particular church.

Deacons, therefore, have always been considered as united in the general polity of the church, and as having rule—within their sphere, and under the authority and direction of the pastor and elders—exercised in a common council. “We believe,” says the Belgic Confession, Art. 30, “the true church ought to be *ruled* with that spiritual polity which God hath taught us in his word, to wit, that there be pastors to preach the word purely, elders *and deacons* to constitute the ecclesiastical senate.” The Book of Common Order, drawn up by Knox, in Geneva, approved by Calvin, and established in Scotland, and by the Puritans, who endeavoured to have it made the polity of England, treats, in chap. v., of “the weekly assembly of ministers, elders, and *deacons*.”† In the First Book of Discipline, chap. x., § 11, the office of deacon is described as above, and it is said, “they may also assist in judgment with ministers and elders, and may be admitted to read in the assembly, if they be required and be able thereto.” This Book also pro-

* On the Office of Deacon, pp. 59, 70.

† This Book was usually prefixed to the Psalms in Metre, in Scotland.

vides, that if the minister was of light conversation, the elders and deacons should admonish him."

In the first Book of Discipline, chap. viii. § 6, it is provided that "if any extraordinary sums are to be delivered, then must the ministers, elders, and deacons consult whether," &c. The second Book of Discipline divides the whole polity of the church into doctrine, discipline, and distribution, with its three-fold officers—pastors, elders, and deacons—who are "to be called and elected as the rest of the spiritual officers;" and as their duties are to be performed at the discretion, and by the appointment of pastor and elders, "for this cause, and not for regimen, *they are to be present at the ordinary meetings of the eldership.*" Guthrie of Stirling, in his Treatise of the Ruling Elders and Deacons, 1699,* says: "It is also true that the deacons may assist in judgment with the minister and elders, and be helping to them in those things that concern the oversight of the congregations, by information and advice." "Deacons are not to count light of this employment, or any others to esteem lightly of them . . . but as one of those holy and honourable employments which the wisdom of God thought fit to appoint." In 1705, the General Assembly declared: "The kirk session, being the lowest judicatory in every parish, consists of one minister or two, and a competent number of ruling elders, *and the deacons of that parish are to be present, and have a decisive vote, only (however) in matters belonging to their own office.*"† The Form of Government of the Westminster Assembly in the chapter "of the officers of a particular congregation," enumerates "one at least to labour in the word and doctrine, AND TO RULE," "others to *join* in government;" and "others to take special care of the poor;" and adds: "*These officers are to meet together at convenient and set times for the well ordering of the affairs of that congregation, each according to his office.*" "As to the members that con-

* Published by order of the general meeting of the ministers and elders of the church.

† See in Edward Irving's Standards of the Church of Scotland, Appendix, p. 154.

stitute parochial sessions," says old Ayton,* "they are ministers of the word, ruling elders, and deacons." And "serving tables," he interprets (p. 624,) as including "care and inspection of the poor, and the distribution of the elements at the sacrament of the Lord's Supper." Our own standards place deacons among the necessary officers in a fully organized church, as given by Christ, and shows their estimate of their status as rulers *quoad hoc*, by appointing in one and the same chapter one and the same mode of election and ordination, for *ruling elders and deacons*, thus making them authoritatively coördinate or joint officers in the church. The representative principle in our polity requires and implies some primary court lower than the session or coördinate with it, in which pastor, elders, and deacons, may meet and deliberate on all matters of common jurisdiction, and in which the deacons may exhibit their records, and have them reviewed, and receive the common and co-equal judgment of all present for their direction; and this is found, and we think in a perfect form, in the deacon's court, as now established and in use in the Free Church of Scotland in this country,† in the constitution and practice of the Reformed Dutch church, and to some partial extent in our own church. This theory, therefore, which ignores and repudiates the deaconship as a branch of the polity of the church, is evidently in contrariety to the representative character, the balance of power, the division of power, and the whole historical constitution of the Presbyterian church throughout the world.

And now, in closing, let us say that, of course, we exempt these theorists from any sympathy with the logical results of their theory. God forbid we should so malign them. Rather would we exalt them. And we would hope that, with their abilities and their knowledge of the theory and practice of government, they may carry out the principle of representation to the perfect system of treating of our principles in accordance with the uniform established character of the Presbyterian system, so that without division or diversion, we may

* Original Constitution of the Church. Edinburgh, 1730, p. 619.

† Digest of Rules of Procedure of the Free Church of Scotland. Edinburgh, 1856, chap. i.

all walk by the same rule and mind the same things, and strive together in love for the furtherance of the gospel, and the glory of our beautiful Zion.

We owe our readers an apology for occupying so many of our pages with the discussion of the Elder question. When our distinguished correspondent proposed sending us a communication on that subject, we expected one article of ordinary length. The materials however at his command, and the range which he proposed for himself, have led to the production of three articles much beyond the ordinary size. This is more than we thought desirable; but having once begun, it was hardly courteous to cut the matter short. The first article, by some mistake, was printed without our having seen it. The last article we could not read on account of the state of the manuscript. It is published on the responsibility of the writer. The editor of a Review can be held to answer only for the general character and bearing of articles not written by himself. In the present case, we understood from Dr. Smyth that his purpose was to oppose the new doctrine, that ministers and ruling elders are one in office. In this opposition we cordially agree with him. As to the manner in which he conducts the discussion, and as to his arguments in detail, he alone is responsible. We regret the introduction of Dr. Miller's name at all into the discussion, which we consider unnecessary, and which is painful to our feelings. This would not have happened, had it not been for the mistake which prevented our seeing the first article before it appeared in print. We do not doubt that the papers prepared by our learned friend with so much labour, although more numerous and more extended than we expected or desired, will prove of permanent value, not only on account of their ability, but for the amount of important matter which they contain.

EDITOR.

SHORT NOTICES.

Outlines of Theology. By A. Alexander Hodge, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Fredericksburgh, Virginia. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860. 8vo. pp. 522.

For some years after the present Professor of Didactic Theology in the Seminary of Princeton entered on the duties of his office, he pursued the following method of instruction: A subject was assigned to the class a week beforehand, on which the students were expected to read the ordinary text-books, and any other works within their reach. An examination was then held on that particular subject, the examination being attended by remarks and explanations on the part of the Professor. At its conclusion, a list of some twenty or thirty questions was given out, to which the students were expected to write the answers for themselves. The questions were always prepared for the occasion, and therefore were never precisely the same in any two successive years. These written answers differed according to the ability, diligence, or taste of the student. Some wrote only a few lines, in reply to any one question. Others made the preparation of those answers the main part of their work during this portion of their theological course. Those who adopted this method, left the institution with a system of theology of their own composition, the materials for which were derived from the books which they read, from their own examination of the Scriptures, and from the ideas suggested in the class-room. The books thus prepared are very different from those of later date, which consist of notes, more or less full, taken from the lectures which the Professor of Theology afterwards thought it advisable to deliver. The writer of this book, being a member of the Seminary while the method of instruction above-mentioned was continued, devoted himself in great measure to the preparation of his answers to the written questions given to his class. The book which he thus prepared is the substratum of the present work. All the answers, however, have been rewritten, with the advantage of his thirteen years of study and experience. Several new chapters, as those on the Evidences and on the Canon, have been introduced. The questions themselves have been modified, multiplied or divided, to suit his particular purpose. While, therefore, the general plan and cast of the work is due to his Seminary course, the

substance of it is his own. That is, the mind with which the reader is brought into contact is his, and not his teacher's. The latter, in reading this book, is conscious of contact with a mind exterior to his own, and differing from it in its modes of thought and expression. This is all the originality which a work, which aspires to nothing more than to be an outline of a received system of theology, can, or ought to have.

The work seems to us to meet a desideratum, and to be well adapted to be useful. Its advantages are, 1. That it is comprehensive. It goes over the whole ground usually embraced in systems of divinity. 2. It is orthodox. This is meant in no invidious or controversial sense; it simply means that the book presents the doctrines of the Reformed church, as those doctrines are set forth in recognized symbols and standards. 3. The several points are clearly presented, and the answers are precise, and concisely expressed. 4. The difference between the Reformed or Augustinian faith and the views adopted by other classes of theologians, are clearly though briefly presented. While, therefore, this book will not satisfy the thorough student, by elaborate and exhaustive discussions, it will be found, as we hope, eminently suggestive, and a convenient digest of religious truth.

A Rejoinder to the Princeton Review, upon the Elohim Revealed; touching the Doctrine of Imputation and kindred topics. By Samuel J. Baird. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth street. 1860. pp. 40.

Dr. Baird attributes the unfavourable character of our review of his late work to personal feeling. He says that we endeavoured "by the mere force of scornful denunciation, to trample opposition in the dust, and annihilate at once author and book." He attributes to us "admirable ingenuity" in avoiding giving any hint that the peculiar teachings of the reviewer are called in question in the book. "The design of the review," he says, "is manifestly to startle discussion into silence, stigmatize the doctrines which the reviewer opposes, and enforce unquestioning acquiescence in his peculiar opinions." If this is so, then it was not only very wicked but very foolish. Of himself, he says, that he was "impelled to the publication of my [his] treatise by a sense of imperative obligation—it was written under an impressive apprehension of the responsibility involved; and with the anxious endeavour to meet that responsibility in a spirit of Christian charity and fraternal courtesy—speaking what seemed to me to be truth, irrespective of persons, but speaking the truth in love." The meaning of this in plain English is, that, *quoad hoc*, Dr. Baird is very good, and his

reviewer very wicked. He wrote with elevated aims and in an humble Christian spirit; we, with a low, selfish object, and with a proud and malicious temper. Although the heart is deceitful above all things, we hope that Dr. Baird has been more successful in interpreting his own consciousness than in divining ours. We give him credit for sincerity when he says he wrote his book with the elevated sentiments to which he lays claim, will he do us justice when we say our review was written, as far as we understand ourselves, from a sincere regard to the truth of God, and with no unkind feeling toward him? If he is unwilling to believe our word, will he at least admit the evidence of fact? We had known for years that Dr. Baird differed from us on certain theological points; we knew that that difference was brought out in his book, and that he had honoured us with no little opposition; yet, notwithstanding, the notice which we wrote and published of his book is the most eulogistic we have yet seen in print. To every candid man this is positive proof that we were prepared not only to do him full justice, but were predisposed, from the very fact of his opposition to us, to go to the extreme limits of truth in commendation. When, on further inspection, we found that his book was designed to overthrow doctrines which, as we believe, are clearly revealed in the word of God, which underlie our Confession of Faith, and which enter deeply into religious experience, it was natural and proper that it should be reviewed with earnestness and feeling. And when, moreover, we found that the objections against these doctrines were, as we regard them, very weak, and such as had been presented a thousand times before, it was impossible not to make it apparent that we so regarded them. If there was anything wrong in the manner of doing this, we are sincerely sorry for it, and would gladly make any amends in our power. But we cannot alter our convictions at will. We still think that Dr. Baird's book is an assault upon some of the most important doctrines of the Bible, and we still regard the arguments which he urges as weak, and we still think that his objections arise, in a great measure, from want of discrimination. This is perfectly consistent with the belief of his sincerity and with the admission, freely and fully made in the review, that his work evinces ability, learning, activity of mind, and diligence, and that "his volume will prove eminently suggestive, and take a high rank in the theological literature of the country." Is not this enough?

It is proverbially hard for us "to see ourselves as others see us," and we suspect that the animus of this rejoinder appears to the reader very different from what it does to Dr. Baird him-

self. Why is it directed solely against the *Princeton Repertory*? The tone of our article, we admit, is different from Dr. Thornwell's. For this the reason is obvious. Dr. Thornwell looked at the questions in dispute from a philosophical point of view, we from a theological. His article is a discussion of realism, ours an examination of our true relation to Adam and to Christ. We looked at the matter as Dr. Baird himself does. He says, "The whole question relates to doctrines which are fundamental to the gospel scheme." Exactly so. We regarded it as a question of life or death. We believe a man may hold the theory of Dr. Baird's book in his head, and be a Christian; but we do not believe that any Christian holds it in his heart. If the sinner has no other ground of confidence than what this book authorizes him to assume, we know not how he can be saved. Viewing the matter in this light, we could not help writing earnestly. For the philosophy of the book, apart from its theology, we care very little. Although there is the characteristic difference between the two reviews just stated, they both come to the same conclusion. Dr. Thornwell says of Dr. Baird's philosophy, that it substitutes "absurdity for obscurity," and of his theology, that it upsets our whole system. We submit, therefore, that if Dr. Baird's object were to vindicate either his philosophy or his theology, the *Southern Review* was as much entitled to his attention as the *Princeton Repertory*.

The special object of the Rejoinder seems to be to convict us of heresy as to the doctrines of imputation, original sin, and justification. The author speaks much of our "peculiar views" on those points, which he denounces as unscriptural and heretical. His principal proofs of our heresy are derived from our Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. That commentary was published in 1835, twenty-five years ago. We were then young and self-distrustful, and therefore availed ourselves of the paternal kindness of Dr. Archibald Alexander, who read every word of the manuscript before it went to press. With his sanction it was published; at least twenty thousand copies of the work have been circulated in this country, and it has been reprinted in Great Britain, translated and printed in France. We have heard of its being spoken of disparagingly enough in other aspects, but we never heard its orthodoxy called into question by any man except Dr. Baird. As to that one point it has received the sanction of Old-school Presbyterians in every way that such a volume could be endorsed. From this it follows, either that Presbyterians do not understand their own doctrines, or that Dr. Baird is mistaken. If they have sanc-

tioned what he condemns, one or the other must be wrong. We think that Dr. Baird has provoked this controversy against great odds. It is not one man *versus* another, but it is Dr. Baird *versus* the great body of his brethren.

Let us look for a moment at these several points—imputation, original sin, and justification. A real causal relation between the sin of Adam and the apostasy of the race, being admitted, there are but three methods of explaining it. 1. That which we hold to be the common doctrine of the church, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed, viz. that in virtue of the union between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the judicial ground of their condemnation, and as the penalty threatened against sin was death, that condemnation involved the loss of original righteousness and the corruption of our whole nature, so that all who are descended from Adam, by ordinary generation, are born in a state of spiritual death. 2. The doctrine of mediate imputation, viz. that as the sin of Adam involved a corruption of his moral nature, that nature in its corrupted state is inherited by his posterity, and is the ground of their condemnation. They are not condemned for Adam's sin, but for the inherent depravity inherited from him. 3. The doctrine that in virtue of the identity of nature between Adam and his race, his sin was truly and properly their sin. Being the act of their nature, it was their act, for which they are responsible on the same ground that they are chargeable with any personal transgression. It was an act of voluntary self-apostasy from God on their part as truly as on the part of Adam. Dr. Baird adopts this last theory. This would be a harmless matter were it not for the reasons assigned for it, and the consequences drawn from it. If any man can attach any idea to the words that he sinned by an act of self-determination thousands of years before he existed, he may be allowed to say so. We cannot help agreeing with Dr. Thornwell in saying that this is substituting absurdity for obscurity. Still there is no sin in absurdity. But the case is very different when we are told we must believe this doctrine, because otherwise God would be unjust; or, when it is asserted, in support of this theory, that the judgments of God must be founded on the personal merits or demerits of those whom they affect; that it is a denial of his moral nature, and even atheistic, to say that he can pronounce the just unjust, or, the unjust just; that the only legitimate ground of judgment are character and works; and when still further it is asserted, that community in a propagated nature involves all those to whom that nature belongs in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor. Then we say the whole gospel is destroyed,

and every scriptural ground of salvation of sinners is renounced. It is admitted among all the Lutherans and Reformed, at least, that so far as imputation is concerned, it is the same in nature and its essential foundation, in the case of the imputation of Adam's sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to the believer. We do not understand Dr. Baird to deny this. But if the above-mentioned principles are true, if, as he says, God must judge every one according to his real subjective character and his conduct, then it not only follows that if condemned for Adam's sin, we must be personally criminal for that offence, but also that Christ was personally criminal and polluted if his sufferings were penal, and that the righteousness which is the ground of justification must be our own inherent moral or spiritual excellence. It must be from our own subjective character, however, that they be induced or derived. This is the fatal matter. If the sinner is referred to what is in himself as the ground of his confidence before God, he is sunk into despair. No man can be saved who, whatever be his theory, does not trust for pardon and acceptance on what is out of himself—on what Christ has done for him, as distinguished from what he has wrought in him. In opposition to the teachings of Dr. Baird, explicit or implied, we hold, in common with our own standards and the faith of the Reformation, that Adam's sin as the sin of our head and representative, was the ground of the condemnation of his race, and inherent personal corruption its penal consequence; that our sins and not Christ's own personal criminality (God pardon the words) was the ground of the penal character of his sufferings; and that his righteousness, and not our own personal, subjective righteousness is the ground of our justification. This is our heresy so far as imputation is concerned.

As to original sin, in the sense of inherent hereditary corruption, there are the following theories: 1. That it is not properly of the nature of sin, but simply a proclivity to sin. 2. That it is truly of the nature of sin and guilt, but that it does not consist in the corruption of the substance of the soul, nor in the positive infusion of any corrupt principle; and that it is the state of a rational and moral being, which is consequent on judicial abandonment and the withholding of the Spirit of God. This we hold to be the common faith of Christians. 3. That the same numerical substance which became corrupt in Adam, is propagated to us, so that the substance of the soul is morally depraved. Conformity of the substance of the soul to the law of God, says Dr. Baird, is holiness; the reverse is sin. Our heresy on this point, according to Dr.

Baird, consists in our denying that the substance of the soul is corrupted, and in making original sin the result of the withholding of the Spirit of God. If so, he argues, it is mere defect; it can involve no criminality, and there must be a time, "however brief," between the withdrawal of the Spirit and the rise of corruption, in which the soul has no moral character. If a man should say that darkness is not a substance, not something black diffused through space, but the absence of light, would he be a heretic in natural philosophy? Is it a scientific heresy to say that cold is the absence of caloric, death the absence of life? Must there be an interval, however brief, between one of these states and the other? When Dr. Baird blows out the candle in his chamber, is there much of an interval between light and darkness? If God judicially withholds spiritual life from apostate men, they are dead. They come into being in darkness and death. We do not think Dr. Baird has much ground for the charge of heresy on this point.

As to justification—the man who holds the principle that *all* God's judgments are founded on the inherent moral state of their objects; that the only criterion is merit or crime; that "every intelligent creature shall be dealt with according to his works;" that "the sinner only can be punished;" who applies this principle to our relation to Adam, and declares that we cannot bear the penalty of his sin unless we "are morally chargeable with it," and really committed it; and who further declares that our justification in Christ is analogous to our condemnation in Adam—does thereby teach that the ground of our justification is our inherent moral character. This doctrine, if we can understand English, is as explicitly taught by Dr. Baird as it was ever taught by any theologian of the Romish church. After arguing at length to prove that we must be morally criminal in Adam's sin, in order to be justly liable to its penalty, that his sin is a proper ground of self-condemnation and remorse, he says: "We are guilty in Adam in a way similar to that in which we are justified in Christ, with only this difference: that in the former case the relation is native and intrinsic, and therefore involves us in the crime and condemnation by an immediate judgment proper to us; in the other, the relation is supernatural and by free gift, and therefore the sentence of justification is by grace," p. 438. That is, the sin and righteousness are alike inherent; they constitute moral character; the one is the ground of remorse, the other of complacency; the only difference is, that the sin is by nature, the righteousness by grace. This might have been copied out of Bellarmine. It is the precise doctrine of the Romish church. Agreeably to

this view of the matter, Dr. Baird goes on to say, in support of the doctrine that we should cherish complacency in the righteousness by which we are justified, that "there are two selves in the believer, the old man and the new. The one is the nature received from Adam, . . . the other is the new nature received from Christ." The one is the ground of remorse, and the other of complacency. The righteousness of Christ is thus confounded with the new nature received from him. He adds: "The proper exercises of the soul are indicated by the fact of our real and substantial communion in the nature that sinned, and in that which wrought the righteousness, in which we are justified. That this implies and requires complacency in that which by grace we are, it will hardly be necessary to prove." "The child of God," he says, "may not cherish self-complacency; if by that phrase is meant, a confidence in the flesh. But it is not only his privilege, but his duty, to cherish a complacency in that which by grace he is," p. 449. According to all this, the ground of condemnation is the old nature derived from Adam, and the ground of our justification is the new nature received from Christ. We should feel remorse for the one, and complacency for the other, as they constitute our moral character. Dr. Baird, of course, teaches at times the old doctrine. He teaches both doctrines—the one, in obedience to his theory; the other, in obedience to the Bible, his early training, and, as we doubt not, to his religious experience. Because we maintain that the ground of our justification is neither anything done by us, nor wrought in us, no inherent righteousness which constitutes our moral character, and is the ground of complacency, he says we ignore the mystical union in connection with justification entirely; that is, because we do not admit that the indwelling of the Spirit, and the new nature received from Christ, constitute our justifying righteousness, the two have no relation to each other. He might as well say, that because we deny that faith is the ground of justification, we deny that it has anything to do with it. The ground of justification is our union with Christ, or rather, our union with Christ is the ground of that imputation of his righteousness for which we are justified. And that union is three-fold: 1. The eternal federal union arising from the gift of God of a people to his Son, whom he represents, and for whom he obeyed and suffered; 2. The inward mystical union arising from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost; and, 3. The union by faith. Now, in virtue of the eternal federal union, and in accordance with the conditions of the covenant of redemption, God in his own good time sends his Spirit into the hearts of his people,

calls forth the exercise of faith (if they be adults,) imputes to them the righteousness of Christ, adopts them into his family, and works in them to will and to do according to his own good pleasure. No man therefore is justified, who is not a living member of Christ's body; but his spiritual life is neither his justifying righteousness, nor the ground of his title to the righteousness of Christ. The great mystery of redemption is, that the innocent may suffer punishment in place of the guilty; and that the guilty may be pronounced righteous on the ground of a righteousness which is not inherently their own. We understand Dr. Baird to deny this; and we regard his book as designed to establish the contrary doctrine. We therefore raised against it our solemn protest. To that protest we are bound to adhere.

The New Englander for August, 1860. Art. X.

The title of this article from our contemporary is "The Princeton Review on Dr. Taylor and the Edwardean Theology." The articles brought under review in it are chiefly that on Dr. Taylor's Moral Government, being the third in our issue for July, 1859, and incidentally that on Edwards and the New Divinity, which was the first in our issue for October, 1858. The writer, at the threshold, informs his readers that he was moved to "great impatience" on reading the former of these articles, in which Dr. Taylor's system was authentically exhibited and proved from his own statements. This information was hardly necessary for those who read his article. It bears throughout the most palpable marks of great mental perturbation, which even the lapse of a year seems to have aggravated. We are sincerely sorry that the writer has allowed his wounded feelings to master him and goad him into such "impatience." This is not only *malum in se*, but *malum prohibitum*, in the light not only of Scripture and conscience, but of the writer's utilitarian tests of an evil affection, as stated by himself, p. 757: "That the affection is a means of evil to its object will not be questioned; that it is also uncomfortable to the person indulging it will also be granted; it is an uncomfortable affection, evil in itself." We hope the author or authors will take it as evidence of our Christian friendship, when we counsel them, as we earnestly do, hereafter, under this and other like trials, to "let patience have her perfect work." They will certainly feel better, and think better, and write better, and be every way the better for it. "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty; and he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a

city." In particular, if they duly curb their feelings, they will not allow themselves to be urged by their "impatience" to overwhelm "even a Princeton Reviewer" with obloquy, to utter directly contradictory and self-annihilating calumnies within the compass of one article of even forty-seven toilsome pages. They will not on one page, under the affectation of charity, pretend that we maintain and oppose what we do in order to gain popularity; and in another that our doctrines are so unpalatable that our ministers dare not preach them. They will not, for the purpose of heaping contrary kinds of odium upon us, say on one page, that "we write like a philosopher," and on another signify that we write like blundering "sciolists." In attempting to refute an article like that on Edwards and the New Divinity, they will try to establish the contradictory of some position or positions of the paper they combat. To contend that Edwards philosophized, and the New Divinity men also philosophized about religion, is not contending for the contradictory of our main position, which was, that the New Divinity men are not, as they and friends often contend, the true successors or heirs either to his philosophy or theology. This is but one out of many irrelevant arguments which form the staple of the review—we mean irrelevant, as regards refuting the articles of which it professes to be a refutation. All arguments to prove that self-love is one proper motive of human action, even if genuine, disprove no position of ours. All quotations from Edwards, or Knox, or Fichte, in favour of this position, or in favour of certain exceptionable and eccentric theories on this subject, prove nothing against us, although they may bewilder the readers of the *New Englander* as to the real issue, and what we have written about it. The word-practice on pp. 754, 755, wherein the writer argues that, according to our statement, "moral goodness is defined to be conformity to moral goodness," is about as keen as it would be to say, when straightness is represented to "mean not only conformity to a standard, but as often the very standard, idea, or law to which we must conform in order to be straight;" according to this, *straightness* is conformity to *straightness*. Is this writer, whose exuberant airs of philosophic superiority are only matched by his contemptuous depreciation of the philosophic insight of his adversaries, ignorant that the same quality, idea, or conception may be spoken of now in the abstract, now in the concrete, now in idea, standard, rule, or law, now in the actual experience or realization of it? If not, we commend to his attention the rudimentary school-books on Logic and Philosophy. If he does, why

what then? As to our allegation, that Dr. Taylor's system resolves right into the means of the greatest happiness, and this to the sentient universe, quantitatively considered, the reviewer says all manner of hard things about it. But he does not disprove it. He does not show the insufficiency of our quotations from Dr. Taylor's treatise on Moral Government to prove it. Nor can he show such insufficiency. See pp. 499—506, inclusive, of our review of this work. He does not even attempt it. Indeed, he is at pains to signify, again and again, that he will not undertake to defend all the language of Dr. Taylor on this subject. And in no part of his article does the reviewer give more hopeful signs of regaining his patience and self-possession than in this discreet wariness. As to our statement that Dr. Taylor was "propounding principles confessedly at war with the doctrines of all branches of the church," which the writer indignantly denies, he cannot and does not invalidate the proof, *inter alia*, quoted by us, (pp. 518, 519,) wherein Dr. Taylor, unlike this special pleader for him, manfully, not to say exultingly, avows it. As to the moulding influences which we mentioned as having contributed to develope and favourably explain Dr. Taylor's peculiarities, but which our reviewer captiously denies or questions, we believe them real. We believe they furnish a clue to the most favourable construction of his system. We know this to have been the opinion of many competent judges. But we have no interest in urging them, if they are offensive to the special friends or advocates of him or his system.

As to all the material points in our articles, which the writer has impugned, we refer our readers to those articles for the proof—proof, despite all that has yet been done, ample and intact—of our positions. As to the irrelevant arguments, the gratuitous aspersions, expressed or implied, by insinuation or inuendo, open and covert, positive and negative, against Old-school theology, the Presbyterian church, Princeton, "the Princeton Reviewers," and "a Princeton Reviewer," we leave them where we find them. If the writer can afford to utter them, we cannot afford to answer them. They are the "cheap defence" of what admits of no better defence. When these writers *prove* that we have "injuriously misinterpreted" and misrepresented Dr. Taylor, or any other person, we shall esteem it not only a duty, but a pleasure to make the requisite corrections. Until they do this, we shall justly regard captious, or irrelevant, or reproachful criticism, as corroborating the substantial truth of our strictures and allegations.

An Essay on the Pastoral Duties of Ruling Elders. By E. T. Baird, D. D.
Read before the Presbytery of Tombeckbee, Mississippi, and ordered to
be published, April 7, 1860.

Our Southern brethren seem to be taking special interest in the Elder question. Synodical sermons have been preached and published; Presbyterian essays have been disseminated; the *Southern Presbyterian Review* has had several important articles on the subject; the papers of Virginia and North Carolina have taken more or less part in the discussion; almost everything in our own pages on this subject is, as has been extensively made known, from a Southern source, and was designed to meet the counter views circulated in the Southern churches. So far as we know, there has been no special attention awakened at the North to this question, and no diversity of opinion avowed. What is the cause of the fact just mentioned, we do not know; the fact itself, however, is apparent. The *Central Presbyterian* recently remarked, with great truth, (speaking, we presume, with special reference to the South,) that a decided change had taken place in the mind of the church of late years, on matters of church government. Formerly very liberal views prevailed on that subject, it being assumed that scarcely anything was prescribed authoritatively as to church organization, in the Scriptures; whereas the tendency now is to assert a special divine warrant for everything. The Hoges, Alexanders, Rices, Baxters, and Speeces of the former generation, would certainly be astonished at the principles now avowed by those who claim to be the only true representatives of American Presbyterianism. This reaction is going, as we think, to an unhealthy extreme. It is unreasonable, unscriptural, and opposed to the historical character of our church. American Presbyterians have ever been distinguished by their zeal for doctrines, and their catholic liberality as to questions of form. They have contented themselves with acting on the defensive, as against Prelatists and Independents, and with asserting the scriptural character of their distinctive principles. Since the organization of our church, there has scarcely been a word of controversy among Presbyterians about the principles of Presbyterianism. Our internal contests have been about doctrine. Now, as we are all of one mind in doctrine, we are trying to fall out about forms. Men are beginning to denounce their brethren who agree with them in everything pertaining to the authority, rights, and functions of ruling elders, because they differ from them as to the method of proof. Appeal is made to the headship of Christ; his authority is invoked; his honour is said to be at stake, when the fact is,

nothing but the private opinions of this or that man, as to what our blessed Lord has enjoined, is at all involved. We fear that it will not be for the best interest of our church, should we begin to follow the example of High-church Episcopalians, and make matters of external organization of equal importance with the truths of the gospel. If we make them equal, all history shows that the latter will soon be regarded as subordinate.

These remarks have no reference to the Essay, the title of which is given above. This pamphlet contains a clear, forcible, and calm exhibition of the nature of the office of ruling elders, and of their peculiar duties. It is written in a dignified, Christian spirit; didactic rather than polemic in its tone and manner. With nine-tenths of what Dr. Baird here says, all his brethren would cordially agree. There are some principles, however, laid down in this pamphlet, which we are satisfied are utterly inconsistent with our system. For an example, the author says: "The power of jurisdiction, which is a joint power, and comprehends everything which church courts may do, but which ministers and elders, by virtue of office, may not do. Hence the exercise of discipline, in all its grades, all declarative and administrative legislation, including the ordering the work of ordination and the authoritative designation of the candidate, and all executive authority necessary to the exercise of other powers, taking in the whole system of evangelization, appertain to the power of jurisdiction." Then a minister cannot organize a church, he cannot ordain elders, he cannot baptize adults and gather them into a church relation, where no church organization previously existed. We cannot send out missionaries; we can only send church courts. If any one does not see that this is inconsistent with Scripture, with our Book, with the practice of the church, and even with the inward law of its life, we must despair of convincing him. Again, Dr. Baird explicitly says, that "there are two offices," that of the minister and that of the elder, p. 1. The ruling elder and minister are not the same in office. But on p. 7, he says, that "in the primitive church there was no distinction between teaching and ruling elders, so far as the office itself was concerned." This is saying, in express terms, that in the primitive church there was no such *office* as that of ruling elder. This is precisely what the enemies of Presbyterianism have said from the beginning; and this is the inevitable consequence of the new doctrine of the eldership. It destroys the office. By making the offices the same, the distinction between them is of course obliterated, and the ruling elder, *as an officer*, is pronounced an interloper in the church of God. No man can read the current productions of the press

on this subject, without being convinced that the greatest confusion of mind prevails respecting it. There are almost as many theories as there are writers. We are well persuaded that little more than a definition of terms is requisite to bring the mass of our brethren to a cordial agreement on the topics now in debate.

Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Edited by the Rev. Henry L. Mansel, B. D., Oxford, and John Veitch, M. A., Edinburgh. In 2 volumes. Vol. II. Logic. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 59 Washington street. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. 8vo. pp. 715.

These Lectures form the concluding portion of the Biennial Course on Metaphysics and Logic, which was commenced by Sir William Hamilton on his election to the professorial chair in 1836, and repeated, with but slight alterations, till his decease in 1856. Although chiefly composed during the session in which they were first delivered, (1837—8,) yet as they continued to be delivered by their illustrious author up to the time of his death, they are to be considered as expressing his abiding views and convictions. "The author," we are told, "largely availed himself of the labours of previous writers." "To the works of the German logicians of the present century, particularly to those of Krug and Esser, these lectures," say the editors, "are under special obligations." The American readers, therefore, have, in the two volumes now published, abundant materials for a competent understanding of the outlines at least of Sir William Hamilton's philosophical system.

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, and Lord High Chancellor of England. Collected and edited by James Spedding, M. A. of Trinity College, Cambridge; Robert Leslie Ellis, M. A. late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Douglas Denon Heath, M. A., Barrister at Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Volume XI., being Vol. I. of the Literary and Professional Works. Boston: Published by Brown & Taggart. 1860. Pp. 461.

There are few epoch-making men, whether in philosophy or civil affairs in the history of the world. Beyond controversy Bacon was one of this small number. His works, therefore, belong to no one age. They are part of the permanent inheritance of the intellectual world. Every student of philosophy must examine them for himself. It is, therefore, a great service rendered to philosophy and literature to prepare a trustworthy edition of the writings of such a man, and to place them within the reach of all who desire to possess them. The editors of the present collection of Lord Bacon's works have every

facility for the successful execution of their task. The specimen volume now published contains several historical essays, the largest and most important of which is the History of the Reign of King Henry VIII. It is equal in the style of printing to the standard productions of the London press, and is an honour to the enterprise and taste of the American publishers.

Commentary on Ecclesiastes, with other Treatises. By E. W. Hengstenberg, D. D., Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated from the German, by D. W. Simon. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 488.

This volume, besides the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, contains Prolegomena to the Song of Solomon, The Book of Job, The Prophet Isaiah, The Sacrifices of the Holy Scripture, The Jews and the Christian Church. As Hengstenberg's character for learning, ability, and piety is almost as well known in this country as it is Germany, we need only inform our readers that another volume from his pen is now accessible, in the English language, and at a moderate price.

Occasional Productions, Political, Diplomatic, and Miscellaneous. By the late Richard Rush. Edited by his Executors. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1860. Pp. 535.

Few American statesmen spent so large a portion of their lives in the public service, or filled so many important offices. He was Attorney General of the United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Minister to France, and Minister to England. All these positions he honourably filled. His remarkable amiability of temper and courtesy of manners made him universally acceptable. His writings do not pretend to be profound dissertations; they are pleasing memorials of men and things, and afford an insight into the social and political life of England and France from a perfectly reliable source.

Love and Penalty; or, Eternal Punishment consistent with the Fatherhood of God. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., Pastor of the Tabernacle Church. New York: Sheldon & Co, 115 Nassau street. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 358.

Dr. Thompson, in the ordinary course of his pastoral labours, delivered a series of Sabbath evening discourses on the subject indicated by the title of this volume. At the request of many of his hearers they were prepared for the press and published. The form of personal address is happily retained, imparting to the lectures the life of oral discourse. The subject is difficult and important. It is treated with skill and force, and the volume is one peculiarly adapted to meet objections which are often secretly cherished when not openly avowed.

The Reformed Pastor: Showing the Nature of the Pastoral Work, especially in Private Instruction and Catechizing. Prepared for a day of Humiliation kept at Worcester, December 4, 1665. By Richard Baxter. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 560.

The late Rev. J. Angell James, toward the close of a ministry of fifty-four years, said: "I have made, next to the Bible, Baxter's Reformed Pastor my rule as regards the object of the ministry. It were well if that volume were often read by all our pastors—a study which I now earnestly recommend to them." The Messrs. Carter have added to the numerous obligations of the Christian public to that enterprising firm, in presenting a new and handsome edition of this work of long established reputation to the numerous pastors of our country.

The Year of Grace: A History of the Revival in Ireland, A. D. 1859. By the Rev. William Gibson, Professor of Christian Ethics in Queen's College, Belfast. With an Introduction, by Baron Stow, D. D. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 464.

An authentic narrative of one of the most remarkable revivals of modern times is of permanent value. Such a narrative is found in this volume, prepared by a man of eminence and wisdom, living in the midst of the scenes which he describes, and furnished with all facilities for obtaining accurate information.

Prolegomena Logica: An Inquiry into the Psychological Character of Logical Processes. By Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D., LL.D., Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Oxford. First American, from the second English edition, corrected and enlarged. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 291.

The design of this work is to exhibit the relation between Psychology and Logic. It pre-supposes a knowledge therefore of both. Dr. Mansel is a man of great skill and culture. He is an eclectic in Philosophy, standing midway between the Scottish and German schools, and endeavouring to combine what he conceives to be the excellencies of both.

Prophetic Office of Christ, as related to Verbal Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. By Eleazar Lord. New York: Anson D. Randolph, No. 683 Broadway. 1859. Pp. 154.

Mr. Lord continues his indefatigable labours in vindication of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. While disagreeing with him in many of the principles on which he rests the defence of the great doctrine in question, we heartily agree with him in his estimate of its truth and importance.

An Exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes. By the Rev. Charles Bridges, M. A., Rector of Hinton Martell, Dorset. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 389.

Mr. Bridges is the author of several well-known and highly esteemed practical works. This volume is of the same general character. The author is indeed a scholar and a student; he is conversant with the discussions as to the authorship, authority, and exposition of the Book of Ecclesiastes, which have been carried on in different ages of the church, but his main object is the edification of the believing readers of the word of God.

A Brief Treatise on the Canon and Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures: For the Special Benefit of Junior Theological Students, but intended also for Private Christians in General. By Alex. McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 336.

The first edition of this valuable manual was published many years ago. It has, however, been long out of print. The present edition is greatly enlarged, and proportionably increased in value. It bears the impress of the clear, sharp mind of the author, and is far more readable than most books on such subjects.

The Book and its Story: A Narrative for the Young. By L. N. R., Author of the "Missing Link." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1861. Pp. 463.

This is a history of the Bible from the first dawn of revelation, with an account of its translation and circulation down to the present time. This is a great subject, and one of universal interest. We commend the volume as containing a great amount of valuable information nowhere else to be found in so compact and accessible a form.

Commentary on the Song of Solomon. By George Burrowes, D. D. Second edition, revised. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 454.

We expressed some years ago, when the first edition of this work was published, a high opinion of its value as a spiritual exposition of this peculiar and difficult portion of the word of God.

My Saviour; or, Devout Meditations in Prose and Verse, on the Names and Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ. By Rev. John East, A. M., Rector of Croscombe, Somerset, England. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 252.

Peace in Believing; exemplified in the Memoirs of Mrs. Ann East. Written by her husband, Rev. John East, A. M., author of "My Saviour." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. Pp. 270.

These are two beautiful little volumes, replete with truth and pious feeling.

Science in Theology. Sermons preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, before the University. By Adam S. Farrar, M. A., F. G. S., F. R. A. S., Michel Fellow of Queen's College, &c. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. Pp. 250.

In theology there are two factors; the truths of God as objectively revealed in the word of God, and the diverse forms of human thought. The former is immutable, the latter is variable. It is one of the most interesting and improving vocations of the student of theology to investigate the relation of these two elements to each other in the different ages of the church, and to see how the undying truths of God have asserted their supremacy and permanence amidst the ever-changing systems of philosophy and the constantly advancing discoveries of science. These elements are ever more or less in conflict, and happy is the man who adheres throughout to the truth as objectively revealed, while philosophy and science adjust themselves to the immutable as best they may. The book before us is intended "to bring some of the discoveries and methods of the physical and moral sciences to bear upon theoretic questions of theology." This design is carried out with a full knowledge of the recent forms of philosophy, as well as of modern science, but with a prevalent tendency to explain the truths of religion in conformity with science. Doctrine is the plastic element, science the controlling one in the author's hands. Such at least is the impression which we derive from a slight inspection of his work.

History of the Christian Church to the Reformation. From the German of Professor Kurtz. With Emendations and Additions, by the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D., author of the "History of the Jewish Nation." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. Pp. 526.

The same. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

The Edinburgh translation was made from the third, the American from the fourth edition of the original work. This is Kurtz's "Text Book of Ecclesiastical History," not his Manual, which is much more extensive. This edition, prepared by Dr. Bomberger, is founded on the Edinburgh translation; but as the latter avowedly altered the original, and omitted the strictly Lutheran portions of the work, Dr. Bomberger has restored such passages and corrected the alterations. This is all fair. Dr. Kurtz is a thorough Lutheran, and impresses his doctrines on every thing he writes. But he is a devout Christian, and therefore his works are, in a religious point of view, immeasurably superior to the current productions of the German press; while in learning and skill they belong to the first class of German books.

Illustrations of Scripture; suggested by a Tour through the Holy Land. By Horatio B. Hackett, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institution. New and revised edition. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 354.

The journey of Professor Hackett was made in 1852; the first edition of this work was published in 1855. The present edition is in several respects improved. The design of the work is not to give a connected view of the geography of the Holy Land, but to illustrate particular passages of Scripture from the topography of the places referred to. It is an interesting and invaluable work.

The True Path; or, The Young Man invited to the Saviour. By the Rev. Joseph M. Atkinson, Raleigh, N. C. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 300.

This volume contains a series of Lectures on a number of related topics, addressed to young men, and designed for the instruction and guidance specially of those who have enjoyed a liberal education. To that class, from the author's style of thought and mode of writing, they are specially adapted. There is in these lectures abundant evidence of culture, of extensive reading, as well as the higher attributes of soundness in doctrine and enlightened zeal. We commend the volume to the young as one which may be of essential service in meeting their difficulties and controlling their decisions.

Early Methodism within the Bounds of the Old Genesee Conference, from 1788 to 1828. By George Peck, D. D. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. 1860. Pp. 512.

This volume contains an account of the most interesting events, and of the most noted personages in the history of Methodism in Central New York and Northern Pennsylvania, during a period of forty years.

Sketch Books; or, Miscellaneous Anecdotes illustrating a variety of Topics proper to the Pulpit and Platform. By William C. Smith, of the New York Conference. New York, Carlton and Porter. 1860. Pp. 350.

Those public speakers who have the disposition and skill to avail themselves of anecdotes as a means of excitement or impression, will find this volume a useful book of reference.

How to Enjoy Life; or, Physical and Mental Hygiene. By William M. Cornell, M. D. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee & Co. Cincinnati: Rickey, Mallory & Co. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1860. Pp. 360.

A popular, rather than a scientific work, replete however, with sound principles and wise counsels, which it would be of unspeakable service to literary men especially, if they would

ponder and practice. It is a work which theological students and ministers would do well to read.

A General View of the Rise, Progress, and Corruptions of Christianity. By the Most Reverend Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, with a sketch of the life of the author, and a catalogue of his writings. New York: William Gowans. 1860. Pp. 288.

Archbishop Whately was one of the writers engaged to prepare introductory essays for the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, now in the course of publication. This treatise is one of those essays. It has not before been printed in a book. The subject and the reputation of the author will secure for it a hearty welcome from the Christian public.

The Bible in Schools. Argument of Richard H. Dana, Jr. Esq. and the opinion of the Supreme Court of Maine, &c. Approved by the Committee of Publication. Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath-school Society. Depository, No. 13 Cornhill. Pp. 59.

A Roman Catholic child was excluded from a district school in Maine, because her father refused to permit her to read the Scriptures in the common English version. For this exclusion the father brought suit for damages, as he was a tax-payer. This pamphlet contains an exhibition of the grounds on which the court sustained the action of the school authorities and non-suited the plaintiff.

The Difficulties of Arminian Methodism; A Series of Letters addressed to Bishop Simpson, of Pittsburgh. By William Annan, author of "Letters on Psalmody." Fourth edition, re-written and enlarged. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860. Pp. 336.

As this work has been many years before the public, it has an established reputation. It has received the stamp of general approbation, and we rejoice that so useful a volume is again sent forth in an improved form. Those of our brethren who are called to contend with the constant misrepresentations of the opponents of the Augustinian system of doctrines, will find this work a very valuable aid.

A Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Revised with important additions. Boston: Swan, Brewer & Tileston. Cleveland: Ingham & Bragg. 1860. 8vo. pp. 608.

This dictionary is substantially a combination of "the Comprehensive Dictionary," and "A Pronouncing, Explanatory, and Synonymous Dictionary of the English Language," previously published by Dr. Worcester. It contains a vast amount of valuable matter in a very condensed form. Besides a full vocabulary of well authorized English words, it comprises numerous technical, obsolete, and provincial words, which need explanation. In all doubtful cases as to pronunciation, the authorities for the different modes in use are given. Besides the usual list of Greek, Latin, and Scriptural proper names,

the appendix contains a list of Christian names of men and women, with their signification; pronunciation of modern geographical names, of distinguished men of modern times; a collection of words, phrases, and quotations from the Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish languages; principal deities, heroes, &c., in Greek and Roman fabulous history, &c., &c. It is evident therefore, that it would be difficult to find so much valuable matter of the kind in any other similar work.

Moral Philosophy; Including Theoretical and Practical Ethics. By Joseph Haven, D. D., Professor in the Chicago Theological Seminary, and lately Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Amherst College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. For sale by McGinniss & Smith, Princeton, New Jersey.

We reviewed favourably Dr. Haven's work on Mental Philosophy a year since. His volume on Moral Philosophy, although it has been before the public for a twelve-month, has only just come into our hands. From the slight inspection which we have been able to give it, we do not think that it will take the same stand with the previous work by the same writer. It is however, compendious, instructive, and well written.

The Philosophy of Natural History. By John Ware, M. D. Prepared on the plan, and retaining portions, of the work of WILLIAM SMELLIE, Member of the Antiquarian and Royal Societies of Edinburgh. Boston: Brown & Taggart. 1860. Pp. 448.

The book of Smellie was published about seventy years ago; in 1824 Dr. Ware prepared an edition for the use of schools. In the present edition the original plan has been adhered to, but extensive alterations have been made, and most of the chapters have been prepared anew.

British Novelists and their Styles; Being a critical sketch of the history of British prose fiction. By David Masson, M. A., Professor of English Literature, University College, London; author of "the Life of Milton and his Times." Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860. Pp. 312.

The substance of this volume was delivered in a course of lectures in Edinburgh. The subject is one of interest to literary men, and it is treated by a man of established reputation.

A Greek Grammar, for Schools and Colleges. By James Hadley, Professor in Yale College.

We have been highly gratified by the inspection of this work. It meets a real want. Recent analysis of the Greek language has put our old Grammars out of date, while the best of the new have hitherto lacked simplicity and clearness in the statement of general principles. Excellent as treatises for a scholar

to read, they are bewildering to a beginner, who seeks to commit them to memory. Professor Hadley's book is addressed admirably to this emergency. A grammatical thesaurus it does not pretend to be. We have works of that kind with whose merits this does not come into competition. But for the purpose of instruction in schools and colleges, it is decidedly an improvement upon anything of the kind hitherto published in our language. We remark especially its admirable arrangement of the verb, at once so clear in itself, and true to the principles of Greek philology; and, in its syntax, the brevity and precision with which the heads of sections are enunciated, whereby the bearing of the whole will be readily perceived and easily apprehended by the memory. We may be permitted to add, that the execution of the whole is marked by the modesty of genuine scholarship.

A Sketch of the Life and Character of Rev. Nathaniel W. Taylor, D. D.
By Rev. S. W. S. Dutton, D. D.

Dr. Dutton differs from most of the eulogists of Dr. Taylor, in the candor and frankness with which he states his distinctive doctrines and traits of character, while he falls behind none in fervent admiration of the man and his system, taken as a whole. He evidently regards Dr. Taylor as the theologian of the age, and as having made permanent and momentous improvements in the science of theology. He speaks of the doctrine of an enslaved or disabled will, and especially of the theory of "moral inability," prevalent in New England when Dr. Taylor appeared, as an "imposition, a sacred sham, enacted in hundreds of pulpits every Sabbath." He says that Dr. Taylor displaced this by "the true doctrine of free-will—of the will as a power able to control its own states, not enslaved by them." While Dr. Dutton glories in this part, and in the general scope of Dr. Taylor's theology, and is far enough from a just appreciation of the views of dissentients, he has the candour to admit the deficiencies of his ethical scheme. He says: "We expect that in future improvement in philosophy and theology, (for such improvement is not ended,) there will be a general acknowledgment that the idea of right cannot be wholly resolved into the idea of expediency or utility; and that the sense of right and duty is as real and *ultimate* ground of appeal or motive in the mind as the desire of happiness." This amelioration cannot be needful for the great mass of the Christian church, who have always repudiated the epicurean and utilitarian schemes. Dr. Dutton regards "the greatest mistake of his (Dr. Taylor's) life" to have been, "the spending no small part of his precious time in proving himself orthodox according to human standards.

He was thus under strong temptations to make out a case of full accordance with standard theologians more plausible than sound." This is well stated. We are sorry to see that, unlike Dr. Dutton, some of this great man's present defenders inherit the same infirmity. He also says, it must be acknowledged that "he did not always justly estimate the intellectual merits of those who differed from him," and was apt to believe that such difference arose from "some weakness or deficiency in minds that did not see and acknowledge" the truth of his positions and reasonings.

Of course, our estimate of the value of Dr. Taylor's theories differs *toto cœlo* from Dr. Dutton's; but we do not see any material difference between us, as to what the salient points in his system actually were. We think his eulogy of this remarkable man all the more effective, because it is not only sincere and unaffected, but so free from disguise or equivocation. In the long run, Dr. Taylor and his system will be estimated for what they were, not for what they were not. No special pleading can prevent this. The sooner all parties recognize divergence from standard theologians, the better. All efforts to the contrary will prove awkward; or, whenever plausible, "more plausible than sound," if we may adopt Dr. Dutton's phrase in the premises.

The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral, and Metaphysical; with Quotations and References for the Use of Students. By William Fleming, D. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. From the second revised and enlarged London edition. With an Introduction, Chronology of the History of Philosophy brought down to 1860, Bibliographical Index, Synthetical Tables, and other additions. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Translator of Tholuck on the Gospel of John. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860.

In our issue for January, 1860, we used the following language in regard to the London edition of Professor Fleming's work, from which the foregoing is reprinted: "The great value of such a work as this title-page describes must be evident to all intelligent men. It is well executed. The technical terms of philosophy are not only defined, but the definitions are sustained and illustrated by copious quotations from the best authors in logic, psychology, metaphysics, and philosophy generally. It must, therefore, be useful not only to students of philosophy, but to all scholars and cultivated men. We call the attention of our publishing houses to it. We do not doubt that by republishing it they would serve their own interests as well as the cause of philosophy." Whether in obedience to this suggestion or not, the work has, we are glad to see, been put by our enterprising Philadelphia publishers within reach of American students. Not only so. It has been greatly enlarged

and improved by the additions of Dr. Krauth. He has added a short glossary of German philosophic words which are coming into frequent use, but are not as yet fairly naturalized. His synthetical table of the departments of philosophy, together with his bibliographical index, and chronological outline, will greatly aid investigations into the origin, history, schools, systems, authors, and books relative to philosophy. Such a work has long been a desideratum for British and American students of philosophy, and scholars generally. It is midway between a mere word dictionary and an encyclopædia of philosophy. In philosophy preëminently, the study of words is the study of things. To master this "vocabulary" is to do much towards mastering the great philosophic questions indicated by the terms it explains. The quotations from the highest philosophical authorities, which show the use of terms by the great masters, also show their opinions on the questions implicated with these terms, or point us to the sources whence their opinions may be learned. Aside from its uses for students of philosophy, what cultivated or thinking man would not be relieved at times if he could at once find the meaning of such terms as Realism, Nominalism, Conceptualism, Idealism, Sensism, Sensorium, etc. etc.? That there should be occasional errors or imperfections in such a work, is a matter of course. They are much fewer, however, than were to have been expected. The book is a rich treasury of precious things, and must find its way to all important libraries. Now that Professor Fleming is an expert in this sort of labour, we join Dr. Krauth in expressing the desire that he will be encouraged to carry out the project of which he has given a conditional promise in his Preface to his second edition, of expanding the plan of the present work into a Cyclopædial Dictionary of Philosophy, thus "rendering to philosophy among ourselves, a service similar to what has been rendered to philosophy in France, by the publication of the *Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques*." It should be mentioned, as an additional proof of the value of the work, that the author enjoyed the assistance of Morell and McCosh in its preparation.

Ethica. An Outline of Moral Science for Students and Reflecting Men.
By John H. Stinson. New York: Published by A. B. Kitson. 1860.

This little hand-volume evinces earnest thinking, and maintains many wholesome principles. It is far, however, from being complete, or in all respects free from error. The author would write far better with wider reading and study of authors, and broader culture, not only in ethics, but in the kindred departments of metaphysics and theology. He would thus raise

himself above a certain crudeness of thought and expression which deforms the present work. At the same time, it is creditable to him, and a pleasant token of profound interest in a science which adjoins, and at various points interlaces with, the *scientia scientiarum*—Christian Theology.

Our First Duty; a Missionary Sermon, preached by appointment before the Synod of New Jersey, at Morristown, New Jersey; repeated in the First Presbyterian Church, Scranton, Pennsylvania; and published at their request. By M. J. Hickok, pastor of the church. New York: John F. Trow, printer. 1860.

A Plea for Home Missions, of unusual power, rising quite above the stereotyped style of preaching on such themes. It abounds in rich, fresh, forcible thought, and glowing appeals. It is one of those sermons which will interest the reader as well as the hearer—a quality by no means common in pulpit discourses.


An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought. A Treatise on Pure and Applied Logic. By William Thompson, D. D., Provost of Queen's College, Oxford. From the fourth London edition. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1860.

This is one of the fruits of the quickened interest in the study of Logic in Britain, which was largely due, in the first instance, to the publication of Whately's celebrated treatise, but has been vastly increased by the fresh contributions to the science, the masterly discussions, and the inspiring personal instructions and influence of Sir William Hamilton—a name destined to be quite as illustrious in connection with logic as with any branch of metaphysical philosophy. Dr. Thompson has dedicated this work to Hamilton, and received important aid from him in preparing it. He has incorporated the doctrines of his great master in his treatise, so far as they command his approbation. Yet the work is by no means servile, or a mere echo of the great philosopher. It bears on every page the imprint of independent, vigorous thinking, of scholarly attainment, and refined culture. In short, it is, in every respect, a masterly treatise, much in advance of any thing else on the subject in our language, unless it be the forthcoming Lectures of Hamilton, which we have not seen. The topics are admirably distributed, and treated in brief chapters, quite convenient for students and teachers. In simplicity and ease of style, as well as other qualities which adapt it to the ready apprehension of young students, and others not familiarized to the ponderous phrase and formidable technology introduced into philosophy by Kant, it is quite superior to those publications of Hamilton which we have thus far seen.

Of the smaller works sent to us we can only give the titles:

- Home Jewels*; or, Maggie Ella Colton and her Brothers. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 821 Chestnut street. Pp. 100.
- Rosalie's Lessons*. By Mrs. Sarah S. T. Wallace. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 132.
- The Lost Children*; or, Henry and his Torch. By the author of the "Widow's Sixpence." Pp. 82.
- Ella Graham*; or, Great Effects from Small Causes. By Abbie Eldridge. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 138.
- Elsie Lee*; or, Impatience Cured. By Mary Grey. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 83.
- Holidays*; and the Reasons why they are Observed. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 106.
- Nursery Tales for her Little Friends*. By Cousin Martha. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 76.
- Mary Humphreys*; or, Light Shining in a Dark Place. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 108.
- The Ulster Revival*; or, Address to Sabbath Scholars. By the Rev. Robert Knox, A. M., Belfast. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 55.
- Ellen*; or, Submission in Affliction. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 36.
- Am I a Christian?* and how can I know it? Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 179.
- Little Annie's First Thoughts about God*. By Nelly Graham. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 87.
- Emily Grey, the Orphan*; and her Kind Aunt. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 153.
- Twyman Hogue*; or, Early Piety Illustrated. A Biographical Sketch, by W. W. Hill, D. D. With an Introduction, by L. W. Green, D. D., President of Centre College. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 186.
- Light in the Valley*; or, the Life and Letters of Mrs. Hannah Bocking. By Miss M. Anneslie. New York: Carlton & Porter, 200 Mulberry street. Pp. 176.
- The Dragon, that Old Serpent the Devil, and Satan*, whose head must be bruised in the Coming Contest among the Nations. By G. B. Stacey. Richmond, Va.: W. Hargrave White, publisher. Pp. 184.
- Haste to the Rescue*; or, Work while it is Day. By Mrs. Charles W. With Preface, by the author of "English Hearts and English Hands." American Tract Society, 115 Nassau street, New York. Pp. 324.
- Katie Seymour*; or, How to make Others Happy. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 231.
- A Cluster of Fruits from the Tree of Heavenly Wisdom*. Compiled for the Board of Publication, by Annie Brooks. Pp. 285.
- The Bar of Iron*; and the Conclusion of the Matter. A True Story. By the Rev. Charles B. Tayler, M. A., Rector of Otley. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 147.
- Hannah Lee*; or, Rest for the Weary. By the author of "Isabel; or Influence," "Margaret Craven," &c. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 211.





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